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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the topic of insomnia in British and American
modernist literature, focusing primarily on the ways in which the condition of
insomnia and the identity category of the “insomniac” intersect with other aspects of
subjectivity, such as gender, occupation, race, and social class. Through examining
insomnia from a narratological perspective, using fictional, philosophical,
psychological, sociological, and medical literature, I discuss the discursive function
of both this disorder and identity category during the Modernist period. It also
explores the relationship between insomnia and Modernism itself, regarding both the
discursive production of knowledge of insomnia and the insomniac during this period
and the ways that the modernist literary text discusses, interprets, utilizes, and
structurally reproduces phenomenological aspects of insomnia. Further, I argue that
insomnia shapes identity, and therefore, perception, in a dialectical manner; as such,
insomnia is a device of character and plot development. I consider the questions,
“Why did those during this period, in America and the United Kingdom, need to
define and interpret insomnia and the insomniac in the ways they did, and what are
the literary and discursive implications of these interpretations?”
My introduction lays out my theoretical framework, arguing that sleep habits,
behaviors, and practices (including insomnia) constitute a type of self care that
intersects with other expected behaviors relating to one’s identity, sometimes creating
or revealing a conflict between expected and “normal” behavior based upon
generalized assumptions and individual will and desire. Further, I argue that while
the diagnosis of insomnia and the label “insomniac” subject the individual to
disciplinary and normalizing measures, this condition and label provide the individual

with a means of exposing and resisting assumed identity categories and the power to
garner resources, time, and space for personal development and reflection. I explore
the ways in the insomniac body reveals and challenges norms and normative
procedures. Additionally, I provide an etymological inquiry into the origins of the
word insomniac, and situate this term and its use historically—a produced identity
belonging to a particular time and place with implications regarding the production of
knowledge about individuals and the motivations behind producing such knowledge.
Finally, I explain the relationship between the phenomenological and ontological
experience of insomnia to the phenomenological and ontological experience of World
War I in order to justify the war as a key turning point in the discursive production of
the insomniac. The second chapter traces the production of knowledge of insomnia
and, eventually, the insomniac through the nineteenth century until today, in an effort
to further elucidate the significance of this condition and figure historically and
currently. It considers questions of the origins of the modernist figure of the
insomniac and the implications of this figure today.
The subsequent chapters focus on the intersection of insomnia with other
aspects of subjectivity. Chapter three discusses the insomnia of soldiers and war
workers during World War I, using the fictional texts Parade’s End by Ford Madox
Ford, A Farewell to Arms by Ernest Hemingway, and Memoirs of an Infantry Officer
by Siegfried Sassoon. This chapter argues that the experience of insomnia is, in
significant ways, akin to the experience of participating in World War I, thus provides
a useful device through which to discuss war experience and its related anxieties.
Chapter four compares the diagnosis, perception, and treatment of insomnia in those

with differently gendered bodies. In this chapter, I argue that insomnia is a form of
bodily inscription, revealing cultural norms and beliefs, as well as allowing the
individual to expose and resist these norms. This chapter focuses on the Pilgrimage
series by Dorothy Richardson, The Soul of a Bishop by H. G. Wells, and The Last
September by Elizabeth Bowen.
The fifth chapter explores the relationship between insomnia and social status,
specifically regarding class, occupation, race, and citizenship. As I argue in this
chapter, insomnia is simultaneously demonized as a form of resistance to capitalist
work ethics, represented as a marker of social privilege, and lauded as a time and
space of insight and reflection. Further, insomnia reveals an anomic tension within
the individual insomniac, indicating a conflict between his or her desires and
capabilities within a given social structure. The literary texts covered in this chapter
are F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Beautiful and Damned, Waldo David Frank’s Holiday,
and E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India. The final chapter discusses the relationship
between insomnia and authorship, describing the ways in which the experience of
insomnia is translated into the experience of creating and reading literature. The texts
covered in this chapter are Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, James Joyce’s Ulysses, and
Richard Wright’s Black Boy. In this chapter I argue that an affinity exists between
the condition of insomnia and the structure of the modernist text, and a reading of the
modernist text, to an extent, recreates the experience of insomnia in the reader.
Essentially, this dissertation looks at insomnia as a battleground between various
elements of one’s identity and subjectivity and explores the ways in which this battle
both affects and is expressed in the literature of the Modernist period.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In her essay “On Being Ill,” (1926) Virginia Woolf describes the way in
which illness changes perception: “we cease to be soldiers in the army of the upright;
we become deserters. They march to battle. We float with the sticks on the stream;
helter-skelter with the dead leaves on the lawn, irresponsible and disinterested and
able, perhaps for the first time for years, to look round, to look up—to look, for
example, at the sky” (12). Her use of the language of war, with phrases such as
“soldiers in the army,” “deserters,” and “march to battle,” is certainly deliberate,
given the temporal proximity of World War I to the writing of this essay. On a
practical level, illness, for many, did provide a respite from war, at least spatially, if
not psychologically. Though Woolf initially seems to associate illness with disability
and helplessness, with her use of images like desertion and floating “helter-skelter,”
her language ultimately illustrates illness as a different sort of ability, an ability to
observe life from a new, more insightful perspective. Perhaps she has a figure like
Siegfried Sassoon in mind, who, through illness (both real and contrived), was
granted separation from the war, enabling him to view it in a new way, as he
describes in his semi-autobiographical war text, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer.
Illness has the function of separation; one is parted from the rest of society, and,
therefore, able to view it from a different vantage point.
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More importantly, however, she is writing of the ontological power of illness,
to change one’s way of thinking; through illness one can see “how the world has
changed its shape” (8). Illness, for Woolf, becomes “the great confessional” in
which “things are said, truths are blurted out, which the cautious respectability of
health conceals” (11).

Her phrase those “great wars,” echoes the Great War itself,

the cause of mental and physical illness for many. The solitude of illness, its ability
to remove the sufferer from daily habits and responsibilities, allows for
contemplation, and consequently, revelation. As Miriam Henderson thinks in
Dorothy Richardson’s chapter novel Deadlock, “[Solitude] was necessary, for
certainties. Nothing could be known except in solitude” (3: 63). World War I, with
its resultant physical and emotional scars, provided illness and its consequent solitude
en masse in such a way that it altered the consciousness of nations.
Insomnia, not necessarily an illness by itself, but a symptom of many, fits well
into the paradigm Woolf envisions. It renders one conscious and isolated within the
bed, making one view the world from said bed, rather than through a more active
form of participation in the external world. Additionally, insomniac consciousness is
different from regular, daytime consciousness, as it is void of the distractions and
activities which shape daily thought. As Elizabeth Bronfen argues, “Insomnia,
calling forth a state of psychic tarrying, transforms the time between dusk and dawn
into a poignant nocturnal countersite to the logic of the ordinary everyday” (159).
She continues, “[Insomniacs] are compelled to endure a state of body and mind that
severs them from the consciousness of the day” (160). Woolf’s description of the ill
person as “[floating] with sticks on a stream,” reminiscent of William James’ model
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of consciousness itself as a stream (described in his essay “Stream of Consciousness”)
accurately describes the thought process of insomnia, in which thoughts float by
seemingly at random. For example, in an essay about insomnia, “Lying Awake,”
Charles Dickens describes his multiple failed attempts during a bout of insomnia to
focus his mind on sleep: “But, Sleep. I WILL think about Sleep. I am determined to
think (this is the way I went on) about Sleep. I must hold the word Sleep, tight and
fast, or I shall be off at a tangent in half a second. I feel myself unaccountably
straying, already, into Clare Market” (1). Throughout the rest of the essay, Dickens
describes the stream-like movement of his thoughts, which range from politics, to
places he has visited, to family members, to death, until he eventually decides sleep is
futile and decides to take a late-night walk (4). This essay illustrates Woolf’s point
about the randomly contemplative nature of illness, which, as she argues, allows
words to “possess a mystic quality. We grasp what is beyond their surface meaning”
(21). As Dickens attempts to focus in on the word “Sleep,” it becomes sort of a
talisman for him, but because of his insomnia, he realizes that his grasp of sleep is
only fleeting. Here, Dickens’ thoughts are clearly motivated by his insomnia and he
is writing through his symptoms, as Woolf envisions in her essay. Most significantly,
however, his insomnia shapes the flowing nature of his thoughts.
Dickens, of course, is a figure of the nineteenth century. But, because of the
Great War, and its related traumas, which I will discuss in more detail to come, the
experience of insomnia became much more widespread in the early part of the
twentieth century. As physician Guthrie Rankin argues in his 1918 article, “Broken
Sleep,” “This terrible war has exacted from those who participate in its activities, as
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well as from those who ‘watch and wait,’ an enormous toll of misery both by day and
by night” (77). He continues, “Peace of mind and safety of body, being alike
imperilled, sleep, which is the guardian of both, has become fickle and unsatisfying”
(77). After the war, insomnia became seemingly endemic, as did its related influence
on thought and perception. Fortunately, as Woolf suggests, a lot can be learned from
and expressed through such a condition. In this sense, insomnia becomes a
productive force, allowing for a new time and space from which to contemplate and
interpret one’s experience.
Insomnia as Activity
Yet, despite this seemingly productive type of insomnia, not all individuals
see the traditional awake-in-bed type of insomnia, or its relief in sleep, in such
sympathetic terms. In 1914, Thomas Edison proclaimed, “Sleep is an absurdity, a
bad habit. We can’t suddenly throw off the thralldom of habit, but we shall throw it
off” (qtd. in Derickson 1). Edison, notorious for his insomniac work habits, fully
embraces the “moral opposition to any idleness,” which “informed a Protestant work
ethic that celebrated perseverance at one’s vocational calling and implicitly
denigrated sleep as a form of idleness” (Derickson 2). Time not sleeping, then, for
figures like Edison, was not best used in bed, thinking, but rather better spent actively
working. According to Alan Derickson, Edison is “the paragon of modern
sleeplessness to legions of journalists, commentators, and other historians. No
American has done more to cast sleeplessness in hegemonic terms. None did more to
frame the issue as one of simple choice between productive work and unproductive
rest” (5). Edison’s most famous invention, the light bulb, became the double-edged
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sword of the insomniac. On the one hand, the light bulb permits people to work
through all hours of the night, allowing them to labor at times more suited to
individual preference; one who prefers to work when everyone else is asleep can now
do so with relative ease. On the other hand, the light bulb permits people to work
through all hours of the night; thus, no time exists when one cannot be working,
whatever the nature of that work may be, whether by choice or requirement. Rest,
then, is no longer built into the daily cycle when the light that facilitates work fades
away, but requires a willful decision to stop working.
Starting near the turn of the twentieth century, insomnia takes on a new
dimension. Not only is insomnia not sleeping when one ought to be or wants to be
sleeping (under the proper conditions for sleep—not sleeping, even though one may
want a nap, during a boring meeting is not insomnia in Western culture), but now it is
also not sleeping with the knowledge that something other than sleeping can, and
probably should, be done. In a capitalist paradigm of maximized, perpetual
productivity, insomnia in the traditional sense (lying in bed, staring at the ceiling,
cursing one’s inability to sleep, experiencing the flow of thought) is pure waste,
contributing neither to active production, nor to recuperative rest needed for optimal
productivity. For any insomniac who has suffered repetitive thoughts of what one
hopes to accomplish or should accomplish, or in other words, how one can better be
using one’s time than lying awake in bed hoping for sleep to come, it is clear that
such thoughts are not conducive to rest. As F. Scott Fitzgerald puts it in his essay,
“Sleeping and Waking,” during his bouts of insomnia, he experienced a sense of
“Waste and horror—what I might have been and done that is lost, spent, gone,
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dissipated, unrecapturable” (67). His insomnia is spent regretting what he has failed
to accomplish. In this context, the insomniac has two options: to feel guilty over
wasted time, as Fitzgerald does, or to forego the possibility of sleep (or at least time
in bed) for “productive” activity and learn to cope with the resultant exhaustion.
One of the other most admired figures of the early twentieth century, Charles
Lindbergh, like Edison, was lauded for his ability to embrace the latter approach.
Lindbergh’s solo trans-Atlantic flight was largely discussed in media of the period as
a story of a man’s ability to conquer the bodily need for sleep. As Derickson argues,
“Sleeplessness immediately became an integral part of the storyline,” and one of
Lindbergh’s backers attributed his ability to sustain wakefulness to his “resilient
constitution . . . and rigorous self-discipline” (12). Gaining international acclaim,
Lindbergh did his best to downplay the effects of fatigue during his flight of more
than thirty-three hours, and despite visible signs of grogginess upon landing, he
claimed, somewhat dubiously, that he was “not sleepy at all” (qtd. in Derickson 13).
Lindbergh, like Edison, became a model of man’s ability to overcome fatigue for the
sake of accomplishment.
I use the phrase “man’s ability” intentionally, here, as women’s sleeplessness
was viewed in a much different light during this period. As A. W. MacFarlane argues
in his 1891 text Insomnia and Its Therapeutics, “Men require less sleep than women. .
. . As a rule, the female possesses more nervous excitability, and being more
impressionable than the male, she requires more sleep for the restoration of her
energies” (40), which is problematic because “women bear the strain of life less
buoyantly than men, and so are more liable to insomnia” (41). Slightly later in the

6

text, he seemingly contradicts himself, arguing that “Women . . . bear the loss of
sleep better, for a time, than men” evidenced by “the length of time they can devote
themselves to night-nursing in response to the calls of affection or duty” (41). Yet, he
resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between the loss of sleep of motherhood
and the insomnia of general feminine susceptibility. In other words, women can only
handle lack of sleep because motherhood requires it; outside of motherhood, insomnia
is particularly harmful to women who typically require more rest than men because
they are essentially weaker and less able to cope with life’s conflicts. Insomnia is
paradoxically a consequence of and threat to motherhood, which is MacFarlane’s
tacitly assumed role for women. Governmental regulations on work from the early
twentieth century apply the same principles as MacFarlane to the sleep of women.
Despite the fact that women, often the primary caregivers of children and other family
members, were often required to keep late hours in order to care for their children or
the sick, they were subjected to more rigorous controls over hours worked outside of
the household because their fatigue was thought to interfere with their ability to bear
and care for children, which many viewed as dangerous to society (Derickson 27).
Broadly speaking, motherhood and sufficient rest are far from synonymous, yet,
while men struggled for more controls over the length of the working day in the early
half of the twentieth century, women struggled to be allowed to work as many hours
as men (Derickson 27).
Insomnia and Contemplation
Regardless of gender disparities, if we look to literary texts of the early
twentieth century, we will see that the dichotomy of insomnia I have just drawn, a
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choice between “productive” sacrifice of sleep or time “wasted” in insomniac futility
is a false one, as Woolf’s essay indicates. Literature and philosophy present us with a
third option. Inasmuch as insomniac time is a time for thought—if one is not sleeping
or doing other work, one has no choice but to think— it allows for a different type of
productivity. For the philosopher Emil Cioran, writing in 1934, insomnia, painful as
it may be, is a means of attaining knowledge. He writes, “The importance of
insomnia is so colossal that I am tempted to define man as the animal who cannot
sleep. . . . God punished man by taking away sleep and giving him knowledge” (85).
Laziness, the ability to forego worldly productivity perhaps by lying idly in bed, is
essential for insight, according to Cioran who “[prefers] an intelligent and observant
laziness to intolerable, terrorizing activity. To awaken the modern world, one must
praise laziness. The lazy man has an infinitely keener perception of metaphysical
reality than the active one” (105). The latter Cioran quotation in this section came
from a chapter from his text From the Heights of Despair, tellingly entitled
“Degradation through Work,” in which he argues for work’s “tendency to dull the
spirit” making the perpetual worker the “impotent slave of external reality” (104).
The most valuable time, for Cioran, is neither time working nor time sleeping, but
time of thought and isolation, made possible through insomnia.
Cioran’s expression of the value of insomnia is in direct opposition to that of
Edison, Lindbergh, and their admirers. Insomnia need not be either time wasted or
time for even more work. For the capitalist, insomnia can have either a positive or
negative value. Its value is positive if it is “productive” time, negative if “wasted”
time. As E. P. Thompson argues, “In mature capitalist society, all time must be
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consumed, marketed, put to use; it is offensive for the labour force merely to ‘pass the
time’” (90-91). For the doctor, insomnia’s value comes as a symptom pointing to a
larger, hopefully curable, condition (insomnia is almost never only an exclusive
condition), but is negative in the sense that it detracts from overall health and well
being (factors necessary for “productivity” in the capitalist sense). Yet, for the
literary or philosophical writer, insomnia’s value lies in its capacity to isolate the
individual in a state of virtual immobility, resulting in a time devoted to thought and
insight. Insomnia, then, helps authors shape their perceptions of the world, which is
then transferred to their texts. For this reason, insomnia becomes an important
literary device when conferred upon a character, a time during which the character
can contemplate sources of anxiety, motivation, suffering, or happiness—to explore
his or her world and place in it.
However, as Cioran and Woolf also argue, insomnia is not simply a time for
thought, but allows for thought that alters one’s perception of the world. It is
dialectical: it shapes identity, which shapes perception. Fitzgerald recounts a
conversation in which someone says, “The world only exists through your
apprehension of it” (“Sleeping” 74). When one’s apprehension of the world is
filtered through insomnia, insomnia necessarily shapes that apprehension. Further,
insomnia reflects one’s struggle with his or her identity. Maurice Blanchot writes,
“To sleep badly is precisely to be unable to find one’s position. The bad sleeper
tosses and turns in search of that genuine place which he knows is unique. He knows
that only in that spot will the world give up its errant immensity” (Space 266). For
the author or character attempting to explore and forge an identity, insomnia is a
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useful and necessary tool, indicating both the search for the self and the knowledge
that the self has been misplaced.
This conception of insomnia, as both productive conceptually and reflectively,
counters the traditional conception of sleep and insomnia as related to economic
productivity in the capitalist model. As Blanchot argues, “the workplace is
everywhere; work time is all the time. When oppression is absolute, there is no more
leisure, no more ‘free time.’ Sleep is supervised” (Disaster 81). In such a model,
supervised sleep means insomnia must be corrected and sleep must be normalized to
meet the needs of the larger society rather than the individual, or, in other words, the
individual’s need to function within the larger society. As we see will in the literary
texts I will discuss, insomniac characters often receive push back: advice on how to
sleep better, lectures on the need for sleep, inquiries into mental and physical health,
and numerous forms of corrective measures, medical or otherwise. The body
becomes the battleground between warring factions: the character who “needs”
insomnia for insight and development, to find his or her own, rather than prescribed
place, and the society (or family or army) that needs the character to sleep well.
Sleep Discourse
The physiological need for sleep, despite its temporal and spatial variations
for individuals, is one element of life that has remained relatively consistent
throughout the course of human existence; however, the discourse regarding sleep
fluctuates contingent upon the conditions of the given historical period and cultural
group. For reasons that we have yet to fully explain and still debate, all people
seemingly require sleep to survive and have for human history thus far, yet the
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concept of sleep represents much more than simply something one needs to do
regularly. In addition to discursive representation of sleep as a biological necessity,
as the literature I will examine indicates, sleep habits and failures are also related to
issues of psychological well being, physical and emotional strength, morality, gender
roles and expectations, and self-control. The importance of sleep, for personal,
medical, and societal reasons, can be illustrated by examining the way both an
individual and the social group of which he or she is a part react when that individual
fails to sleep in a way that the larger culture deems proper and appropriate, a
condition we currently refer to as insomnia. Therefore, examining the discourse that
produces understandings of the condition of insomnia and the insomniac as an
identity category reveals not only a great deal about the relationship of the individual
to his or her own body and mind but also of the individual to the larger society. Such
an examination of sleep habits and failures reveals a great deal of tension between the
individual’s will and desire and the expectations placed upon that individual
inasmuch as they govern the seemingly “private” (isolating) behavior of sleep.
In his essay “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,”
Michel Foucault provides a useful model through which to explore the way in which
the discourse of insomnia has been historically produced. Using the concept of
“madness” as an example, Foucault explains his epistemological concerns: “[His
research] was a question of knowing how madness, under the various definitions that
have been given, was at a particular time integrated into an institutional field that
constituted it as mental illness occupying a specific place alongside other illnesses”
(297). My exploration of insomnia will be similar: my goal in this dissertation is to
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illustrate how, but more importantly, why, insomnia “at a particular time” (the period
directly preceding and following World War I—the period of literary Modernism),
came to be constituted as a disorder, but more significantly a disorder that specifically
identifies and categorizes an individual, “occupying a specific place” alongside other
disorders and deviant identity categories in ostensive need of normalization.
Before 1907, the “insomniac” did not exist. Certainly, as sleep historians like
A. Roger Ekirch and Eluned Summers-Bremner assert, history is laden with both
famous and anonymous individuals who have, at times, suffered from or reveled in
troubled, reduced, or broken sleep. However, the communal need to classify such
individuals through the use of language into an identity category, thereby creating a
new semantic understanding of the relationship between sleeplessness and identity,
was not apparent in the English language until its formal introduction into medical
discourse in a 1907 lecture by physician Alexander Morison, entitled “A Lecture on
Sleep and Sleeplessness.” This lecture was printed in the British medical journal The
Lancet in 1908 under the same title (OED). It introduces the “insomniac” in the
following quotation: “[An increase in urinary secretion] is, like the phenomenon of
sleeplessness, most evident in the neurotic insomniac” (OED). The coining of a new
label and this quotation’s implications are significant. The focal point of insomnia
itself has shifted from an event or state happening to a person to a specific identity
category. In other words, the inability to sleep is now regarded not as an external
condition but as an internal trait; the label itself allows for a person to be solely
defined in terms of his or her insomnia. When sleep habits are deemed faulty or
abnormal, as with insomnia, they are then subject to scrutiny and normalization, from
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the medical discipline in this particular instance. But more significantly, not only are
the insomniac’s sleep habits called into question, the insomniac himself or herself
becomes the subject of inquiry.
With regard to the process of normalization, an informative parallel may be
drawn here between the insomniac and the criminally delinquent. Foucault argues
that in the case of the criminal, delinquency is seen as an attribute of the person rather
than merely a consequence of the crime; thus, the individual, rather than the offense,
becomes the subject of scrutiny (Discipline 252). In other words, in the view of
disciplinary authorities (medical, educational, criminal, religious), something about
the person, independent of the actual crime, caused his or her delinquency—the same
case can be made for the insomniac. Arguably, one is not an insomniac simply
because one cannot sleep, but because some other attribute of one’s personality or
physiology causes one to become an insomniac. Foucault writes, “The delinquent . . .
is not only author of his own acts (the author responsible in terms of certain criteria of
free, conscious will), but is linked to his offence by a whole bundle of complex
threads (instincts, drives, tendencies, character)” (Discipline 252-53). Through the
act of labeling the “insomniac,” the individual is now implicated, and perhaps even
blamed, in his or her own insomnia and also represented as responsible, to an extent,
to the larger society for treating the problem. This semantic shift indicates a larger
practice in medical discourse rooted in attributing “unhealthiness” to some flaw of
personality, character, history, or constitution, and is evident in both the
aforementioned novels and medical literature of the time.
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Etymology of the Insomniac
To be fair, Morison was not the first to use the word insomniac to describe a
sleepless individual hoping for a “normal” night’s rest; however, he was the first
physician to have his use of this label recorded and introduced into the medical
discipline. The word insomniac has been used colloquially a handful of times prior to
Morison’s lecture. The first such instance I could trace comes from the “Household
Matters” section of the 5 February 1887 edition of The Leeds Times, written by “A
Yorkshire Housewife.” Her article, sandwiched between the “Fashion and Dress”
and “Recipes” columns, cites the advice of several medical authorities on the
treatment of insomnia, but the use of the word insomniac appears to be her own
creation. She writes, “In exceptional cases [of sleeplessness] the insomniac makes a
fair recovery” (6). Despite the anonymity of the author of this article, as well as its
less-than-prominent placement on the sixth page of a local newspaper, the
“Housewife’s” column makes several important points about causes and
understandings of sleeplessness that will persist for the next several decades. Firstly,
she asserts, mostly through the citation of medical authorities, the negative
consequences of prolonged, untreated insomnia, including confusion, indecision, and
nervousness (6). She uses the pronoun “he” to describe the poor sleeper, emphasizing
the male as the normal standard of judgment, but claims, as do physicians
contemporary to her, that young women, especially those who have the “bad habit of
taking too limited a supply of sleep, at irregular hours” are the most prone to and
most negatively impacted by the effects of insomnia (6), an assertion Richardson’s
character Miriam comes to resent. The author also equates insomnia with mental
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overwork, lack of exercise, and poor nutrition (6). Her proposed cure is either
through the use of prescribed drugs or through the regulation of one’s sleeping habits
(6). In short, within her article this “Housewife” summarizes much of the
contemporary medical discourse on the causes and treatments of insomnia.
The next instance of usage of the word insomniac comes in a creative nonfiction piece in the 7 July 1888 section of the Manchester Courier and Lancashire
General Advertiser, entitled “Our Domestic Circle,” by an author identified only as
“Beryl.” “Beryl’s” short narrative about an experience of insomnia is of particular
interest in that this individual claims to have invented the term. Beryl writes, “I
should have been told that I was suffering from this insomnia. Luckily for me, I am
neither, viz., a person of consequence nor an insomniac—excuse the word. I have
coined it expressly for the occasion, feeling sure that the Goddess of Sleep in her
coyness will pardon any words she may put me in a strait for” (5). Beryl’s claim of
authorship of the term insomniac suggests that this word was not in common, if any,
usage at the time. The definition the article provides implies not only sleeplessness,
but chronic sleeplessness, is associated with being “a person of consequence,”
echoing MacFarlane’s assertion that “idiots, the feeble-minded, and even healthy
persons whose brains are inactive, sleep much longer than active-minded men” (28).
Beryl illustrates further inventiveness through the possible creation of the “Goddess
of Sleep.” In Roman and Greek mythology, sleep was a male god, Somnus or
Hypnos respectively. Hypnos’s wife, Pastithea, is the goddess of rest, but is also
associated with hallucinations or hallucinogens rather than sleep itself. Perhaps,
Beryl is referring to the Norse goddess of the night, Nótt, but provides no evidence
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for this association. Regardless, the choice to feminize sleep is an interesting one,
perhaps related to contemporary discursive views of the need for sleep as a form of
femininity or weakness.
Two more instances of the use of the word insomniac occur in British
newspapers prior to the 1908 usage the Oxford English Dictionary cites as the word’s
first appearance in print. The first of these two is in a short poem from the “Comic
Cuttings” section of the 31 May 1894 edition of The Yorkshire Herald, and the York
Herald. An author named only “Putch” uses the word in the title of a poem called
“Impromptu by an Insomniac.” The text of the poem is as follows:
(In the small hours, after long sleeplessness).
Ah! Labour—that slumbers—may say its long say
On the boon—or the bane—of an Eight Hours day;
But what should I hail with ecstatic delight
Would be, oh sweet Somnus! a sound Eight
Hours Night! (6)
This poem reinforces the importance of eight hours of sleep, commonly thought to be
the ideal amount for most adults, but also puts this eight hour sleep in contrast with
the eight hour work day. In doing so, the poem points to the necessity of sleeping at
night for laboring during the day. Thus, sleeping night is, in essence, merely an
extension of the working day, enabling one to cope with the necessity of labor.
The final instance that I found prior to 1908 is in an article entitled “A Cure
for Insomnia” from the 13 February 1896 edition of London’s Morning Post, in a
letter to the editor by Alice M. Werge. Werge encourages the use of technology to
cure insomnia, specifically in the form of a machine (which she would hypothetically
invent) designed to rock a bed back and forth, thereby simulating the rocking cradle
in which an infant sleeps. If a mechanized bed is too expensive, she claims a more
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cost-effective rocking footstool placed near a comfortable chair might serve the same
purpose. However, if these items either do not work or are financially unattainable,
“The insomniac may lie on either side, the knees resting on each other, the feet ditto,
the toes firmly fixed on the tightly tucked in sheet, then with them sway the body
gently” (2). Werge’s assertion of the ability of technology to cure insomnia reflects
the prominence of technological advancement in Victorian society. As I will discuss
in the chapters to come, new technologies, including the use of electricity, were often
embraced as a means of treating disorders, including insomnia.
What these four appearances of the word insomniac have in common is the
relative anonymity of the authors, all but three lacking a full name as identification.
Similarly, none of the authors are in the medical profession (at least none claim to
be). They all use the word as a noun, in the same way it will come to be used
medically, and use it to point to a chronic condition of sleeplessness. Further, in
varying manners, they all assert the necessity of treating this type of individual,
whether that treatment is to prevent one from feeling confused and nervous, to
prepare one for work, or to provide one with the innocent and childlike rest of
comfortable slumber, thereby relating sleep requirements to mental health, work, and
morality. However, most significantly, right from its invention as a term, even when
spread out over various and somewhat random sources, the insomniac is always
heavily tied to contemporary discourse. He (or, she, less commonly as male is the
assumed norm) is never simply presented on his (or her) own terms, but related to
gender, labor, mental illness, moral strength, and technology.
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That said, the research I conducted included a scan of an archive of millions
of British newspaper articles dating back to the seventeenth century and a selection of
major American newspapers dating back to the mid-eighteenth century, just prior to
the Revolutionary War. Aside from those four instances of the word appearing in
print before 1908, I could find nothing before the 1887 British article and nothing
whatsoever in American newspapers. Of course, while it is possible to prove that
something has occurred, it is much more challenging to prove that it has not, or, in
other words, that no one in any time prior to 1887 has ever used this word. So,
perhaps other examples exist. But clearly, the fact of the apparent emergence of the
word in this specific historical period of the late nineteenth century, and more
importantly its emergence in medical discourse of the early twentieth century soon
thereafter, is historically significant. As Foucault traces the origins of the madman, I
am doing the same with the insomniac, beginning with its emergence in discourse.
Production of Knowledge
Through its appearance in language, the word insomniac enables the
individual to be constituted as an insomniac on the basis of his or her sleep habits.
Foucault explains the process of producing the individual within a diagnostic
category using the example of hysteria:
Hysteria, which was so important in the history of psychiatry and in
the asylums of the nineteenth century, seems to me to be the very
picture of how the subject is constituted as a mad subject. And it is
certainly no accident that the major phenomena of hysteria were
observed precisely in those situations where there was a maximum of
coercion to force individuals to constitute themselves as mad. On the
other hand, I would say that I am now interested in how the subject
constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self,
these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the
individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and
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are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society,
and his social group. (“Ethics” 291)
Similarly, the coining of the term insomniac and diagnoses and treatments of
insomnia coerce the individual into adopting this identity and owning its implications;
yet, the subject himself or herself plays an active role in constituting the self as an
insomniac, through his or her practices of the self—practices which are socially,
culturally and medically mediated.
My intent is to explore the conflicting ways in which the literature of the
Modernist period becomes a battleground for the purpose and value of insomnia and
regulation of sleep as a “practice of the self” and a “practice of self formation.”
Foucault’s concept of “care of the self,” which he defines as “an exercise of the self
on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain a
certain mode of being” (“Ethics” 282) becomes a valuable way through which to
argue that sleep habits are a form of self care, which, in effect, enable the individual
to prioritize which self requires the most attention. Foucault argues that the self is not
unified; one has a multiplicity of selves reflecting the various roles one has in life:
employee, family member, citizen, and so forth. Thus, how one comes to define
“care of the self” reflects not only how one wants to go about developing oneself, but
what “self” one wants to develop, a hierarchical prioritization of one’s numerous
roles—this issue, which “self” should take precedence and receive the most “care,” is
the issue at stake in medical and literary narratives. In medical narratives, the self
that deserves the most care is the social self: the employee, parent, citizen. Yet,
oftentimes in literary narratives, the self that deserves the most care is the inner,
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creative or intellectual self: the student, artist, poet, philosopher—that part of the self
that performs the “work” of interpreting experience.
The insomniac comes to represent a body and mind in conflict during a
specific historical time and place. It is an identity category produced just prior to the
start of World War I, and one that I will argue is, like WWI a culmination of
processes of medical and scientific advancement as well as the rationalization of both
industry and, eventually, warfare. Because of the war, the significance of the
category of the insomniac takes on a heightened meaning because of its rootedness in
conflict between personal obligations and social obligations. This conflict of the
prioritization of the self becomes all too apparent when the self is also a soldier or
war worker serving his or her country. Care of the self takes on a role beyond merely
being “successful” at earning money or raising a family, but instead includes
implications not only for individual life and death, but also for the prosperity and
survival of whole nations relying on individuals to devote their “selves” (bodies and
minds) to the war effort. World War I, often noted being temporally related to the
origin of Modernist period, a notion with which I agree for reasons I will explain to
come, became a sort of turning point in the history of psychology (as the medical
discipline produced studies of shell shock and its related conditions), in part because
of a change I have noticed in literary texts about the nature of insomnia (post-WWI
insomnia often involves reliving or recreating traumatic or regretful memories or
fearing sleep because of its likeness to loss of self and death), and in part specifically
because of the shift in emphasis in literary texts of the nineteenth century from
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unconscious states (dreams, trances, somnambulism) to insomnia in literary texts of
the twentieth century.
Insomnia in Literature
The difference between the presentation of insomnia in literary texts of the
nineteenth century and those written in the twentieth, during and after World War I,
reveals a shift in the nature of the insomniac’s anxiety, or, in other words, what is
keeping a character awake. Often, in nineteenth century texts, the anxiety depicted in
scenes of insomnia is an anxiety over the future. Take, for example, the following
passage from Charles Dickens’ novel Great Expectations (1860-61):
If I [Pip] slept at all that night, it was only to imagine myself drifting
down the river on a strong spring tide, to the Hulks; a ghostly pirate
calling out to me through a speaking-trumpet, as I passed the gibbetstation, that I had better come ashore and be hanged there at once, and
not put it off. I was afraid to sleep, even if I had been inclined, for I
knew that at the first faint dawn of morning I must rob the pantry. (15)
In this passage, Pip describes his anxiety prior to his impending robbery of his sister’s
pantry as demanded, on threat of his life, by Magwitch. The passage incorporates a
sense of uncontrollable forward movement (“driving down the river on a strong tide”)
in the direction of imminent demise. He is unable to sleep not because of the
knowledge of what he has done, but what he must do in the future. He fears sleep,
but not because he will lose himself in sleep, but may lose himself to his future
actions. His insomnia is an insomnia of anxiety over the future.
In another example from the same text, Pip awakens at night and is unable to
return to sleep. Pip narrates:
As I had grown accustomed to my expectations, I had insensibly begun
to notice their effect upon myself and those around me. Their
influence on my own character, I disguised from my recognition as
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much as possible, but I knew very well that it was not all good. I lived
in a state of chronic uneasiness respecting my behavior to Joe. My
conscience was not by any means comfortable about Biddy. When I
woke up at night . . . I used to think, with a weariness on my spirits,
that I should have been happier and better if I had never seen Miss
Havisham's face, and had risen to manhood content to be partners with
Joe in the honest old forge. (302)
As in the passage discussed earlier, Pip’s insomnia is related more to his fear of the
future than to his past. Certainly, he contemplates his previous ill-mannered and
selfish behaviors with regard to Biddy and Joe, yet only insofar as these behaviors
represent the direction in which his character seems to be taking as time progresses.
His regrets over the past are limited to his fears over the type of person they suggest
he is becoming, rather than has already become. He believes his manhood and
character would have been better served had he taken a different direction in life, only
because he sees himself as not becoming the person he wishes to be in the future.
Charlotte Brontë’s novel Jane Eyre (1847) includes a similar example of a
character unable to sleep because of anxiety over the future. In the passage cited
below, Jane has insomnia on the eve of her soon-to-be-botched wedding to Mr.
Rochester. Brontë recounts Jane’s thoughts:
This prediction [of blissful slumber] was but half fulfilled: I did not
indeed dream of sorrow, but as little did I dream of joy; for I never
slept at all. With little Adèle in my arms, I watched the slumber of my
childhood—so tranquil, so passionless, so innocent—as soon as the
sun rose I rose too. . . . She seemed the emblem of my past life; and he
I was now to array myself to meet, the dread, but adored, type of my
unknown future day. (208)
As with Pip, Jane is reminded of her past during her futile attempt at sleep. Yet, these
memories are not the reason for her inability to sleep. Instead, her anxiety over her
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future union with the “dread” Mr. Rochester keeps her awake. Her past, in its
“emblematic” form, slumbers peacefully, but her future self induces insomnia.
We can see a similar pattern of insomnia based in anxiety in American
literature. For example, Lily Bart, protagonist of Edith Wharton’s The House of
Mirth (1905) often suffers from insomnia. In one case, Wharton describes Lily’s
thoughts, as she “lay in the darkness reconstructing the past out of which her present
had grown” (28). As with Pip, Lily’s insomnia focuses on her past, but only in order
to view her life teleologically. She is not haunted by past memories, but her present
and future, so like Pip and Jane, the person she will become. The past is only
significant inasmuch as it affects her present and future situation. The occurrence of
Lily’s insomnia comes after she spends (and loses) more money at cards than her
budget allows. She is anxious over her economic condition and her future prospects.
This fear of the future keeps her awake; thus, her anxiety is based in the future, even
when her thoughts focus on her past.
Perhaps the reason for this future-centric, teleological form of insomnia as
depicted in these pre-WWI texts has a lot to do with pre-WWI fears of the future.
The nineteenth century was a time of great change in both the United Kingdom and
America. These nations were industrializing and urbanizing, thereby drastically
changing the day-to-day lives of citizens. Technology was developing rapidly, and in
the second half of the nineteenth century we see such advances as the introduction of
the railways (and Railway Standard Time) and widespread use of electric lighting,
enabling people to both be out in public and perform labor, whether domestic or
professional, at night. Additionally, the countries were expanding geographically
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through conquest of colonial lands. Further, especially in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, we see changes within the domestic sphere, with women
assuming a more public presence and petitioning for the right to political
involvement, as with the Women’s Suffrage movement, which gained a great deal of
social and political traction during the end of the nineteenth century.
Fears associated with these technological, scientific, and social changes are
reflected in the literature of this period. For example, texts such as H. G. Wells’ The
Invisible Man (1897) and Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886)
describe fears of the scientist overstepping the laws of nature and unintentionally
creating something monstrous and uncontrollable. Similarly, fears of the
consequences of colonial expansion are present in texts such as Edgar Allan Poe’s
“Murders in the Rue Morgue” in which a colonial import, an ourang-outang from
Borneo transported by a sailor, escapes control of his (white, male) master and
murders two virginal white women living in their seemingly impenetrable apartment
(late at night). One reading of Poe’s story is as a tale of fear of the uncontrollable
other, brought back from colonial realms and unleashed in Western society. Sadly,
one common association made in Poe’s time (and specifically by one of his friends,
Thomas Dew), is the equation of the black man with a beast. According to Dew, with
“the free black . . . the animal part of the man gains victory over the moral” (qtd. in
Dayan 243) and in this story we see the destructive power of the ourang-outang once
he frees himself. Joan Dayan argues that “Poe’s reconstructions depend upon
experiences that trade on unspeakable slippages between men and women, humans
and animals, life and death” (244). In this story, Poe depicts the ape both as human
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(trying to shave, to speak, to conceal its crimes), and unspeakably inhuman, because
in the brutal nature of the murder “there was something . . . altogether irreconcilable
with our common notions of human action” (Poe 26). The ape symbolizes this
slippage between human and animal, the type of slippage that becomes possible
through colonial domination when one race tries to take possession of another,
dehumanizing the colonized (and the colonizer) in the process.
The popularity of the vampire tale of the nineteenth century also speaks to a
sense of future-oriented anxiety over social change. According to Lois Cucullu, the
vampire tale reveals “uneasiness over blood and kinship ties, social mores and class
standings, and . . . gender and sexual norms” and does so through its disruption of
waking and sleep (305). For example, in Bram Stoker’s Dracula, we see numerous
examples of women, who during their bouts of vampire-induced insomnia, become
overtly sexual, insist on solitude, and wander alone in the evenings to pursue sexual
encounters. Joseph Sheriden Le Fanu’s Carmilla provides another example of this
motif. The action of the novel begins with the unexpected arrival of three strange
women at the narrator, Laura’s, father’s home. The women who arrive behave
shockingly, the elder one approaching Laura’s father as an equal rather than her
superior, making demands of him immediately. Laura describes the elder one as “so
distinguished, and even imposing, and in her manner so engaging, as to impress one .
. . with a conviction that she was a person of consequence” (412). These women are
travelling independently (the only males are servants), and in a surprisingly unmotherly manner of behavior, the older woman requests that Laura and her father
provide a temporary home for her alleged daughter Carmilla, so that she can attend to
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her “journey of life and death” (411). After bestowing upon Carmilla a “glance
which [Laura] fancied was not so affectionate” (412), the elder lady drives away,
leaving Carmilla behind. The elder lady’s rude and abrupt manner, her commanding
presence, and her willingness to abandon her sick “daughter” to strangers point to her
unfeminine nature; whereas, Laura wants only to take on the feminine role of
caretaker for the supposedly ill girl. Carmilla’s “illness,” as it turns out, is a show of
false helplessness meant to make her hosts vulnerable to her machinations. A
governess notes that there was a third woman in the carriage as well, one who is “a
hideous black woman, with a sort of coloured turban on her head . . . with gleaming
eyes and large white eyeballs, and her teeth set as if in fury” (414), which expresses
anxiety both over female independence and the colonial other. The arrival of
Carmilla, the vampire, is associated with two decidedly unfeminine women.
Carmilla effaces gender and sexual norms, openly pursuing Laura sexually,
even violating Laura’s bed, which simultaneously attracts and repulses Laura.
According to Cucullu, “The [vampire] novels broadly hinted that no young woman is
safe, even in her bedroom, a version of ‘you snooze, you lose’ or, worse, become
loose” (306). We see this “looseness” with Laura who describes her “lassitude and
melancholy” as “almost luxurious” (437). Carmilla symbolizes the destructive
consequences of females disregarding “natural” (sexually reserved) female behavior,
but notably, she destroys other women rather than men. Her presence indicates an
anxiety over the danger of the sexually overt and independent female and her
detrimental effects on other women. In a sense, she is even more dangerous than a
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male vampire like Dracula because she can both play the part of the helpless woman
and use that role to fool others into admitting her into their homes and confidence.
In short, insomnia was not absent from texts before World War I, but it was
treated differently after the war because of its connotations with anxiety over the
future (with thoughts of the past working in service of predicting or explaining the
future), as opposed to a backwards movement to the past, which is often regarded
with shame and regret; in other words, where pre-war texts use insomnia to analyze
the past’s impact on the present and display anxiety over the future, post-war texts
illustrate the past as a source of shame and dwell in, rather than reflect upon, the past.
Post-war insomnia may contain a sense of anxiety over the future, but significantly
places much more focus on both the past and present. By the second decade of the
twentieth century, people witnessed the consequences of modernization.
Industrialization, conflicts over territory, and changes in the nature of the domestic
sphere and its related values had already taken hold, and the Western world witnessed
the consequence: the Great War. There was no longer need to fear what these
movements might bring because it had already happened (though I would place more
emphasis on the former two than the latter here). The Great War, the culmination of
the uglier side of industrialization’s capacity advancement without reflection and its
related dehumanization, illustrated the consequences of “progress.” Therefore, as a
fear of the future morphed into both a sense of regret over the past and the need to
analyze it to understand why circumstances turned out as they did, the nature of the
way in which insomnia is depicted in literary texts changed as well. As Carl Jung
notes, after having a dream in 1926 of being shelled during the war, “The happenings
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in the dream suggested that the war, which in the outer world had taken place some
years before, was not over yet, but was continuing to be fought within the psyche”
(qtd. in Fussell 113). This stronghold of the war upon the psyche is reflected in the
ways in which texts describe scenes of insomnia, whether or not the texts are overtly
about literal war.
Examining the works of Wells, a writer who produced works spanning from
the Victorian era to the period following World War I, provides an interesting
example of the shift of the focus of insomnia even in the works of the same author.
In his text The Invisible Man, published in 1897, Wells explores the dangers of
scientific overreach when not coupled with moral considerations, as he tells the story
of a man who, through the use of scientific innovation (making himself invisible),
abuses his powers and becomes a force of greed and destruction to all he encounters.
This tale is one of anxiety over the future and the negative consequences of scientific
progress, and these concerns are reflected, at times, in the thoughts of characters
during periods of insomnia. For instance, Wells describes the thoughts of Dr. Kemp,
a scientist, as he stays up late at night working in his study. Taking a break from his
work, Kemp allows his mind to wander. Wells relates these thoughts during his
period of restlessness, or productive insomnia “during which his mind had travelled
into a remote speculation of social conditions of the future, and lost itself at last over
the time dimension” (73). In this passage, Kemp’s late night thoughts focus not on
the past or present, but on the future as a source of anxiety.
Yet, in his work written during World War I, Wells offers a different view of
insomniac thought. In his 1917 text, The Soul of a Bishop, the main character’s
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insomnia is not focused on the future, as it is for Kemp in The Invisible Man, but
rather on the past and present. Whereas the previous text describes the dangers of
scientific progress without moral progress, The Soul of a Bishop discusses the
inability of existing moral and social institutions, specifically the Anglican Church, to
combat the moral decay progress engenders; older ways of being are inadequate to
handle present circumstances and have, in fact, generated these present conditions.
Rather than being a text of anxiety over the future, it is a lament over problems of the
present. In a chapter aptly entitled “Insomnia,” Wells describes some of the causes
for the bishop, Edward Scrope’s, insomnia. Immediately, Scrope’s insomnia is not
focused what will be, but rather on present circumstances:
It was as if he had fallen suddenly out of a spiritual balloon into a
world of bleak realism. He found himself asking unprecedented and
devastating questions, questions that implied the most fundamental
shiftings of opinion. Why was the church such a failure? Why had it
no grip upon either masters or men amidst this vigorous life of modern
industrialism, and why had it no grip upon the questioning young? . . .
This was not as things should be. He struggled to recover a proper
attitude. But he remained enormously dissatisfied. . . (36-37)
In this passage, Scrope is thinking obliquely of World War I, but his thoughts are
centered on the current state of spiritual and moral crisis, which he links to
industrialization and religion as a force of disunity. He does not fear coming change,
as Kemp does in the aforementioned passage, but rather knows that change has
already occurred but cannot be handled by former methods, and his insomniac
thoughts reflect this revelation.
A bit further on in the same chapter, Scrope links his insomnia more explicitly
to the war: “He rolled in [the bath tub] in spite of ill-health and insomnia, and all the
while he was tormented by the enormous background of the world war, by his
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ineffective realization of vast national needs, by his passionate desire, for himself and
his church, not to be ineffective” (54). Just prior to this passage, the bishop recalls
another instance of insomnia in which he was awakened in the night by a “shameful
memory” of a stolen cigarette (54). Again, we see insomnia focused not on fear of
the future but on past regret and present struggle. As in the previous passage, Scrope
is not anxious over what may come, as Kemp is, but rather, current affairs and his
ability to cope with them. The reference to past insomnia and shame is significant in
that it implies a chain of causality: past behaviors lead to present circumstances, so
the past must be regarded shamefully. He is anxious over what is, and what is takes
precedence in his insomnia over what will be.
Such a way of describing insomnia is not exclusive to Wells. In Jean Rhys’s
Good Morning, Midnight (1939) written more than two decades after Wells wrote
The Soul of a Bishop, we see a similar pattern. Central character Sasha Jensen
narrates her insomnia: “Last night was a catastrophe” (9). She explains how “last
night” keeps her awake: “That [humiliating experience] was last night. I lie awake,
thinking about it” (11). She describes both her memory of her humiliation and her
inability to sleep, “rolling from side to side” while listening to “the clock ticking on
the ledge” (12). Sasha’s insomnia is not based, as is Pip’s, Jane’s, or Lily’s, in a fear
of the future, but rather her behavior in the past, which she remembers shamefully.
Even though Sasha’s memories are not directly linked to the war, we can see in these
examples a shift in the content of the insomniac’s thoughts—from future anxiety to
contemplation of memories and their subsequent impact on the present moment.
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Similarly, in an American text such as John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath
(1939), insomnia is also oriented in present anxiety rather than fear of the future. For
instance, the preacher, Jim Casy, discusses the causes of his anxiety in terms of his
inability to effectively deal with the moral decay of his society (much like Scrope in
Wells’ novel): “[The ability to save souls] worried me till I couldn’t get no sleep.
Here I’d go preachin’ and I’d say, ‘By God, this time I ain’t gonna do it.’ And right
while I said it, I knowed I was” (23). Like Scrope, Casy eventually turns his back on
organized religion, which he feels is ultimately ineffective in meeting the demands of
modern morality. Instead, also like Scrope, he turns towards his own individualized
sense of morality resulting from his sense of the failure of organized religion.
Insomnia and Modernism
In part, because of this shift in the presentation of insomnia, I am situating my
discussion of insomnia and the beginnings of Modernism alongside the start of World
WWI. While I would not disagree that novels written prior to WWI have modernist
stylistic tendencies (one might read Laurence Stern’s Tristram Shandy as similar in
significant stylistic ways to James Joyce’s Ulysses, see examples of stream of
consciousness writing in Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, and view the metafictional
structure at work in Wharton’s novella Ethan Frome), Modernism needed the Great
War to fully come into being precisely because it was the symbolically calamitous
culmination of the advances of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, numerous
changes in several areas of discourse relevant to insomnia took place directly because
of the war. These discursive shifts include changes in the nature of medicine and
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psychiatry, changes in the conception of time, and changes in the ways in which
language and art functioned, all results of the war.
Beginning my discussion of insomnia and the insomniac after WWI is also
important given the war’s structural affinity to insomnia. The Great War and the
phenomenology of insomnia are similar for many reasons. The war was one of
attrition, or in other words, exhaustion, and exhaustion was felt by many during the
war, one soldier even stating that he “felt [he] would barter [his] soul for a few hours
of uninterrupted slumber” (qtd. in Eksteins 151). The war was won by the side that
could cope with its exhaustion the most effectively. Additionally, WWI was largely
fought nocturnally. It turned the soldiers and war workers into insomniacs, requiring
them to remain awake long into the night to reinforce the trenches, launch attacks,
and conduct other business of war that the visibility of daylight rendered too
dangerous. Modris Eksteins explains that as a result of the nocturnal nature of trench
life, “The normal bourgeois approach to time and to the clock was reversed” (150).
Consequently, the war altered perceptions of time and created a reversal of night and
day. Further, the length of the war and the sense of its endlessness mimics the
insomniac waiting for sleep. Logically, one knew the war must end, much as the
insomniac knows sleep will eventually come. The problem was that no one could
predict either the end of the war or the end of insomnia.
Finally, the war had an important impact on perceptions and treatments of
mental health problems. In an article entitled “Shell Shock and Its Lessons,”
published in the British Medical Journal in 1917, author G. Elliot Smith
acknowledges the ignorance of mental health authorities on their ability to treat
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mental disorders: “There is hardly any department of medicine which has been so
neglected in this country, not only from the clinical and therapeutic but also from the
research standpoint, as that of psychopathy as apart from definite insanity” (47).
Consequently, research increased. Because of the traumatic nature of the war
experience, fostered by both the often stagnant conditions of the war, as well as the
devastating nature of injuries made possible by new technologies such as poison gas,
air strikes, more accurate and deadly munitions, and repeated shellings and bombings,
even soldiers who remained physically uninjured often suffered psychologically and
emotionally. Eksteins writes that “one of the great fears of soldiers was that they
might break under stress, that they might lose self control, that their legs or nerve
might fail them in an emergency” (180). Because, prior to the war, mental illness was
viewed as more of a women’s problem, related to constitutional and emotional
weakness, the mental breakdown of soldiers and others involved conflicted with the
traditional conceptions of masculine stoicism. As Elaine Showalter argues, “shell
shock was related to to social expectations of the masculine role in war. The Great
War was a crisis of masculinity and a trail of the Victorian masculine ideal” (Female
171). Yet, after the war, “The image of idle middle-class women as the chief
clientele for nervous disorders had been substantially modified” (Showalter, Female
195). The mental breakdown of many otherwise healthy individuals lead to changes
in the perceptions of psychological disorders as feminine problems or indicators of
weakness, which will be discussed in the chapters to come.
In addition to the changes I have just described, WWI had an influence on the
ways in which individuals understood their relationship to time beyond differentiating
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day and night. As Fussell explains, “The image of strict division clearly dominates
the Great War conception of Time Before and Time After, especially when the mind
dwells on the contrast between the prewar idyll and the wartime nastiness” (80).
Thus, not only does the war act as a culmination of scientific, political, and
technological innovation, but also as a fixed dividing line between past and present
society and mode of life. Not only is history divided into two distinct periods, one’s
actual experience of time itself changed. Bryony Randall explains:
The First World War radically disrupted the ways in which human
temporality was or could be conceived. . . . Not only was the war an
event without precedent, in brutality and scale, radically challenging
attempts to create an historical narrative that would be able to
incorporate it, but, as [Paul] Fussell emphasises, there was a
widespread belief in circulation at the time that ‘the war would
literally never end and would become the permanent condition of
mankind.’ Fussell describes how the experience of fighting at the
front, characterised by often apparently meaningless routine, the
carrying out of illogical or downright contradictory orders, and the
absolute ignorance of what was going on even a few hundred yards
down the line, let alone miles away, conspired to deprive temporality
of its familiar characteristics of causality, logical succession and
change. (3-4)
One could express insomnia in largely the same terms Bryony Randall uses to
describe the war’s effect on notions of temporality. Like war, insomnia appears to be
a “permanent condition” at least as it is being experienced. Often, for the insomniac,
fear of insomnia itself is enough to elicit insomnia, perpetuating the sense of the
infinite. Because the insomniac sometimes does not know when he or she sleeps or
even that he or she may have been asleep in the midst of what seems to be a state of
wakefulness, insomnia does indeed incorporate a sense of endlessness. Additionally,
because medical texts emphasize the importance of establishing proper bedtime
routines and habits, insomnia reveals these routines to be ineffectual, illustrating the
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“apparently meaningless routine, the carrying out of illogical or downright
contradictory orders” in this case given by doctors or well-meaning friends or
relatives in futile attempts to help the insomniac. Insomnia also often includes “the
absolute ignorance of what was going on even a few hundred yards down the line” as
the insomniac is typically isolated from others and ignorant of what is happening
beyond his or her (non)sleep space. Finally, insomnia can appear to be “conspired to
deprive temporality of its familiar characteristics of causality, logical succession and
change” as it robs the individual of participation in “normal” diurnal cycles of
sleeping and waking. Preparing for bed should logically lead to sleep, but for the
insomniac, who is unable to make the change from the waking state to the sleeping
one, such a notion of succession and causality unravels. Thus, as war-time mentality
and memories of war experience took hold of the population, the literature produced
evidences these changing notions of time through the frequent incorporation of
insomnia into literary texts.
The binary division of time into “before” and “after” reflects a greater change
in the language habits of individuals, as Fussell notes:
The physical confrontation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is an obvious
figure of gross dichotomy. But less predictably the mode of gross
dichotomy came to dominate perception and expression elsewhere,
encouraging finally what we can call the modern versus habit: one
thing opposed to another, not with some Hegelian hope of synthesis
involving a dissolution of both extremes (that would suggest ‘a
negotiated peace,’ which is an anathema), but with a sense that one of
the poles embodies so wicked a deficiency or flaw or perversion that
its total submission is called for . . . one of the legacies of the war is
just this habit of simple distinction, simplification, and opposition. (79)
One can relate this dichotomous language with a binary distinction between sleeping
and waking. While it is not always the case that either can necessarily be presented
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as “a deficiency or flaw or perversion” by itself, we do get repeated images of either
sleep as valued over waking, or waking over sleep. Similarly, sometimes sleep is
presented as an enemy, as in the case of Ernest Hemingway’s short story “Now I Lay
Me” in which the narrator, an injured and traumatized WWI soldier, does everything
in his power to stay awake at night because he fears the consequences of sleeping.
However, insomnia is a liminal state, between sleeping and waking. Though
many tended to resort to binary language, insomnia presents another option,
indicating the failure of binary categorization. Understanding the space between
sleeping and waking as a sort of nether-region of consciousness has origins before the
war. The nineteenth century text often focused on altered states of consciousness in
which one did not know whether one was awake, asleep, dreaming, hallucinating,
hypnotized, mesmerized, or in some other way experiencing altered consciousness.
Consciousness itself was a variable and unstable state. Jenny Bourne Taylor argues
that during the nineteenth century, psychology as a discipline developed rapidly:
The emergence of psychiatric medicine, or ‘mental pathology,’ as a
newly respectable branch of the medical profession with the
development of the county asylum system and the state care of the
insane, contributed to the ways in which discussions of the working of
consciousness, the unconscious, and memory formed part of a much
wider debate on the nature of social identity. (142)
Importantly, the nineteenth century gave rise to a sense of connection between
identity and forms of consciousness, contributing to the development of the identity
category of the insomniac at the start of the twentieth century, indicative of this push
towards clear classification through identity categories. While in the modernist text,
we see a great reduction in the use of states like somnambulism, hypnosis,
hypnogogia, and altered states of consciousness apart from the occasional bout of
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drunkenness, we see a lot more insomnia, which, by its very nature resists binary
classification. Interestingly, more recent scientific studies, which I will discuss in
detail in the next chapter, postulate that frequently the insomniac sleeps without
awareness of sleep, so the sleeping/waking binary becomes further muddled. Perhaps
one of the reasons insomnia becomes such a focus of discussion within the modernist
text is a general sense of discomfort with the tendency towards binary classification
and the simplification of the individual into fixed, readily-definable identity
categories. Perhaps, these texts react to the tension between the two dichotomous
states of sleeping and waking, revealing the problems with such a dichotomy.
Language was further altered in tone, particularly for the British as Fussell
asserts. He describes “the style of British Phlegm”: “The trick here is to affect to be
entirely unflappable; one speaks as if the war were entirely normal and matter-offact” (181). This practical use of language to describe unimaginable horrors was
bureaucratized by the Field Service Post Card, in which a soldier could send a letter
home by simply erasing inapplicable phrases and leaving relevant (though often
dishonest) ones present on the form. For example, one might cross out “I have been
admitted into hospital” if this were not the case, but leave “I am quite well” or “I am
being sent down to base” as applicable (Fussell 184-85). Such a form, (the first form
ever created for widespread use, according to Fussel (185)) denied soldiers the ability
to include any sense of emotion or personal experience. Unsurprisingly, those with
literary inclinations likely balked at the reduction of experience to a worksheet.
Even less surprisingly given this simplification and condensation of language,
a subsequent growing sense of the failure of language as a means of expression
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begins to take root in period. Another change in language Fussell describes to be a
consequence of the war is a sense of the inadequacy of language. Fussell writes:
Logically, one supposes, there’s no reason why a language devised by
man should be inadequate to describe any of man’s works. The
difficulty was in admitting that the war had been made by men and
was being continued ad infinitum by them. . . . [T]he presumed
inadequacy of language itself to convey the facts about trench warfare
is one of the motifs of all who wrote about the war. (170)
This growing discomfort with the ability of language to convey wartime experience
might also contribute to the prevalence of insomnia in the modernist text. Because
sleeping and waking were seen medically and scientifically in a black and white
manner, as polar opposites, and also because people perceive this black and white use
of language to be ultimately inadequate in its capacity to describe the war, literary
texts often seek to explore a state that is not so black and white. During this gray
space of insomnia, the individual can process experience and express the collapse of
these simplistic, dichotomous world-views.
In addition to changes in language, the war essentially destabilized the world.
As Eksteins explains, “As the war’s meaning began to be enveloped in a fog of
existential questioning, the integrity of the ‘real’ world, the visible and ordered world,
was undermined. . . . And as the external world collapsed in ruins, the only redoubt
of integrity became the individual personality” (211). Thus, in the modernist literary
work, we see both the collapse of the ordered, rational world (Joyce’s Nighttown
section of Ulysses is an excellent example here given its hallucinogenic qualities), as
well as an intensified focus on individual psychology. Even in the work of Wells, we
can see this shift in the difference between his aforementioned texts, The Invisible
Man and The Soul of a Bishop. Whereas The Invisible Man is a story largely told
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from an omniscient perspective, presenting the thoughts of many characters with no
more specific focus on the psychological workings of one character over another and
often offering only fleeting insights into each character, The Soul of a Bishop deals
extensively with the psychological conflicts of one particular individual.
Unsurprisingly, given all I have argued thus far, insomnia is often the medium
through which the protagonist of the latter text’s conflicts are exposed and discussed.
Ultimately, the war itself became regarded as “a form of art” (Eksteins 210).
This artistic expression of the war, as Eksteins explains, is due to the fact that the
horrific nature of war experience “had . . . little interpretive potential except in very
personal terms” (214). Eksteins continues:
[War writers] connected the sights and sounds of war with art. Art
became, in fact, the only available correlative of war; naturally not an
art following previous rules, but an art in which the rules of
composition were abandoned, in which provocation became the goal,
and in which art became an event, an experience. As the war lost
external meaning, it became above all an experience. (214)
War, in other words, is not re-presentable through traditional means of expression,
and language, by itself, often failed. Thus, after the war, literature, even literature not
about war specifically, became more experiential. Texts like Joyce’s Ulysses, even
though not about war directly, are clearly motivated by this new approach to art.
Neither presents a story in the traditional sense; events happen, but the actual
experience of reading the text takes precedence over the plot of the text. When
combined with the aforementioned changes in the nature of understanding of cause
and effect and time, as well as changes in language, we can see the importance of the
war in shaping the modernist text.
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Conclusions
By the time the war did finally end on 11 November 1918, these associations
between war and modernity had become so ingrained in the lives of Americans and
British, the impossibility of a return to pre-war ways of life became apparent. Such
changes were reflected culturally in new styles of art, including literature. As Fussell
asserts, “Very often, the new reality [of life after World War I] had no resemblance
whatever to the familiar, and the absence of a plausible style placed some writers in
what they thought was an impossible position. . . . [This change in language and
literary style] was a matter of leaving, finally, the nineteenth century behind” (174).
Literature changed accordingly, and literary uses and depictions of insomnia followed
suit. Much like the modernist text, insomnia is not a story, but an experience. During
bouts of insomnia, typically, nothing happens. As Blanchot explains, “insomnia is . .
. percussive stillness” (49). Insomnia may fit into a plot, but by itself has no plot. It
marks the passage of time, but is itself without movement. Consequently, insomnia
becomes a very important literary vehicle of the modernist text because it fits so well
with changes that took place in literature after the war. It allows for intense focus on
individual psychology, it disrupts traditional notions of cause and effect (I am tired
and want to sleep, and I am in bed awaiting sleep, but I cannot sleep), and it reflects
the same sense of time (infinite waiting with no end in sight) as the war experience.
In order to explore insomnia in the modernist text, I have divided this
dissertation into five further chapters. The second chapter provides an overview of
the discourse of insomnia from the nineteenth century until modern times. As I
argued earlier, the insomniac is a figured produced by discourse, thus his or her
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disorder is always tied into contemporaneous values, beliefs, morals, and ethics. The
main purpose of this section is to situate the creation of the insomniac historically, as
well as illustrate the ways in which the Modernist period influenced our
understanding of insomnia and the insomniac today. The next three chapters are
devoted to insomniacs in different social identity categories, or, more specifically, the
way the category of the “insomniac” intersects with other identity categories.
Chapter three examines the insomniac as a product of the war, as well as the
relationship between the phenomenology of insomnia and the phenomenology of the
war experience. Chapter four looks at insomnia as related to the gendered body,
because, as I will argue, insomnia in bodies of different genders has different
discursive representations and implications. The fifth chapter discusses insomnia as it
relates to social class, further emphasizing the relationship between social identity
categories and the causes, treatments, and perceptions of disordered sleep. Insomnia
is regarded both a consequence and disorder of privilege, illustrating again its
paradoxical nature. My final chapter breaks from examining various categories of
identity in order to illustrate the ways in which insomnia shapes perception and
thought, and therefore, literary productions of authors. If experience, but more
importantly perception of experience, which is always filtered through language and
discourse structures reality, then insomnia, as experience, has the ability to influence
one’s perception of the world, and, therefore, one’s interpretation of it as expressed in
the literary text. The final chapter explains the ways in which the experience of
insomnia translates to the structure of the text.
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Ultimately, literature deals with conflict. The four basic literary conflicts
involve a person struggling against the self, another person, nature, or society. And,
what is insomnia if not conflict, whether the conflict lies in the struggle to sleep or the
struggle to keep oneself awake despite exhaustion? But, what makes insomnia so
interesting is that it, sometimes simultaneously, envelopes each of these types of
conflict. Interpersonal relationships may certainly cause insomnia, as may internal
conflict. Similarly, one’s difficulties with social position or expectations are often
reflected in insomnia, as is one’s battle with his or her own physiology, nature, or the
external, physical world. Conflict, when combined with the changes in art, literature,
psychology, and medicine brought about by WWI, lead to a type of literature in
which insomnia becomes particularly significant and relevant as a means of
expression. The treatment of insomnia in literature presents both a standard discourse
in which sleep-time is essential to the working day, or, in other words, productivity,
and may also be equated with immoral behavior or contradicting “natural” social
roles, yet, the counter-discourse, as represented in literary texts, presents insomnia as
essential to a different type of self care, one which comes through exploring one’s
internal and external conflicts. Insomnia, as a device, provides the time and space for
such exploration, and as an experience, alters perceptions of both the day time and
night time worlds.
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CHAPTER 2

SNOOZERS AND LOSERS: A GENEAOLOGY OF SLEEP STUDIES

“Sleeplessness is a human tragedy—great or small according to its severity,”
begins the “Sleeplessness” section of Dr. W. Johnson Smyth’s 1923 “Address on
Sleep and Sleeplessness” (226). Smyth’s statement, made nearly a century ago,
accurately represents the medical field’s perception of insomnia as antagonistic, a
condition hampering human life, and necessary to prevent through intervention. A
cursory internet search done today reflects Smyth’s sentiments; the phrase “insomnia
treatments” results in 32.7 million hits on Google. The pursuit of sound sleep also
makes for profitable business. According to David Randall, in 2010 a full 25% of
adults in the United States possessed prescription sleeping pills, and advertising for
these pills accounted for more than $1 billion from 2005-2006 (237).
These numbers are not unexpected given the prevalence of insomnia today:
“As the NSF [National Sleep Foundation] documented in its 2002 Sleep in America
poll, 58 percent of Americans identify from one to four of the symptoms of insomnia
as occurring in a given week, and 35 percent of respondents claim insomnia
symptoms running for an entire year” (Wolf-Meyer 161). More recently, the 2014
Sleep Health Index created by the National Sleep Foundation reports that “35% of
Americans report their sleep quality as ‘poor’ or ‘only fair’” (NSF). Statistics in the
United Kingdom are similar:
In a recent [2007] UK study by Morphy and colleagues, 37% of
respondents reported insomnia at baseline; a year later 69% of these
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still had problems sleeping, while 15% of those without insomnia at
baseline had developed it. Insomnia is also a persistent condition. In a
recent [2009] longitudinal study of people with insomnia at baseline,
74% still reported insomnia after a year, and 46% still reported
insomnia after 3 years. (Calem et al.)
Given that more than a third of American and British adults regularly have trouble
sleeping and more than half have intermittent trouble sleeping, our current interest in
sleep and insomnia and the amount of money and resources the sleep industry
generates are unsurprising.
Despite the current statistics, the interest in insomnia and its remedies is not a
recent phenomenon, nor is relatively widespread insomnia exclusive to contemporary
times. Sleep and insomnia have long been literary, philosophical, and poetic tropes,
but the emergence of modern medical sleep studies in the USA and UK came about
primarily in the second half of the nineteenth century, coinciding with the second
Industrial Revolution in Europe and America. Cultural studies sleep researcher
Matthew Wolf-Meyer cites Robert MacNish’s 1824 text, The Philosophy of Sleep, as
the “first modern monograph on sleep” (27), and further notes that “by the 1880s a
robust body of literature [on sleep] existed” (52). This new scientific and medical
interest in sleep studies in part reflects industrial developments of the nineteenth
century rooted in the “principle of unlimited productivity that made fatigue both
inevitable and inadmissible” (Summers-Bremner 100), as well as the emergence of
the fields of psychology and psychiatry, as described in the first chapter. Increased
interest in the production and use of energy, when combined with the growth of both
manufacturing industries and the widespread use of publically produced gas and
electric lighting, arose alongside inquiries into the maintenance of proper sleep habits,
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also known as “sleep hygiene,” the goal of which was the prevention of fatigue and
the maximization of productivity.
Around this period in the mid-nineteenth century fatigue, a primary
consequence of insomnia, became a social and medical “obsession” (Rabinbach 20).
More importantly, however, scientific and medical communities viewed fatigue as a
“conquerable” state, one that could be regulated and prevented (Rabinbach 21),
thereby resulting in the intervention of the medical branch into people’s sleep habits,
but also other elements of their daily behavior or even morality with implications
regarding sleep. Anson Rabinbach argues that medical literature of the mid-to-late
nineteenth century depicts fatigue as a moral and social ill (20), and “considered
fatigue as the chief sign of the body’s refusal to bend to the disciplines of modern
industrial society” (38). In this sense, the chronically faulty sleeper came to be
understood as a sort of social outcast and rebel.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, medical discourses often
complemented the industrial mentality of the maximization of productivity through
emphasis on the correlation between sleep habits and contributory citizenship and
moral behavior. For example, when giving advice to parents as to how to handle
children with troubled sleep behaviors, Henry Munson Lyman writes in his 1885
book Insomnia; And Other Disorders of Sleep:
Wakefulness sometimes occurs merely as the result of a bad habit.
This is usually observed among delicate children of a nervous
temperament, whose inclinations have never been thwarted. Such
patients have been sometimes cured, after the failure of a long and
expensive course of treatment with homoeopathic globules, by the
adoption of a systematic moral training reinforced by the occasional
forcible application of the parental hand to the gluteal region of the
child. Of course such a method must not be recommended without
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certain knowledge that no lurking disease of the nervous system has
escaped detection. Fretfulness and wakefulness are not associated
with proper living and good health. (112)
Lyman’s suggestion to cure troubled sleep habits through spanking (which he
euphemizes beautifully) implies both the relationship of good sleep to morality, but
also of good sleep to appropriate socialization. Lyman implies that the troubled
sleeper lacks moral strength and discipline, and he regards such a child as a drain on
the family in two significant ways: as spoiled (“inclinations have not been thwarted”)
and “expensive” in terms of the cost of treating the child medically. Overall, these
descriptions of the poorly sleeping child reflect the child as not actively productive of
resources or “earning” them, but as one who unfairly demands and depletes the
family’s attention and finances. The insomniac child is an economic drain on the
family, just as the insomniac citizen becomes a drain on his or her society. Thus, he
illustrates the relationship between “proper” and disciplined sleep habits and financial
prosperity. Consequently, Lyman emphasizes moral education as necessary in
instilling good sleep habits, enabling the child to not be a drain, but a productive,
disciplined individual.
Sleep and Industry
This interest in fatigue and sleep reflects a developing nineteenth century
consciousness of the preservation and utilization of energy rooted in the rise of
industry and technology. However, society was essentially dichotomous, and the
effects of industrialization were inconsistently spread through urban and rural areas:
“the nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth were effectively a patchwork
of disjunct spaces and times, some rationalized and shaped by new institutional and
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market-based requirements, while in many others premodern patterns and
assumptions obdurately survived” (Crary 66). The rise of interest in fatigue
correlated with a society in transition between older, pre-modern and newer,
industrial ways of being. Here we see a dichotomy between rural lives and the goods
they produce still regulated by natural cycles, but others in more modernized areas
living according to the idea that “the rationalization of production was predicated on
the rationalization of the body” (Rabinbach 243).
This increased interest in studies of fatigue reflects the rationalization of the
body required by industry. According to Eluned Summers-Bremner, “The need to
accept the limit to reason of the body’s secret knowledge about when it will sleep or,
as with democracy, an opacity key to the system’s functioning, can also be mapped
onto social concerns about the future of urban labour in America in the 1880s” (120),
but this statement certainly applies to British society as well. Here, we can see an
anxiety over understanding the workings of “natural” sleep, the body’s secrets about
why and when it can sleep, for the benefit of industry. Interestingly, complaints of
insomnia increased alongside industrial developments (Summers-Bremner 83).
Paradoxically, the more social discourse focused on maintaining and maximizing
energy use, the more the public felt that their energy was being depleted and
experienced an increased sense of fatigue. This relationship is similar to the
insomniac’s relationship with sleep: the more one obsesses over the need to sleep,
the more difficult falling asleep becomes.
One of the major figures involved in the regulation of bodily functions to
increase the productivity and profitability of labor is Frederick Taylor, developer of
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the Taylorist system of industrial management, or “the first truly scientific method of
organizing modern industrial work based on efficient procedures” (Rabinbach 239).
Taylor presented a view of sleep research different from labor scientists interested in
eliminating fatigue. Taylor’s goal was not necessarily to reduce fatigue, as we see
with some other practitioners of the labor science, but rather to eliminate wasted
movement and energy (Rabinbach 243). When presented in the light of insomnia,
views of fatigue management researchers and views of Taylorists can be applied in
both convergent and divergent ways. Both see fatigue and insomnia as counterproductive; however, where those who study fatigue management see insomnia as a
cause of decreased energy, Taylorists view it as wasted time. Either way, the need to
study and control the sleep of laborers, and by extension, all citizens, essentially
makes the work-day (regardless of the type of labor) unending. Now, in addition to
time spent working being a marker of productivity, time spent at home, sleeping or
not sleeping, also becomes a factor subject to discipline. The industrial anxiety over
wasted time, or in other words, wasted productivity and profits, resulted in a medical
discourse of sleep and habit regulation as associated with productivity, but also put
the work-day on a continuum, which extended through the night. This view persisted
into twentieth century devaluations of sleep, as those of Thomas Edison and Charles
Lindbergh discussed in the first chapter.
This view of the individual as twenty-four hour machine (whether working or
not) is apparent in the language of the medical discipline. For example, in the 1869
book Sleep and Its Derangements, John Hammond writes, “The more active the
mind, the greater necessity for sleep, just as with a steamer, the greater number of
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revolutions the engine makes, the more imperative is the demand for fuel” (50). In
another example of mechanistic language, Hammond makes the following
comparison: “To use the simile of the steam-engine again, the fires are lowered and
the operatives go to work to repair damages and put the machine in order for the next
day’s work” (43). Here Hammond clearly compares the individual to a machine,
reflecting the relationship between the necessity of sleep and industrial productivity,
which Wolf-Meyer explains as “an appeal to efficiency . . . and the continued ability
of individuals to labor” (60). In Hammond’s view, the human as machine is either
working or “repairing” itself for work; thus, it is always in some state of work.
Hammond provides a clear example of the interrelationship of the medical discipline
to industry. A. W. MacFarlane provides another example: “the need for sleep is
well explained by the fatigue of daily toil, in which waste products are manufactured
quickly and energy is expended . . . a time of rest is required for the removal of the
one and the recuperation of the other” (25). Though MacFarlane does not overtly
refer to the body as a machine, his language implies this correlation. Using terms like
“manufactured” and “products,” MacFarlane presents a comparison of the body to a
factory, and like Hammond, views the time of sleep as a period of mechanical repair.
MacFarlane and Hammond utilize an economic model of the body, incorporating
sleep as a necessary part of the manufacturing process. Marxist writer Paul Lafargue
is heavily critical of this mechanistic view of the worker, arguing that for the
capitalist, “it is ideal to reduce the producer to the smallest number of needs, to
suppress his joys and his passions and to condemn him to play the part of a machine
turning out work without respite and without thanks” (21). Lafargue notes the 24-
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hour model of individual as worker and finds fault with this conception of man as
now presented both by industrialists and the medical field.
Night Lights
Another industrial-medical correlation in sleep studies comes with the
increased study of the relationship between the newly developing use of electricity
and sleep or fatigue. The first central electricity station was built in New York City
in 1883, facilitating the introduction of electric lighting in people’s homes and its
widespread public use (Schivelbusch 66). Electric lighting, safer and cleaner than
gas, was enthusiastically embraced by the public (Schivelbusch 70-71). The use of
electric lighting opened up new economic possibilities, allowing businesses to stay
open later and increasing the safety of travelling the streets at night. Jonathan Crary
argues, “The illumination of nighttime was a symbolic demonstration of what
apologists for capitalism had promised throughout the nineteenth century: it would
be the twin guarantee of security and increased possibilities for prosperity,
supposedly improving the fabric of social existence for everyone” (16-17).
However, the increased use of electricity had somewhat paradoxical
implications, many of which are detrimental to sleep. Wolfgang Schivelbusch notes
that when gas is in use, when going to sleep, “people preferred to sever all connection
with such a dangerous element and restore the household’s original autonomy for a
few hours” (38), but electricity renders lighting not “individualistic,” but rather makes
one part of a “collective,” unable to be cut off in order to temporarily sever household
ties to the rest of the world (76). Schivelbusch claims, “Just as the public sphere
gained access to the home with daylight, so big industry forced its way in with the
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light of the gas flame and electric bulb” (186). Thus, much as industrial and fatigue
management systems extend the workday into the evening through their interest in
sleep, electric lighting ensured that the household always remained “open,” dependent
upon, and accessible to the influence and power of industry.
Night Work
One additional sleep-negating implication of the widespread use of industrial
lighting is the ability to turn night into day. Smyth notes that “Most people sleep
during the night. The silence of the night and other circumstances co-operate to bring
this about” (226). However, as early as 1845, nearly forty years before the
widespread use of electric lighting, critics of industry began to notice the implications
of disrupting this typical pattern and equate the disruption of sleep for the purpose of
labor with capitalist greed. Frederick Engels writes that the aim of capitalists:
[W]as to make the capital invested in the building and machinery to
produce the highest return, by every available means, to make it work
as actively as possible. Hence the manufacturers introduced the
shameful system of night-work. Some of them employed two sets of
operatives, and let one set work the twelve hours of the day, and the
other the twelve hours of the night. It is needless to picture the effect
upon the frames of young children, and even upon the health of young
persons and adults, produced by permanent loss of sleep at night,
which cannot be made good by any amount of sleep during the day.
Irritation of the whole nervous system, with general lassitude and
enfeeblement of the entire frame, were the inevitable results, with the
fostering of temptation to drunkenness and unbridled sexual
indulgence. One manufacturer testifies that during the two years in
which night-work was carried on in his factory, the number of
illegitimate children born was doubled, and such general
demoralization prevailed that he was obliged to give up night-work.
(161)
Engels’ critique places him in a unique position in relation to the medical discipline’s
views of the relationship between sleep and productivity. On the one hand, Engels
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agrees that the disruption of sleep cycles and irregular sleep habits are problematic in
that they both decrease a person’s energy and perpetuate vice. MacFarlane, for
example, notes effects of exhaustion in “the poor, who are obliged to continue their
work into the night to eke out their means of subsistence” and relates exhaustion to
vice for the “searchers after pleasure who convert night into day” (39-40). In this
sense, Engels is in accord with the prevalent medical views of his time, such as the
ones discussed by MacFarlane above and Lyman earlier. Engels decries the moral
and physical consequences of a break from sleep cycles dictated by natural cycles of
light and darkness, noting a marked increase in the vice of night-workers.
On the other hand, Engels acknowledges, in a way many doctors do not, the
relationship between the presence of industry and disrupted sleep. Of course, the
medical discipline did cite “overwork” as a cause for insomnia; however, “overwork”
typically referred to mental, rather than physical toil (MacFarlane 64), thus was
dissociated from industrial practice. In another example, with regard to the railroad, a
major symbol of industrialization, MacFarlane denies any relationship between it and
sleep: “Much was written at one time concerning the effects of railway travelling in
preventing sleep, but the writer, after careful inquiries, which, as medical adviser to
two railway companies, he had extensive opportunities for making, was unable to find
any evidence in support of this opinion” (46). Not surprisingly, MacFarlane,
acknowledging in this statement that he is paid by railway companies, has a stake in
disconnecting railway travel from insomnia, which Engels does not in the case of
industry; in fact, Engels is determined to find fault with industrialists. Those who
worked for and with industry, as many medical professionals and fatigue researchers
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did, did not readily acknowledge the correlation between industrialization and sleep
loss, but rather emphasized the role of individual health and habit. Others, like
Engels, view industry’s drive towards increased productivity as a source of sleep
disruption on a massive scale. One’s view of the relationship between industry and
sleep heavily reflected the bias of the individual analyzing this relationship.
It would be inaccurate to argue that workers did not labor at night prior to the
Industrial Revolution, and in “nascent enterprises—the mills, forges, and mines of
early modern Europe—we can glimpse the profound contributions that nighttime
would one day make to industrial productivity” (Ekirch 161). However, industrial
night work was the exception rather than the rule. What was not an exception,
though, were other forms of labor that commonly took place at night, such as street
cleaning (including the removal of excrement and corpses), the work of servants,
laundry, and other tasks that did not require bright light for detailed construction. As
A. Roger Ekirch argues in At Day’s Close, a study of nighttime and sleep practices in
pre-industrial times, a great deal of labor did, in fact, take place at night (156).
However, unlike the perpetually running factories Engels describes, as well as the
alienation of the worker from products of these factories, night work of pre-industrial
times had two distinct characteristics: idiosyncrasy and personal necessity. Ekirch
notes the “irregular hours that marked some laborers’ travail”: “Not all times of day
or days of the week for these workers were alike in intensity” (157). Further, it was
“the pressures of subsistence” which drove workers to night work (Ekirch 158). Night
work was done not as an alternative to, but in addition to daytime work. I am not
arguing that the laborer in a factory does not work for subsistence, but he or she
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might have the same level of subsistence if granted a day shift instead. The preindustrial worker’s subsistence, however, relied upon the addition of this night work,
making it not an alternative to daytime work but a supplement.
One major advancement made in the ability to do work on a massive scale at
night is the use of electricity. Unsurprisingly, the case of electricity provides another
example of the medical discipline embracing industry and its products is evident in
discussions of electricity and lighting. Not only does the rise of gas and electrical
lighting facilitate the ability to stay awake later into the night, it also disrupts the
privacy and isolation equated with sleep, though electricity more so than gas, as
discussed earlier. However, despite the changes in sleep allowed through the ability
to light up hours of darkness, the medical discipline, rather than criticizing the
prevalence of nighttime lighting, quickly embraced the use of electricity in treating
fatigue. According to Schivelbusch:
Electricity was believed to be, and was used as, a means of restoring
exhausted energies. In a study of the late-nineteenth-century obsession
with exhaustion, we read that “in chemical and technological warfare
against fatigue one weapon stands out among the rest: electricity. If
fatigue was the disorder of energy, electricity held out the promise of
restitution.” (71)
Many sleep studies after 1880, including MacFarlane’s Insomnia and Its Therapeutics
(1891), Lyman’s Insomnia; And Other Disorders of Sleep (1885), Edward Payson
Hurd’s Sleep, Insomnia, and Hypnotics (1891), and George M. Beard and A. D.
Rockwell’s On the Medical and Surgical Uses of Electricity (1891) offer descriptions
of the uses of electricity in treating insomnia. MacFarlane, for example, asserts its
efficacy: “This remedy, whether in the form of central galvanization or general
faradizations, is often attended by an improvement in the quantity of sleep. . . . The
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writer has found it beneficial in about three-fourths of the patients who have used it
for insomnia” (294). Here we begin to see a dichotomy between public perceptions
of electricity as a means to forestall sleep and the medical and industrial view of
electricity as a means to prevent fatigue, similar to the discrepancy between Henry
David’s Thoreau’s famous illustration in Walden of the railway as disruptive to sleep
and MacFarlane’s denials of this relationship.
Creating the Insomniac
Given this convergence of various factors, including industry, studies into
fatigue and productivity, and widespread public and domestic nighttime lighting, the
early twentieth century gives birth to a new medical diagnostic category: the
“insomniac,” which I discuss in my first chapter. I will not repeat my discussion of
the general implications of this new term here, but rather illustrate ways in which
sleep studies incorporated the idea of biographic inquiry as a method of treating
insomnia. Regarding the insomniac, in a 1923 article on the treatment of insomnia,
British physician Robert Hutchinson explains, “A careful inquiry should be made into
his past history and present conditions, his daily routine, the arrangement of his
meals, the hours and conditions of his work” (776). Hutchinson’s statement
emphasizes that insomnia is now not only a condition to be studied, but rather, the
person who suffers from insomnia becomes a character to be studied. The idea of
inquiry into character as a means of both diagnosis and treatment as we see with the
case of the insomniac was intensified by the outbreak of World War I in 1914.
Another product of the rise of industry and mechanization, the use of industrial
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warfare precipitated a spike in the amount of studies done into insomnia, as a
symptom of nervous disorder and fatigue. Rabinbach writes:
Apart from the manpower needs served by the psychophysics of
aptitude testing and the rehabilitation of the wounded, the
psychological effects of combat, especially pathological fatigue and
neurasthenia, also emerged as a universal concern. The war brought in
its wake a voluminous literature on the psychology of the emotions, in
particular the nervous disorders of the combatants. (266)
Much as medicine and industry worked together to use industrially produced
electricity as a form of treatment and ensure a rested workforce, so then did medicine
and industry work in the rehabilitation of soldiers to return them to productivity both
during and after the war: “In short, two systems were ultimately compatible. It was
not good intentions or a new intellectual synthesis, but World War—especially the
reorganization of national industry for war production—that accomplished the
amalgamation of the science of work to the Taylor system” (Rabinbach 258). In
other words, the war allowed for a culmination of the goal of sleep studies initiated in
the nineteenth century: to enable the medical discipline to ensure a productive labor
force, but also a labor force dependent on the very systems that render it productive
(electricity and medicine).
Part of the methodology of applying work science to both the military and
industry involved inquiries into the nature of the individual as reflected in the creation
of the diagnostic category of the insomniac. As Smyth observes, “There are few, if
any, human ailments requiring so fine a comprehension of our patient’s individuality,
his physique and surroundings, as the condition of insomnia” (227). Part of the
understanding of the individual comes with an understanding of his or her habits: “In
order to affect this desirable end [to insomnia] an attempt ought to be made by every
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middle-aged person who suffers from insomnia in whatever degree to mend matters
by some attention to the details of routine habits” (Rankin, “Broken Sleep” 77).
Because sleep is a habit, correcting the habit of disrupted sleep requires discipline;
however, discipline also involves outside coercion (as that from a doctor) into daily
individual behaviors. As Foucault argues, “Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is a
specific technique of power that regards individuals as both objects and instruments
of its exercise.” He continues, “The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism
that coerces by means of observation” (Discipline 170). The diagnosis of insomnia,
or more significantly, of being an insomniac, opens one’s life up to both discipline
and observation of an individual’s past and present circumstances and coercion into
“improved” sleep hygiene and habits.
According to Elaine Showalter, the period from 1870 to World War I was
“dominated” by Darwinian psychiatry. This particular branch of psychiatry “sternly
maintained that hereditary organic taint compounded by vicious habits caused
madness” (Female 104). While madness and insomnia are far from synonymous
(though the latter is often a symptom of the former), the methodology of this
Darwinian branch of medicine has strong resonances with the ways in which
insomnia was diagnosed and treated in the time period surrounding the coining of the
term insomniac. Showalter writes that Darwinian psychology “brought with it
changes in the view of the psychiatrist’s role and of the proper conduct of treatment”
(Female 105). Most significantly:
Claiming a new social authority as experts on the laws of heredity and
the operations of the mind, Darwinian psychiatrists extended their
professional role far beyond the asylum walls. They sought to capture
a wide sphere of power in late nineteenth-century society: in the
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courtroom, where they made pronouncements on the family and
education of youth; in the bedroom, where they defined acceptable
sexual behavior; and in the state, where they proposed mental hygiene
as the model of social discipline. (Female 105)
This invasion of psychiatry into the “bedroom” and other realms of a patient’s life, as
Showalter argues, goes beyond just the diagnosis of madness to the regulation of
overall social hygiene, reflecting a medical discipline imbued with a strong sense of
social responsibility.
This sense of responsibility only increased with the outbreak of WWI in 1914
and the subsequent cases of war trauma, then commonly referred to as “shell shock.”
Many believed that “shell shock was dependent upon a psychoneurotic history, and
that it was highly contagious, more frequent among the nervous, weakly, and
maladjusted, and among undisciplined units” (Showalter, Female 170). Thus, again,
we see a condition that is not interpreted as a product of its immediate circumstances,
but rather, one that is regarded as a culmination of circumstance, character, and
biography. Significant parallels exist between the diagnosis of insomnia and the
treatment of the epidemic of “shell shock” that occurred as a result of the war. On the
most basic level, insomnia is one of the most consistent symptoms of shell-shock.
Additionally, the diagnosis and treatment of both shell-shock and insomnia involve
inquiries into the character of the afflicted, as well as an association between
character type and propensity to suffer from either disorder. Finally, the goal of
treatment for either was the ultimate return to “normal” productive daily life. In a
passage on the relationship between shell shock and insomnia, in the 1918 article
“Broken Sleep,” physician Guthrie Rankin writes:
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This terrible war has exacted from those who participate in its
activities, as well as from those who “watch and wait,” an enormous
toll of misery both by day and by night. The man whose nervous
system breaks under the strain of the horrors of active conflict finds his
clinical counterpart in the mother, wife, or sweetheart at home, whose
mental poise has equally, and after a similar manner, yielded to the
burden of long-continued anxiety. Both have reached, through
different channels, the limit of endurance, and the periodical repose
which the nervous system can only obtain during sleep is interrupted,
or, it may be, permanently broken. (77)
In this passage, Rankin effeminizes the soldier who suffers from shell shock,
comparing him to a housewife. As Showalter argues, “Built on an ideology of
absolute and natural difference between women and men, English psychiatry found
its categories undermined by the evidence of male war neurosis” (Female 168), and
this undermining of categories is evident in Rankin’s linkage between soldier and
housewife. While he does acknowledge the horror of war as an intrinsic part of the
breakdown of one’s sleep, his wording suggests the importance of character. For
example, he says “The man whose nervous system breaks,” rather than “The horror of
war breaks the man’s nervous system.” His use of the passive voice defers agency
from the war experience to the character of the man incapable of resisting its effects.
The Modernist period, roughly concurrent with the start of World War I,
provided a dichotomous representation on the function and purpose of sleep studies.
On the one hand, the medical discipline continued along its previous trajectory of
emphasizing the evils of disrupted sleep, associating insomnia with flaws of
temperament or constitution, and conducting inquiries into the character and history
of the insomniac. On the other hand, literary authors began to incorporate their own
critiques of the medical discipline in their texts, and often did so through illustrating
the futility of medical treatments of insomnia and attempts at regulation of sleep. We
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see such critiques in the works of modernist authors like Virginia Woolf, Dorothy
Richardson, H. G. Wells, Siegfried Sassoon, and Ford Madox Ford. Other authors,
including F. Scott Fitzgerald, Franz Kafka, Marcel Proust, and James Joyce include
within their texts a different presentation of insomnia from that of doctors, not as a
condition diminishing productivity, but a state necessary to artistic and creative
production. I will address both approaches in more detail in subsequent chapters.
It is worth mentioning, however, that during this period we also see the rise of
the insomniac as a character, which this dissertation discusses in much detail. Kenton
Kroker argues that “The 1920s and 1930s saw the evolution of the full-blown
insomniac, whose routine struggle for adequate sleep provided psychiatrists and
neurologists with a typology, and patients with an identity” (349). As Kroker notes,
during this period insomnia was viewed as an “organic condition . . . thoroughly
grounded in the personal and medical care of the body,” and this condition also had
important resonances with overall mental health (351). Though I argue that WWI
itself had a great deal to do with the seemingly endemic nature of this condition,
Kroker argues that some contemporaries saw discussion of insomnia in media as
being part of the problem as well. For example, he cites the sleep researcher Robert
Kingman, who viewed insomnia as a “circular madness” that was so exaggerated
within media that people developed a “pathological fear of wakefulness” thereby
proliferating the condition of insomnia (351). Interestingly, Kingman largely viewed
insomnia as a delusion, and believed that modern individuals required less sleep than
their pre-industrial counterparts (Kroker 351). Much as Kingman feels that insomnia
is “circular madness,” his argument about the media involves circularity as well: did
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media make this condition “popular” through discussion? Or did it discuss this
condition because of its popularity?
Modern Sleep Studies
Ultimately, the goal, purpose and discourse of sleep studies remains fairly
consistent through the Modernist period in the ways I have previously described and
will explore in more detail in chapters to come. In fact, some maintain that, with the
exception of an increased production of information about the brain, body chemistry,
and circadian rhythms, little has changed in the study and practice of sleep over the
last century. Jim Horne, author of the 2006 book Sleepfaring: A Journey through the
Science of Sleep, argues that “our sleeping life has not really changed and, if
anything, is better today than for the average worker 100 or so years ago” (205). He
cites a passage from an 1894 editorial on sleep published in the British Medical
Journal, which states, “The hurry and excitement of modern life is held to be
responsible for much of the insomnia of which we hear” (qtd. in Horne 184),
commenting after the above quotation: “All that needs to be done [to the article] is
change the writing style a little to fit the modern idiom and the message is fit for
today!” (184). In short, we still see “modern life” as responsible for lost sleep and
consider sleep as a major part of overall health practices.
Current studies on sleep have taken two different and widely oppositional
directions. On the one hand, modern sleep science continues the work of maintaining
a productive and alert workforce, offering lifestyle advice or medications in order to
prevent insomnia and ensure quality sleep, and detailing new research producing
knowledge of the medical role of sleep in our lives. However, one major difference
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between the sleep studies of today and the sleep studies of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries rests in their relationship between insomnia and morality. While
some today still view being awake at odd hours a sign of suspicious behavior,
medical studies of sleep do not tend to argue that morally culpable individuals are
more likely to suffer from insomnia. On the other hand, and only recently, studies of
sleep science itself (as opposed to scientific studies of sleep) have become relatively
popular, giving rise to a number of authors critiquing the function and necessity of
sleep research. Up until very recently (the twenty first century), critiques of the
medical sleep industry were generally limited to literary narratives, many of which
will be explored to come. Today, we see some researchers in the social sciences
becoming involved in questioning the discourse of sleep and presenting the modern
sleep industry (ranging from developers of prescription drugs to manufacturers of
mattresses and sleep accessories) as having increasing cultural and discursive
significance. Many current sleep research critics depict insomnia as a battleground for
individual autonomy and identity. Others, often more philosophically or literarily
motivated, study sleep and insomnia from an ontological perspective, and argue that
insomnia is a necessary and productive state, not to be eliminated, but to be embraced
and explored. All sleep studies researchers, whether from the sciences, social
sciences, or humanities are currently continuing the work of interpreting, resisting,
and shaping discourses of sleep and insomnia that I argue was begun by modernist
literary authors about a century before.
For the purposes of simplification, I will focus on texts produced within the
twenty-first century and divide sleep studies today into three main disciplinary
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branches: sciences, social sciences, and humanities (there is also a “fine arts” branch
of sleep studies that inquires into sleep/insomnia in visual arts, but that is beyond the
scope of my research). While often, there is a correlation between researcher and
disciplinary conventions, this correlation is not absolute. Just as sleep and insomnia
are “interdisciplinary” (biological, psychological, philosophical), so are sleep studies;
for example, social science texts sometimes quote literature and personal narratives of
insomnia quote scientific texts, so no approach is without interdisciplinary tendencies.
In fact, all branches of sleep studies utilize narrative forms. The division these
categories itself is culturally produced, but it is useful in creating an overall picture of
approaches to sleep studies today. Generally, scientific sleep research focuses on
“objectivity”: evidence from studies, medical research, and analysis of brain waves.
Social scientific texts utilize more media-based evidence, such as advertisements.
Humanities text employ personal testimony and examples from literature, art, and
philosophy. That is not to say scientific texts do not mention advertising for sleep
medications or humanities texts do not cite studies conducted by physicians. The
differences exist in the motivation of the text: scientific texts seek to diagnose,
explain, and treat sleep disorders; social science texts examine the cultural impact of
sleep discourse; and humanities texts describe the impact of sleep discourse and
behavior for the individual. At the same time, disciplinary conventions also shape the
content of each text and become relevant to their interpretation and understanding of
the way in which they present sleep and insomnia. My goal in this section is not to
provide reviews of each individual book, nor is to cover every sleep studies book in
print, but rather to get a general sense of the ways in which sleep and insomnia are
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currently understood and discussed, especially inasmuch as our discussion of sleep
and insomnia today is predicated upon the Modernist period on which I am focusing.
As I stated earlier, the scientific branch of sleep studies extends exactly what
the science of sleep studies did in the nineteenth and twentieth century: the
understanding and optimization of sleep and the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention
of insomnia. Two examples of scientifically-based sleep studies texts include David
Randall’s Dreamland: Adventures in the Strange Science of Sleep (2012) and Jim
Horne’s Sleepfaring: A Journey through the Science of Sleep (2006). To be clear,
David Randall is not a scientist, but an American reporter and Professor of Journalism
writing about recent and past advances in sleep studies, with the goal of making
scientific studies palatable for the average adult reader. Horne, on the other hand, is a
Professor of Psychophysiology and Director of the Sleep Research Centre at
Loughborough University, UK, as well as Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Sleep
Research, but, even given his scientific background, he presents his material in
Sleepfaring in such a way that the lay-person can clearly understand the science.
This very idea of making the “science” of sleep accessible to the masses
emphasizes the importance of sleep in our current era and mimics the work of earlier
sleep researchers from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who often
published, in addition to monographs on sleep, newspaper editorials meant to educate
the average citizen on proper sleep hygiene. In addition to the similarities between
the titles of the two aforementioned books, both of which include “the Science of
Sleep,” as well as their goal of general accessibility, their formats are largely similar.
Both books incorporate a general background on the history of sleep research, discuss
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current innovations in the science of sleep, devote separate chapters to issues or
ailments that prevent “normal” sleep (significantly, insomnia, but also issues like
sleep apnea, somnambulism, and narcolepsy), and offer advice as to how to avoid
insomnia. Another interesting feature of both books is that they present sleep science
in two separate parts: sleep science of the nineteenth century and sleep science after
World War II, skimming over the Modernist period (essentially jumping from the
late-nineteenth century to the 1950s), which is, of course, my main area of inquiry.
With regard to insomnia more specifically, both texts echo medical texts of a
hundred years ago and present insomnia as a matter of individual causation and
responsibility and defer to scientific discovery and methodology for treatment. David
Randall writes, “[I]nsomnia is a unique and difficult condition to treat because it is
self-inflicted. The cause is often the brain’s refusal to give up its unequaled ability to
think about itself, a meta-phenomenon that Harvard professor Daniel M. Wegner has
called ‘the ironic process of mental control’” (229-30). Interestingly, David Randall
refers to the “self” as cause (“self-inflicted”), but then through his use of synecdoche,
the “brain” substitutes for the “self” in his explanation. Within this statement exists a
paradoxical relationship between the brain and the self; the “self” is implicated in the
functioning of the brain, but at the same time, the brain resists the self’s control.
David Randall acknowledges the difficulty in treating insomnia, partially because
“science, as a whole, has a fuzzy definition of what constitutes the disorder” (232).
Again, he makes a revealing statement, arguing that the self’s inability to control the
brain is the cause, yet the resolution rests with more scientific understanding. In
essence, he appears to be searching for scientific solutions to seemingly ontological
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problems, begging the question as to whether we really want science to be able to
determine the way we “control” our thoughts. To put it a different way, if insomnia
rests in our inability to control the functioning of our brains, are we looking for a cure
that entails scientific understanding and manipulation of thought processes? I cannot
help but envision a Hegelian dialectic that is not between the self and other (self), but
rather the self and scientist.
Horne, like David Randall, argues that we do need medical intervention into
our thoughts to prevent and treat insomnia. The treatments he suggests are mainly
psychological: “For a start, the sufferer must avoid getting angry about the insomnia
and blame it for all their problems—it is probably the other way around” (216). He
continues, “Do not worry about not having enough sleep” (217). He concludes that
the best course of action, assuming there are no underlying physical reasons for the
insomnia (like chronic pain or uncomfortable sleeping conditions), rests with therapy:
There is often anger and frustration over other aspects of [insomniacs’]
lives, focused on when trying to sleep. Which is all the more reason
for sorting out the personal problems and getting these other issues
aired during the day rather than taking them to bed. Here is where
good counselling can be so very effective, in highlighting these
problems and demonstrating why insomnia is not so much a sleep
disorder, but one that largely permeates all of wakefulness. (219-20)
Horne, like sleep researchers a century before him, views the root of insomnia as a
matter to be dealt with through therapeutic inquiry. The insomnia does not need the
treatment; the insomniac does. Given his view of insomnia as something that
“permeates all of wakefulness,” intervention into sleep involves a more holistic
intervention into waking life, inversely mirroring sleep studies of the nineteenth
century in which the requirements of waking life entailed intervention into sleeping
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habits. Again, we see the self on a continuum between sleep and waking, where both
become unified in their need for intervention and normalization.
Another idea proposed by both David Randall and Horne is the idea that
insomniacs often sleep a lot more than they believe they do, adding an additional
layer of complexity to the mind-body relationship of the insomniac. Horne writes,
“Apart from anxiety [the insomniacs’] problem also lies with a loss of the ability to
realise that, during the first hour or so of seemingly endless tossing and turning, for
what seems like interminable periods during the night, they are dipping in and out of
what can become beneficial sleep” (214). David Randall makes a similar argument:
Patients who have spent a night in a sleep lab, for instance, often
complain that it took them more than an hour to fall asleep when a
chart of their brain waves shows they were asleep within ten minutes.
Problems of self-reporting aren’t limited to judging how long it took to
get to sleep. Some patients wake up in labs claiming that they didn’t
sleep at all during the night, despite hours of video and brain wave
evidence to the contrary.
It is part of the paradox that sleep presents to a conscious mind.
We can’t easily judge the time that we are asleep because that time
feels like an absence, a break from the demands of thought and
awareness. The times that we do remember are those that we wish we
couldn’t: staring at the clock in the middle of the night, turning the
pillow over desperately hoping that the other side is cooler, kicking the
covers off or pulling them up close. Those experiences, even if they
last only three minutes, often become exaggerated in our minds and
overshadow the hours we spent sleeping peacefully, simply because
we remember them. (232-33)
In other words, not only is insomnia all in the insomniac’s head (as cause of
insomnia), but it is also all in the insomniac’s head (as experience of insomnia).
Again, according to this presentation of the experience of insomnia, the actual
insomnia is not the problem; rather the way we think about the insomnia is the real
issue at stake. We think we are not sleeping; therefore, even if we do sleep, we
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cannot realize that we have, which further exacerbates the sense of sleeplessness and
perpetuates its existence (or perceived existence).
Both of the explanations above of the discrepancy between the amount of
sleep an insomniac “actually” gets and the amount of sleep he or she perceives raises
an interesting question: what is more important, sleep or the feeling of having slept?
Both David Randall’s and Horne’s approaches point to a privileging of the scientific
over the ontological: getting “beneficial” sleep trumps the benefits of feeling like one
has slept. Insomnia becomes a mere chimera, but an extraordinarily powerful one.
Yet, the “illusion” of insomnia appears to be what truly motivates the insomniac and
perpetuates the ongoing sense of insomnia. The body may have slept according to
scientific “evidence” like brain wave patterns, but the mind does not feel this way.
The subject then perceives the reality to have been lack of sleep, though, as Horne
argues, most sufferers “are not particularly sleepy in the daytime, are ‘bright eyed’ by
day, and do not complain of sleepiness—only that they cannot go to sleep” (214). He
concludes, “No daytime sleepiness equals no real sleep loss” (214). The area of
contention becomes the state between “real” (Horne’s word) and perceived, but also
raises another question: if the insomniac is not really tired or suffering other health
effects, why is insomnia a complaint at all?
Sociological Sleep Studies
The answer to this question comes, at least in part, from a different approach
to sleep studies, which examines discursive perceptions of the importance of sleep
and the “harm” of insomnia. Taking a different route from the scientific analysis of
sleep are the social-science texts such as Jonathan Crary’s 24/7: Late Capitalism and
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the Ends of Sleep (2013), Matthew Wolf-Meyer’s The Slumbering Masses: Sleep,
Medicine, and Modern American Life (2012), Simon J. Williams’ The Politics of
Sleep: Governing (Un)consciousness in the Late Modern Age (2011), and Eluned
Summers-Bremner’s Insomnia: A Cultural History (2008). The authors of these
texts come from a wide range of academic disciplines: Crary is a Professor of
Modern Art and Theory, Wolf-Meyer is an anthropology professor, Williams is a
sociology professor, and Summers-Bremner is an English professor. Despite their
divergent fields, all approach sleep from a social/cultural perspective if not from the
social sciences directly. Rather than explaining the content and conclusions of sleep
research, these texts trace the impact of sleep research on Western life both
historically and currently, and do so through examining both scientific and cultural
texts. They do not offer advice on insomnia cures or analyze sleep with the end of
understanding and improving one’s rest, but instead emphasize the ways in which
sleep research, rather than sleep itself, contributes to our daily behaviors and
interpretations of the world. The first three texts, while they include some historical
perspectives generally from the last half of the nineteenth century, are mostly focused
on sleep in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, adopting the general
position that the current state of scientific sleep studies, as well as the sleep industry,
reflects, supports, and emphasizes a frenetic sense of production and acquisition
apparent in modern capitalist life. Summers-Bremner focuses more broadly on the
history of sleep studies, beginning in the ancient world, but also concludes with the
effects of modernity and capitalism on sleep today; she also includes historical
examples from literature within her research. One common feature of all texts is that
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they present the way we discuss sleep, but more importantly, the way we actually
sleep, as intrinsically connected with economic and social forces in action today.
One conclusion these sociological texts share is the perspective that capitalism
devalues sleep-time, essentially because it is time spent neither earning nor spending
money. Crary, for example, argues:
The huge portion of our lives that we spend asleep, freed from a
morass of simulated needs, subsists as one of the great human affronts
to the voraciousness of contemporary capitalism. Sleep is an
uncompromising interruption of the theft of time from us by
capitalism. . . . Sleep poses the idea of a human need and interval of
time that cannot be colonized and harnessed to a massive engine of
profitability, and thus remains an incongruous anomaly and site of
crisis in the global present. (10-11)
As of yet, scientific endeavors have focused on the ability to reduce or eliminate
sleep, rather than the ability to eliminate wakefulness through the “productive” use of
sleep time (in the sense of putting sleeping people to work in their sleep), but his
comments suggest the future possibility of such a movement. Currently, we have
some nascent examples of this trend, as anyone who has ever tried to quit smoking or
learn a foreign language in their sleep could attest. Crary traces sleep’s
“incompatibility with modern notions of productivity and rationality” back to
Enlightenment philosophers like David Hume, Rene Descartes, and John Locke, who
“disparaged sleep for its irrelevance to the operation of the mind and the pursuit of
knowledge” (12). “Sleep,” Crary asserts, “is the only remaining barrier, the only
enduring ‘natural condition’ that capitalism cannot eliminate” (74).
However, just because capitalism has not yet managed to eliminate sleep, that
does not mean it has not tried to do so. For example, David Randall notes that the
American military’s “goal was to develop a way for a soldier to go without sleep for
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one hundred hours and still perform common tasks. The military spent millions of
dollars testing theories, such as whether it would be possible to put half of the human
brain asleep at a time, essentially allowing a person to sleep like a dolphin” (135).
All these tests failed, and to date, no medication has been developed that can
substitute for sleep. Additionally, psychologist Ray Meddis, writing in the 1970s,
hoped to find a way to rewire the brain so as to avoid the “wasted time” associated
with sleep (Wortham 2). Meddis viewed sleep as an unnecessary by-product of
evolution, no longer essential, but simply a product of habit (Wortham 2). A
movement towards reducing or eliminating the need for sleep points to a mechanistic
conception of the individual as a 24/7 machine evolving from the nineteenth century
portrayals, such as those of MacFarlane and Hammond:
A 24/7 environment has the semblance of a social world, but it is
actually a non-social model of machinic performance and a suspension
of living that does not disclose the human cost required to sustain its
effectiveness. . . . An illuminated 24/7 world without shadows is the
final capitalist mirage of a post-history, of an exorcism of otherness
that is the motor of historical change. (Crary 9)
Humans no longer simply resemble machines, as nineteenth century comparisons
indicate; rather, according to Crary’s view, with the drive towards sleeplessness
(which must be distinguished from insomnia), humans become the machines, fully
integrated into a larger network of machines. Part of this de-individuation comes
through the devaluation of sleep.
Historically, the discursive view of sleep has changed. Prior to the Industrial
Revolution, sleep was regarded as “something to be striven for, a quiet state that
needed to be gained” (Summers-Bremner 8). Rather than being regarded as a
passive, unproductive state, Summers-Bremner argues that the ancients saw sleep as
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“an active part of life whose only distinction from waking activity was that it usually
took place in darkness” (8). Like Crary, Summers-Bremner aruges that modernity
devalues sleep (8). Thus, we see this movement from sleep as an active, desired state
to a currently devalued one, with a turning point essentially being the emergence of
capitalist economic systems in which increased time spent working is equated with
increased profits (Summers-Bremner 50). However, the Industrial Revolution, given
its focus on the rationalization of the body to foster efficiency, created a middle
ground of sorts between sleep as an active, desirable state and sleep as a waste of
time. According to Wolf-Meyer, “Since the industrial revolution, Americans have
become invested in a form of social organization that limits varieties of sleep.
Moreover, this limiting organization also forces the medicalization of particular
normal sleeping patterns, rendering them pathological” (254). Wolf-Meyer’s
argument makes sense in the context of the sheer amount of sleep studies that took
place in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Sleep was certainly seen as
desirable, but only inasmuch as it fit into and prepared one for the workday.
Summers-Bremner writes, “Not only does capitalism count on its workers having had
a good night’s sleep before they have had it, but it adds the future value of future
sleep, required to keep the worker working reliably, into its forward accounting of
time” (99). As I argued earlier, in the nineteenth century, so much sleep advice
existed because sleep was seen as essential to productivity. Today, as technology
changes, science has begun to question whether or not sleep actually is essential or to
what extent it can be eliminated.
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Though Crary and others argue that capitalism currently devalues time spent
asleep, in a way that did not take place a century earlier when time asleep should be
maximized rather than eliminated, some researchers describe ways in which
capitalism can, in essence, reclaim the value of sleep, not by eliminating it, but by
selling it. Profits from lost sleep come largely in the form of sleeping pills, which as I
noted earlier, 25% of Americans have been prescribed. This widespread use of
pharmaceuticals indicates an ironic (and cynical) attempt at re-establishing “natural”
rhythms of sleep and waking. Wolf-Meyer notes that “At the turn of the twenty-first
century, American everyday life is fundamentally tied to ideas of the rhythmic,
emblematized in the repetitive use of pharmaceuticals, which produce and depend
upon everyday notions of time and space” (92). Modern life and technology have so
far removed us from “natural” (I use this term skeptically—if a cave person ate some
soporific berries, is his or her sleep “natural”?) time and space that their effects can
now be recreated medically.
We can see the extent to which pharmaceuticals have become profitable
through the sheer number of their sales; Williams illustrates that the global market for
sleeping pills, both prescription and over-the-counter, exceeded $4.3 billion in 2005,
with predictions of sales exceeding $11 billion by 2012, nearly a three-fold increase
(Politics 138). In America alone, according to an NBC News article, a reported 50 to
70 million Americans suffer sleep disorders, and “about 59 million sleeping pills
were prescribed in America in 2012” (Aleccia). These numbers exclude other sleeprelated products, such as designer mattresses that can cost up to $10,000 (Hayes 77),
white noise machines, Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) masks for sleep
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apnea, fitness trackers that purportedly measure and record sleep time and quality,
and even SmartPhone applications designed to improve the quality of sleep.
Not only do we see a recent increase in the amount of sleep-inducing drugs on
the market, but also in the use of prescription stimulants, such as Provogil, used to
promote and extend wakefulness. Originally used to treat narcolepsy and shift-work
sleep disorder, as well as (more controversially) sleep apnea, Provogil has recently
seen a spike in prescriptions for ordinary drowsiness, and “can now be prescribed at
the whim of attending physicians for any number of drowsy conditions” (Wolf-Meyer
146-47). Wolf-Meyer quotes the website of Cephalon, the pharmaceutical company
that manufactures Provogil: “People with excessive sleepiness may feel as if they
just don’t have the energy to do the things they need to do on a daily basis, such as
spending time with their families or performing duties at work” (qtd. in Wolf-Meyer,
147). Analyzing these statements, Wolf-Meyer argues, “One might notice in these
symptoms the very conditions of modern life” (147). Interestingly, the “treatment”
for modern life is not rest, but rather artificially induced wakefulness.
Seemingly, then, given the fact that capitalism devalues time spent sleeping
due to lost productivity in combination with the fact that sleep disorders are highly
profitable given the numbers of pharmaceuticals and other sleep-inducing products
sold, insomnia is one of capitalism’s greatest allies—the epitome of a “create the
problem then sell the solution” driven market. Yet, somewhat ironically, insomnia
and capitalism have yet to become friendly bedfellows, and definite tension exists
between the conflicting ideas of the push to get “proper” or “enough” sleep and the
drive to eliminate the need for sleep and promote the value of spending more time
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awake. As Williams argues, “In response to this dominant or sleep-negative agenda,
we may also now point to a second growing and altogether more concerned: sleep
positive agenda . . . in which sleep is problematised as a matter of concern on the one
hand, given the costs and consequences of poor sleep for society, and championed on
the other hand” (Politics xiv). So, while we are given every reason not to sleep today,
from a multitude of responsibilities and distractions to the ability to conduct business
at any hour, we are still told how important and necessary proper sleep is, essentially
for the same reasons that existed in the nineteenth century: it is necessary to be
healthy and productive. For Williams, “sleep is being or has become increasingly
politicised in the late modern age” (Politics xvii). I differ with Williams on this
point, as I argue that this politicization of sleep is far from a recent phenomenon, but
his point is resonant in its understanding of sleep as a matter of public and political
concern, but also one subject to conflicting discourses: sleep is good, healthy and
necessary as opposed to sleep is a waste of time and productivity. The difference, for
me, between today and the Modernist period is the balance between sleep as waste
and sleep as health. While, in the Modernist period, there was certainly a sense that
excess sleep was waste, the idea of eliminating sleep altogether was not seen as the
option it is today, especially given the social concerns over fatigue. Even those who
sought, like Edison, to limit their sleep, were viewed as supermen of sorts, not
necessarily someone to be emulated by the majority, but outliers with a unique talent.
An important distinction between insomnia and sleeplessness must be
acknowledged, which is another significant different between the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries and the twenty-first century. Sleeplessness, as in the sense of the
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hypothetical sleepless soldier mentioned earlier, is time spent awake and active,
participating in the 24/7 network Crary envisions. In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the ability to be sleepless yet rested was sometimes seen as admirable,
especially in powerful men like Napoleon and Edison (albeit dangerous for women).
But, eliminating sleep altogether was off the table in terms of lifestyle options.
Insomnia is time spent awake, but awake in isolation, hence it implies noncompliance, and was and is accordingly problematic. If sleep is politicized and seen
in a dual light, so then must be insomnia. Interestingly, though nearly all of the
aforementioned authors of cultural sleep studies argue that capitalism,
industrialization, and modernization foster insomnia, they also present the view that
insomnia is no friend to capitalism, despite the revenue it generates. Crary, for
instance, paraphrasing and adapting Emmanuel Levinas’ ideas, argues that insomnia
is powerful because it is a form of resistance to the violence of modern society:
Part of the modernized world we inhabit is the ubiquitous visibility of
useless violence and the human suffering it causes. This visibility, in
all its mixed forms, is a glare that ought to thoroughly disturb any
complacency, that ought to preclude the restful unmindfulness of
sleep. Insomnia corresponds to the necessity of vigilance, to a refusal
to overlook the horror and injustice that pervades the world. It is the
disquiet of the effort to avoid inattention to the torment of the other. . .
. It is where we face the near impossibility of living humanely. (1819)
Levinas, in Time and the Other, describes insomnia as “Vigilance without end” (48).
He argues that insomnia is “a vigilance without refuge in unconsciousness, without
the possibility of withdrawing into sleep as into a private domain” (49). If we look at
insomnia as a state of waking isolation, where one is not awake in the sense that one
is being distracted by the goings-on of the world, but rather can merely contemplate
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them, then insomnia becomes a time of questioning, realization, and resistance.
Essentially, insomnia is a state of awake-ness without external stimulation, which can
prevent analysis and insight. Insomnia, in Crary’s view, forces the insomniac to
reckon with the conditions of his or her existence, and Crary argues that these
conditions are quite ugly. We can be distracted from this ugliness by constant
stimulation, but without that stimulation, as is the case of the person who lies awake
in bed alone at night, we must confront the ugliness instead.
Wolf-Meyer, on the other hand, has a different position as to why insomnia is
problematic today. He argues that our concern over insomnia today relates not as
much to insomnia as a time for confronting the horrors of the modern world, but
rather because of another form of resistance that the insomniac displays: resistance to
homogenization. He writes, “The power of medicine lies in its ability to cure, in its
ability to make bodies anew; the force of medicine is homogenizing; it makes bodies
the same, it produces the masses” (94). He continues:
In seeing ourselves through medicine, we integrate ourselves into the
body of the masses—that abstract set of data that rules normative
expectations about bodies and their behaviors. In so doing, we
eradicate our differences by becoming subject to the power of
medicine. It is only when our bodies react poorly to treatments, when
individuals become noncompliant, that difference is reasserted. (95)
Insomnia, when it is resistant to treatment or normalization, essentially devalues the
power of science, but the “problem” (if one sees it as such) is much larger. Science,
via medicine, is “a form of contemporary control of the natural” but also a way to
“draw on American medicine’s colonial and industrial legacies of surveillance and
control of individuals and the masses. This control is the basis of our desires and
intimacies” (93). To phrase Wolf-Meyer’s argument in a different way, we are
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essentially coerced through mainstream discourse to trust in the power and objectivity
of science and medicine. Wolf-Meyer argues that it is through this trust in science
and medicine that we can be normalized, and our behaviors and desires are shaped.
However, a condition that resists or rebels against scientific treatment, such as
insomnia, illustrates the fallibility of science and shakes our faith in its efficacy. As a
result, we become more independent, and less subject to outside normalization and
homogenization. In other words, insomnia protects individuality in a society that
strives for uniformity. This idea of the non-participation of insomnia in the 24/7
network to which Crary alludes to a point of agreement between Crary and WolfMeyer despite their divergent views on the “danger” of insomnia: they both feel, in a
sense, that insomnia “protects” individual autonomy.
Summers-Bremner offers a similar view on the “problem” of insomnia today:
The wired world cannot help us manage contingency and dependence,
the true price of interconnectedness, to the text that these are what it
imagines it excludes. In response to this world, insomnia is not only a
nightmare mimicry of the idealized instantaneity, however—too many
thoughts occurring all at once, too quickly!—but also a form of
historical consciousness because in the absolute unknowing it calls us
to—we are unable to continue worshipping ‘the now’. Insomnia
shows that although we can study the world repeatedly, we can never
study it with our own being fully included, just as we cannot be awake
and asleep in the same moment. (148)
Summers-Bremner’s argument is a synthesis of the arguments made by Crary and
Wolf-Meyer. She shares Crary’s view of insomnia as revelatory and as a source of
exclusion from the 24/7 network of capitalism and modern technology. She also
expresses Wolf-Meyer’s interpretation of insomnia as a form of non-compliance with
social norms and the illusory capacity of medicine to truly eradicate individual
difference. For Summers-Bremner, it is not the insomnia that is chimerical, as Horne
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and Randall posit, but rather the idea that we can fully illuminate both the world and
ourselves that is the illusion. She points to the inability of science and medicine to be
fully objective because, after all, scientists are humans too. We cannot eliminate
ourselves in the study of ourselves, or as Louis Althusser argues:
What seems to take place outside ideology . . . in reality takes place in
ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take
place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe
themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of
ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of
ideology by ideology: ideology never says, ‘I am ideological.’ It is
necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be
able to say: I am in ideology (a quite exceptional case) or (the general
case): I was in ideology. . . . Which amounts to saying that ideology
has no outside (for itself), but at the same time that it is nothing but
outside (for science and reality). (118-19)
Science and medicine can create the appearance of being outside of ideology, but
such placement is impossible.
Williams supports Summers-Bremner’s view of insomnia as a nemesis to
medicine. He argues that insomnia “was a condition characterised more by
controversy than consensus, idiosyncrasy than typicality, regarding its nature and
status, including diagnostic difficulties and frequent discrepancies between subjective
and objective estimates of sleep loss” (Politics 121-22). Again, we see this recurring
argument among the sociological studies of insomnia and sleep that points to
insomnia as a condition that eludes and defies modern scientific-medical knowledge
and the power of culture and science to effect homogenization and full integration. If
anything, insomnia cannot be treated en masse, and thus the insomniac individual
remains apart. Efforts to look at the insomniac as part of a group of insomniacs have
ultimately failed in terms of consistency of symptoms, diagnosis, treatment, and
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resolution. Essentially, insomnia remains a citadel of individuality in an increasingly
de-individualizing, interdependent, and inter-connected world, something that
modernist literary authors, as well as physicians, pointed to decades before.
Insomnia in the Humanities
Then, if insomnia must and can only be regarded on a case-by-case basis, the
humanities offers us the ability to truly examine the individual experience of
insomnia, with various authors providing highly personal and divergent views. The
humanities presents a series of perspectives on sleep studies, which I will categorize
in three general directions. First, there are philosophical explorations of sleep and
insomnia, the most recent of which is French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Fall
of Sleep (2007), which examines the ontological implications of sleeping, falling
asleep, and failing to sleep. Additionally, writers like Blake Butler in Nothing: A
Portrait of Insomnia (2011) and Bill Hayes in his autobiographical text Sleep
Demons: An Insomniac’s Memoir (2001), write phenomenological and ontological
accounts of their insomnia and its impact on their lives and interpretation of the
world, but both also incorporate philosophical, literary, medical, and historical
perspectives on sleep and insomnia. Finally, there are some recent studies of
insomnia and sleep as it is presented in fictional literature as it relates to authorial
experience, including Herschel Farbman’s The Other Night: Dreaming, Writing, and
Restlessness in Twentieth-Century Literature (2008) and Peter Schwenger’s At the
Borders of Sleep: On Liminal Literature (2012). Similar to the insomniac memoirs
mentioned above, these texts examine insomnia as a productive, generative state, but
use literary and philosophical texts, rather than historical ones, as primary sources.
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Nancy’s text focuses mainly on the space between sleeping and waking, the
elusive moments during which one “falls” asleep, a word which implies movement
though the body is still. Though Nancy is French, his writing is applicable to both
American and British society because of the homogenization of Western culture
present in our increasingly globalized world, which Nancy addresses in his text.
Nancy’s primary argument is that sleep eradicates the subject but preserves the self,
again associating sleep with individuality and non-participation in larger systems of
production. For Nancy, “There is no phenomenology of sleep, for it shows of itself
only in its disappearance” (13). No “subject” can experience sleep because the
subject does not exist in the sleeping state, at least to himself or herself. He discusses
the slippage of the self during the time of sleep, arguing that during sleep, “I myself
become indistinct. I no longer properly distinguish myself from the world or from
others, from my own body or from my mind either” (7). Nancy makes an important
distinction between the self as “I” and the self as soul. During sleep, the “I” (or self
as subject) disappears, but “never does the soul sleep” (35). Sleep is a “vanishing” of
the individualized self, as well as a return to the self through the loss of the “I,” but
more importantly, it is a respite from “the supposed heights of vigilant consciousness,
from surveillance and control, from projection and differentiation” (11). Sleep, then,
for Nancy is an escape from an integrated, 24/7 world.
Nancy demonstrates tension between the modern world and sleep, and here
we see echoes of Crary’s vision of an inescapable 24/7 world in which one is always
immersed in an interconnected network of a paradoxical combination of stimulation
and somnolence. In such a world, sleep has lost its import: “occupying night,
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invading it by work, is the obsession of systems of production” (22); sleep is again
devalued. Nancy writes of this “invaded” world in more detail:
It is possible that the world today is that way: without sleeping or
waking. Sleeping standing up, waking while dozing. Sleepwalking
and somnolent. World deprived of rhythm, world that has deprived
itself of rhythm, that has stripped away from itself the possibility of
seeing its days and its nights correspond to the system of nature or
history. . . . World in shambles, out of balance, uneven enough to
make sleep itself devastated by unevenness. Sleepers harassed, always
on the alert, less fallen asleep than thrown into sleep, precipitated by a
numbness from short hours broken by knocking sounds in the head,
knocks on the door, blows or gunshots. Sleepers are not so much
sleeping as knocked out, conquered at night as they were during the
day. . . . Nights shot through with flashes of fire, of frenzy, of famine.
Nights stripped of their very night, uprooted from darkness and
shadow, thrown into the harsh light of a nuclear blinding. Sleeps that
are nothing but parodies, caricatures of sleeps, heads kept buried
beneath muddy water but kept from giving themselves over to the
abandon of deep waters. (38-39)
In this lengthy passage, Nancy creates a dire view of sleep in the modern world.
Night no longer exists, rhythms of the natural world are disrupted, sleep cannot
remain undisturbed, and we no longer “fall” but are rather “thrown into” sleep. If we
think of the 24/7 world in which we live today, with constant access to lighting,
media, and various forms of stimulation, his arguments make sense. The idea of
being “knocked out” rather than asleep speaks to our society’s use of prescription
medications and other self-prescribed substances to aid in sleeping. His argument
also resonates with Crary’s point of insomnia’s ability to expose the non-sleeper to
the horror and violence of our current world. One who is awake at night can witness
the violence of the world.
However tied into contemporary life as Nancy’s view of sleep and waking
today seem, as Horne argues regarding our complaints of sleep over the past century,
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the world Nancy depicts may have existed for a hundred years or more, not simply
coming into being recently, but continuing along a trajectory that began in the middle
of the nineteenth century. Take the following passage from Thoreau’s Walden:
We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us. Did you ever think
what those sleepers are that underlie the railroad? Each one is a man. .
. . The rails are laid on them. . . . They are sound sleepers, I assure
you. . . . And when they run over a man that is walking in his sleep, a
supernumerary sleeper in the wrong position, and wake him up, they
suddenly stop the cars, and make a hue and cry about it, as if this were
an exception. (107)
Much like Crary and Nancy, Thoreau offers a view of people as essentially
sleepwalking through life, intertwined with and subjugated by the technology that has
come to dominate both them and their lives. Benjamin Reiss, in an article about
Thoreau’s views of sleep entitled “Sleeping at Walden Pond,” writes, “Thoreau
perceived modernity as a world of unasleep, unawake zombies, hooked onto
machines, fueled by neural jolts delivered by caffeinated beverages and sensational
news stories . . . and occasionally being run over by the machines to which they are
enslaved as they walk in a somnambulistic trance across the tracks” (15-16).
Thoreau’s world is not that different from Nancy’s (ours), as Thoreau expresses a
somnambulistic world deprived of “natural” rhythms, ruled by technology, and
dominated by the violence of people being “run over” by their own creations.
Additionally, Schivelbusch’s previously discussed arguments about the use of
industrial lighting point to the fact that the nocturnal world has been turned into a
state of unnatural daylight since the second half of the nineteenth century beginning
the process of the dissociation of the modern world from “natural” rhythms.
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Strikingly, Nancy excludes insomnia from his discussions of sleep:
“Interruptions and perturbations, including those that arise sometimes from within
sleep itself, like those nightmares that wake us up in anxiety and sweat—these
accidents of sleep do not belong to it” (17). His world may be sleepless, but it is not
an insomniac world, just as one cannot be sleepwalking and have insomnia
simultaneously. According to Nancy, the soul has essentially two states: vigilance
and somnolence. The vigilant soul watches us when we are awake, and the
somnolent soul when we are asleep, but “it is not the insomniac, this soul” (37).
Nancy’s view seems to correspond here with that of Horne and David Randall who
argue that insomnia may be perceived, but is not necessarily “real” in the “objective,”
scientific sense. Rather, insomnia is a state of alternation between sleep and waking,
described by Nancy as the heavily disrupted sleep of modernity, but by Horne and
David Randall as the inability to distinguish between when one is asleep and when
one is awake. Paradoxically, for Nancy, insomnia seemingly does not exist (one is
awake, falling asleep, or asleep), but it is also perpetual, as we live our lives not
knowing the difference between sleep and waking, behaving as though we are asleep
when we are awake and thinking we have been awake when we were really asleep.
We are perpetually in a state of false insomnia, which we may see and understand as
insomnia, but is only a series of unwitting vacillations between sleeping and waking.
Whether or not insomnia is a “real” physical and psychological state, or only
“real” as an ontological state, the perception of insomnia does in fact alter one’s
relationship to the worlds of both sleep and waking. Writers who study the power of
insomnia in their own lives include Butler and Hayes, both of whom wrote memoirs
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of their experiences with insomnia. Their interdisciplinary works are largely hybrid
studies of insomnia, pointing again to insomnia as a condition that is viewed as
simultaneously medical, social, and psychological, as well as highly individualized
and philosophical. The one aspect of these two texts that differentiates them from
others I have discussed is the focal point of the solitary individual (the author) as the
primary insomniac of the text simultaneously studying and describing his own
insomnia. These authors, unlike the authors discussed earlier who study insomnia to
study its role in either society or medicine, study insomnia to learn something more
about themselves and their own lives and perceptions.
Other commonalities are visible in Butler’s and Hayes’s descriptions of their
insomnia. Their texts include an important feature lacking in the more scientific texts
mentioned earlier. They both describe firsthand accounts of the emotional component
of insomnia and its related sense of anxiety and frustration to a much more extensive
degree. They illustrate, rather than simply discuss, the linkage between insomnia and
interconnectivity with technology. Butler, for example, inserts repetitive keyboard
symbols throughout his text, and Hayes refers to his “mind racing like the spell-check
function on a computer, scanning all data” (3) during his bouts of insomnia. Both
Butler and Hayes express the futility of medical attempts at treating their insomnia
and skepticism about the use of prescription drugs in its treatment. The importance of
these two memoirs comes primarily from the ability of these two authors to present
extended case studies of insomnia that illustrate the role of insomnia in producing the
individual and influencing the interpretation of the self and experience.
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Despite choosing to write about insomnia and its impact on their lives, even
the self-proclaimed insomniac authors see insomnia as a possible issue of perception
rather than reality. Lifelong insomniac Butler notes that:
Problem sleepers often interpret their rest conditions to be more severe
than recorded sleep times and depths may, to someone outside that
skin, make them seem. In some self-perceived ‘insomniacs’ there
might be no sign of a disrupted state at all—and yet, in their mind and
flesh, they feel arrested, turned out, scratched. In this way, though the
person never experiences a full-blown, calculable sleep session, he or
she does transgress the phases of consciousness, blurring the mind,
allowing rest. Many claims to extensive insomnia are, then, not only
questionable, but perhaps even delusional. It becomes difficult to say.
(35)
Hayes also confesses to a failure to realize when he has slept. He writes, “Every so
often, [his partner] Steve begged to differ with my morning-after reports. Adamant
that I hadn’t slept more than an hour the night before, for instance, I’d be shocked to
hear him say, ‘You were sound asleep from three to five at least.’ . . . Uh oh, caught
in a lie that I didn’t even know I’d committed” (267). According to Hayes,
sometimes an insomniac’s claims of sleeplessness stem from “a twisted pride” in not
sleeping, but Hayes acknowledges the possibility of a condition known as “sleep state
misperception” in which despite “all evidence to the contrary, a person claims to be
an incurable insomniac” (267).
Both Butler and Hayes acknowledge not only the possibility of insomnia as
delusion, but also insomnia as a state of unknowable alterations between sleeping and
waking, thus, not necessarily a state distinct from either but a state of blurring of both,
such as Nancy describes. Butler comments, “Eventually, inside of troubled sleep, the
sleeping and not sleeping begin to feel the same” (112). Butler and Hayes both
account for the possibility of insomnia as a state of delusion rather than reality, but do
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so more tentatively. Instead of saying “it is difficult to say” whether or not someone
has “real” insomnia, Butler says it “becomes” difficult to say. His use of the word
“becomes” here implies this particular definition of insomnia not as lack of sleep, but
lack of awareness of sleep, as a relatively recent development. Similarly, Hayes
proposes the idea of insomnia as a matter of self-perception with implications for
identity: “What I insist on calling insomnia, [my father] calls a few lousy nights’
sleep” (321). What one may regard as an occasional inconvenience becomes an
important component of identity to another—even if both have similar symptoms.
If we take in combination the medical views of insomnia as presented by
Horne and David Randall and the personal confessions of Butler and Hayes that they
may be exaggerating their own insomnia, perhaps there is a current movement not
only to eliminate sleep, but to eliminate insomnia as well. This elimination of
insomnia does not come through treatment, but rather denial, through simply
changing one’s perspective on what insomnia is or is not. This “trend” points to a
paradoxical relationship between the mind and body. Just as insomnia exposes a
tension between desires of the mind and desires of the body, this movement towards
viewing insomnia as a mere matter of misunderstanding of the self reveals a different
tension. Is the “true” self that we “know” the one that is measured through scientific
standards like brain waves and objective observation? Or, is the “self” a product of
what we believe to be our experiences? Ultimately, to treat a condition that involves
a conflict of will and autonomy, one must will oneself to believe that the condition
does not really exist.
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Yet, there seems to be no doubt in Butler’s or Hayes’s minds that their own
insomnia is quite real and plays a substantial role in their lives and relationships.
Butler, for example, claims to have been awake for a full 129 hours (106). Further
emphasizing the reality of his own insomnia (but also its illusory nature), Butler
describes it largely in spatial, physical terms. At one point, he describes insomnia as a
barrier to entering the room of sleep (13-14). He presents insomnia as a physical
movement of the mind and reshaping of the body:
The fear of sleeplessness breeds more sleeplessness, and the locks
begin to change around the keys, the mind turning activated inside a
tired body, full of no distinct direction. The air of what wants out or
on inside the head in growing tired and staying tired makes days seem
brighter, thicker. . . . As well, in the context of the body, the skull
might seem thicker made around the eyes, or softing. The pupils just
set deeper in the head now, new fat black edges around the seen. One
might feel degrees warmer inside oneself, though the skin itself is as
any day, as if cooking too deep beneath the outer surface to be
detected. The head may seem sunken in itself, unseen layers laid over
layers, like a helmet or a gown. (102)
In this passage, we again see the image of sleep as an inaccessible room with
changing locks as the insomnia persists. But, more significantly Butler presents
insomnia not just as a delusion, but as a series of perceived changes to the structure of
the body and mind. Because the body is not literally changing in the ways Butler
suggests, even the very real physical description he provides of his insomnia’s
physical symptoms contains an element of illusion and non-reality. He also
dissociates himself from this particular passage, never referring to himself
specifically, but rather as an amalgamation of generalized body parts. Insomnia,
despite its real effects on his day-to-day life, at least partially remains an illusion, and
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throughout his memoir insomnia is described in terms of abstractions vacillating in
and out through other philosophical and medical observations about sleep.
For Hayes, insomnia does not take on the surrealistic quality it does for
Butler. Where Butler presents insomnia as amorphous and surreal, Hayes views it as
having a clear, consistent relationship to ongoing circumstances in his life. For him,
sleep is “more like an emotion than a bodily function” (5). Along these same lines,
Hayes describes his insomnia as intrinsically connected to other emotional
components of his life, specifically his relationships with his family. He writes:
My insomniac fate was sealed when the plane touched down in
Spokane. Dad ran the city’s main pop factory from the time I was a
little boy until the year I left for college. I drank so much Coca-Cola
growing up, I cannot take a sip of it today. I’ve often wondered if all
that sugar and caffeine altered my neurochemical makeup, turning me
into the altered, anxious man I am. I suspect it still runs in my veins at
night, nourishing my sleeplessness. (44)
Of course, he realizes logically that “The half-life of caffeine in adults is four to six
hours, not thirty-six years” (44), but the important point he makes is that his insomnia
is significantly connected to his family’s circumstances.
Butler and Hayes are creating a contemporary insomniac text, indicative of the
prevalence of insomnia today, but also the complex nature of insomnia as medical,
psychological, and philosophical. Despite the seemingly new nature of these two
memoirs, insomnia has played a significant role in literary creation for the past
century. Modernist authors, many of whom were themselves insomniacs, created
insomniac texts and personal descriptions of their own insomnia in diaries, essays,
and letters. Studying these modernist contributions to the discourse of insomnia is
my primary goal, but other authors have also looked at the role of insomnia in the
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literary work (though from a different angle than I will use). Analyzing the role of
sleep in literature is not a new idea. However, texts such as Farbman’s and
Schwenger’s do not simply examine sleep, but rather look at sleep as part of a larger
continuum of consciousness and unconsciousness. Their writing does not focus on
the symbolic value of sleep alone, but rather examines the states surrounding sleep,
including falling asleep, dreaming, awakening, insomnia, and sleep-like states, such
as somnambulism and hypnogogia. These texts are fairly recent and support the
emergence of sleep studies as an important, interdisciplinary field, which looks not
only to science but also philosophy and literature for answers about the significance
of the threshold of separation between consciousness and unconsciousness. Both
examine this space between consciousness and unconsciousness as integral to
processes of writing and reading, creation and interpretation.
Farbman organizes his book around authors, focusing primarily on four:
Sigmund Freud, Maurice Blanchot, Samuel Beckett, and James Joyce. Even in his
choice of subjects to examine (a psychologist, a philosopher, and two literary
authors), we can see the interdisciplinarity of sleep studies on display. Farbman’s
main premise is to examine sleep and waking as oppositions that cannot exist
simultaneously, but at the same time, are completely dependent on one another. He
writes, “Where there is no possibility of sleep, there can be no waking in this ordinary
sense” (2) and “Waking life ends where sleep begins” (3). However, despite the
dependence of waking on sleep and vice versa, sleep and waking are in constant
tension, represented by the dream, which he describes as “resistance to the stillness of
sleep” (5). Because “complete sleep would be death” (3), the dream is a reminder
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that we are alive even though we are asleep; rather than being the guardian of sleep,
as the dream is for Freud, it is the guardian of life itself. He argues that “The dream
is not an escape from the world and worldly responsibilities. It is rather nightly
evidence of the impossibility of escape, so long as one is alive—the impossibility of
complete sleep” (18). His text seeks to compare the dream to the act of literary
creation, not in the sense that dreams inspire writing, but rather that dreaming and
writing are phenomenologically similar. He says, “This book argues that this nightly
experience that can’t be shared is an experience of language as shared—of the sharing
of language—and that experience is essentially literary” (10). The dream is a paradox
of unconsciousness and isolation only made possible through consciousness and
communication. It represents the impossibility of complete unconsciousness while
alive, thus, the dream itself is a form of insomnia: “The dream, for Blanchot, is the
pure perpetuation of insomnia—‘the impossibility of sleeping’ that we encounter in
the very heart of sleep” (51).
Because the dream and insomnia resist complete unconsciousness akin to
death, “it may imply a kind of triumph over death” about which Farbman argues
regarding Joyce’s image of the “ideal insomniac” in Finnegan’s Wake. The “ideal
insomniac” envisioned by Joyce, however, is “more like a dream than it is like the
real ordeal of the real insomniac, who will in fact catch some sleep here and there”
(91). For Farbman, there are two distinct types of insomnia: “real” and metaphorical
in the sense Blanchot uses. Real insomnia is a form of suffering, but one does
eventually sleep, though sleep is delayed. One wants to sleep and, subsequently,
loses his or her sense of self when it arrives. The metaphorical insomnia Farbman
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discusses is not a postponing of sleep, but rather restlessness within sleep, an
affirmation of life in the face of the loss of the self. This restlessness is similar to the
restlessness involved in literary creation: “Though none of the writers studied in this
book claims . . . that works of writing are produced in his sleep, each brings to the
fore of his work the restlessness that persists even in the depths of sleep, and each
experiences that restlessness as an indication of the inevitability of writing” (17).
Writing becomes an affirmation of living and means of resisting death—retaining a
form of consciousness and communication from a space of unconsciousness and
isolation. Writing is an act of metaphorical insomnia.
Again, we see an example of insomnia as a matter of perception (I perceive, in
the dream, that I am awake even though I am “really” asleep), but also a form of
perception that, as Butler and Hayes indicate, has profound implications for waking
experience. Schwenger uses his analysis of insomnia differently than Farbman, but
essentially views it in a similar manner. He argues, “The desire for sleep, then, is not
only a desire for rest so that we can ‘recharge our batteries’ for the day’s work; it is
also the desire for a respite from existence itself, from its incessant, unrelenting
movement” (57). Like Farbman, Schwenger sees sleep as “the brother” of death (57),
and insomnia is again a resistance to death. Where Farbman uses the dream as
insomnia, Schwenger takes the example of pre-sleep insomnia, arguing that “the
writer’s relationship to insomnia goes beyond . . . such common causes as an inability
to relinquish the concerns of the day or a subliminal fear of death; insomnia becomes
the very source of writing” (58). Basically, the difference between the perspectives
of Schwenger and Farbman is spatial: insomnia for one exists within sleep and for
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the other outside of it, but for both, it is an essential and necessary part of the process
of literary creation.
Unlike Farbman, Schwenger structures his text not around authors, but around
states of sleeping or non-sleeping, including falling asleep, failing to sleep, waking
up, and disordered sleep. This structure makes sense in his argument because he
discusses the role of each of these states not only in creating, but more importantly
structuring, the literary text. For Schwenger, insomnia is a perpetuity of thought, but
not as the normal daytime running monologue one might experience. Rather:
In the night one reaches no resting point, no conclusion or illuminated
‘secret’ that is not immediately eroded by the continuing flow of
thought; and with all the structures of daylight thinking dissolved in
the night, the strangest adumbrations are free to appear. Their
strangeness means that they cannot be owned or intimate: we do not
think, it thinks. (60)
Insomnia has a sort of “dream logic” but “is stripped of the acquiescence that carries
us through our dreams” (63). Insomnia itself does the thinking, rather than the
insomniac. This type of insomniac thought, or insomnia as cogito existing through its
own thought, always running, but never reaching a conclusion, half way between
conscious and unconscious, can be translated into literature in several different ways.
Schwenger uses the example of Kafka, citing the “liminality” and “circular” nature of
his writing (64-65). Additionally, again with reference to Kafka, we see the failure of
resolution in the insomniac text: “The more the insomniac pursues problems in the
night, the more they lead inevitably to a final dis-solution, which is not a resting
point, but rather, ‘percussive stillness’” (66). His final quotation refers to the work of
Blanchot. Insomnia, then, similar to writing is “something in the writer but beyond
the writer” and both writing and insomnia occur “in a liminal realm between the
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modes of daylight and night” (71). While for Farbman, dreaming and writing are
similar, both in their creation and their communicatory effects, the same is true for
Schwenger with insomnia and writing.
Thus, we have come full circle. The only truly consistent factor in sleep
studies is that they always present both one argument and its opposite. Medical
experts argue that insomnia hampers productivity. Literary critics and authors argue
that it is essential to productivity. Medical experts argue that to study insomnia one
must study the biography of the insomniac. Insomniac memoir writers argue that
insomnia generates the biography to be studied. Scientists argue that the perception
of insomnia is not necessarily reality. Literary writers counter that perceiving
insomnia makes it a reality. Medical science and capitalist systems of production
seek to cure insomnia through technology and medication. Authors in the humanities
and social sciences posit that technology and medication perpetuate the problem
rather than present any sort of possible solution. A condition that seems so easy to
define—not being able to fall asleep when one desires sleep—resists definition.
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CHAPTER 3

NO REST FOR THE WAR WEARY: INSOMNIA AND COMBAT

Towards the end of his World War I autobiography, Goodbye to All That,
Robert Graves describes his physical and mental condition after the war as follows:
“Very thin, very nervous and with about four years’ loss of sleep” (288). Through
this statement, “four years’ loss of sleep,” Graves relates the experience of war to the
condition of insomnia. His use of metonymy, substituting sleeplessness for war
experience as a whole, creates a powerful metaphor through which he is able to
express the restlessness, anxiety, exhaustion, isolation, helplessness, and physical
discomfort associated with his life during the war. Metaphors of exhaustion and
insomnia are particularly relevant to World War I, a war which ultimately became a
matter of which side could wear down, or tire out, its opponent first. Yet, as with the
onset of sleep, neither side knew when the other would first exhaust its abilities to
fight, making the war appear to be unstoppable, much as wakefulness seems to the
insomniac.
In his WWI novel A Farewell to Arms, Ernest Hemingway’s characters often
comment on the way in which the war seems to carry on infinitely. For example, a
soldier named Passini remarks, “[The war] doesn’t finish. There is no end to war”
(50). Narrator Lieutenant Frederic Henry thinks to himself, “Perhaps wars weren’t
won any more. Maybe they went on forever. Maybe it was another Hundred Years’
War” (118). And, Catherine Barkley, the British war nurse and then-pregnant
girlfriend of Henry, jokes cynically, “For three years I looked forward very childishly
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to the war ending at Christmas. But now I look forward till when our [as yet unborn]
son will be a lieutenant commander” (141). The sentiment Hemingway’s characters
express was commonplace during the war, which is one often described as a “war of
attrition” (Fussell 10). As Paul Fussell explains:
[T]he likelihood that peace would ever come again was often in
serious doubt during the war. One did not have to be a lunatic or a
particularly despondent visionary to conceive quite seriously that the
war would literally never end and would become the permanent
condition of mankind. The stalemate and the attrition would go on
infinitely, becoming, like the telephone and the internal combustion
engine, a part of the accepted atmosphere of the modern experience.
(71)
Much as during a bout of insomnia, the insomniac feels that it will be the permanent
condition of his or her life, so felt citizens and soldiers during the Great War.
Significantly, Fussell notes the connection between war and modernity,
positing an inextricable relationship between the two. War, and its associations with
perpetual stagnation, claustrophobia, and exhaustion, characterized the modern
experience. As such, many novels written about the war depict insomnia as an
experience common to both soldiers and civilians. Insomnia is a particularly
significant device through which to expose this condition, in part because of its
associations with helplessness, isolation, anxiety, and frustration, feelings that are
familiar to many who have experienced war. Further, insomnia mirrors the liminality
of the war itself, which often left individuals feeling trapped between states of hope
and hopelessness, activity and inactivity, bravery and cowardice, and patriotism and
cynicism. Insomnia is often symptomatic of a conflict between internally and
externally constructed identity; it puts in contrast identity as a soldier and identity as
an individual. In doing so, it reveals conflicting desires and the tensions these desires
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create. Insomnia can be described as a conflict of desire and need between the mind
and body—one desires or requires rest while the other desires or requires activity.
For example, even though the body of a soldier may be exhausted, fear of nightmares
related to the war may make him reluctant to sleep.
More importantly, the necessity of insomnia reveals the true extent to which
modern society, especially a society at war, abolishes the “private” individual.
According to Jürgen Habermas, “The fully developed bourgeois public sphere was
based on the fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals
who came together to form a public: the role of property owners and the role of
human beings pure and simple” (56). If we substitute “soldiers” for “property
owners” in this quotation, Habermas’ argument applies especially well to war; the
soldier’s body becomes public property, so even the “privacy” associated with sleep
and one’s control over one’s sleep are matters of public interest. Insomnia exposes
the tension this situation generates for individuals robbed of their sense of privacy,
“fictitious” though it may be. The soldier is expected to sleep when he can to be alert
and prepared for duty, as his nation depends on his capabilities; the man, on the other
hand, may find that the only time he has to himself is when others are sleeping, so
might keep himself awake in spite of his duties. Insomnia becomes a means of
reclaiming a feeling of privacy within in a space (army camp, hospital, or trenches)
where privacy is otherwise nearly impossible.
The three texts I will discuss in this chapter are all fictional works that take
place, at least in part, during World War I: Ford Madox Ford’s Parade’s End
tetralogy, Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, and Hemingway’s
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aforementioned A Farewell to Arms. These literary texts provide evidence of the
way in which the contemporary discourse regarded sleep habits and failures and
characterized and understood those who suffered from insomnia, as well as make
specific connections between sleep behaviors and war experience. They expose
expectations regarding the depth of one’s obligation to one’s society, the society’s
dependence on individual complicity, and the extent to which individuals during this
time period were expected to maintain and subsume themselves to discipline over
their bodies and minds, regardless of the degree to which that particular form of
discipline is actually possible. The texts use insomnia as a metaphor to represent the
tension between allowing one’s body to be used for the “greater good” of the war
effort and maintaining one’s independence of mind and body at the same time, a
tension frequently resulting from idealized images of both men and women in a time
when these ideals were both necessary to the war effort and in flux because of it.
Both men and women were expected to sacrifice themselves and their bodies
to the war effort, men through the giving over of their bodies to the army and women
through their roles as nurses and ambulance drivers, but also as the encouragement
and motivation behind the more obvious and immediate sacrifice of their sons,
husbands, and brothers. The tension created through this sacrifice involves images of
idealized manhood in the form of the men’s ability to maintain self-control, stoicism,
and taciturnity through conditions of extreme physical and emotional stress, yet still
submit their bodies and minds to military discipline. Females were no less subject to
images of idealized womanhood as they were expected to maintain the role of
domestic guardian, as well as facilitate male participation in the war, knowingly
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encouraging loved ones to take substantial risks. In short, men were expected to be in
control of themselves and disciplined, and women were expected to protect and care
for men through their jobs as nurses and mothers, as well as support the sacrifice of
these same men through encouraging them to fight.
War Fatigue
Writing in July of 1918, Guthrie Rankin notes the connection between the war
and insomnia: “In these strenuous times there has been probably no greater
interference with the ordinary comfort of humanity than the broken sleep that has
become such a widespread experience since the outbreak of the war” (“Broken Sleep”
77). Not only does Rankin see the pervasiveness of insomnia as troubling, but also as
more detrimental to health than disease more generally, arguing, “Life is no longer a
struggle to escape accident and disease, but has become a purgatory of suspense and
bereavement” (77). His use of the word “purgatory” suggests his feelings, shared
with many of his contemporaries, that the war is a sort of temporal punishment; it
may eventually end, but no one knows when or what one must go through before that
end.

Yet, while the war continues, people remain trapped in a hellish nether-world,

awaiting their final judgment and the judgments on their loved ones.
When faced with such a circumstance, a seemingly endless war that involved
perpetual stalemates and long periods of stagnation, it is not surprising that one of the
major concerns of those in charge of the war effort became the fitness and vitality of
troops. Fitness, both physical and emotional, was crucial, not only because troops
needed to be strong to physically dominate the enemy, but also because they needed
to be strong to withstand attacks for extended periods without breaking down

99

mentally. As Fussell argues, “In the three lines of trenches the main business of the
soldier was to exercise self-control while being shelled” (46). Interestingly, Fussell
does not describe the duty of the soldier as valiantly charging in an attack, using his
strength to overpower an enemy soldier, or using his skill with a rifle to take one
down, but rather being able to keep himself together the longest while under attack.
Fussell uses the term “self-control,” but perhaps a better term might be discipline, as
self-control implies personal agency; whereas discipline involves subsuming personal
agency to training. Discipline often took on the guise of self-control, but as General
Campion in Parade’s End asks, “What was discipline for if subordinates were to act
on their consciences?” (481), suggesting that discipline means simply having the selfcontrol to give over control of oneself to the military and one’s superiors. In essence,
to win the war one side had to be able to outlast the other side, hoping the other side
became too exhausted and undisciplined to continue fighting or hold a position. As a
result, the war was fought not only militarily, but medically, with doctors being
consulted not only to treat wounded soldiers, but also to discern the most effective
ways to keep the soldiers in a prolonged state of controlled readiness by keeping them
as healthy, sane, and alert as possible.
According to Anson Rabinbach, “The fitness of troops became an important
medical concern, as did the deployment of their skills in the war effort. The war
required the maintenance of their physical and psychological capacities to sustain
morale and combat” (260). In order to maintain this “fitness,” “Experts on fatigue, on
production, on industrial hygiene, and on nutritional physiology were enlisted in the
staggering redeployment of national energy” (Rabinbach 260). In such a war in
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which more often than not victory came not through killing other troops, but keeping
one’s own troops alive, having troops available takes on a meaning more complex
than simply having enough healthy men to fight. The capability of fighting rested in
more than a lack of physical ailments for the soldier, requiring the mental fitness
needed to endure long periods of waiting in often very uncomfortable, stressful, and
anxious situations. As such, issues like fatigue came to the forefront of medical
research during this period.
David Randall explains the significance of combating fatigue in war through
tracing battles that may have been lost due to nothing more than the fatigue of the
troops. Referring to the 1942 Battle of Guadalcanal in World War II, he argues:
With so little sleep after days of combat and the need to maintain a
constant state of readiness, the men aboard those ships simply weren’t
able to react to an attack that came in an unexpected form. Their
brains could not shift their cognitive framework from scouring the
skies to patrolling the waters, missing the [Japanese] boats in plain
view because they had their minds locked on the idea that enemy
planes were the greater danger. (142)
Though David Randall claims the American military first “noticed that lack of sleep
could severely undermine the discipline of troops going through routine chores” in
1959 (142), Rabinbach situates this realization earlier, during World War I, as I have
previously cited. Regardless of their disparate timelines, the point remains that
fatigue is a significant issue with which militaries must contend. The efforts to
control fatigue among troops persist today, and the stakes are quite high:
Fatigue, long the overlooked nemesis of military efficiency, can soon
be regulated and quantified as easily as food rations or bullets. In one
report, [Thomas] Balkin estimated that in future conflicts, the number
of friendly-fire accidents will plunge toward zero, all on account of the
increased decision making abilities made possible by sleep. (D.
Randall 151)
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If the military is able to ensure a supply of rested troops, accidental deaths can
possibly be eliminated, keeping more troops alive and available to continue fighting.
However, actually enabling soldiers to rest adequately is a problem that we
are still not able to solve, and certainly had not overcome during WWI. Rankin, who
advises insomniacs to attend to regularized routines to treat insomnia acknowledges
that his advice cannot often be applied to soldiers or others involved in the war
because “under war conditions the normal nights of many have become disturbed and
restricted” (“Broken Sleep” 77) thereby preventing them from regulating sleep habits
effectively. Fussell explains:
Normally the British troops rotated trench duty. After a week of ‘rest’
behind the lines, a unit would move up—at night—to relieve a unit in
the front line trench. After three days to a week or more in that
position, the unit would move back for a similar length of time to the
support trench, and finally back to the reserve. Then it was time for a
week of rest again. (45-46)
Despite the apparent time for “rest” allowed during the weeks when troops were not
in the actual front trenches, the disruptive, nocturnal schedule of trench life during
which it was “after evening stand-to” that “the real work began” (Fussell 47) likely
created havoc among the troops’ sleep schedules. Even soldiers and war workers on
the Italian front (and not in the trenches), such as the ones Hemingway describes in A
Farewell to Arms, are required to transition to a nocturnal schedule. For example, in
the novel’s opening, Henry describes hearing the sounds of fighting and the flashes of
shells in the dark, noting that “There was much traffic at night” (3-4).
Being forced to continually rotate working shifts, sometimes following a
traditional sleeping/waking schedule and other times being expected to sleep during
the day and remain nocturnally active, creates myriad sleep-deprivation related health
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issues. The schedule Fussell describes resembles the shift-work schedule many
employees adopt when working in fields, such as medicine or industrial work, in
which businesses are open twenty four hours a day. Stanley Coren defines shift-work
as work in which the worker must labor outside of the traditional 7 am to 7 pm hours.
The schedule of soldiers in the trenches, as Fussell describes, follows what Coren
defines as a rotating shift-work schedule, which includes a fluctuating combination of
day and evening work and wakefulness. This type of schedule is extremely stressful
for the individual. According to Coren, “shift work is a remarkably efficient device
for disrupting an individual’s normal sleep-wakefulness pattern” primarily because it
“[disorganizes] our circadian rhythms” forcing the workers to “fight against their own
internal clock” (209). Rotating shift work of the nature soldiers experienced with
their trench and duty schedules is particularly problematic because it prevents the
individual from ever fully acclimating to a new sleeping-waking schedule. Coren
explains: “If you stay on a particular shift long enough, your internal clock will
eventually adjust to it. Unfortunately, some people on the night shift never allow
their body to make this adjustment because they never give it a chance” (211). The
consequences of a perpetually disrupted sleep schedule include “excessive fatigue,
reduced work efficiency, and tendencies to be irritable, depressed, and generally
unhappy” (Coren 211). In effect, the military, in its attempts to give soldiers
adequate rest by keeping them away from the front-line trenches and its related
nocturnal routines for two weeks at a time, ultimately fostered and perpetuated
insomnia, fatigue, and generally disrupted sleep schedules by never giving soldiers
“the chance” to acclimate to a fully nocturnal routine.
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Further complicating the issue of sleep at war is the perceived relationship
between having the ability to go without sleep and the idealized masculinity expected
of soldiers. Coren uses the medical discipline and its tradition of requiring those to
the field to work extended hours as an example. According to his source, a medical
school dean, requiring (initially male) doctors to remain awake for long periods of
time is a Darwinian method of weeding out the ineffective, or weak, ones:
Before World War I the way that you obtained your graduate medical
education was through an actual apprenticeship. You could say that
the medical hierarchy was quite selective and exclusionary, and the
gateway to the profession was the internship. . . . This means that the
profession dictates that you must make the training really hard and the
hours really long so that it serves as an effective barrier screening off
the domain of the practicing physician. This will serve to limit the
number of trainees who actually make it to the status of full-fledged
physician. If you survive the long hours, the work, the lack of sleep,
then you have shown that you, too, are a hero with super-human
qualities. As a hero, you can join the ranks of other heroes, those who,
like you, have bested the challenge and have been rewarded with the
honorific title of “Doctor.” (qtd. in Fussell 204)
The associations specifically within the medical discipline, stemming from pre-WWI
values of masculinity (physical strength, vigor, self-control and endurance) create a
real tension between expectations of fatigue tolerance and efforts to minimize fatigue.
As I have noted earlier, Rabinbach points to the efforts of WWI doctors to combat
and prevent solider fatigue. But, conversely, these very same doctors were raised in a
tradition in which masculinity is defined, in part, by the ability to tolerate and
overcome fatigue. Thus, we have a situation in which the values and practices of the
medical discipline are in direct conflict with its ostensive goals on behalf of those it is
attempting to treat, in this case soldiers. The discourse on sleep and waking becomes
itself a sort of tension: fatigue must be controlled and monitored, yet the strong
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individual should be able to tolerate fatigue internally rather than require external
supervision or assistance.
This mentality based in idealized masculinity is also reflected in beliefs
regarding the treatment of soldiers for war trauma, also referred to as both “shell
shock” and, aptly, “war fatigue.” Such a mentality engendered the belief that the best
treatment for war shock came not from a removal from the conditions of war, but
rather through a reminder of the importance of military discipline. An article entitled
“’Nerve Shock’ in War” published in The British Medical Journal in July of 1915
notes that in cases of “nerve shock” “the prospect of discharge from the army [for the
afflicted soldier] was apt to delay recovery” (64). As Paul Lerner argues regarding
the military treatment of shell-shocked soldiers in Germany:
One consequence of rationalized psychiatric treatment was that
humanity and sympathy were removed from the psychiatrist’s office.
Pity and charity were decried as effeminate and even pathogenic
impulses; which the assertion of medical control over all phases of the
diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of neurotics, doctors exploited
the therapeutic efficacy of military discipline and industrial
functionalism. (20)
Though Lerner comments specifically on the German military, his observations are
equally applicable to the British and Americans. An article by G. Elliot Smith
published in The British Medical Journal in July of 1917 calls for “the more rational
treatment of what might be termed more minor mental maladies” and laments that “a
nation so humane as the British should be so surpassed in any regard by a nation
which has proved itself so inhuman as Germany” (47) regarding the methods of
treatment of shell shocked soldiers. Another article, by F. W. Mott, also written in
July of 1917, points to the necessity of discipline in the treatment of shell shocked
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soldiers: “Discipline is very essential; laxity of discipline, over-sympathy and
attention by kind, well-meaning ladies giving social tea-parties, drives, joy-rides, with
the frequent exclamation of ‘poor dear,’ has done much to perpetuate functional
neuroses in our soldiers” (42). Discipline, which Campion argues should substitute
for conscience, also comes to substitute for self-control in cases of trauma.
Paradoxically, in order to regain self-control, the soldier must first relinquish it.
A literary example of the medical focus on discipline appears in Virginia
Woolf’s post-war novel Mrs. Dalloway (1925), which explores the treatment of shellshocked war veteran Septimus Smith. Woolf, who wrote in her diary in June of 1923
that one of her goals in writing Mrs. Dalloway was to “criticise the social system, &
to show it at work, at its most intense” (93), illustrates the damaging effects of that
“social system” on Septimus. Part of the damage done to Septimus comes through
his doctor, Sir William Bradshaw, who believes Septimus can be cured by
disciplining his mind into adopting a rational view of the world that Bradshaw
explains as a sense of “proportion” (283). Woolf describes Bradshaw’s societal role:
“Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England
prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it
impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of
proportion” (283-84). Later in the same section, Woolf notes that “Sir William was a
master of his own actions, which the patient was not” (285). Sir William’s
“treatment” of Septimus, a suggestion of prolonged, isolated rest until Septimus could
be made to see the world as Sir William does, leads to Septimus’ suicide, pointing to
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Woolf’s opinions on both the lack of empathy she attributes to medical professionals
and failures of the disciplinary model at healing traumatized soldiers.
According to Frederic Jameson, “the will to read literary or cultural texts as
symbolic acts must necessarily grasp them as resolutions of determinate
contradictions” (80). The model of the text as an attempt to resolve contradictions
that Jameson articulates is useful in understanding the ways in which literary texts
present and treat insomnia. First and foremost, insomnia itself is a state of
contradiction: the desires of the body contradict those of the mind or vice versa.
Insomnia can be described both in terms of lack (lack of sleep) and presence
(presence of insomnia as a state). But beyond insomnia itself, medical and military
discourse is also contradictory. It proffers the message that care of the self as a
soldier is necessary for the survival of nations. The men (and women) must be rested,
healthy, sane, and prepared to fight for their country. At the same time, those who
purvey this message also feel that the truly strong and masculine self can transcend
the need for self-care and expect the woman to willingly sacrifice herself and her
loved ones for the good of others, as caretaker of her family or the sick and mother,
sister, or wife of the soldier. The will to serve one’s country should overcome to the
will to serve oneself. Hence, the discipline of the military serves two conflicting
functions: to teach oneself to behave in a manner that optimizes one’s ability to be
productive (sleeping well, eating properly, avoiding vice) and to teach oneself to
subsume the self’s needs for the greater good (go without sleep, food, or comfort).
The literature of WWI, then, attempts to expose and resolve these conflicting views
of one’s responsibility as a soldier and frequently does so through the medium of
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insomnia. In the texts of Ford, Sassoon, and Hemingway, insomnia becomes a
vehicle through which one can both exercise (or exorcise) expectations of masculinity
through self-deprivation, yet still focus on individualized care of the self through
allotting insomniac-time to more private, individual needs. Simultaneously, the
function of insomnia is to valorize masculine strength and transcendence of bodily
need, yet still afford resistance to the type of discipline which foregoes the
individual’s interests for the needs of the masses.
Discipline
Given the reliance on the military of having soldiers fit for battle, not taking
opportunities for sleep indicates a resistance to discipline on the soldier’s behalf,
prioritizing his individual concerns over his role within the military when it comes to
his “care of the self”: an act tantamount to insubordination. According to Michel
Foucault, since the Classical Age, the human body was viewed as an “object and
target of power,” allowing those in authority to see the “docile” body as something to
be “subjected, used, transformed, and improved” (Discipline 136). One of the means
of objectifying and controlling the body is through discipline:
Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of
utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of
obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one
hand, it turns it into an “aptitude,” a “capacity,” which it seeks to
increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of energy, the power
that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.
(Discipline 138)
Authorities, medical or military, attempt to control the actions of the body, and, in
doing so, essentially exhaust the body’s capabilities thereby requiring the individual
to sleep in order to begin the process of exhaustion anew. Discipline, as a controlled
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expenditure of bodily energy, serves two major functions: the productivity of the
body is increased in order to be used for production (profit) or power (war) and,
through putting the body in constant motion, the ability to contemplate (and thus
question) is lessened. As Ford’s character Valentine Wannop thinks when she
comments, “You could not run a dual physical and mental existence without some
risk,” (534) many believed that keeping physically active prevents thought and
immobility promotes thought. A. W. MacFarlane, author of Insomnia and Its
Therapeutics, argues that “we may predicate that sound nervous structures, properly
nourished, adequately rested, and rightly exercised, are fundamental desiderata for
good sleep” (29), indicating the belief that one who receives proper and balanced
amounts of physical and mental exercise during the day will sleep well at night.
The type of discipline described by Foucault applies quite fittingly to the body
of the insomniac. The disciplined body tires itself out during the working day, so it
sleeps well at night; there is not that extra “insomniac-time” for excessive thought, as
can be seen in Sassoon’s character, Sherston, who believes fully in the war while he
is kept in action, yet begins to question the war when he is given time to rest and
think about it in more depth and eventually adopts an anti-war stance, refusing to
return to combat (510). Sherston argues that “At three o’clock in the morning a
sleepless mind can welcome improbabilities and renounce its daylight skepticism”
(461). Eventually, his early morning ponderings lead him to realize his desire to
resist further participation in the war, which he ultimately succeeds at through
pleading insanity (512). In Sherston’s case, his insomnia enables him to prioritize his
individual needs over those of the military. Similarly, one may prioritize personal

109

needs over the war effort for using time awake for personal pursuits of pleasure and
companionship as Henry does in his nocturnal relationship with Catherine Barkley, or
purposes of thought, as we see with characters like Christopher Tietjens or George
Sherston, the latter of whom stays awake to read a novel, acknowledging the obstacle
the army’s day-to-day requirements presents to thinking “one’s own thoughts” (357);
thus, he uses his “insomniac-time” as a time for personal thought. “Proper” sleeping
habits entail both physical and mental discipline, in the form of salubrious living and
the avoidance of “over-thinking.” Achieving this discipline increases the aptitude of
the worker or soldier, allowing him or her to be more rested, and thus, more capable
of fulfilling duties effectively and without question. Yet, soldiers often refused to
sleep properly in an effort to attend to individual identities and concerns.
In short, because a society, and especially a society at war, relies on its
individual members to be productive (produce goods, perform tasks), the larger
society does indeed have a stake in how well its members sleep. Prior to World War
I, both American and British society were in the midst of a great movement of
industrialization, with industrial models seeking to minimize waste in order to
maximize productivity, and this mentality carried over into the treatment and
discipline of soldiers. Within rationalized society, “an attempt is also made to assure
the quality of the time used: constant supervision, the pressure of supervisors, the
elimination of anything that might disturb or distract; it is a question of constituting a
totally useful time” (Foucault, Discipline 150). Parade’s End, Memoirs of an Infantry
Officer, and A Farewell to Arms all illustrate the idea that it is the obligation of the
individual to be healthy and productive to benefit the larger group. In fact, Tietjens,
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central character of Parade’s End, asserts, “Sick bodies are not only of no use to the
King, but are enormously detrimental to the army that has to cart them about” (581);
therefore, taking responsibility for one’s health is “a duty to your children. And the
King” (616). Tietjens, guardian of tradition and honor, considers these conditions
“very reasonable and proper” (581), yet resists them, through his insomnia,
nonetheless. Sherston of Memoirs of an Infantry Officer considers the idea that as a
soldier he “could no longer call [his] life [his] own” (359). And, in A Farwell to
Arms, illness is only a reason for being removed from the front if the illness is a direct
result of physical injury; otherwise, soldiers, sick or not, must fight. When Henry is
wounded and in the hospital, he develops a case of jaundice. Because his jaundice is
a consequence of his illicit, and quite heavy, drinking, the head nurse, who initially
pities him for having the illness when she thought it was a result of a shrapnel wound
he sustained, comes to despise him, commenting “And I was pitying you for having
jaundice. Pity is something that is wasted on you. . . . Unless you find something
else [wrong with you] I’m afraid you will have to go back to the front when you are
through with your jaundice. I don’t believe self-inflicted jaundice entitles you to a
convalescent leave” (144). She is only concerned for Henry’s health inasmuch as
Henry’s health relates to his physical war wounds, not his mental ones that lead him
to drink excessively. He is no less sick, but the knowledge that his illness is selfinflicted leads his nurse to see him as more fit and prepared to return to duty than had
his illness merely been a case of bad luck.
These types of moral and behavioral judgments rendered against failures to
establish regularity and self-control and to keep oneself healthy are present in the
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texts of Hemingway, Ford, and Sassoon, further illuminating connections among the
regulation of the body and its cycles, morality, and avoidance of over-thinking to
sleep habits. With regard to the regulation of behavior, Foucault argues that there are
three primary ways to control time and activity: “establish rhythms, impose
particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition” (Discipline 149). He points
to the presence of such means of control in modern establishments such as armies,
hospitals, and schools, and he equates the regulated and cyclical life led by members
of monastic orders to “the regulations of great manufactories,” which “laid down the
exercises that would divide up the working day” (Discipline 149). This same type of
regularity and discipline is emphasized by the medical authorities as a means of
preventing insomnia and returning the insomniac to a state of “normalcy.” In the
three cases of Henry, Sherston, and Tietjens, “normalcy” is resisted through their
insomniac behaviors. Henry commits all of his rebellious acts at night: from his
drinking, to his relationship with Catherine, to his escape from the army, to the birth
of his still-born, illegitimate child. Sherston’s insomnia gives him the time for
thought he needs to actually contemplate the war, and in doing so, he comes to see the
war as pointless and futile, leading to his refusal to rejoin the army and commitment
to a mental hospital, and Tietjens forgoes sleep in order to ponder interpersonal
relationships, which may have seemed frivolous to many during a time of crisis on
such a massive scale, but for Tietjens, such ponderings allowed him to maintain his
sense of individuality in an ever-depersonalizing and dehumanizing world. Insomnia
is a vehicle through which all three characters can resist discipline and maintain their
individualized sense of priority.
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Though all three characters resist discipline through insomnia, these novels
still emphasize the importance of physical and mental discipline in a wartime setting.
The emphasis in Foucault’s aforementioned passage is on training the body through
repetition and regularity, of which physical exercise is an example. Foucault’s
argument is reflected in a passage from Parade’s End in which Valentine considers
her job as an athletic instructor. Ford writes, “The military physical developments of
the last four years had been responsible for a real exaggeration of physical values.
[Valentine] was aware that in that Institution [the girls’ school], for the last four
years, she had been regarded as supplementing, if not as actually replacing both the
doctor and the priest” (535-36). In this case, Valentine acts as the disciplinarian. She
is responsible for replicating the regularity and discipline associated with Foucault’s
hospitals (“the doctor”) and monastic orders (“the priest”), instilling “physical
values” in her pupils.
Valentine understands physical discipline in relation to its ability to disrupt or
prevent thought. When one wants to avoid over-thinking, one can turn to physical
exercise, and disciplining the body is a means of disciplining the mind. Mental overwork, which as MacFarlane claims is mostly “seen in the literary, scientific,
professional, and commercial classes” is “one of the great sources of insomnia” (64).
It is not coincidental, then, that in the aforementioned medical literature, both
physical fitness and the avoidance of over-thinking are seen as means of preventing
insomnia. Valentine also considers the connection between fitness and morality,
mulling over the possibility that “the [student’s] lie was the product of an
overoxygenated brain” (535). Lack of activity created an imbalance between oxygen
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distribution in mind and body, leaving an abundance of oxygen left over for the brain;
therefore, the student was over-using her brain, leading to the immoral act of lying.
Had she been physically worn out, her mind would have been quieted and less prone
to both immorality and fabrication. Valentine’s cynicism regarding her role gives her
some pause when drawing this conclusion, but she still does see at least a connection
between physical discipline and the prevention of “immoral” behavior.
In A Farewell to Arms, Hemingway also associates sleep and nocturnal
behavior with morality, but does so through showing the ways in which the war has
changed morality. Early on in the novel, Henry admits to fearing God in the night
(72). Yet, as the novel progresses, his relationship with the night becomes more
comfortable and positive. As I have mentioned, Henry and Catherine have a
nocturnal relationship; they are only able to see each other at night. This night life of
Henry’s becomes central to his morality though many of their contemporaries would
at least claim to see their sexual encounters, which take place outside of wedlock, to
be immoral, Henry, on the other hand, sees his faithfulness to Catherine and hopes for
their future as guardian of his morality. When discussing religion with a friend,
Henry comments that “[his] own [religious feeling] comes only at night” (263).
When asked what he believes in, he comments that he only believes “in sleep” (179).
And, when he considers the purpose of his life, he thinks that it is to “Eat and drink
and sleep with Catherine” (233), sleep meaning both sex and shared repose. It is
during his nights with Catherine, when he is shirking both his duties and conventional
morality, that he finds himself to be at his most moral and with the most religious
feeling. War, for Hemingway, is the true source of evil, not Henry’s love for
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Catherine. But, of course, conventionally, war is valorized where extra-marital sex
(especially when it leads to a child) is demonized. Even when Henry commits the
one action that many of his comrades would find unforgiveable by defecting from the
army and escaping to Switzerland, rather than losing sleep over his supposedly
cowardly and immoral behavior, he describes his sleep as peaceful, rather than full of
nightmares and fears, as it had previously been: “We slept well and if I woke in the
night I knew it was only from only one cause and I would shift the feather bed over,
very softly, so that Catherine would not be wakened and then go back to sleep again,
warm and with the new lightness of thin covers” (293). Now that Henry has pursued
what he believes to be individually important (his life with Catherine) rather than
nationally important (his participation in the war), he is able to rest comfortably.
Hemingway equates sleeping well with being undisciplined yet able to pursue
one’s own morals; Ford supports Hemingway’s argument through exploring its
opposite. Evidence of the value given to physical discipline and regulation appears in
Parade’s End in several examples, and again, as in the medical literature, physical
discipline is seen in terms of a connection to morality. As Valentine contemplates the
“immoral” act of becoming Tietjens’ mistress, she sees her own physical fitness as an
obstacle to immorality and, in a sense, a protector of her chastity:
“Well, I’m fit…” She had an image of the aligned hundred of girls in
blue jumpers and men’s ties keeping whom fit had kept her super-fit.
She wondered how many of them would be men’s mistresses before
the year was out. It was August then. But perhaps none! Because she
had kept them fit… “Ah!” she said, “if I had been a loose woman,
with flaccid breasts and a soft body. All perfumed!” … And perhaps
the price she paid was just that; she was in such a hard condition that
she hadn’t moved him to… She perhaps exhaled such an aura of
sobriety, chastity, and abstinence as to suggest to him that… that a
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decent fellow didn’t get his girl into trouble before going to be
killed… (273)
In this case it is her own fitness that Valentine sees as a barrier between her and the
immoral behavior of becoming someone’s mistress, believing in the possibility that
Tietjens, witnessing her physical fitness, was dissuaded from the idea of seducing her.
She cannot even bring herself to articulate the relationship in explicitly sexual terms.
Yet, she acknowledges that two other women in the novel, Sylvia Tietjens and Edith
Ethel Duchemin (later Macmaster) are simultaneously physically fit and “immoral.”
However, the novel makes quite clear that Valentine and Tietjens should pursue their
relationship despite its social impropriety. Parade’s End exposes the disconnection
between the appearance of physical discipline and morality.
Despite the adulterous actions of Sylvia and Edith Ethel, their physical fitness
is still equated with a form of cleanliness, simulating the appearance of morality.
Tietjens, upon learning his comrade is ill, thinks, “You don’t contact loathsome
diseases except from the cheapest kind of women or through being untidy-minded”
(614). In this statement, Tietjens refers to disordered thought in terms of cleanliness,
illustrating his belief in the connection between mental “tidiness” and physical health.
Logically, a woman like Sylvia with multiple sexual partners is equally likely to
transmit a disease as any woman, cheap or not, with an equal amount of partners; the
difference is in the perception of her “clean” appearance. Furthermore, Sylvia, one of
the novel’s more morally flexible characters, prides herself on her physical fitness,
which she equates with beauty and attractiveness: “If [Sylvia] had no other training
at her very expensive school she had had so much drilling in calisthenics as to be
singularly mistress of limbs, and, in the interests of her beauty she had always kept
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herself very fit” (393). Sylvia is often despised by those who know of her immoral
behaviors (Vincent Macmaster, Edith Ethel, Mark Tietjens), yet, seen as exceedingly
moral and upright by those who are taken in by her charms, like General Campion,
and, for a while, Valentine. Within the novel, there is not so much a one-to-one
connection between athleticism and morality, as there is between athleticism and selfcontrol, leading to the appearance of morality and propriety. One need not have the
self-control to be moral, but one needs self-control to appear moral. The society
depicted in this novel is extremely focused on the appearance of propriety (rather than
actual propriety), as we see with the characters’ numerous attempts to make their
actions appear socially acceptable, including Tietjens’ attempts to cover up his wife’s
affairs and his certainty that his son was better off being known to “have a rip of a
father than a whore of a mother” (77) as it is more acceptable (though likely equally
common) for men to be unreliable and promiscuous than for women to be either.
Tietjens’ character is somewhat contradictory in terms of physical discipline;
he is often described as ungainly and even corpulent, but, at the same time, he
possesses great physical strength. At his first meeting with Valentine, on the golf
course, he runs “like a rhinoceros,” yet is able to outrun all of the other men and keep
pace with the exceedingly fit Valentine (much to her surprise) (67). When he is in the
trenches, at one point the trench is bombarded, and he must struggle to free one of the
men under his command from a pile of debris:
Thank God for my enormous physical strength!’ It was the first time
that he had ever had to be thankful for great physical strength. . . . It
was a condemnation of a civilisation that he, Tietjens, possessed of
enormous physical strength, should never have had to use it before.
He looked like a collection of mealsacks; but at least he could tear a
pack of cards in half. (638)
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Tietjens acknowledges that his physical strength could be of great use to society; he
sees it as a waste that he is not better used in this way a member of the lower classes
might be.
Yet, physical strength and discipline are not equivalents. Tietjens’ strength
does not come from physical training, as it is inherent, treated within the novel as
constitutional. And, Tietjens does have a physical weakness, his lungs, and is often
regarded as being generally undisciplined, and, consequently, as an anomaly. He is
simultaneously strong but awkward, just as he is a master of social propriety,
knowing exactly the right thing to say in every situation, but often viewed by others
as odd and non-conformist, not having the same goals of monetary success as his
peers. Additionally, he is not easily reconciled to the discipline of the army. When
considering joining the army, as two of his brothers already have (both are dead), he
knows that the type of discipline enforced by the army will not suit him:
But no doubt he would not have liked the army. Discipline! He
supposed he would have put up with the discipline: a gentleman had
to. Because noblesse oblige: not for fear of consequences… But army
officers seemed to him pathetic. They spluttered and roared to make
men jump smartly: at the end of apoplectic efforts the men jumped
smartly. But there was the end of it. (127)
He sees the power of the officer as only based in appearance. They can control the
bodies of the men, but that power, by itself, is hollow. Regardless, Tietjens
acknowledges that he must behave with social propriety and obedience to authority,
but he displays a strong sense of discomfort with both being controlled and
controlling others: “It was detestable to him to be in control of the person of another
human being—as detestable as it would have been to be himself a prisoner… that
thing he dreaded most in the world…” because, at least, “to control a prisoner even
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under the compulsion of discipline on yourself, implies a certain free-will of your
own” (619). He equates the instillation of physical discipline by outside forces as
control over the will. Thus, he illustrates Foucault’s idea of physical discipline as a
means of controlling the human mind and will, a powerful weapon of those in
authority. Tietjens is extremely uncomfortable both with using discipline to control
and with having discipline used against his own person. If anything, he desires to be
complete master of his own mind and body.
Sherston seems to share a similar viewpoint. As his company prepares to go
on a raid, he illustrates his willingness to participate, regardless of the danger:
“Anyhow I meant to ask Kinjack to let me go on the Raid. Supposing he ordered me
to go on it? How should I feel about it then?” (297). Like Tietjens, Sherston
understands the necessity of willingness to fight as well as take orders. But, also
similar to Tietjens, Sherston balks at the idea of having his body completely under the
control of another person. He would be content to volunteer for the raid, illustrating
his ability to overcome his fear of physical danger or death, yet the idea of being
under someone else’s control bothers him. Volunteering for the raid is one issue, but
being ordered to go is something entirely different. He is not afraid to die or be
injured, but he is hesitant to cede control of his will to someone in higher authority.
The submission of the body to discipline is often required of a soldier, and
both Tietjens and Sherston are required to follow orders throughout both texts, as is
Henry as a medical worker. Up until the point at which Sherston is sent away from
the war to rest and begins to question the validity of the war itself, his capacity to be
an effective soldier is not questioned. Henry remains cynical about the war
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throughout the novel, but because he is not a soldier who must take lives, but rather
one who cares for the wounded, his moral position is less dubious. However, he does
become exposed to the dark underside of military discipline when he sees the army
executing its own soldiers for alleged cowardice and ends up defecting (224-25). The
language that Hemingway uses in this section of the text is telling, as he repeats
“questioning,” “questioned,” and “questioners” multiple times when describing the
“trial” of the accused soldiers.

Literally, Hemingway is referring to the interviews

with the accused defectors, but his language points more to the sense that these
individuals “questioned” the war itself through their hesitancy to participate
obediently. As he escapes, Henry reflects that “I was not made to think” (233), but
only does so because he knows the opposite to be true; he thinks this only to stop his
other thoughts; however, his thoughts are never about the moral validity of his
escape, but rather the friends he left behind.
Tietjens proves to be slightly more contradictory in this regard. Though
Tietjens is reluctant to submit his body to discipline, he does have some of the
characteristics of an excellent soldier, mainly coming from his desire to comply with
orders given by those above him hierarchically. Yet, in some ways he is extremely
disciplined. For example, in one scene when he is finally asleep after a long,
emotionally-exhausting evening, he is able to wake up instantaneously, merely, he
thinks, because of the presence of the general: “Immediately upon awakening he was
not perfectly certain of where he was, but he had sense enough to answer with
coherence the first question the general put to and to stand stiffly on his legs” (444).
The narrator comments that it was likely “voices from without” (444) that were
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responsible for awakening Tietjens, but his ability to immediately and instinctively
produce the appropriate response, before even realizing where he is, indicates his
capacity, if not aptitude, for discipline.
Tietjens’ body is adaptable to survival in difficult circumstances although he
greatly fears having to go up to the front lines. He grew up wealthy and privileged,
but does not require luxury to be content. In this sense he is hardened enough to
survive the war, which he does. To his brother Mark, who attempts to give him
money, he says, “I loathe your beastly Riviera-palaced, chauffeured, hydraulic-lifted,
hot-house aired beastliness of fornication” (218). Tietjens would rather eschew
comfort than accept money from a brother who doubts Tietjens’ character. After the
war ends and Tietjens returns home, he happily sells nearly all of his possessions in
an attempt to begin a new life with Valentine. Merely having the ability to be close to
Valentine, for him, supersedes any desire he has for financial or material acquisitions.
He will work, as a seller of antique furniture, to support Valentine and the child she is
carrying, but requires very little in terms of material comfort. In this sense, he rebels
against the capitalistic and materialistic nature of the society of which he is a
member, and this puts him at odds with many people who know him, including his
brother, leading some, including Edith Ethel, to go so far as to doubt his sanity (504).
Self-Control
In Parade’s End having control over one’s body, the type of control that
allows one to sleep at will or tolerate physically uncomfortable situations, is given
great respect by nearly all of the major characters. The same type of value is given to
controlling one’s body in Sassoon’s novel. In Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, for
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instance, Sherston reiterates the importance of being able to control one’s body, and
he does so with specific regard to the ability to sleep. By necessity, soldiers either
had to sleep in uncomfortable or anxiety-inducing circumstances, or they did not
sleep at all. Sherston describes sleeping under conditions most would find
unthinkable, with slumbers that “were inured to noises which would have kept us
wide awake in civilian life,” either because of physical or psychical discomfort (338).
For example, Sherston writes, “I fell asleep to the sound of heavy firing toward La
Boisselle, rattling limbers on the Citadel road, and men shouting and looking for their
kits in the dark. There are worse things than falling asleep under a summer sky. One
awoke stiff and cold, but with a head miraculously clear” (353). He does not even
need a bed to sleep: “As for my flea-bad, it was no hardship; I have never slept more
soundly in any bed” (322). In addition to being able to fall asleep to the sound of
machine gun fire, some soldiers were able to sleep right before launching an attack, or
even while sitting up (341). He refers to a friend named Leake who “had a talent for
falling asleep in any position” (426). In this case, Sherston and his fellow soldiers
resemble Napoleon, so often praised for his controlled sleep habits.
The self-control expected of Sherston had results surpassing merely the ability
to sleep soundly under difficult conditions; it also entailed a great deal of control over
one’s emotions, notably fear and anxiety. Elaine Showalter argues that the extremity
of the expectation of emotional control essentially disallowed many men to express
any feelings at all during the war and even after, effectively rendering them
“emotionally incapacitated”:
This parade of emotionally incapacitated men was in itself a shocking
contrast to the heroic visions and masculinist fantasies that had
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preceded it. The public image of the Great War was one of strong
unreflective masculinity. . . . Chief among the values promoted within
the male community of the war was the ability to tolerate the appalling
filth and stink of the trenches, the relentless noise, and the constant
threat of death with stoic good humor, and to allude to it in phlegmatic
understatement. Indeed, emotional repression was an essential aspect
of the British masculine ideal. (Female 169)
British society expected a community of stoic men who could face any trial, lifethreatening or otherwise, with serenity or at least its appearance. Unfortunately, the
level of detachment needed to tolerate the conditions of the trenches was not
conducive to easily returning to a less stoic state after the war; many had to be
reconditioned to face and handle difficult or uncomfortable feelings.
Even Sherston struggles with a growing sense of detachment; he is largely
able to face his circumstances without complaint (and even with reckless bravery),
but he does lose some sense of emotional connectivity with other humans, as
displayed when he writes, “And the dead were the dead; this was no time to be
pitying them or asking silly questions about their outraged lives. Such sights must be
taken for granted, I thought” (435). Shockingly, the sight to which he is referring is
“the mask of a human face which had detached itself from the skull” that is “floating
on the surface of the flooded trench” (435). He has trained himself not only to face
the most horrific conditions without displaying any outward weakness, or arguably
feel any inward vulnerability, but also comes to take it “for granted,” as something
that is simply a matter of course during the war. That Sherston remains affectively
unmoved, or at least tells himself so, from this disturbing vision illustrates that he has
experienced a significant degree of desensitization, both to his immediate conditions
and his emotional reaction to those conditions. Eventually, he is unable to retain his
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stoicism and has himself declared mentally incompetent, but he does regain ability to
feel and express emotion and comes to see the war as an outrage though only after he
is separate from it. Similarly, Septimus of Mrs. Dalloway has mastered his emotions
so completely that he has managed to annihilate them almost completely: “Septimus,
far from showing any emotion or recognising that here [at the death of his comrade]
was the end of a friendship, congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very
reasonably. The War had taught him,” but as a consequence, “he could not feel”
(272). When Septimus kills himself, his suicide is not a matter of feeling too much,
but of feeling nothing at all.
Like Sherston, Tietjens is displayed making numerous attempts to keep his
emotions in check and control his thought processes; at times these efforts are related
to his sleep behaviors. In the beginning of the novel, prior to Tietjens’ enlistment, he
is already aware (and a great supporter) of the British regard for masculine stoicism:
“As Tietjens saw the world, you didn’t ‘talk.’ Perhaps you didn’t even think about
how you felt” (6). Even with Macmaster, his closest friend (excepting Valentine later
in the novel), Tietjens rarely expresses any emotions over personal issues. Ford
writes, “Absurd as it seemed, Macmaster knew that he knew next to nothing of his
friend’s feelings. As to them, practically no confidences had passed between them”
(15). Tietjens differs from Sherston in that his hesitation to express emotion was not
initially a product of coping with war trauma, but instead is rooted in his deep-seated
beliefs in social propriety and convention. In Sherston’s case, this convention is
taken to an extreme, allowing him to face death and gore without horror.
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Despite Tietjens’ ability to show a great deal of restraint when handling
personal matters, such as his unstable relationship with his unfaithful wife and
questions regarding the paternity of his son and only heir to his father’s estate, he
does not display Sherston’s capacity for emotional detachment when faced with that
very same death and gore. As Ford writes:
It has been remarked that the peculiarly English habit of selfsuppression in matters of emotions puts the Englishman at a great
disadvantage in moments of unusual stresses. In the smaller matters of
the general run of life he will be impeccable and not to be moved; but
in sudden confrontations of anything but physical dangers he is apt—
he is, indeed, almost certain—to go to pieces very badly. (178)
This passage refers to a particularly daunting interview Tietjens must have with his
banker, in which he actually does not go to pieces as he fears; however, he does show
signs of instability when a fellow soldier to whom Tietjens had previously denied
leave, O Nine Morgan, dies in his arms (308).
Immediately after Morgan’s death, Ford depicts Tietjens’ attempts to control
emotion. Tietjens must be reminded to wash his hands of Morgan’s blood, as he does
not do so on his own (310), suggesting his sense of culpability in Morgan’s death and
feelings of responsibility towards his men—feelings that leave him with a sense of
powerlessness. To circumnavigate his realization of lack of circumstantial, and even
ethical, control, he attempts to assert control over his thoughts by simultaneously
working on two tasks, handling matters related to his job, while writing a sonnet in
under three minutes upon being given rhymes with which to work. Tietjens is
abiding by a “rule” of his: “Never think on the subject of a shock at a moment of
shock” (315). Yet, throughout the novel, images of Morgan’s death recur to him, and
he is unable to restrain himself from thinking about it. The night of Morgan’s death
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is also one instance in which Tietjens wills himself to have insomnia despite physical
exhaustion. He decides to devote the night to thinking over his problems with his
wife and his potential mistress, Valentine, in large part to avoid thinking about
Morgan’s death. He knows how to handle social problems, like those with his wife,
so even though his wife has put him in a difficult situation, he is much more
comfortable dealing with marital problems than the death of one of his comrades and
his sense that he may have somehow been responsible. Tietjens knows that if he
settles in to sleep, he will undoubtedly have to confront the horrors of what he had
previously witnessed, so his choice of insomnia rather than sleep points to his efforts
to prevent thinking on a subject he does not want to confront.
Hemingway’s Henry takes another path towards the mastery of emotion. One
effort involves planning his thoughts in way similar to Tietjens. He says, “I was
going to try not to think about Catherine except at night before I went to sleep” (166).
One of his reasons for doing so is likely the fact that he misses Catherine, but more
significantly, his attempts to think of her only before sleep suggest his need to focus
his pre-sleep thoughts on something less horrific than the war, implying that letting
his mind roam freely would be dangerous to his well being. He also attempts to
assert control through relinquishing self-control via the abuse of alcohol. Not a day
or night goes by in the novel that fails to include Henry drinking heavily. In fact, as I
mentioned earlier, he drinks to the point of jaundice. But, Henry’s drinking often
fails him and he finds himself struggling to control his thoughts much as Tietjens and
Sherston do. In one such instance, Henry uses insomnia as a means of control:
I watched [the search lights in the sky] for a while and then went to
sleep. I slept heavily except once I woke sweating and scared and then
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went back to sleep trying to stay outside of my dream. I woke for
good long before it was light and heard roosters crowing and stayed on
awake until it began to be light. I was tired and once it was really light
I went back to sleep again. (88)
At first, he tries to control his dreams to avoid his nightmare, which he never
describes. Presumably, this attempt fails and once he reawakens, despite the earliness
of the hour, he remains awake. Staying awake in bed, when he could and should be
sleeping, is a result of his efforts to keep his unconscious mind in check. This
passage contrasts interestingly with the aforementioned passage in which Henry
mentions sleeping next to Catherine and knowing the only reason for awakening is
her in bed next to him. Once he has left the war, he does not need to control his sleep
and can enjoy it freely. However, during the war, sleep entails a great deal of fear
over what he may have to confront.
Hemingway’s short story “Now I Lay Me,” is a story about insomnia, which,
upon reading, F. Scott Fitzgerald commented, “I thought there was nothing further to
be said about insomnia” (“Sleeping” 63). Much as in the way in which Henry from A
Farewell to Arms avoids sleep to avoid nightmares, the narrator Nick uses his
insomnia for a similar purpose. Nick is in the hospital for an indefinite time (months
at least) because he “had been blown up at night” (“Now” 276). He describes himself
as someone who has “practice at being awake” (“Now” 279), and does so through
recounting memories of his past and reciting prayers. He refuses to allow himself to
sleep at night: “I myself did not want to sleep because I had been living a long time
with the knowledge that if I ever shut my eyes in the dark and let myself go, my soul
would go out of my body” (“Now” 276). For Nick, sleep must be conquered because
sleep involves a horrific confrontation with his mind that he cannot endure. He fears
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that when asleep, he will lose himself completely, likely because he felt that he had
already lost himself to the war. Being awake and controlling his sleep is his only
means of retaining self-control.
The Function of the Binary
Evidence of this tension between self-control and discipline comes through
the textual treatment of insomnia and sleep, which, as the texts depict cannot be
treated as a simple binary, one such as sleeping and waking, because of the
complexity of the relationship between mind and body in the experience of insomnia.
As I noted in my introductory chapter, Fussell argues that one of the outcomes of
World War I in relation to the use of language and production of literature was a
tendency towards representing war experience and post-war experience through
binary language. An interesting example of Fussell’s theory is present within A
Farewell to Arms with Hemingway’s depiction of the binary between night and day
as perceived early in the text by Henry. Towards the beginning of the novel, Henry
notes his inability to express this binary completely:
I had gone to no such place [as Abruzzi] but to the smoke of cafés and
nights when the room whirled and you needed to look at the wall to
make it stop, nights in bed, drunk, when you knew that that was all
there was, and the strange excitement of waking and not knowing who
it was with you, and the world all unreal in the dark and so exciting
that you must resume again unknowing and not caring in the night,
sure that this was all and all and all and not caring. Suddenly to care
very much and to sleep to wake with it sometimes morning and all that
had been there gone and everything sharp and hard and clear and
sometimes a dispute about the cost. Sometimes still pleasant and fond
and warm and breakfast and lunch. Sometimes all niceness gone and
glad to get out on the street but always another day starting and then
another night. I tried to tell about the night and the difference between
the night and the day and how the night was better unless the day was
very clean and cold and I could not tell it; as I cannot tell it now. But
if you have had it you know. (13)
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This passage, which describes Henry’s wartime experience of regular drunken visits
to brothels, both relies upon binary notions of day and night and confuses these
binaries, illustrating the narrator’s tendency to resort to such binaries, but also their
failure to express his experience. He asserts that drunken nights can seem like the
time when “you knew that that was all there was,” yet, simultaneously, “you must
resume again unknowing and not caring in the night.” He distinguishes the drunken
blurriness of the night with the “sharp and hard and clear” morning, yet refuses to
posit that the morning is a time of renewed stability, as one might face a “dispute”
over the costs of a prostitute’s services or experience the “excitement” of waking in
bed next to a new stranger each day. The passage suggests that what makes the night
knowable is its relationship to chaos and confusion; during war, chaos and confusion
are really all one can be certain of. The day seems clearer in the sharpness and
hardness of its appearance, but it fails to prevent another confusing and chaotic night.
Day only seems to provide honesty and clarity, but night, in its mystery is more
revealing and truthful but only of more mystery and confusion. Henry’s conclusion
that he cannot express the true distinction between night and day, though he knows
one exists, illustrates the circular, rather than linear model of the binary structure. As
Henry contends, there is “always another day staring and then another night,”
suggesting that the two are not opposites, but simply different parts of the same cycle
of confusion, one leading to the next and so forth.
Later on in the novel, however, as Henry’s experience in the war continues,
and he is both wounded in a shelling and witness to the death of his comrades, his
sense of distinction between night and day stabilizes: “I know that the night is not the
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same as the day: that all things are different, that the things of the night cannot be
explained in the day, because they do not exist, and the night can be a dreadful time
for lonely people once their loneliness has started” (249). Night and day have
regained their binary distinction, but only because of their incompatibility. The night,
the time at which he was most active as a war worker or as a pursuer of distraction,
becomes the inexpressible other to the more familiar and less isolating daytime.
While Henry asserts that the night is lonely for most, his nights are not lonely
at all. Much of his life with Catherine takes place at night; the war has turned him
into a complete insomniac. After he is hospitalized for his injuries, as the result of a
circumstantial coincidence, Catherine is transferred to his hospital and takes a job on
the night shift. Her desire to work on the night shift is motivated through her desire
to be with Henry, as night is the only time they can be alone. Hemingway writes:
Catherine Barkley was greatly liked by the nurses because she would
do night duty indefinitely. She had quite a little work with the malaria
people, the boy who had unscrewed the nose-cap was a friend of ours
and never rang at night, unless it was necessary but between the times
of working we were together. I loved her very much and she loved
me. I slept in the daytime. . . (108)
Thus, though the level of intimacy that their relationship reaches is forbidden because
they are not married, Henry asserts self-control, rather than discipline, through
maintaining his nocturnal connection with Catherine. He disregards hospital
procedure, allowing Catherine into his room socially, but can only do so because he is
able to sustain his insomnia. His insomnia allows him to pursue individual interests.
Hemingway further emphasizes the nocturnal nature of Henry’s relationship
with Catherine through making the significant actions of their relationship take place
nocturnally. For instance, they first visit each other at night, when Catherine is off
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duty (before her transfer and Henry’s injury). More significantly, their first public
liaison as a “married” couple (they claim to be married to a hotel manager and to
themselves, but are not legally married) takes place on the night before Henry’s return
to service. They remain in a hotel together as a couple until Henry must take the
midnight train back to the front (147). They leave Italy at night as well, escaping to
Switzerland in the dark (291). Additionally, Catherine goes into labor with their child
at three in the morning (313). Every action Henry takes to pursue his own selfinterests, as opposed to national interests in the war, takes place at night.
Anxiety
The constant confrontation of trauma or the ubiquitous possibility of traumatic
events, in turn, creates a sense of anxiety in many characters within both novels.
Anxiety is often cited as one of the most prevalent causes of insomnia, and a feeling
displayed by many characters throughout both texts, not only in relation to World
War I, but also in relation to modernity itself. Both Eluned Summers-Bremner and
Ford, argue that modernity, especially with its related urbanization and effects of that
urbanization such as crime and noise, creates anxiety, which then causes insomnia.
For Summers-Bremner, when a village grows, it becomes a city, but a city can grow
indefinitely, seemingly infinitely, much as “sleeplessness causes thought to feel
unstoppable” (111); similar to the way in which a citizen may feel that urban sprawl
has grown out of his or her control, the insomniac may feel his or her stream of
thoughts is beyond control and ever multiplying. According to Christina Britzolakis,
Ford understood modern cities in much the same way as Summers-Bremner. Ford
viewed modernity as an excess of stimuli “caused by urbanization and by the various
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technological and social changes that accompany it” (3). Consequently, modernity
and “metropolitan identity” were closely related. Ford viewed modernity itself as a
form of trauma, and, because he saw “metropolitan identity” as an essential element
of the life of the modern individual, survival in the modernized world must be “an
affair of anesthesia, of defensive non-sensitivity to an otherwise overwhelming
burden of stimuli” (4). Ford’s sense of the overstimulation of urban modernity is
similar to that of Georg Simmel, who describes the modern urban experience:
The psychological basis of the metropolitan type of individuality
consists in the intensification of nervous stimulation which results
from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli.
Man is a differentiating creature. His mind is stimulated by the
difference between a momentary impression and the one which
preceded it. Lasting impressions, impressions which differ only
slightly from one another, impressions which take a regular and
habitual course and show regular and habitual contrasts—all these use
up, so to speak, less consciousness than does the rapid crowding of
changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single
glance, and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions. These are
the psychological conditions which the metropolis creates. (409)
Much as William James asserts that a reliance on habit, grounded in familiarity,
prevents exhaustion by allowing us to minimize the amount of conscious attention we
focus on a given habitual behavior (Habit 40), Simmel argues that the increased
unfamiliarity of the urban setting due to its amorphous nature creates mental
exhaustion through the over-exertion needed to perceive and interpret surroundings.
The trench system of World War I that the soldiers inhabited mirrored the
over-stimulation and chaos of the urban setting. As Fussell notes, trenches were
given decidedly urban names: “a less formal way of identifying sections of trench
was by place of street name with a distinctly London flavor. Piccadilly was a
favorite; popular names also were Regent Street and Strand; junctions were Hyde
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Park Corner and Marble Arch” (42-43). However, the likeness does not stop simply
at urban-themed assignations. Fussell presents a description of the trenches,
illustrating their similarity to an urban setting: “To be in the trenches was to
experience an unreal, unforgettable enclosure and constraint, as well as a sense of
being unoriented and lost. One saw two things only: the walls of an unlocalized,
undifferentiated earth and the sky above” (51). He then recounts the experience of a
World War I vet, wandering through a city in India, whose experience of being lost in
back alleys makes him feel as though he had returned to the trenches (51).
In Fussell’s description of the trenches, the monotony of the landscape is
certainly not reminiscent of the ever-changing and over-stimulating world Simmel
describes. But even then, one can imagine a shelling or explosion to create both
sensory overload and a malleable landscape. The sense of entrapment, chaos,
claustrophobia, and disorientation Fussell illustrates further resembles the urban
experience as described by Simmel as one in which the individual feels lost and
isolated amidst a crowd. One can imagine that in an urban landscape, the only view
of the natural world is the sky; because the person is hemmed in by buildings on all
sides, the only escape from this view is upwards. The trenches elicit a similar
experience. Fussell argues, “It was the sight of the sky, almost alone, that had the
power to persuade a man that he was not already lost in a common grave” (51).
Both the trenches of World War I and the urban cityscape are products of
modernization and can have the paradoxical consequence of de-sensitization through
repeated over-stimulation. Britzolakis argues that for “Ford, metropolitan anesthesia
is a function of a culture marked by ever more highly developed powers of mass
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communication and technological destruction alike” (15). This belief translates into a
form of “impressionism” in his writing, in which vision itself is the vehicle of both
attempt and failure to understand the modern world. Within Parade’s End, Ford’s
outlook is arguably translated in the form of the visual illusions that Tietjens
experiences when he has not been able to sleep, so becomes intrinsically connected to
Tietjens’ insomnia: “His eyes, when they were tired, had that trick of reproducing
images on their retinas with that extreme clearness, images sometimes of things he
thought of, sometimes of things merely at the back of his mind” (299). During the
scene from which the above quotation is taken, Tietjens is mulling over problems
with his wife but also the human tragedy of war itself, and it is a reproduction of his
wife’s image that he sees before him, but he is also trying to comprehend the world
around him, indicating that these retinal illusions are his means of adjusting to and
understanding the world of his experience.
During this scene, Tietjens is introduced to Captain McKechnie (whom he
mistakenly thinks of as McKenzie for quite some time). McKechnie is assigned to
Tietjens’ unit because McKechnie has been showing symptoms of war neurosis, yet,
as Macmaster’s nephew, McKechnie is a person to be protected and not disgraced for
his mental illness. Tietjens’ unit is well behind the front lines, and Tietjens can act as
sort of baby-sitter to McKechnie while he “recovers.” Just prior to his conversation
with McKechnie, Tietjens contemplates the true tragedy of the war:
Heavy depression settled down more heavily upon him. The distrust
of the home Cabinet, felt by then by the greater part of that army,
became physical pain. These immense sacrifices, this ocean of mental
sufferings, were all undergone to further the private vanities of men
who amidst these hugenesses of landscapes and forces appeared
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pigmies! It was the worries of all these wet millions in mud-brown
that worried him. (297)
There is a parallel here between Tietjens’ sense of the war as out of control
(especially his control) as viewed through a huge and ever expanding landscape and
that same lack of control felt by those experiencing a seemingly infinite increase in
modernity and urbanization. His use of natural imagery, including vast landscapes,
oceans, and mud associated with the masses of suffering soldiers, emphasizes the
disconnection between the more natural world of the men and their individual worries
and the modernized, dehumanizing world of the military authorities. The vastness of
the war landscape, similar to ever-expanding cities that dwarf their inhabitants,
associates the expansiveness of modernization with the horrors of war.
As Tietjens converses with McKechnie, McKechnie raises the subject of
Sylvia. Tietjens, who went to war at least in part to remove himself from the
problems of his home life, is overwhelmed by the painful effect the mere mention of
Sylvia’s name has on him: “In the dark brownness, an intolerable pang went all
through his heavy frame—the intolerable pang of home news to these desperately
occupied men, the pain caused by disasters happening in the darkness and at a
distance” (299). Again, Tietjens is struggling with a lack of control that he equates to
spatial expansiveness. He is mostly unable to affect circumstances at home given his
separation from his wife and family. His mind’s tendency to reproduce images on his
retinas can be seen as a reaction to a sense of being out of control and the subsequent
anxiety that state creates.
Tietjens is a decidedly pre-modern character, often referred to as being of the
eighteenth century. It is no coincidence that in his moments of exhaustion, when
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experiencing visual illusions, Tietjens often sees “a woman in an eighteenth century
dress looking into a drawer in his bureau” (418). When he is exhausted or feels as
though life is out of his control, his mind’s reaction is to focus itself on a scene from
which he takes comfort. Ford identified Tietjens as a man “whose body is tied in one
place, but whose mind and personality brood eternally over another distant locality”
(qtd. in Gose 446). This brooding is often a product of anxiety, from which Tietjens
certainly suffers, but his anxiety more related to “instrumentalizing relations,” or his
innate opposition to “the shaping of human will to the designs of technical
administration,” (McCarthy 178-79) as opposed to fear of pain or suffering, fear of
not sleeping itself, or failure to live salubriously. According to Jameson, “modernism
. . . involves a whole Utopian compensation for increasing dehumanization on the
level of daily life” (42). Tietjens’ orientation towards the past in moments of
rebellion against the modern world illustrates his frustration with the dehumanization
he witnesses. Ford’s inclusion of this tendency within the text serves to illustrate
Tietjens’ utopian inclinations (he sees the eighteenth century as an idealized era in
which interpersonal relationships take precedence over rationalized ones) in direct
response to not Modernism, but modernity.
When Tietjens is unable to sleep, it is primarily because he is concerned with
interpersonal relationships, mainly those between himself and his wife or himself and
his future mistress (243; 348). In many ways, modernity diminished the practical
necessity of interpersonal relations, through increased bureaucracy, rationalization,
mass production, mechanical warfare and countless other factors. Tietjens, however,
focuses his mental energy not on solving problems of productivity, but of working out
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situations of interpersonal communication and conflict, differentiating himself from
his modern counterparts. Tietjens does believe that “it is proper that one’s individual
feelings should be sacrificed to the necessities of a collective entity” (357), as is
evidenced by his various attempts to control his thought processes. However, unlike
Sherston, Tietjens is not able to detach himself from interpersonal feelings and
emotions, resulting in a unique type of anxiety from which Tietjens both suffers and
is kept awake at night.
An example of this social anxiety comes when Tietjens’ wife, Sylvia, decides
to visit him at the front after he believes they had been permanently parted, never to
interact as husband and wife again. Rather than choosing to sleep after an exhausting
day, Tietjens, “had appointed this moment of physical ease that usually followed on
his splurging heavily down on to his creaking camp-bed in the doctor’s tent hut, for
the cool consideration of his relations with his wife” (342). This is a scene in which
Tietjens chooses insomnia, deciding to use his “insomniac-time” as time for thought,
as he forces himself to write down the story of his recent history with his wife.
However, his marital difficulties are not all that are keeping him awake. This scene
takes place subsequent to the death of O Nine Morgan, and visions of Morgan’s death
continue to occupy his thoughts, against his will. He fails to come to any definite
conclusions regarding his relationship with Sylvia, as he finds it difficult to
concentrate on her and not on the trauma he suffered with Morgan’s death.
As thoughts of Morgan overtake his mind, he begins to equate his exhaustion,
and even sleep itself, with death:
And at the thought of the man [Morgan] as he was alive and of him
now, dead, an immense blackness descended all over Tietjens. He said
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to himself: I am very tired. Yet he was not ashamed…. It was the
blackness that descends on you when you think of your dead… It
comes, at any time, over the brightness of sunlight, in the grey of
evening, in the grey of the dawn, at mess, on parade; it comes at the
thought of one man or at the thought of half a battalion that you have
seen, stretched out, under sheeting, the noses making little pimples; or
not stretched out, lying face downwards, half buried. Or at the thought
of the dead that you have never seen dead at all…. Suddenly, the light
goes out… (356)
In this passage, Tietjens is overtly discussing the horrors of mortality, especially for
those left alive in the war, but his arguments about thoughts of horror parallel the
result of exhaustion and the impending need for sleep. He is considering a lack of
control over thoughts, thoughts that come on a person seemingly randomly, much as
insomnia in large part implies a lack of control over sleep. Insomnia itself mimics the
condition of human mortality, death being the ultimate form of isolation from
communication with the rest of humanity. Sherston, for example, sees soldiers and
“was doubtful whether they were asleep or dead, for the attitudes of many were like
death, grotesque and distorted” (431). It is their isolation, their attitude of being cut
off from the rest of humanity, that Sherston finds grotesque. Sherston asks, “And the
soldiers who slept around us in their hundreds—were they not like the dead, among
whom in some dim region where time survived in ghostly remembrances, we two
could still cheat ourselves with hopes and forecasts of a future exempt from
antagonisms and perplexities?” (358). We live our lives not knowing with any
certainty when death will come, yet with awareness of our own mortality, just as the
insomniac suffers from a heightened awareness of time’s passage, yet lacks
knowledge of sleep’s arrival. One who cannot sleep is also unable to capture the
freedom from consciousness brought on by both sleep and death. Standardized Time
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and Taylorization sought to eliminate idiosyncrasy of time, as did the 1914 institution
of Daylight Savings Time meant to lengthen the amount of daylight one experienced
and save fuel (Coren 270); insomnia reclaims this idiosyncrasy because the sleepless
individual gains a heightened awareness of time, yet also a heightened awareness of
his or her lack of control over it. This same idiosyncrasy reflected the idiosyncrasy of
war and its disruptive effects on biological rhythms.
Tietjens is kept awake by worrying not about himself, but about others in his
life, whether they are comrades in the war or friends and family. Similarly, he is not
the only one kept awake by anxiety, though his anxiety takes on a unique form based
in interpersonal relations. Sherston, too, suffers from anxiety, which, even in spite of
his aforementioned adaptability to uncomfortable circumstances, makes it difficult for
him to sleep. In this case, insomnia was almost expected from the soldiers, as
Sherston’s comrade Dottrell observes, “[The soldiers] must suffer terribly from
insomnia with so many guns firing fifteen miles away” (351). After Sherston returns
from Army School, he learns of an impending raid on the enemy trenches. As a
consequence of this information, he is kept awake. He writes, “I was now full of
information about the Raid, and I could think of nothing else. My month of rest at
Flixécourt was already obliterated” (296). He had been away from the front lines
prior to this point, and, consequently, he was able to rest. However, his return to the
front and the subsequent anxiety it caused had the effect of erasing all the benefits of
his rest. Sherston continues, “I wouldn’t mind going up there and doing it now, I
thought, for I was wideawake and full of energy after my easy life at the Army
School” (297). Sherston implies that the time he is spending not sleeping is time
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wasted in this case. He would rather take action, though that action entails a great
degree of physical danger, than spend time in anxious limbo, merely waiting to act.
He would prefer a state of combat to the state of anxiety preceding combat, this
anxiety creating a state of insomnia.
Though Tietjens and Sherston were both active in the war, soldiers and other
war workers were not the only people to suffer from insomnia related to the war and
its anxieties. In Parade’s End, both Sylvia and Valentine acknowledge being unable
to sleep at night due to their concern for Tietjens and the war itself. Valentine, for
instance, exclaims, “I can’t sleep…never….I haven’t slept a whole night since…
Think of the immense spaces, stretching out under the night…I believe pain and fear
must be worse at night” (234). And, Sylvia says, “I’m dog-tired…. I haven’t slept for
six nights…. In spite of drugs” (443). Valentine and Sylvia, despite their shared
insomnia, are to be differentiated here. Valentine’s insomnia is similar to Tietjens’
in that one of its causes is the horror of war itself; she is not concerned for herself,
and, while she is concerned for Tietjens’ safety, she is more focused on the general
suffering of all involved with the war. She mentions “immense spaces,” echoing the
Tietjens’ anxiety over the “hugenesses of landscapes” (297) and also Ford’s concerns
over the uncontrollable expansion of urbanity that comes with modernization. Sylvia,
on the other hand, is more selfish. Her insomnia stems from a lack of control, but this
lack of control is not due to the suffering and seeming infinite nature of the war, but
over her inability to control Tietjens himself. He is no longer under her power, so she
is kept awake by thoughts of how to regain some sort of mastery over him.
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Furthermore, Valentine, like Tietjens, is willing to stay awake with her thoughts, but
Sylvia uses drugs in an attempt to sleep.
Whatever form the cause of anxiety contributing to insomnia may take,
civilian insomnia was not uncommon during the war. In fact, some civilians suffered
from not only just insomnia, but also neurosis, similar to the “shell-shock”
experienced by soldiers. Initially, medical authorities did not believe civilians could
suffer from neurosis caused by war-related anxiety; however, through imagining the
horrors of the war, many civilians did indeed become susceptible to suffering, and the
condition gained public recognition, skeptical as that recognition may have been
(Tate 11-12). Insomnia became one of the more frequently visible symptoms of
civilian suffering. Because civilians did not directly experience combat or even
threats of physical danger, neurosis was largely related to stress associated with loved
ones more directly involved in the war, complicating an understanding of it as related
to neurotic responses resulting from more direct threats like bombings or air raids.
Therefore, it stands to reason that the cure for insomnia and disturbed sleep
often involved establishing control over both one’s thoughts and one’s environment.
Mastery of the body and mind was the primary area of focus in the discussion of the
treatment of insomnia, but medical experts provided practical advice as well. Drugs
were not the preferred method of treatment in the years following the war, but could
be used as a method of last resort (“Broken Sleep” Rankin 78). However, with or
without sedatives, one should have a place to sleep that is “dark, quiet, and wellventilated. A spring bed was best, and it should be placed away from the wall”
(Hutchinson 777).
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Ford gives an example of attempts at environmental control in order to
alleviate insomnia. Tietjens, after the war, arranges his bedroom in a manner
conducive to sleep. Ford relates Valentine’s thoughts upon seeing how Tietjens has
arranged his room:
These things looked terribly sordid and forlorn. Why did he place
them in the centre of the room? Why not against a wall? It is usual to
stand the head of a bed against a wall when there is no support for the
pillows. Then the pillows do not slip off. She would change… No,
she would not. He had put the bed in the centre of the room because
he did not want it to touch walls that had been brushed by the dress of
[Sylvia Tietjens]. (651)
This passage gives Valentine’s interpretation of the arrangement of Tietjens’ room;
Tietjens himself provides no explanation. Yet, her analysis makes sense. Earlier in
the novel, we learn that Sylvia, Tietjens’ estranged wife, is a major cause of his
insomnia, or at least it is mainly of her and their problems that he thinks when he is
up late at night (Ford 79). Tietjens is doubling Hutchinson’s brand of advice: he has
both placed his bed away from the wall and attempted, by doing so, to separate
himself from the cause of his insomnia. He has attempted to master his environment
in order to master his thoughts.
Fallout of Insomnia
The consequences of insomnia for the individual may include exhaustion,
decreased alertness and productivity, but the consequences of insomnia for the larger
group are arguably revelatory of the stability of the society itself as well as the
relationship of the individual to the larger group. In his book The Rationalisation of
Slaughter, Daniel Pick raises a crucial issue: “The sense of crisis aroused by shell
shock owed a great deal to the expectations of manliness fostered by the war
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propagandists and to the wider presumption that mental illness was an index to the
moral state of the nation—as though the sum of individual physical and psychological
conditions formed a collective mind and body” (243). Pick, much like the medical
authorities seeking to prevent insomnia, illustrates the alleged relationship between
mental health and morality (though he does not take this relationship for granted). He
points to the idea of “individual physical and psychological conditions” (which can
certainly include insomnia) as more than just a reflection on the individual sufferer,
but on the society itself. If British authorities choose to point to lesser proportion of
incidences of shell shock as proof of the superior strength of their psyche, then it is
arguable that the cases that do exist point to cracks in that social armor.
It was then very much in the interest of authorities to emphasize the
individual’s personality or circumstances, rather than the society, as the impetus of
the insomnia. A useful parallel here may be drawn between insomnia and shell
shock. Lerner uses the actions of post-war German medical community to illustrate
the extent to which “science” molded itself to serve the needs of government and
industry. One important generalization Lerner makes about the shift in psychiatric
discourse regards the discipline’s widespread acceptance of the view that “traumatic
events do not make healthy people sick, but rather sick people react pathologically to
traumatic events” (15). This mentality is not exclusive to the German medical
industry. An article written by several unnamed British doctors gives the following
explanation of war neurosis:
It is maintained that the nervous breakdown, which is a common
sequel of participation in battles of to-day, is practically confined to
persons who are already subject to nervous instability, or in other
words, that the strain of modern warfare is merely an exciting cause of
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“nerve shock,” and that many of the sufferers would, under ordinary
circumstances, have broken down sooner or later. (“Nerve Shock” 64)
Findings seem to indicate that the various symptoms of neurasthenia, including
unconsciousness, amnesia, and aphasia, are not due to external conditions alone, but
rather the patient’s “pre-morbid personality,” which is more worthy of examination
than his or her actual trauma (“Nerve Shock” 64). Not surprisingly, treatments were
similarly self-serving for the government.
Mental breakdowns of soldiers resulting from war trauma were largely viewed
in the same light as industrial accidents, and insomnia was one of the indicators of
mental breakdown. Many treatments were designed not to allow the patient to
reprocess his or her experience as cognitive and psychoanalytic models of treatment
propose, but to influence the will towards “patriotism, altruism, and productivity”
(Lerner 23). This notion is exemplified by the rejection and marginalization of
theories of Doctor Hermann Oppenheim who suggested war trauma was the true
culprit for veterans’ conditions such as stuttering, shaking, and mutism (Lerner 16).
Oppenheim’s theories were rejected for what amounted to economic reasons; if the
war was to blame for the soldier’s illness, the state was morally and financially
responsible for his cure. Thus Oppenheim’s assertion that the war caused the illness
was seen as “scientifically false, but perhaps more importantly, disastrous ‘for the
economic interest of the state and the health of the individual’” (Lerner 16-17). Not
all doctors and psychologists agreed on this subject. W. H. R. Rivers, for instance,
argues that many soldiers repressed their war experience rather than confronting it
outright, but this repression did not necessarily indicate mental illness on its own:
“repression is not in itself a pathological process, nor is it necessarily the cause of
144

pathological states” (1). For Rivers, the need to repress is not indicative of pathology,
but may become pathological during “times of special stress” at which “these failures
of adaptation are especially liable to occur” (1). Notably, Rivers emphasizes the
external causes of the failure of the repressive mechanism rather than individual
weakness. He does not blame the soldier for his neurosis, but rather the soldier’s
stress. Even so, his considerations of treatment are not limited to the benefit of the
soldier: “When treating officers or men suffering from war neurosis we have not only
to think of the restoration of the patient to health; we have also to consider the
question of fitness for military service” (10). Not necessarily an advocate of
treatment through discipline like other medical professionals I have already
mentioned, his concerns in sending back the soldier are not in the soldier’s interests
alone; sending a soldier back prematurely “might have produced some disaster by
failure in a critical situation or lowered morale of his unit by committing suicide”
(10). Despite his refusal to blame the individual for his own trauma, Rivers’ priorities
of treatment remain focused on the best interests of the military as a whole.
Yet, doctors like Oppenheim and Rivers were more the exception than the
rule, at least initially. For example, an article describing the “soldier’s heart” or “the
irritable heart of soldiers” explains that “This strain (of war experience) inevitably
finds out the impaired hearts” (Mackenzie 117). Even though this article is talking
about an ostensibly physical ailment, albeit one “to which soldiers are particularly
liable” (117) rather than a psychological one, the language is telling, indicating that
the war does not cause weakness, in this case heart trouble, but reveals it. Although
insomnia and shell shock are different conditions, the discursive treatment of these
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issues is generally the same. If the individual is implicated in his or her own
insomnia, the individual, rather than the society, must take responsibility for the
consequences of that insomnia. Within the novels, we see various approaches to the
consequences of suffering from insomnia or choosing not to sleep at night.
In Parade’s End, there are a few occasions on which Tietjens goes without
sleep. After one particular occurrence, he becomes unusually forgetful: “He had not
been on the back of the animal two minutes before he remembered that he had
forgotten to look it over. It was the first time in his life that he had ever forgotten to
look . . . before climbing into the saddle” (363). He expects that riding the horse will
help him become more awake and aware, “But the ride did not clear his head—rather
the sleeplessness of the night began for the first time then to tell on him after a
morning of fatigues” (364). Later on, Tietjens becomes dizzy, and the hut he is in is
“reeling a little” (450). Other characters try to come to Tietjens’ rescue, McKechnie
providing him with hot cocoa (364) and Levin providing him with smelling salts
(450). The willingness of others to help remedy Tietjens’ exhaustion shows the
nature of their co-dependence and the necessity of Tietjens acting alert and awake
despite having been unable to sleep. Yet, Tietjens shows little concern with the
consequences of his own insomnia, emphasizing both his refusal to prioritize himself
as a soldier in terms of his self care, but also the extent of his masculinity, as Sylvia
compares him to her lover, Perowne, in the following manner: “He would not do
anything to a girl like you. He’s a man…” (381). Later, she gives herself ten minutes
to find a man comparable to Christopher in a room full of soldiers, but finds herself
unable to do so (415). Tietjens’ manliness extends to his ability to stay awake all
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night without complaint: “It was the day after he had been up all night because the
draft had been countermanded…. It didn’t matter” (448). Tietjens does not express
any concern over his ability to do his job after an extended period of sleeplessness.
His focus is his relationship with his wife. When he is offered the aforementioned
smelling salts to help him become more alert, he does not comment on their effect,
but on how they remind him of his wife (448).
For Sherston, lack of sleep also has various effects, certainly not limited to
exhaustion. As a result of his insomnia, Sherston has a difficult time retaining mental
focus consistently. Sassoon writes, “During the next two days my mind groped and
worried around the same purgatorial limbo so incessantly that the whole business
began to seem unreal and distorted. Sometimes the wording of my thoughts became
incoherent and even nonsensical. At other times I saw everything with the haggard
clarity of insomnia” (508). Two particularly interesting ideas are implicit within
Sherston’s observation. In one sense, the lack of sleep lessens Sherston’s ability to
control and even understand his own thoughts, much as we see with Tietjens who
suffers from hallucinations when he is tired. Alternatively, and perhaps because of
the additional time for thought afforded to him by his inability to sleep, he sees with a
sense of clarity. “Haggard” implies exhaustion, but he knows there is some truth to
what he sees through the lens of this exhaustion; it is as if the world comes to him
unfiltered and he can gain a new sense of reality and understanding.
However, there are occurrences in which Sherston’s exhaustion does have
definite repercussions in terms of his ability to perceive reality and to function
interpersonally. In one scene, Sherston is stumbling around in the dark trenches:
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Once, when I tripped and recovered myself by grabbing the wall, my
tentative patch of brightness revealed somebody half hidden under a
blanket. Not a very clever spot to be taking a nap, I thought as I
stooped to shake him by the shoulder. He refused to wake up, so I
gave him a kick. “God blast you, where’s Battalion Headquarters?”
My nerves were on edge; and what right had he to be having a good
sleep, when I never seemed to get five minutes’ rest?... Then my beam
settled on the livid face of a dead German whose fingers still clutched
the blackened gash on his neck. . . . Stumbling on, I could only mutter
to myself that this was really a bit too thick. (That, however, was an
exaggeration; there is nothing remarkable about a dead body in a
European war, or a squashed beetle in a cellar.) (437)
Sherston’s jealousy of one who is sleeping takes some prominence in this passage.
He does not sympathize with the soldier whom he thinks to be asleep (and perhaps
even share his sense of exhaustion); rather, Sherston resents the soldier’s “nap” and
kicks him in an effort to awaken him, even as Sherston believes this soldier to be a
comrade. Upon realizing the soldier is not actually sleeping, but dead, Sherston still
expresses no sense of pity, sympathy, or empathy. Instead, he likens the dead man to
a squashed beetle, robbing him of their shared humanity (albeit somewhat
understandably, as undoubtedly the German soldier’s intention in the trench was to
kill as many British soldiers as possible). Sherston points to the soldier’s hands,
“clutching the blackened gash on his neck,” which seems to humanize the German,
illustrating that he died with pain and fear, making him worthy of the reader’s pity,
yet Sherston quickly disrupts this moment of humanization by declaring the site of
the body to be “nothing remarkable” comparable to a “squashed beetle in a cellar.”
This passage reveals an inadvertent effect of insomnia (and of the war itself) in that
the soldiers are desensitized to each others’ humanity and also the tragic nature of
death and destruction on such a mass scale. The clarity that Sherston attains both
reveals to him the dehumanizing effects of war, yet makes him apathetic as well.
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Towards the end of the text just before his committal Sherston argues that
insomnia can provide clarity, but prior to this observation clarity for him in the
previous scene is akin to likening a dead human to a dead insect, providing an
instance of the devaluation of the life of the individual. Death is inevitable and
unremarkable. He has come to understand the hardness of the life he is forced to live
during the war, but to be able to cope with this hardness is to renounce humanity to an
extent without even realizing, at least at the time, that he is doing so. Others, like
Sigmund Freud, counter that sleep, rather than insomnia, is needed for understanding
of the self. Time spent sleeping is considered important for reasons other than
physical and mental productivity or alertness, but also purposes of insight. Some, like
both of Hemingway’s lieutenants, choose to avoid sleep at night to avoid the insight it
might provide, but arguably to their own detriment. Freud, whose theories of
psychology were particularly influential to the society represented in the novels, for
example, views the state of sleep as necessary to gain a greater understanding of
ourselves, our desires, and our fears; consequently, to avoid sleep means to avoid a
confrontation with them. When we are awake, Freud argues, our conscious mind acts
as a censor, allowing us to pursue some thoughts, while suppressing others. On the
other hand, as we fall asleep, “the ‘undesired ideas’ emerge, owing to a slackening of
a certain arbitrary (and, of course, also critical) action, which is allowed to influence
the trend of our ideas” (Dreams 193). The state leading up to sleep allows our minds
to operate without conscious or even subconscious restriction, bringing to the surface
thoughts we normally exclude from our internal monologues. When one is able to
suppress self-criticism, “an unlimited number of thoughts enter his consciousness
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which would otherwise have eluded his grasp. With the aid of material thus
obtained—material which is new to the self-observer—it is possible to achieve the
interpretation of pathological ideas” (Dreams 192). One has to be able to sleep to rid
oneself of pathology, so to not sleep might be a means of self-punishment through
maintaining and perpetuating pathology. Such an argument makes sense in light of
the guilt Tietjens feels regarding Morgan’s death, Sherston feels regarding his
participation in the war, and Henry might feel for his various moral transgressions.
Their insomnia simultaneously prevents them from confronting the nightmares they
may have, yet through preventing this confrontation, allows them to prolong their
guilt and self-punishment.
For Freud, dreaming, which primarily takes place when one sleeps, is also
necessary to gain self-awareness, especially in cases of malady or neurosis because
clues to the workings of the psyche lie within dreams. He writes, “The theme to
which [the dreams of the neurotic] point is, of course, always the history of the
malady that is responsible for the neurosis” (Dreams 194). Dreams were necessary
for non-neurotics as well, as they were forms of “wish-fulfillment,” leading people,
through psychoanalysis, to better understandings of themselves and their, sometimes
hidden, desires (Dreams 208). So, in addition to sleep being necessary for physical
health, it is also necessary for psychological health.
Again, Tietjens presents an interesting application of Freud’s ideas. There is
one scene in particular in which Tietjens talks in his sleep, giving prominence to
issues with which he is contemplating, if only subconsciously (453). Tietjens is not
surprised that he has been talking in his sleep, claiming, “It’s nothing to write home
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about! With the overwork I’ve had and the sleeplessness…” (453). In this instance,
he echoes MacFarlane, acknowledging overwork as a cause for his inability to sleep
and poor sleep quality. He explains his sleep-talking when he says, “It means that
one has been under mental pressure, but all mental pressure does not drive you over
the edge” (453). His mental pressure had a necessary outlet in his sleep-talking,
allowing him to do something which Levin characterizes as indicating that one is “a
bit dotty” (453), but is ultimately able to retain his sanity. Tietjens’ awareness of
great mental pressure supports Freud’s argument that dreaming provides an outlet for
difficult emotions. When he does sleep, his anxieties are given visual expression.
Further bolstering Freud’s theories is the actual content of Tietjens’ sleep talk.
Freud, as previously mentioned, believes that the content of dreams points to the
cause of mental suffering; he further argues that sleep allows the sufferer to have
thoughts that he or she would normally suppress during waking hours. Both elements
of Freud’s argument prove true in Tietjens’ case. Tietjens, who cannot remember
what he said while sleeping, asks Levin, who answers, “You were talking to a young
lady about matters you don’t generally talk to young ladies about…. And obviously
you were trying to let your…. Mrs. Tietjens, down easily…. You were trying to
explain also why you had definitely decided to separate from Mrs. Tietjens…. And
you took it that the young lady might be troubled….at the separation….” (458-59).
To this point, Tietjens has consciously thought very little about Valentine,
considering the impossibility of making her his mistress while he is away at war,
primarily due to fear of impregnating her then dying and being consequently unable
to care for her and the child, who would be a bastard. Both sleep and trauma return
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thoughts of her to his mind: “He had not thought of that girl [Valentine] for over a
fortnight now . . . She was certainly now obsessing him” (604). However, even in
sleep, he refers to her as “Miss Wannop,” illustrating the deeply ingrained nature of
his social values and sense of propriety. Yet, his dreams reveal his feelings towards
her and his wife, even if he is hesitant to acknowledge them himself. Prior to this
point, Tietjens maintained that divorce should not be requested by a man, arguing that
“such calamities [marital infidelities] are the will of God. A gentleman accepts them.
If the woman won’t divorce, he must accept them” (11). Yet, in his dream, he
attempts to find a way of releasing Sylvia from their marriage rather than just sticking
it out as he previously thought was the proper course.
The instance of sleep-talking follows a particularly painful exchange between
Tietjens and Sylvia, in which her former lover, Perowne, attempts to enter her hotel
room despite Tietjens’ presence there. Tietjens physically throws Perowne out and
causes a scene at the hotel, which also involves another officer, necessitating General
Campion’s begrudging intervention given the personal and emotional nature of the
conflict. Even after Tietjens’ inner thoughts are revealed, he is still hesitant to talk
about them openly, citing social propriety, specifically that of the British. To Levin
he says, “You’ll excuse my having been emotional so far. You aren’t English, so it
won’t have embarrassed you” (458). Levin, who is Jewish (and therefore nonEnglish to Tietjens), takes offense, but Tietjens does not necessarily mean his
statement as an insult, arguing that there is “nothing in the world” the matter with
Levin, which is “just what makes [him] un-English” (458). Tietjens claims that “it
doesn’t matter what’s wrong with us…” (458), but his argument here constitutes his
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first real criticism of the expectation of the English stoicism that disallows him to
publically discuss his innermost feelings and also dictates the nature of his
interactions with Valentine. Dreaming allows Tietjens a viewpoint from which he
can consider feelings he has previously suppressed, but also opens for him the
opportunity to talk about those feelings despite their impropriety.
If Tietjens’ dream of discussing leaving his wife with Valentine signifies his
true feelings if not hidden desires, and the dreams of soldiers often reveal the source
of their neurosis, other dreams are equally revelatory, especially when those dreams
are nightmares. Nightmares are mentioned in both texts. Cowley, one of Tietjens’
comrades claims that one of the most common nightmares during the war involved
“seeing your dead” (441). This too supports Freud’s ideas concerning dreams
pointing to the source of a trauma. Interestingly, Cowley argues that nightmares can
be cured by “Epsom salts… And of course you should keep off women for a
fortnight” (441). The latter element of Cowley’s “cure” again refers to the idea of the
relationship between faulty morality and faulty sleep, as immoral relations with
women are said to contribute to one’s nightmares.
Tietjens himself suffers from a recurring nightmare “of the mining Germans
who desired that a candle be brought to the Captain. At first, every night, three or
four times every night, it had visited him…. Now it came only once every night….”
(604). This nightmare has several features relevant to Tietjens’ current situation in
the trenches. Present within the nightmare is the perpetual action of the “mining
Germans,” representing the constant threat of danger and perpetual nature of the war.
Interactions with authority are also included within the nightmare, the bringing of the
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candle to the Captain as representative of a sense of duty. In one instance of Tietjens’
experience of this nightmare, he is particularly on edge, unaware of the difference
between consciousness and unconsciousness. Ford writes:
He had found the sound of the pickaxes beneath his flea-bag almost
unbearable. They were probably our own men. Obviously they were
our own men. But it had not made much difference, for, of course, if
they were there they would be an attraction, and the Germans might
just as well be below them, counter-mining. His nerves had been put
in a bad way by that rotten strafe. He knew his nerves were in a bad
way because he had a ghostly visit from O Nine Morgan. . . . A voice,
just under his camp bed, said : “Bringt dem Hauptmann eine Kerze…”
As who should say: “Bring a candle for the captain…” Just like that!
A dream! It hadn’t been as considerable of a shock as you might have
thought to a man just dozing off. Not really as bad as the falling
dream, but quite as awakening…. (561-62)
Paradoxically, the dream itself leads to his awakening. This dream occurs during a
particularly stressful time for Tietjens, subsequent to the death of Morgan, for which
he blames himself, pointing to the relationship between stress and nightmares. In
fact, during this particular sequence, Tietjens feels himself to be under so much
mental pressure that upon awakening, “He cast about in his mind for some subject
about which to think so that he could prove to himself that he had not gone mad”
(564). One of the signs of mental distress is Tietjens’ inability to distinguish between
the state of sleep and wakefulness.
Privacy
Tietjens is not alone in his sleep talking; Henry talks in his sleep as well (198).
A significant issue raised by the act of talking in one’s sleep is the issue of privacy.
Military service, especially during war time, does not lend itself to privacy.
Consequently, Tietjens observes that as an officer, his men “watched [him] eternally
and knew the minutest gestures of [his] sleep” (570). Ford’s use of “sleep” here is
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significant; the men do not just know Tietjens’ behaviors, but his sleep behaviors, or,
in other words, his behaviors at a time when he is unable to consciously control them.
Tietjens struggles with this lack of privacy, as Ford describes:
No scenes. Obviously for the sake of the servants—who are the same
thing as the public. No scenes then, for the sake of the public. And
indeed, with him, the instinct for privacy—as to his relationships, his
passions, or even as to his most unimportant motives—was as strong
as the instinct of life itself. He would, literally, rather be dead than an
open book. (342)
Talking in his sleep, and the revelations it allows those who witness it, is an
extremely uncomfortable experience for Tietjens, who places such a high value on
privacy. Insomnia, then, might be interpreted as his act of resistance to revealing
himself through sleep-talking. Again, we see Tietjens prioritize his private self over
his public self; he would rather forego sleep than risk his sleep-words being used
against him. Similarly, Henry attempts to protect his privacy through control of his
sleep talking. He is surrounded by Italians, but manages to limit his sleep talking to
English so they are unable to understand him (198).
Tietjens is not the only character within Parade’s End who talks in his sleep,
as there is “a boy” who “was making such a beastly row in his sleep that they could
not hear themselves speak,” so he must be removed to a different room (557). The
other soldiers “could not tell what had happened to the boy,” but “the acting sergeantmajor thought he must have got at some methylated spirits” (557). Here again there
is a connection between sleep-talk and trauma, but also disrupted sleep and morality.
The officer in authority chooses to point to the boy’s allegedly unhealthy habit of
consuming “methylated spirits” rather than “what had happened” (as the other
soldiers acknowledge) as the source of the boy’s poor sleep quality. Sherston, too,
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witnesses sleep-talking, or at least talking during a state of semi-consciousness.
Sherston writes:
Everyone in the ward seemed to be asleep except the boy whose bed
had screens round it. . . . He must be jolly bad, I thought now, as the
Sister came from behind the screen again. His voice went on, in the
low, rapid, even tone of delirium. Sometimes I could catch what he
said, troubled and unhappy complaining. Someone called Dicky was
on his mind, and he kept on crying out to Dicky. “Don’t go out,
Dicky; they snipe like hell!” And then, “Curse the Wood…. Dicky,
you fool, don’t go out!” All the horror of the Somme attacks was in
that raving; all the darkness and the dreadful daylight. (365-66)
This soldier’s trauma had something to do with witnessing the death of his comrade,
Dicky. Sherston acknowledges that his ravings reveal “the horror” of the war, the
true source of the boy’s trauma. Perhaps the boy is reliving a scene in which he feels
he could have saved Dicky’s life, bolstering Freud’s argument that what is revealed in
the pre-sleep state of semi-consciousness is the “history of the malady that is
responsible for the neurosis” (Dreams 194).
According to Simon Williams, Tietjens’, Henry’s, and Sherston’s diminishing
sense of privacy is not without social context. Williams argues that, in Medieval
times, sleep was often a public affair, in the sense that people often slept, quite
comfortably, in public, shared spaces; sleep “was a relatively ‘undisciplined’,
‘undifferentiated’, affair at this time, not least as far as daytime sleep was concerned:
anywhere, anytime, one might say” (Society 40). Yet, as time moved on, “this
unconcern disappears, slowly in the sixteenth century and more rapidly in the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries; first in the upper classes and much
more slowly in the lower classes” (Williams, Society 40). As Hilary Hinds notes, by
the end of the nineteenth century, the shared marital bed itself became an alleged
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source of illness, but also loss of privacy: “For [advocates of domestic hygiene]
proximity to others was a source of pollution and danger, in the face of which the
health of the individual could best be assured by demarcating his or her individuality
more clearly through physical separation from others” (281). Accordingly, many
couples, at least those who could afford it, opted to sleep in separate beds (Hinds
281). Even as theories of miasma and disease changed, separate-bed sleeping
remained fairly popular. In her famous book Married Love (1918), Marie Stopes
advises couples to retain separate sleeping quarters when possible (Hinds 298).
However, as Williams asserts, “a slight relaxing of these strictures seems to have
occurred since the First World War” (Society 40). Indeed, by 1938, Stopes’ opinion
changes somewhat, to regard the shared bed as “the arena in which the marriage is to
be nurtured and sustained, through the sexual, and thereby emotional, merging of the
couple” (Hinds 290). While it makes sense that such strictures would have to have
been relaxed because of the war, which required men and women to sleep in close
quarters, the earlier anxieties over the inability of close sleeping quarters to allow one
to protect one’s health and delineate one’s individuality helps, in part, to explain the
anxiety these characters face over shared sleeping quarters and their lack of privacy.
Idiosyncrasy
If one must be under constant observation, then one does not want to be
caught in a moment of weakness or embarrassment. Thus, mastery over oneself,
achieved through the mastery of routine and environment, is a motif present in both
the novels and the medical literature of the period. However, despite being lauded for
its regulatory effects, the war actually presented an increased sense of the inability to
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control one’s environment. The condition of insomnia mimics the life of the soldier
or war worker, whose schedule is largely determined by the course of the war. As is
depicted in the novels, the soldier or war worker is frequently unable to regulate his
or her schedule, thus introducing the idea of idiosyncrasy to the habit of sleep.
Regularity is the lack of idiosyncrasy, and much of the literature of sleep to date, such
as in the aforementioned examples, focused on the establishment of good sleep habits
through creating a sense of regularity. However, the good soldier must be able to
master idiosyncrasy. Summers-Bremner argues that insomnia is idiosyncratic
because the arrival of sleep is unknown. In effect, the soldier must ape rationalized
society itself in order to cope with the conditions of war, but the war itself reveals this
type of rationalization to be impossible. She writes, “Electric light and Railway
Standard Time leach natural space and time of idiosyncrasy, and, like Taylorist
method, both hide the fact that they are doing so” (122). And so must the soldier, by
becoming his own form of electric light or standard time.
We see instances of the idiosyncrasy, in terms of lack of control over schedule
or environment, in the lives of soldiers in all three novels. For instance, Tietjens is
kept up for two days straight to fulfill his duties, “because the draft had been
countermanded” (448). He is also subject to “physical irregularities” which have the
inadvertent effect of lessening his propensity for self-control, rather than increasing it:
“Tietjens wondered how long physical irregularities would inconvenience his mind.
You cannot think well with a parched back to your tongue. . . . Then he had nothing
to go on to tell him how long he would be inconvenienced!” (600). Treatments for
insomnia and neurosis often focused on the exact opposite: control of physical
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conditions and imposition of regularity. Yet, participation in the war introduced the
opposite conditions into the soldiers’ lives. Furthermore, other physical conditions
leading to idiosyncrasy contributed to lack of control rather than its increase. For
example, Tietjens, under bombardment, finds his intellectual faculties reduced rather
than heightened by the discipline he must show. Ford writes, “There was so much
noise it seemed to grow dark. It was a mental darkness. You could not think. A
Dark Age!” (637). The Dark Ages, the period before the Renaissance, represents a
time during which education and literacy, as well as the valorization of intellect,
diminished. The mental darkness Tietjens is experiencing under the bombardment is
worth comparing to a passage in which Ford discusses the function of discipline:
It was a very great achievement to have got men to fire at moments of
such stress with such complete tranquility. For discipline works in two
ways: in the first place it enables the soldier in action to get through
his movements in the shortest possible time; and then the engrossment
in the exact performance begets a great indifference to danger. When,
with various-sized pieces of metal flying all round you, you go
composedly through efficient bodily movements, you are not only
wrapped up in your task, but you have the knowledge that that exact
performance is every minute decreasing your personal danger. (581)
Here discipline is not presented as control over one’s thoughts, but as the ceding of
one’s thoughts to training; it removes idiosyncrasy. The soldier ceases to be an
individual, in control of his environment; rather, he is under the control of his learned
behaviors. Despite its discursive presentation, discipline is not truly self-control
taken to an excess; it is the willing relinquishment of that control to a series of
prescribed motions and behaviors. Given the contrast presented in text between the
theory of discipline as desirable and healthy and the actual reality of war experience,
the idiosyncratic conditions of both time and environment introduced by participation
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in the war seems to counter to the idea that regularity increases discipline, which, in
turn, increases one’s ability to adapt to idiosyncrasy while maintaining mental and
emotional control. Soldiers could not be expected to be regularized in a situation in
which regularity is impossible, leaving the conclusion that they were merely expected
to be able to control themselves to the extent that it allowed them to follow orders and
act without thought. Self control as mastery of the self, then, is mythical; it is merely
the consequence of authoritative control.
For Sherston, the idiosyncrasy of war time and reality has a similar effect and
consequent revelation. His schedule and duties require that “there was a working
party every second night, which meant being out from seven o’clock till after
midnight” (310). He acknowledges that such a lifestyle changes the way in which he
sees time itself: “Sooner or later I should get windy myself. It was only a question of
time. But could this sort of thing be measured by ordinary time, I wondered” (310).
Time, for Sherston, cannot be understood in terms of set schedules or hours for
waking and working. Time is merely a function of extent to which he can maintain
his composure. He continues, “Trench life was an existence saturated by the external
senses; and although our actions were domineered over by military discipline, our
animal instincts were always uppermost. While I stood there then, I had no desire to
diagnose my environment” (311). Similar to Tietjens, Sherston displays a sense that
discipline is only a façade, especially in such idiosyncratic conditions. He can
maintain the appearance of discipline, just as Sylvia can maintain the appearance of
morality through her focus on physical beauty, but in reality, Sherston sees himself as
an animal, one who reacts rather than plans and controls. He falls back on his
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training to determine his actions. This notion runs contrary to the British ideal of
constitutional self-mastery and control. No degree of discipline can completely inure
humans to environmental hardships. Even if the outer expression is one of calm, the
inner state may be completely opposite, as Sherston and Tietjens illustrate.
Henry also expresses the fear that discipline is not enough to protect people from
breaking down as a result of the war. In a conversation about the seeming endless
nature of the war, Henry responds that it must inevitably end, but only because “It
will crack somewhere” (20). Catherine responds, “We’ll crack. We’ll crack in
France. They can’t go on doing things like the Somme and not crack” (20). Both of
them acknowledge that the nature of the war itself leads to breakdown. Much later in
the novel, once he has given up his role in the war, he thinks, “If people bring so
much courage to this world the world has to kill them to break them, so of course it
kills them. The world breaks everyone and afterward many are strong at the broken
places. But those that will not break it kills” (249). Henry comes to view breaking or
cracking in a positive light. Breaking actually protects people. Those who refuse to
break or are unable to do so, like Septimus, end up dying. The only way to survive is
to first crack and then be repaired, like Sherston. Remaining too disciplined for too
long only leads to death, as it would have for Henry if he had confronted the military
police attempting to arrest him rather than escaping them.
Insomnia as Literary Device
While all three of the novels this chapter discusses illustrate insomnia in
phenomenologically similar ways, pointing to it as physical evidence of resistance to
the disciplinary mechanisms of the military, a reaction to the horrors and stresses of
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war, and a time for characters to reassert their individuality and personal priorities,
the texts make use of insomnia in different ways as a structural device. For Ford and
Sassoon, insomnia expresses a sense of liminality. Both of their protagonists,
Tietjens and Sherston, are caught in liminal positions. For Tietjens, his marriage to
Sylvia is liminal, as is his relationship with Valentine. Through much of Parade’s
End, Tietjens remains married to Sylvia for the sake of appearance, despite their
emotional and physical separation. His marriage to her is a consequence of his
valorization of conservative morality, as he uses the marriage to protect her public
image. Many instances of Tietjens’ insomnia are used to reflect the liminality of this
marriage, as he often has insomnia at times when their marriage is the subject of his
thoughts or public discussion. For example, I have already discussed the passage in
which he stays up at night to review the history of their marriage after Morgan’s
death. Another example occurs when Sylvia’s scandalous behavior, running off to
France with Perowne, threatens to be a matter of public knowledge. Later that night:
Tietjens fell, nevertheless, at once prey to real agitation. For a long
time he pounded from wall to wall and, since he could not shake off
the train of thought, he got out at last his patience cards, and devoted
himself seriously to thinking out the conditions of his life with Sylvia.
He wanted to stop scandal if he could; he wanted them to live within
his income, he wanted to subtract that child from the influence of its
mother. These were all definite but difficult things. . . . Then one half
of his mind lost itself in the rearrangement of schedules… (79)
In this passage, we see Tietjens struggling to direct his thoughts, and consider his
marriage calmly, but his mind itself is in a liminal state, as one half focuses on his
marriage, while the other half focuses on “the rearrangement of schedules.” Further,
this passage describes the liminality of his marriage, as he is within this liminal state
of insomnia experiencing the liminality of a divided mind. He simultaneously wants
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to protect Sylvia and live as a married couple, at least financially, but remove her
from her role as mother. His role as father is a bit doubtful though, referring to his
son as “that child” and “it,” thus neither by his name or even by his gender, and
certainly not possessively, as in “our” child or “my” child (he suspects the child his
not his). Interestingly, when Sylvia feigns leaving Tietjens, by leaving the country
via Paddington Station, she does so in the early morning hours when Tietjens is
awake in bed and can hear her directions to the driver (343).
Similarly, Ford uses the liminality of insomnia to mirror the liminality of
Tietjens’ relationship with Valentine. Their first extended interaction takes place late
at night as they try to escape Valentine’s friend escape the legal ramifications of her
golf course prank. During their ride, Valentine comments that she is “not sleepy” but
rather “loving it all” to which Tietjens responds “I’m rather loving it too!” (131). The
scene of their interaction takes place in a heavy fog, further obscuring their proximity,
but also reflecting their uncertainty of where they stand in relation to each other. In
fact, in the fog, he “almost kissed her” (137) but restrains himself, as this action
would violate his sense of propriety. Tietjens finally returns Valentine home in the
morning, but not after their relationship has been publically exposed, leading to the
scrutiny he will experience at the military camp (143-44). Through juxtaposing the
origins of Valentine and Tietjens’ love with both insomnia and fog, Ford uses textual
liminality to expose Tietjens’ personal liminality.
Additionally, Tietjens is in a liminality of position with regard to his military
service. He clearly cares a great deal about his men, given the depth to which he feels
the pain of Morgan’s loss, and he sees the propriety of his leadership role within the
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military, as well as his subordination to his superiors, because of his social status and
ethics. Yet, at the same, for reasons I have discussed earlier, he questions the validity
of disciplining both his own body and the bodies of his soldiers. Sherston is similar
in this sense, feeling a responsibility to his country and sense of patriotism, yet, at the
same time questioning the war. As with Tietjens, the liminality of Sherston’s
insomnia reflects his sense of being between different states: patriotic solider and
pacifist war critic.
For Sherston, as with Tietjens, one liminality begets another. His liminal role
regarding the war places him in a liminal situation regarding his sanity. He feels
himself to be perfectly sane, but must claim insanity in order to avoid a return to war.
Further, he is caught in the liminal position of wanting to assert agency through
renouncing the war, but his ability to assert this form of agency comes only when he
renounces his ability to assert agency over his life more broadly and has himself
committed to a mental hospital. He refers to the transitional state between military
duty and renunciation of this duty as a “double life” (490). Insomnia plays a
significant role in his decision-making process, as it during bouts of insomnia in
which is resistance is born. However, his resistance places him in a “purgatorial
limbo” (508). The novel ends with his admission to Slateford War Hospital (514).
Though he has to willfully deny his own sanity, he ends up pleased with the result.
Hemingway uses Henry’s insomnia in a different manner. While Henry does
place himself, at times, in a liminal position, he is a medical worker in the war rather
than a soldier. His duty is to heal rather than hurt; thus his position is less morally
tenuous. For Henry, rather than symbolizing liminality, his insomnia represents, at
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least in part, a fear of loss. William Adair argues that “things happen to
Hemingway’s protagonists: they do not control things, they are victims. And the
essential thing that happens to them is loss rather than violence” (294). Insomnia, for
Henry, then becomes a means through which he can control himself and his
surroundings. He does not sleep, so he does not lose himself to it. Adair continues,
“Nick [of “Now I Lay Me”] and Frederic [Henry] (before he loves Catherine) may
fear in the night that if they shut their eyes and let themselves go that their souls will
slide out of their bodies and they will die. But the Hemingway protagonist has
another fear in the night, the fear of loss” (297). Insomnia becomes a means both by
which characters can control their souls and also avoid the temporary loss of self that
sleep requires. Insomnia is used in A Farewell to Arms as a way for Henry to reassert
his selfhood when everything else in his life is increasingly destabilized.
Conclusions
Despite the assertions of war’s regularizing effect and the industrial emphasis
on increasing productivity and utilizing time efficiently, as well as maintaining
discipline, the war often appeared to do the exact opposite and lead to break down of
discipline and much time wasted. Ford writes about “the process of eternal waiting
that is War”:
You hung about and you hung about, and you kicked your heels until
and you kicked your heels: waiting for Mills bombs to come, or for
jam, or for generals, or for the tanks, or transport, or the clearance of
the road ahead. You waited in offices under the eyes of somnolent
orderlies, under fire on the banks of canals, you waited in hotels, dugouts, tin sheds, ruined houses. There will be no man who survives His
Majesty’s Armed Forces that shall not remember those eternal hours
when Time itself stayed still as the true image of Bloody War!.... (569)
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For all of industrialized society’s Tayloristic notions of increasing productivity, the
war ended up being the exact opposite, a process of endless waiting rather than
endless working. The irony is that the emphasis on productivity was never
relinquished, yet, at least according to this passage, it was hardly the soldier’s fault if
he were not productive: he was waiting for everyone but himself. This type of
reality, in the face of a completely contrary discourse of incessant productivity (even
rest time being considered constructive), must have created a type of cognitive
dissonance. The citizen could never live up to the society’s expectations, mostly
because of the authority structure itself. Yet, at the same time, the war was portrayed
as a means of creating ideal citizens, ones who were productive, contributing
members of society, in control of both their time and their emotions.
Ironically, but a logical antecedent of the contemporary discourse, war even
came to be considered a cure for trauma because it could correct degeneracy in
society through its emphasis on regularization and discipline, and the ideal aim of a
cure was to send the soldier back to war as quickly as possible (Lerner 27).
According to Showalter “The goal of wartime psychiatry was primarily to keep men
fighting” (Female 176). The cure for mental disorders based in trauma is primarily
rest-based, but patients were encouraged, if not required, to remain in the army, as
“the prospect of discharge from the army was apt to delay recovery,” at least
according to medical authorities (Lerner 64). War was viewed as a way to establish
good habits, of the type needed to prevent and cure insomnia, mainly because of the
ostensible focus on discipline and routine. At the beginning stages of the war, the
war was largely understood by the British community as a cleansing force:
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The assumption of the polarity of war and peace allowed
contemporaries to experience the declaration of war as a movement
from normal, familiar life to an alternative existence which differed
markedly from bourgeois society. It was commonly felt that, with the
declaration of war, the populations of European nations had left behind
an industrial civilization with its problems and conflicts and were
entering a sphere of action ruled by authority, discipline, comradeship,
and common purpose. (Leed 41)
War, in other words, would purify society, ridding it of its degenerate elements
through the establishment of discipline to obtain a universal societal goal of
productivity, much in the same way requiring doctors to work rigorous and trying
hours during their training weeded out the weak among them.
Yet, contrary to these expectations, in reality, the war introduced the
aforementioned idiosyncrasy, as opposed to routine and regularity, into the lives of
soldiers, with its resultant contradictory messages. In a sense, though the war was
lauded for its “cleansing” abilities, it really introduced the type of “mental untidiness” to which Tietjens attributes disease (614). Ironically, just as the causes for
insomnia are often perceived to be a result of mental “un-tidiness,” and the
consequences of insomnia include mental impairment and clouded thinking, the
treatments often focus on “cleaning up” one’s routine and mind. James, similar to
many of the medical authorities mentioned previously, argues that mental health and
sleep are connected. He refers to a specific mindset, which he labels “healthymindedness.” He defines “healthy-mindedness” as “the tendency which looks on all
things and sees that they are good,” and this trait can either be naturally occurring or
can be cultivated by the individual (“Religion” 85-86).
Healthy-mindedness, while not necessarily connected with a particular
religion, embodies a specific type of religious temperament. In religious thinkers not
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preoccupied with hellfire and damnation, James sees “the presence of a temperament
organically weighted on the side of cheer and fatally forbidden to linger, as those of
opposite temperament linger, over the darker aspects of the universe” (81). In more
extreme cases, a religious temperament can prevent the individual from feeling any
evil at all (82). James cites two cases in which the person who did not adopt a
healthy-minded, religious outlook suffered from lack of sleep. He transcribes an
interview with a man whom he describes as “a sufficiently familiar contemporary
type,” who claims that “[Religion] is nothing” (89). This particular man diagnoses
his own temperament as being “nervous, active, wide-awake, mentally and
physically. Sorry that Nature compels us to sleep at all” (90). James also relates a
letter from a woman who writes, “Life seemed difficult to me at one time. I was
always breaking down, and had several attacks of what is called nervous prostration,
with terrible insomnia, being on the verge of insanity” (99). Despite the work of
numerous doctors, and even narcotics, the woman was not cured until she accepted
the “New Thought” and began to adopt “a constant turning to the very innermost,
deepest consciousness of our real selves or of God in us for illumination from within”
(99). Once she adopted a religious outlook, her mental and emotional problems
ceased to trouble her. “Healthy-mindedness” in practically any character is far from
present in the literature of Ford, Hemingway, or Sassoon, illustrating this particular
discursive element through its negation. None of the insomniac characters depicted
in Ford, Hemingway, or Sassoon can be said to have particularly optimistic or
accepting outlooks; they are consistently portrayed as over-thinkers and people not
cheerily accepting, but struggling to understand, their place in the world.
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In addition to fostering the ability to think in a “healthy-minded” way,
treatments were designed to reduce cost (of the treatment) and maximize efficiency
(in the sense that the goal of the cure was more about returning soldiers to battle than
actually making them feel better). Economic motivations dictated treatment:
Forced to handle unprecedentedly high numbers of patients with
limited resources, doctors borrowed from industrial models,
developing “assembly-line” techniques for making diagnoses, treating
patients, and ruling on pension and discharge matters. Speed and
efficiency became the primary medical values, as methods of treatment
and administration were centralized and rationalized, and a
comprehensive approach to the psychic health of the whole nation was
adopted. (Lerner 18)
Perhaps, in hindsight, such methodology seems counter-intuitive but served its
purpose, illustrating the way in which the theories presented by the medical
establishment served the existing power structures.
Consequently, and not surprisingly, one possible cure for neurosis was
thought to be productive work: “men with psychological disabilities were channeled
into work situations which fitted their psychological strengths and abilities” (Lerner
19). The “channeling” described by Lerner does not apply exclusively to soldiers
suffering from mental illness. In fact, the medical field made numerous attempts to
direct physically wounded soldiers into post-war work that “complemented” their
injuries. Frank and Lillian Gilbreth write, “A prime necessity is to inspire the cripple
with the feeling that he can remain, or become, a productive member of society”
(135). Gilbreth and Gilbreth describe ways in which people with various injuries can
be fit into specific fields that suit them given their limitations: “It will mean fitting
for useful vocations of thousands, who otherwise would be dependents upon society,
which is always a greater burden to the one so afflicted than to those of society who
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bear the expense of such disability” (146). Discursively, this idea of the war as a
“cure” or “cleansing” proffered by the medical community in conjunction with the
arm of the state serves the primary function of justifying the war itself. The war must
be righteous if it can “fix” the wrongs of both society and the individuals involved in
the war. If the war harmed instead of fixed, it was merely a matter of the weakness of
the individual and a result of his inability to accept necessary discipline.
Ultimately, the insomniac is one whose mind and body refuse to be
disciplined, whether it be by choice, circumstance, or one or more countless other
factors. Discursively, discipline is presented as self-control, but the reality is quite
different. Discipline only constitutes self-control inasmuch as it entails one’s ability
to give up that control for what one perceives to be the greater good, whether that
consists of doing one’s duty as a soldier or being a productive member of one’s
society. True discipline, as self-control, is a myth. That the very condition of
insomnia exists proves that the mind cannot be fully in control of the body all of the
time, nor can the individual be fully in control of his or her mind. The revelation of
this myth of complete self-control is very dangerous to a society that relies on
compliance based in discipline, masked as self-control. Therefore, those in power
turned to the insomniacs when looking for a place to which their accusatory fingers
could point. Insomnia is constitutional, they argued, a flaw of the individual.
Conveniently, much as the cure for war trauma involved returning to the war as
quickly as possible, the cure for insomnia consisted of giving oneself over to structure
and discipline, to quieting the questioning voices inside of one’s head in favor of
complacency and acceptance. For this reason the insomniac is treated as a deviant,
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one with a pathological condition worthy of scrutiny and treatment. It is the
insomniac who reveals the limitations of social discipline, coming with the idea that
the power of society is not so omnipotent as to enable the will to fully control the
body, despite all of the citizens’ reasons for doing so. The insomniac’s tendency to
exist liminally, at odds with ideals of the power of the mind over the body, illustrates
that there are ways in which citizens can fail to work towards the greater good
without it merely being a matter of their unwillingness to subject themselves to
discipline in the war-time situation, thereby prioritizing the individual self (as
husband or pacifist) over the soldier-citizen.
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CHAPTER 4

BEAUTY SLEEP(LESSNESS): GENDERED SLEEP PRACTICES

Louis Althusser argues that “there is no ideology except by the subject and for
subjects. Meaning, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this
destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: meaning, by the
category of the subject and its functioning” (115). Ideology, which Althusser defines
as “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence”
(109), is both produced and enacted by subjects, but also produces the subject itself.
His use of the words “destination” and “concrete” implies that ideology has a
physical, spatial component, specifically the human body, but more specifically, as I
contend, the gendered body. Further, ideology enables and requires categorization of
subjects; gender is one such means of categorization. As I have argued, through the
creation of the identity category of the “insomniac,” insomnia is another means of
categorization. In this chapter, my goal is to examine the intersection of these two
categories, the gendered insomniac body, as it produces and is produced by ideology.
Because the insomniac is a discursively produced category (as is gender), as a form of
subjectivity, this category both reflects and contributes to the creation and enactment
of ideology. Examining the way in which insomnia functions for different genderidentity categories, phenomenologically, psychologically, medically, and politically
reveals not only the ways in which ideology and gender are related to both produce
and perpetuate such identity categories, but also the ways in which the subject can
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expose, resist, and, therefore, change the ideology associated with such categories
through insomnia.
Susan Bordo, building on Althusser’s theories, argues not only that the subject
is both product and producer of ideology, but also that the subject’s body is a surface
upon which ideology is made visible. According to Bordo, the body is “a politically
inscribed entity, its physiology and morphology shaped by histories and practices of
containment and control” (21). The disordered body, for Bordo, is particularly
revealing. Writing of disorders such as anorexia, hysteria, and agoraphobia, she
argues, “The symptomatology of these disorders reveals itself as textuality. . . .
Working within this framework, we see that whether we look at hysteria,
agoraphobia, or anorexia, we find the body of the sufferer deeply inscribed with an
ideological construction of femininity emblematic of the period in question” (168).
The disorders she describes are historically associated with women, but her argument
can also be applied to insomnia in any gender. Insomnia is a disorder that cannot
exist without a culture that regulates and normalizes sleep and, as such, it often
exposes a conflict between the insomniac and ideologically based expectations.
Without the production of the “proper” and “normal” behaviors and conditions of
sleep, disordered sleep is not possible. Insofar as these proper and normal behaviors
and conditions are related to gender, insomnia is produced and interpreted relative to
differently gendered bodies. In terms of symptoms of insomnia, including
restlessness, anxiety, exhaustion, altered perception of time, frustration, and
relationship to various forms of productivity, insomnia makes visible and exposes
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social conditions and practices that emphasize physical and mental discipline; sleep
as an extension of the working day; and active, economic productivity.
In order to examine the ways in which the insomniac is produced as a
gendered subject, I will again use a model proposed by Michel Foucault. In the
second volume of History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, Foucault proposes three
analytic categories, which he applies to the analysis of sexuality: “(1) the formation of
sciences (savoirs) that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice,
(3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves
as subjects of this sexuality” (4). I will apply a similar model to insomnia through a
discussion of scientific and medical developments related to the study of disordered
sleep, attempts at regulation of sleep habits and practices, and ways in which the
insomniac becomes an identity category that is applied to bodies of different genders.
In other words, my goal is to examine the formation of ideology as it relates to the
insomniac’s subjectivity.
As I argued earlier, because the individual both produces and enacts ideology
through his or her body, it is important to discuss the implications of insomnia itself.
What does the experience of insomnia in a given body reflect about a culture in a
specific time period? Further, how is one’s perception of one’s insomnia mitigated
by culture and ideology? Invariably, the argument is dialectical: ideology shapes
perception and perception shapes ideology. As ideology shifts, so does perception,
and then ideology and so forth. To be perceived as an insomniac shapes the
perception of the insomniac, which, in turn, shapes what it means to be an insomniac.
The insomniac is not simply subjected to the power of categorization, but has an
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active role in producing and shaping that category. Therefore, the implications of
categorization as an insomniac reflect the workings of power, both as power enacted
on a subject, but the power of the subject to use his or her categorization to his or her
benefit. As Foucault argues in the first volume of The History of Sexuality: An
Introduction, power is exercised and productive, not as an “all-encompassing
opposition between rulers and ruled,” but as part of a “machinery of production”
operating on all levels of a social order (94). Resistance, for example the insomniac’s
refusal to sleep “normally” (whether intentional or incidental), is “never in a position
of exteriority in relation to power” (95), but part of the functioning of power—it is a
productive power in and of itself, which “undermines and exposes [power], renders it
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (101).

In this regard, insomnia is a form

of power insofar as it shapes perception and ideology, but also as it provides the
insomniac a means of resistance to control of sleep as a disciplinary mechanism.
Insomnia exposes the individual’s prioritization of the self he or she chooses to
develop during insomniac-time, but may also expose a tension between the
individual’s prioritization and external, ideologically-based expectations.
Insomnia can be used to both produce and counter expectations of gendered
subjectivity. During the time period I am discussing, many medical professionals
believed that males and females reacted to insomnia differently and experienced
insomnia for different reasons, as I will discuss in more detail to come. Thus, the
perception of the insomniac (symptoms, consequences, diagnosis, treatment) and the
insomniac’s perception of his or her condition is influenced by gender norms. For
example, a mother who stays up all night nursing a sick child is not discursively
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considered an “insomniac”; rather, she is a “good mother.” Whereas, a mother who
stays up late at night pursuing other interests, perhaps because it is the only time she
has free, would be an insomniac, but also, might be scrutinized with regard to her
priorities. Similarly, a man who works late into the evening to earn money for his
family is “a good provider” or a “go-getter,” yet that same man, if he foregoes sleep
for a non-work related activity, puts this same status in question. As a consequence,
examining the gendered treatment of insomnia and the insomniac can be used to
expose, as well as challenge, gender conventions. Because insomnia is so closely
tied in with other aspects of one’s subjectivity, including one’s gender, but also other
parts of one’s identity including job and familial role (areas also influenced by
gender), any discussion of the relationship between insomnia and gender must also
involve these other areas of inquiry.
To conduct my examination of insomnia and gender, I will look at three
literary texts, as well as medical and psychological texts written during the same time
period. The three literary texts upon which this chapter focuses are Dorothy
Richardson’s Pilgrimage (a collection of thirteen chapter novels), H. G. Wells’ The
Soul of a Bishop, and Elizabeth Bowen’s The Last September. Pilgrimage follows
the life of one female character, Miriam Henderson, as she grows into womanhood
during the period of social and cultural transition at the end of the Victorian Era.
Miriam is an insomniac and proud of it. She enjoys her insomnia for the freedom and
privacy it affords her. Further, Miriam uses her insomnia in defiance of gender
norms, but, simultaneously, she takes advantage of gender norms regarding sleep and
mental health practices to attain the independence she desires. Wells, a friend of
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Richardson, and character in Pilgrimage (under the alias Hypo Wilson), is one of the
figures in the novel who attempts to control Miriam’s insomnia because he sees it as
in conflict with her ability to become a fit mother. In his own novel, The Soul of a
Bishop, Wells depicts the life of an insomniac, Edward Scrope. Scrope, unlike
Miriam, is ashamed (at least initially), rather than proud of his insomnia, but his
insomnia performs an important role in his transformation from spokesman for the
Anglican Church to spokesman for his own spiritual disavowal of organized religion.
His insomnia allows him a series of revelations about the inefficacy of the Church in
addressing the problems of the modern age and is a necessary force in his spiritual
and personal transformation. Yet, his insomnia puts him in a state of conflict, not
only because it makes it physically and mentally difficult for him to perform his role,
but also leads to the questioning of his role in the Church, which, in turn, complicates
his role as provider for his family—his expected role based on his gender. The final
text, Bowen’s The Last September, depicts of a whole group of insomniacs in an Irish
household just after World War I. I will use this text to illustrate the ways in which a
female author depicts insomnia within the same text differently according to the
characters’ genders. Additionally, I will examine the extent to which these three texts
both reflect and challenge contemporaneous medical and psychological discourse
regarding insomnia and the insomniac.
Insomnia and the Body
All three of these texts describe the ways in which insomnia becomes an
essential aspect of the care of the self, as described by Foucault, which I discuss in the
introductory section of this dissertation. Especially in the first two texts, those by
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Richardson and Wells, insomnia becomes a source of conflict for the character
because, through their insomnia, they are caring for their non-social selves (their
academic, artistic, and spiritual inclinations) rather than their expected social roles.
As physician W. Johnson Smyth argues, treatment for insomnia requires attention to
one’s individuality and background (227). In other words, insomnia forces one to be
regarded individually, outside of general categories of identity. Insomnia becomes
both a form of categorization, but also a resistance to it, as the insomniac cannot
simply be regarded as like all other insomniacs. Thus, insomnia becomes a bodily
expression of resistance to fixed identity categories. Miriam’s insomnia makes her
question her desire for motherhood and role as caretaker (assigned to her by simple
virtue of being a female), and Scrope’s insomnia makes him question his role within
the Church, thereby jeopardizing his role as provider for his family. Though friends
and physicians advise both characters on how to treat their insomnia, and, as a result,
resume their expected roles, the characters resist or take advantage of these treatments
and ultimately embrace their insomnia. Miriam embraces her insomnia because she
sees it as a means to independence. Scrope finds that the insomnia and its treatments
(psychotropic and hallucinogenic drugs) afford him spiritual revelations and
transform his, and his family’s, financial circumstances and social position.
In his creative non-fiction text about his insomnia, contemporary writer Blake
Butler describes his insomnia, in part, as a hyper-awareness of his body: “The
restless body, rolling, finding partial conditions, in continual correction, begins to feel
simultaneously thicker and thinner, stuffed and hollow—like a wet but drying bar of
soap, hard at the center, soft around the edges, mushy, comes off on your hands. The
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fidget begets a fidget” (32). His language in this passage, aside from the expression
of bodily sensation, is also expression through bodily sensation. All of his sensations
are contradictory, illustrating the contradictory nature of insomnia itself: the body
and mind at war over sleep, each striving to become unconscious of the other.
Insomnia becomes a conflict both inscribed on and experienced through his body. As
a contradictory bodily experience, insomnia becomes a particularly useful device to
illustrate other conflicts of the body, such as those of gender and sexuality, which can
be expressed via the bodily experience of insomnia.
Richardson expresses this sort of bodily awareness through insomnia in
Pilgrimage. Miriam often stays up late at night reading, choosing insomnia despite
being tired because it is the only time she can find to pursue her own interests,
primarily academic ones traditionally limited to males. Her insomnia becomes a
means of transcending gender roles; thus, her insomnia indicates both her awareness
of these roles and her desire to use her body to resist them. Miriam’s reading is an act
of rebellion against gender norms for multiple reasons, including actively reducing
her efficacy as caretaker of children (her students) through cultivating exhaustion in
order to gain entrance into a wider social and intellectual sphere. One of Miriam’s
first experiences with insomnia, described in Backwater, is presented in a morally
ambiguous light through use of religious terminology:
For the last six weeks of the summer term she sat up night after night
propped against her upright pillow and bolster against the gas-jet
reading her twopenny books in her silent room. Almost every night
she read until two o’clock. She felt at once that she was doing wrong;
that the secret novel reading was a thing she could not confess, even to
Miss Haddie. She was spending hours of the time that was meant for
sleep, for restful preparation for the next day’s work, in a ‘vicious
circle’ of self-indulgence. It was sin. (1: 282)
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Miriam clearly finds her reading experience pleasurable. She chooses to stay awake
and read, she enjoys reading, and she enjoys the time and space that being awake
alone at night allows her. However, her pleasure is tinged (and perhaps intensified
by) guilt, as she has a distinct sense that she is doing something that she should not.
And, in fact, proper sleep habits are often equated with morality. For example, in a
1919 book on child rearing, author A. B. Barnard comments, “The formation of good
habits is the basis of morality and intellectual efficiency” (99). Yet, Miriam resists
forming “good” habits of sleep. She knows that it is her responsibility, as a teacher
(caregiver), to be prepared for the next day’s lessons. In choosing not to sleep, she is
willfully using her body to detract from her effectiveness at filling her role.
In this passage from Backwater, Miriam views insomnia as a moral concern,
using words like sin and confess, but also as a medical issue, reflecting both Victorian
and Edwardian medical literature, which often conflated morality and science; the
literature frequently represented disease and disorder as caused by a combination of
physical and moral irregularities. Miriam discusses her insomnia as a form of “selfindulgence.” Physician Silas Weir Mitchell, originator and proponent of the “rest
cure,” which was designed to treat patients diagnosed with hysteria and neurasthenia,
also uses this type of language. Mitchell’s rest cure, which he explains in his text Fat
and Blood (1885), involves a regimen of seclusion, rest, and diet (emphasizing milk
and raw meat as fattening agents) (44), with a combination of controlled exercise or
electricity and massage to compensate for the absence of muscle movement (55). It
prohibits amusements, like reading or sewing, in order to render patients more
obedient and responsive to the doctor's orders (58).
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Mitchell views hysteria not only as a disorder to be treated medically, but also
as a form of selfishness and self-indulgence on the part of the patient. His patients,
most of whom were female, are not considered “productive” members of their
households and “failed” at fulfilling familial duties. He describes his patients as
“invalids, unable to attend to the duties of life, and sources alike of discomfort to
themselves and anxiety to others” (9). Mirroring Miriam’s (somewhat ironic)
description of her insomnia as “sin,” Mitchell writes of the “moral degradation” of his
patients (39), whose sickness serves to “cultivate self-love and selfishness, and to take
away by slow degrees the healthful mastery which all human beings should maintain
over their emotions and wants” (40). While in this scene Miriam does not suffer
from hysteria, she does expose a discursive presentation of women who acted
contrary to their expected caregiver roles as selfish and immoral through her
characterization of her decision not to sleep as a self-indulgent act, focusing on her
own “wants” because it may affect her ability to teach and care for her students.
Further illustrating Miriam’s simultaneously moral and medical
characterization of insomnia, she refers to her insomnia as “a vicious circle.” The
idea of the “vicious circle” in medical literature is outlined in a 1913 text, Vicious
Circles in Disease, by physician Jameison Hurry. Hurry argues that chronic disease
is a product of “vicious circles,” in which “two or more disorders are so correlated
that they reciprocally aggravate and perpetuate each other” (xiii). These types of
diseases are an example of nature’s “beneficent influence” becoming “maleficent”
(xiii). At this stage in Pilgrimage, which Richardson began writing two years later in
1915, Miriam does not yet see her insomnia as a possible symptom of hysteria (as she
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will, following her mother’s suicide); however, she does express Hurry’s idea of
correlation and perpetuation with regard to her insomnia. Her lack of satisfaction
with her job creates her desire to find satisfaction during her undisturbed time (sleep
time), which, in turn, leads to a lack of sleep, making her already dissatisfying job
even more difficult and arduous. She continues to attempt to find an escape through
her nightly reading, which aggravates her exhaustion, which increases the difficulty
of her job, and the circle continues. Her insomnia is both product and cause of her
sense of dissatisfaction with her life and her desire to find satisfaction independent of
her assumed role, reflected through her bodily actions.
According to Bordo, the body is “a surface on which the central rules,
hierarchies, and even metaphysical commitments of a culture are inscribed and thus
reinforced” (165). She argues that disorders are a means of exposing “fragility and
lack of power in the face of a decisive male occupation of social space” (171). The
disorders that she discusses, such as anorexia and hysteria, are disorders of idealized
femininity (168), as I describe earlier, which Miriam’s insomnia is not. Miriam’s
insomnia is not reflective of her domesticity (agoraphobia) or her desire to take up
less physical space and practice self-denial to provide for others (anorexia). Rather,
her insomnia challenges, rather than perpetuates, such an ideal since she sees it as a
form of self-indulgence and intellectual expansion. However, Miriam’s insomnia
shares many characteristics that the female anorexic embodies—self-control,
discipline, determination, which are stereotypically “male” characteristics (Bordo
171). She uses her insomnia to learn about herself and to pursue interests outside of
those deemed appropriate for a woman of her time period. Miriam sees self-
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consciousness as a means of comprehending, and thereby entering the “world of
men” (Hanscombe 48). Gillian Hanscombe argues that “Richardson sees Miriam’s
gradual acquisition of insight and control as an act of consciousness rather than an act
of will, that is, as intellectual rather than moral virtue” (54). On several occasions,
Miriam describes herself as being more male than female, or thinking in a masculine
way. For instance, she thinks, “Perhaps I can’t stand women because I’m a sort of
horrid man” (1: 404). She uses her insomnia as a time to occupy traditionally male
spaces. She does this intellectually, in part through reading. For example, she desires
to talk to her employer about her reading “man to man, about the book. She could not
do that. Everything she said would hurt her, poisoned by the hidden sore of her
incapability to do anything for his children” (1: 383). In this passage, she wants to
meet her male employer, Mr. Corrie, as an intellectual equal, but knows it would only
ruin his image of her as an appropriate governess for his children because she would
be stepping outside of her assumed female role by asserting her intellect. Her desire
to meet him as a man (“man to man”) illustrates her desire to step outside of the
feminine caregiver role, but she understands this redefinition of herself only makes
her household position more tenuous.
Yet, even in identifying with men, she feels aversion as well: “How utterly
detestable mannishness is; so mighty and strong and comforting when you have
mewed up with women all your life, and then suddenly, in a second, far away, utterly
imbecile and aggravating, with a superior self-satisfied smile because a woman says
one thing one minute and another the next” (1: 423). She realizes that, try as she
might, men will never meet with her on an equal level, and despite her sense of
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independence and pride in her intellect, many will persist in seeing her as inferior and
weak. She realizes she will never be (nor does she want to be) the person others
come to expect simply because she is a woman: “For a long time she sat blankly
contemplating the new world that was coming. Every one would be trained and
efficient but herself” (1: 244). She has made it a point not to cultivate efficient sleep
habits. Miriam’s body does not want to conform to the expectations placed upon it,
and her language in this passage indicates her sense of a social drive towards
maximization of productivity and efficiency, which requires every individual to play
his or her part effectively. Yet, she resists playing this part.
More tellingly, Miriam’s insomnia allows her not only to use her body as a
force of rebellion, but to experience her body itself as a contradiction of gender
norms. Her insomnia allows her to perceive her body differently, as not only a
feminine body; thus it is through her insomnia that she is able to transcend discursive
representations of womanhood. Her views are supported by contemporary medical
attitudes that differentiate female insomnia from male insomnia and see femininity
itself as a cause of insomnia. As A. W. Macfarlane argues, “Sleeplessness or
disturbed sleep is apt to appear in females from causes peculiar to the sex” (279).
These causes, according to MacFarlane, include puberty, menopause, menstruation,
pregnancy, and giving birth (279), or, in other words, nearly any condition unique to
female biology (with the exception of puberty, which MacFarlane does not discuss as
a cause for insomnia in males). Further, insomnia “chiefly affects those of neurotic
temperament, with highly-strung and unduly sensitive nervous systems, and those
debilitated by neurasthenic conditions” (MacFarlane 279). The latter statement is the
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second sentence of his chapter entitled “Insomnia Peculiar to Females,” so, while it
would seem that although people of any gender might be “highly-strung” or “unduly
sensitive,” clearly these are conditions he equates with women and sees as worth
mentioning at the start of this chapter. Incidentally, he never actually addresses these
psychological conditions in this chapter; he has other chapters devoted to
psychological conditions, which makes his mention of neurosis quite interesting, and
seemingly gratuitous at this point. Notably, MacFarlane’s text does not include a
chapter entitled “Insomnia Peculiar to Males,” indicating that biological factors
exclusive to masculinity are, by themselves, not causes of insomnia. Further, devoting
a chapter to females suggests that males are the assumed standard of normalcy against
which females are judged.
Yet, Miriam’s insomnia is not caused by a condition such as menstruation,
menopause, or pregnancy (at least not in this particular passage with regard to
pregnancy). During one bout of insomnia, she has an experience of her body as
“other” to the bodies of women: “it was only when she was alone and in the intervals
of quiet reading that she came into possession of her hands,” which “came between
her and the world of women” (1: 283). Miriam views her hands as masculine, so they
serve as a bodily signifier of that which differentiates her from other women. The
language she uses to describe her hands is language of strength, as she sees hands that
“when the two were firmly interlocked they made a pleasant and curious whole, the
right clasping more firmly, its thumb always uppermost, its fingers separated firmly
over the back of the left hand palm, the left hand clinging, its fingers close together
against the hard knuckles of the right” (1: 283). She identifies more with her right
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hand, which she sees as “larger… kindlier, friendlier, wiser” than her left, which is
“less reassuring… narrower, lighter… more flexible, less sensitive” (1: 283). Her
choice of words is interesting, as she uses traditionally masculine language to
describe the hand with which she identifies, words like firmly, larger, wiser, hard, but
her left hand is described in traditionally feminine terms with words like clinging and
more flexible. In identifying herself in a masculine manner, she acknowledges that
she wants to be treated as an intellectual and social equal, for example engaging in
discussions of information in newspapers, which allowed anyone to “know as much
as the men sitting in arm chairs if they chose” (1: 243), but she understands that she
does not necessarily want to play a male role either, as men are “ignorant” (1: 443).
According to Elaine Showalter, female writers emerging from the Victorian
era were in a position of conflict (again pointing to the aptness of insomnia as a
device). Many desired, as Virginia Woolf says, to “tell the truth about [their] own
experiences as a body” (qtd. in Showalter, “Killing” 340), yet found this “truth” to be
perceived as “unthinkable, unspeakable, or unprintable” (Showalter, “Killing” 342).
Showalter continues, “The Angel in the House commands that [this truth’s] existence
should be avoided, denied, or suppressed” (“Killing” 342). Richardson, in her
attempt to represent female experience through writing does not avoid “truth,” but
instead creates a character who feels oppressed by expectations placed upon her
because of her gender, yet still internalizes these expectations and questions her
ability to successfully rebel against them. She is telling the story of a female’s
struggle with repression and her internalization of repressive mechanisms.
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A useful parallel example of the paradoxical female struggle with repression
is present in the way in which female writers use humor to both express and comply
with oppression by defining themselves through it, which assumes oppression as part
of their identity. For example, Katharine Streip summarizes Jean-Paul Sartre’s
argument regarding the female use of humor:
Woman, as a relative being, receives meaning through her relation
with her ‘oppressors.’ Although injured by them, she is also
complicitous with their injustice. She resents her status and yet she
sanctions it and identifies with her oppressors’ interests. Her injury is
central to how she defines both herself and him, the worm who has
injured her. (119)
Viewing the female as someone not free to express her experience openly, as
oppressed, and as defined, not independently, but in relation to her oppressor and his
interests points to her status as that of the “other.” She is only a “relative” being,
defined relationally, with the definition of female being understood as “not-male.”
She is not the dominant authority in society, but becomes a subject of that authority.
Maleness is the norm against which femaleness is compared. One way in which
Richardson’s writing can be read, then, is as a narrative of “otherness,” as a struggle
for identity against an oppressive force, but still in part determined by that force. She
expresses the thoughts and feelings of a woman subjected to systematic repression;
she tells the story of that repression and its effects. Yet, Miriam sees herself not only
as “other” to men, but “other” to women as well, and it is her insomnia that facilitates
this understanding.
As Joan W. Scott argues, while it is valuable to include non-normative
viewpoints as an alternative to traditional representations of history, presenting these
viewpoints as alternative, without inquiring as to how and why they came to be seen
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this way, is problematic: “The evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the
fact of the difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established,
how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the
world” (777). The danger becomes that “the evidence of experience . . . reproduces
rather than contests given ideological systems” (778). Therefore, Pilgrimage should
be read not only as a representation of the sciences, systems of power, and
subjectivity related to being an insomniac woman, but also the ways in which Miriam
comes to realize and reacts to the notion that specifically as a female, her insomnia is
particularly problematic because of her femininity. She sees insomnia as a means of
rebellion, but it is also important to consider against what she needs to rebel, and why
she feels rebellious rather than rebelled against. Additionally, that she faces
corrective measures shapes her identity, and, therefore, influences the way in which
she views the world. Her identity and worldview are both colored by her status as an
insomniac female. Miriam does not just experience insomnia; she experiences
insomnia as a woman. This experience takes on a dialectical paradigm: her
experience of insomnia shapes her identity, which then shapes her experience, which
further influences her sense of identity, and so on.
In Wells’ The Soul of a Bishop, Scrope, like Miriam, has a similarly bodily
experience of insomnia that allows him to express anxiety over his role in society.
Early in the text, Wells gives a description of the physical and mental conditions
surrounding Scrope’s insomnia:
Immediate trouble arose from his loyalty [to the King]. He had
followed the King’s example; he had become a total abstainer and, in
addition, on his own account he had ceased to smoke. And his
digestion . . . was deranged. He was suffering chemically, suffering
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one of those nameless sequences of maladjustments that still defy our
ordinary medical science. It was afflicting him with a general malaise,
it was affecting his energy, his temper, all the balance and comfort of
his nerves. All day he was weary, all night he was wakeful. He was
estranged from his body. (6-7)
Scrope’s body is a political entity, and as a result of using it to make a political
statement (support the King), he places himself in a state of conflict, resulting in
insomnia. Scrope uses his body to support the existing order and tradition; whereas
Miriam uses her body to defy it. Both attempts result in sleeplessness, yet Miriam
relishes her sleeplessness while Scrope, at least here, detests it.

For Miriam,

challenging conventions gives her a sense of power and contentment, yet for Scrope,
reifying conventions leaves him feeling uneasy and ill. Miriam’s insomnia is an act
of defiance, where Scrope’s is a result of conformity. Through Miriam’s insomnia,
she becomes more familiar with her body and comes to understand it better, but for
Scrope, his insomnia initially causes him to be “estranged from his body.”
Part of this explanation for the disparity of bodily reactions comes through the
characters’ oppositional social stances. Miriam welcomes a change from older ways
of being and defining femininity. Yet, Scrope is a conservative. Accordingly, the
time frame during which The Soul of a Bishop takes place is extremely relevant. The
text, published in 1917, spans the early years of World War I. Modris Eksteins
argues, “the British looked on [the war] as a struggle to preserve social values,
precisely those values and ideals which the prewar avant-garde had so bitterly
attacked: notions of justice, dignity, civility, restraint, and ‘progress’ governed by a
respect for law. For Victorians and even the mass of Edwardians, morality was an
objective matter” (118). Miriam, whose story takes place before the war, is one of the
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attackers of those values, but Scrope is much more conservative. Scrope’s desire to
follow the model of the King, and by doing so show both his restraint and morality,
points to this desire to return to the ways of the past. However, his adverse physical
reaction to his political and spiritual attempt at conservatism points, through the
consequence of his insomnia that will result in the changes in perception he
experiences, to his initially unconscious awareness of the futility and ultimate failure
of such conservatism.
Bowen also presents insomnia as an act of political expression and expression
of gender roles through the body. One can see such a treatment of insomnia in a
scene in which multiple characters, male and female, within the same household
experience insomnia simultaneously. Francie and Hugo, a married couple visiting the
Naylor’s country home where the bulk of the action of the text takes place, both lie
awake in bed together, but maintain their separate experiences of insomnia through
their gender roles. Bowen writes about the couple’s experience: “till well on into the
night they lay beside each other under the darkness in an intent and angry silence”
(151). When Francie breaks the silence, Hugo’s response is angry: “Look here, if
you can’t sleep you’d better take something” (151). Clearly, Hugo cannot sleep
either, but takes on the dominant role of medical advisor, “treating” his wife, with no
suggestion that he should “take something” for himself as well despite his own
insomnia. He seems to believe he can handle his own insomnia, but she needs to
medicate hers. Part of his anger rests with the fact that “he could not bear her to
intrude upon his wakefulness” (151), indicating his desire to dominate the time and
space of their shared insomnia. Bowen continues, “Whichever way he turned in that
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mournful freedom—and the perspectives of his regret opened fanwise, profound
avenues, each white at the end with a faceless statue—she would come stumbling
after him, hand to heart. ‘Try and sleep,’ he said, and sent her away angrily” (15152). In his state of insomnia, which he views, like Miriam as a form of freedom, he is
also encumbered by his role as “leader” of the family. Based on his reaction to
Francie, he resents this role and wants her to stop “stumbling after him.”
Francie has her own experience of insomnia, also clouded by gender,
expressed through her body:
She feigned sleep rigidly, hardly bearing to lie there. Her mind
clenched tight, like a fist, at the isolation of this proximity. She longed
to resume the life of day downstairs in the empty rooms. She had lain
awake in the South of France hearing palm trees creak in the gritty and
dry wind, hooked-back shutters rattle against the wall; she had lain
awake in town with her room a battle of lights through the thin blinds,
lights like her thoughts flashing and crossing—But across this battlepiece, under the long lances, had swarmed, like Uccello’s roses, small
comforts, the tenderness of imagined contact. She had wept because
he was not with her. Now a nostalgia for that solitude, for a wall so
patient and smooth to the reaching hand where there was now a
sleeper, came on her, quenching tears. He thought she slept.
In this passage, we see an example of woman as a “relative being” as described by
Streip earlier. While Hugo’s insomnia is not because of Francie, but rather in spite of
her, Francie sees Hugo as central to her insomnia. During her insomnia, she attempts
to control her body, by remaining rigid in bed and pretending to sleep, in order to
pacify Hugo, where he makes no such adjustments for her. She also uses her body,
and its rigid position, to deceive him, to make him feel as though she is sleeping and
he has his isolation, but in truth, he does not. So, her insomnia becomes a source of
power over him, allowing her to observe him without his awareness. Further, while
her earlier bouts of insomnia were nostalgic, in her ability to think of Hugo
191

pleasantly, her current insomnia is much less so because of his proximity. Isolation in
proximity is much more painful, for her, than isolation with separation because it
reveals the true extent of her emotional distance from her husband, which was
previously masked by spatial distance. Most significantly, while he attempts not to
think of her during his insomnia, during her insomnia, she willfully thinks only of
him, but does so through her remembrances of past insomnias.
Aside from mutual resentment of their positions within the marriage, the
insomnia of both Francie and Hugo is retrospective; both think of the past. During
his insomnia, Hugo thinks of “regret,” which inevitably comes from past actions, as
one cannot think with regret on what has not yet been done. Francie’s insomnia is not
filled with regret from her past, but happier memories of missing her husband
(somewhat ironically); if anything, her past becomes part of her lament over her
present. A third character in the household experiences insomnia on that evening,
which is also focused on thoughts of the past. Bowen writes:
Laurence could not sleep either. There must have been something at
dinner. . . .
He lit a candle, blinked at the startled flame and blew it out
again. Darkness resumed, with an uncomfortable suggestion of
normality. There seemed proof that the accident of the day, of action,
need not recur. And from this blank full stop, this confrontation of a
positive futurelessness, his mind ran spiderlike back on the thread spun
out of itself for advance, stumbling and swerving a little over its own
intricacy. He caught trains he had missed, rushing out to the boundless
possible through the shining mouths of termini, re-ordered meals in a
cosmopolitan blur, re-ate them, thought of thought but sheered away
from that windy gulf of a fateful clapping of empty book-covers. Far
enough back, in a kind of unborn freedom, he even remade marriages.
(152-53)
Food is a recurring motif throughout Bowen’s text, used to contrast the ordinary,
everyday elements of life with the political and social turmoil of the society the text
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describes (related to both the aftermath of World War I and the persistent, recurring
conflict between the British and Irish). Food becomes a primary motif through
Laurence’s insomnia, as he first remembers “something at dinner” causing his
insomnia, then envisions the ordering and eating of meals he might have had. Food
is, in fact, one of the most frequently cited medical causes of insomnia by physicians
from this time period, as we see both in this text and in Wells’. For example, an
article written in 1925 argues that “It was not to be forgotten that insomnia, especially
in the shape of morbid sleep, was frequently caused by toxic states of the blood—for
example, such as might be due to abnormal functioning of the digestive system”
(Hutchinson 776-77). Disrupted eating leads to disrupted sleeping.
Even more important to Laurence’s insomnia is its backward movement, with
his mind running “spiderlike” through the past that led him to his present state.
Laurence’s insomnia, much like Hugo’s from earlier, is a state from which he can
imagine control over others, using his insomnia to envision series of events that he
authorized, but only retrospectively. Further elaborating on this theme of authorship
through insomnia is the way in which his insomnia shifts from his own thoughts to
the imagined thoughts of another, female, character, who is no longer present:
And alarmed by the dragging tick of the watch at his pillow, slowing
down as the mortal sickness of Time, he turned over and thought in a
fury, he could not think why Laura should have married Mr. Farquar. .
. . Her confusion had clotted up the air of the room and seemed, in
that closest darkness under the ceiling, to be still impending. Here,
choked up under the sweep of the bed curtains, she had writhed in
those epic rages, against Hugo, against Richard, against any prospect
in life at all; biting the fat resistant pillows until once she had risen,
fluttered at her reflection, dabbed at her eyes, buttoned a tight sleek
dress of that day’s elegance over her heaving bosom, packed her
dresses in arched trunks (that had come back since to rot in the attics)
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and driven off, averting from the stare of the house an angry profile.
(154)
Through his insomnia, which brings attention to the delayed movement of time as
well as to the past, he authorizes Laura’s own insomnia, imagining her in a neurotic
state, rebellious against her marriage and life. As he imagines Laura’s insomnia, he
also imagines her body, with visions of her “tight sleek dress” and “heaving bosom.”
The reason he gives for Laura’s marriage, “confusion,” is really his own confusion,
projected onto her. He also gives Laura’s imagined insomnia a physical component,
through his use of terms like “clotted,” “choked,” and “writhed,” indicative of her
alleged “confusion” and frustration displayed through her body. Not only does he
authorize Laura’s behavior and motives, he authorizes her body as well, controlling it
in a way similar to that of Hugo as he suggests his wife take sedatives to treat her
sleeplessness. Laura is not within reach or control of Laurence, but through his
ability to imagine her, he can imagine control over her as well.
Lois Farquar, product of the marriage between Laura and Mr. Farquar, is a
young ward of the Naylor family coming of age in the time following World War I,
who expresses a sentiment regarding her femininity similar to that of Miriam, and
does so through a discussion of insomnia. In a conversation with her friend Marda,
who was recently engaged to be married, Lois expresses skepticism of gender roles
and discomfort with her unstable social position, related to her status as ward, but
complicated by the fact that as a woman, her ability to establish herself independently
is limited. Lois states that she would “like to be related; to have to be what I am. Just
to be is so intransitive, so lonely” to which Marda replies, “Then you will like to be a
wife and mother. . . . It’s good thing we can always be women” (142). Lois is
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searching for a stable place in society, as she is currently in a liminal and volatile
social position. However, like Miriam, Lois responds by saying, “I hate women. But
I can’t think how to be anything else. . . . But I wouldn’t like to be a man. So much
fuss about doing things” (142). Lois, like Miriam, sees herself as trapped between
two genders, desiring full identification with neither, but instead wanting to establish
her own category. She seems to desire the independence associated with masculinity,
the ability to not rely on her adoptive family and have to meet their demands and
expectations, but does not want to deal with the “fuss” associated with being a man
either; she makes men appear petty, and almost effeminate, where Miriam
characterizes them as “ignorant.” Lois expresses, also like Miriam, a desire to go
abroad, but has thus far been prevented from doing so “because of the War” (142).
Ultimately, what Lois wants is to escape conventional gender roles and political
subjectivity, which she links to the war. Bowen writes, “She wanted to go wherever
the War hadn’t. She wanted to go somewhere nonchalant where politics bored them,
where bands played out of doors on hot nights and nobody wished to sleep” (143).
Insomnia becomes an escapist fantasy. Despite the many similarities between Lois
and Miriam expressed in this passage, the final statement indicates a differentiation
between them. Miriam’s insomnia is an act with political implications, enabling her
to integrate into and occupy traditionally male spaces. Lois has a different vision of
insomnia, as apolitical. Where Miriam’s insomnia is integrative, allowing her to
extend her role to academic and social realms outside of the domestic sphere, Lois
depicts insomnia as a direct means of avoidance of the political. The implication is
that politics and the war make people want to sleep, perhaps in an effort to escape
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consciousness for a time, again an expression of conflict through the body. She
envisions insomnia as a new form of escapism, where sleep as escape is no longer a
necessity. But, being apolitical through the desire to avoid politics, is, to an extent, a
political act. She is calling for a conscious dismissal of politics and the war through
extended consciousness itself.
Miriam’s insomnia as a political act, aside from simply giving her time and
space to consider and defy the limitations placed upon her because of her gender,
entails her ability to use her insomnia to explore spaces beyond the domestic realm,
the space traditionally relegated to women. She seeks to inhabit traditionally male
spaces physically, through walking around the city and visiting tea houses and
restaurants, which she frequently does at night. Scott McCracken writes of teahouses
as a space where she can transcend gender:
In the early chapter novels of Pilgrimage, the ABCs [teahouses] allow
her to be similarly “amphibious,” when they act as staging posts or
thresholds between her private room in the boarding house and the
public life of the city. In this context, the café not only allows “private
behavior in a public place,” but, between her room and the street, it is
a space where public and private meet. As such, the chain teashop is a
productive space, the narrow stage upon which Miriam can perform a
new kind of gendered subjectivity, which is neither conventionally
masculine nor feminine. (133)
Miriam uses her nocturnal walks as a means of inhabiting public and private spaces.
The urban site of her wanderings, especially in the chapter novel Clear Horizon, just
prior to her departure for her rest cure, comes to represent her growing confidence
and desire to exert independence, and she becomes someone who “had dared to
venture alone, driven by cold and hunger, into the mystery of a London restaurant just
before midnight” (4: 329). Peter Baldwin notes that nocturnal urban wanderings
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presented an especial danger to women of the nineteenth century, who had “no safe
way to travel through the city at night without a man’s protection” and in doing so
faced “the possibility that something very unpleasant could happen to [them]” (152).
As society modernized and the streets became increasingly safer for lone women,
their sense of freedom increased. Miriam’s nocturnal walks reflect her sense of
confidence and a break from older insecurities. In addition, her late night walks
represent Miriam’s adaptation into a modernizing and rapidly urbanizing society.
Insomnia and Urban Spaces
Georg Simmel argues that the fast pace and rapid movement of life within the
metropolis “promoted a highly personal subjectivity” (414). Simmel’s argument is
reflected in the following passage relating one of Miriam’s nocturnal walks:
[She] swiftly crossed the wide, empty roadway, feeling as she reached
the far, opposite pavement, which was still just within the circle of her
London homeland, strength to walk, holding back thought, on and on
within her own neighbourhood until, stilled by the familiar presences
of its tall grey buildings, and the trees detachedly inhabiting its quiet
squares, the inward tumult should subside and leave her to become
once more aware of her own path, cool and solid beneath her feet; so
that when presently she encountered Amabel, the events of the long
evening, if, by that time, in her own mind, they were already irrelevant
and far away, might be left, by mutual consent, shelved and untouched
until they should come forth to fulfill, one by one, their proper role as
lively illustrations for the points of intensive colloquies. (4: 337)
Through her nocturnal walk, she had “become more aware of her own path,” she is
“within her own neighborhood,” and she can control the thoughts “in her own mind.”
The repeated use of the possessive “own” reiterates her feelings of ownership, over
her mind, body, and surroundings, leading to the “highly personal” sense within this
passage. Her late night solitude in the urban setting allows her to repossess herself,
allowing her to pursue her own path and control the dissemination of knowledge
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about herself, both to herself and to her friend. She uses her walking to cross new
boundaries, both physical and mental. Commenting on the function of boundaries in
urban spaces, Walter Benjamin writes, “The city is only apparently homogenous.
Even its name takes on a different sound from one district to the next. Nowhere,
unless perhaps in dreams, can the phenomenon of the boundary be experienced in a
more originary way than in cities" (88). The idea of the boundary is important within
this passage, as Miriam’s mind is only quieted once she is “within the circle of her
London homeland” upon crossing the street to her familiar territory. Both authors
acknowledge urban exploration as a means of interpreting subjectivity. For Simmel,
this subjectivity is individualized, as the individual is forced to distinguish himself
from the chaos of the metropolis. For Benjamin, urban life stretches the boundaries
of the self, making the subject aware of heterogeneity and connectivity.
Miriam’s experience of urban wandering can be said to have both functions
and allow her to gain control over her subjectivity through resisting traditional roles
and expectations. In her argument regarding humor in the literature of Jean Rhys,
Streip argues that women are not traditionally seen as funny because “it is difficult to
identify with them as subjects. How can women be recognized as separate in their
narcissism if they are valued for their nurturing, if they are experienced as someone
‘related to’ rather than identified with?” (124). Ultimately, Miriam’s insomniac
wanderings, a result of her initial use of sleep time as time for self-exploration, allow
her to cultivate an independent identity, as someone capable of narcissism, of putting
the self first, rather than as someone “identified with” or through the role of caretaker
(one is never just “caretaker,” but always caretaker of something or someone),
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escaping this role through taking her rest cure abroad, and these walks also allow her
to explore her place within the city, which affords her confidence. She is connected
to her environment and takes power from that connection. Throughout Pilgrimage,
Miriam struggles with and comes to resent the position of caretaker, and her
insomniac practices directly influence her rejection of Victorian female stereotypes.
Lois Cucullu, in an argument about the Victorian novel of insomnia and
somnambulism, argues that “The intrusion of these texts into nightly sleep coheres
with the intrusion occurring around the city into its nocturnal hours” (306). One
example Cucullu utilizes is Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula, which “concerns the
female body's internalization of overstimulation and modern restlessness in which the
next result has everything to do with sexual modernity and even perhaps with . . .
metronormativity” (304). Novels such as Dracula exhibit a sense of anxiety over a
world which allows for increasing amounts of female independence, similar to
Mitchell placing blame on industrialization for a heightened amount of cases of
nervous hysteria among women (Bassuk 250). Women were indeed breaking circles,
but they were breaking the circles of routine to which Miriam fears awakening rather
than breaking circles of “disorder” resulting in a renewal of their domestic duties.
William James argues that “what is called our ‘experience’ is almost entirely
determined by our habits of attention” (Habit 172).

He raises the point that to which

we choose to attend creates our experience. Miriam displays a shift in her attention,
fostered by her ability to use the privacy and space of sleep time, to better understand
herself as a subject and expose and resist her assigned subjectivity to create an
independent subjectivity rather than a relational one.
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Like Miriam, Scrope’s experience of urbanity influences his subjectivity. He
ponders God as he walks around London: “He no longer felt that God was in Pall
Mall or St. James’s Park, whither he resorted to walk and muse. He felt now that God
was somewhere about the horizon…” (92). Wells continues, “The world had become
opaque and real again as he walked up St. James’s Street and past the Ritz. He had a
feeling that he was taking the afternoon off from God” (92). To this point, the bishop
was overwhelmed by his new sense of God, yet his urban experience provides him
with some relief and he is able to feel a renewed sense of stability. Simmel argues:
The metropolitan type of man . . . develops an organ protecting
himself against the threatening currents and discrepancies of his
external environment which would uproot him. He reacts with his
head instead of his heart. . . . Intellectuality is thus seen to preserve
subjective life against the overwhelming power of metropolitan life”
(410).
Scrope’s urban walks return him to a more intellectual understanding of God, but the
effects are only temporary, as “All the relief and benefit of his experience in London
had vanished out of his life” (116) after he leaves the city.
Insomnia as Resistance
One final example of Miriam’s insomnia as a response to gender roles is
exposed through a discussion she has with Hypo Wilson, Richardson’s character
based on Wells. Hypo views her insomniac tendencies as indicative of childishness
and irresponsibility. He interrogates her with regard to her sleep habits, asserting that
she “ought to sleep” (4: 319). “Sleeping only at dawn,” Hypo continues, “is a not a
habit to be cultivated” (4: 322). In this passage, Hypo patronizes Miriam, asserting
masculine authority over her pursuit of individuality (and possible rejection of
motherhood), but also over the way in which she chooses to use her body. Hypo puts
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his comments in medical terms, echoing the language of child rearing literature, such
as that by physician L. Emmet Holt, who writes that “quiet and peaceful sleep is a
sign of perfect health” (120). Holt continues, “Disturbed sleep or sleeplessness may
be due to causes purely nervous. Such are bad habits acquired by faulty training”
(120). Habit, according to James, involves paths which are formed within the body
and mind, enabling one to repeat the same task with increasing efficiency (Habit 810). However, even though habits can be cultivated for useful purposes, they can also
be harmful: “Many so-called functional diseases seem to keep themselves going
simply because they happen to have once begun. . . . Epilepsies, neuralgias,
convulsive affections of various sorts, insomnia are so many cases in point” (10).
Curing these disorders merely involves a disruption of the habit through means such
as medication (James, Habit 10). James essentially presents the same view of
nervous diseases as Hurry does, only James sees as habit what Hurry sees as a
component of a vicious circle. Both agree that in order for a habit to be broken or a
disease to be cured, invention and disruption of the cycle is necessary.
This philosophy of disruption of habit as cure is reflected in Hypo’s language
when he speaks of Miriam’s willful insomnia as “not a habit to be cultivated.”
According to his logic, the more she gets into the habit of insomnia, the more difficult
it will be for her to break this habit when she is required (through becoming a wife
and mother) to follow a more regularized schedule. Miriam’s interests at this point
do not include marriage and motherhood, so she views Hypo’s comments as an
affront to the identity she has cultivated (rather than the habit): “Surprised and stung
by the sudden, public discrimination, by its implied . . . repudiation of the envy and
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admiration he had so often expressed in regard to her own independence of sleep and
food, she forced herself to concentrate on his question” (4: 319). Unlike both
Laurence and Scrope, she does not blame her insomnia on her diet, and sees herself as
“independent” with regard to food. She understands Hypo’s comments about her
sleep habits as reflective of his view of her as destined for motherhood, as he believes
all women should be: “’You, Miriam,’ ran his message, ‘booked for maternity, must
stand aside, while the rest of us, leaving you alone in a corner, carry on our lives’” (4:
321). This same combination of science with a narrow conception of femininity
centered on the role as mother and nurturer expressed by Hypo is similar to Mitchell’s
presentation of hysteria as a disease of body, mind, and morality. Hypo, through his
counsel, is attempting to direct Miriam to her “proper” role in life, just as Mitchell
saw it his duty to not only cure his patients physically and mentally, but serve as their
moral counselors (Mitchell 62).
However, this conversation between Miriam and Hypo is not simply a
representation of his assertion of power over her, but also illustrates the power which
Miriam is able to utilize through her exposure of and resistance to his expectations of
her. She understands the role she is supposed to embrace, but willfully refuses to do
so. When speaking with Hypo about familial devotion, she says:
You may call the proceeding [devotion] by any name you like, choose
whatever metaphor you prefer to describe it—and the metaphor you
choose will represent you more accurately than any photograph. It
may be a marvelous incidental result of being born a woman and may
unify a person with life and let her into its secrets—I can believe that
now, the wisdom and insight and serene independent power it might
bring. But it is neither the beginning nor the end of feminine being. It
wasn’t for my Devon-border grandmother who produced twenty-two
children. (4: 331)
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She sees the ability to be devoted, as a wife or mother, as part of her identity, but not
as the main or only part of her identity. Further, she understands that other women
have felt this way before her. Hypo becomes bored by this line of discussion and
loses interest in her comments, but through the rejection of defining herself in terms
solely based in relation to those she cares for, she is exercising a form of power. She
is also judging his reaction to her comments and expectations of her. In doing so, she
is rejecting an assigned identity.
Hypo views Miriam as a biological entity, a woman destined for motherhood,
but through her insomnia, Miriam rejects this classification as the primary motivator
of her character. Miriam has a conflicted view of medicine and science, ultimately
taking advantage of this scientific/biological view of herself to escape the
ramifications of this perspective. In the penultimate chapter novel, Dimple Hill,
Miriam expresses both her skepticism of science as well as her desire to take
advantage of it, thinking of her supposed “rest cure” as an element of her “newly
dawned determination to exploit, for the sake of its attendant possibilities, the verdict
of a science she half despised” (4: 443). The Pilgrimage series parallels Miriam’s
approach to science and medicine through its inclusion of scientific and medical
discussions that reflect contemporaneous medical belief with the intent of exposing
and challenging the limitations of such a model for understanding behavior and
character. In some cases Miriam’s thought underscores scientific thought, yet there is
always an element of skepticism and cynicism directed towards these reflections. For
example, illustrating Miriam's simultaneously moral and medical characterization of
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insomnia yet ultimate skepticism towards it, she refers to her insomnia as “a vicious
circle,” as I have discussed earlier.
As Pilgrimage continues, Miriam comes to equate her behavior, including her
insomniac tendencies of exploration, with the perpetuation of hysteria, and views this
“hysteria” as directly related to her dissatisfaction with limitations and expectations
of her because of her gender, often expressed as and through insomnia. Stacey Fox
writes that Miriam reads an article on the “lymphatico-nervous” class, a class in
which Miriam tentatively places herself:
In assuming the role of diagnostician, Miriam reads her life through
the diagnostic framework provided by the article, and “all she had
suffered in the past,” the trauma of her mother's death, her inability to
fit in with other people, her dissatisfaction with conventional feminine
roles, her restlessness and her search for a productive feminine
identity, come to stand as symptoms of her lymphatico-nervous
disorder. The classificatory model is not explicitly gendered, but the
symptoms of the “lymphatico-nervous class”—“no energy, no
initiative, no hopefulness, no resisting power; and sometimes bilious
attacks”—recall the symptoms of her mother. (79)
Through her identification with the symptoms described in this article, she is
“interpellated into this scientific model and, as a result, can only register her life in
pathological terms” (Fox 79). At this point, Miriam has internalized the discursive
views of feminine weakness and incapability of handling insomnia. Even as Miriam
attempts to rebel against the idea of the female as weak, she comes to fear that her
insomnia may, in fact, lead to a nervous breakdown because of her alleged weakness
(Fox 80). Miriam registers the causes of her insomnia, restlessness and
dissatisfaction, as well as its results like lack of energy and initiative, as possible
indicators of hysteria.
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Hurry, like Miriam, sees insomnia as an integral part of vicious circles of
neurasthenia (2), especially as related to what he calls the “habit” subset, which
entails an “exaggerated reflex irritability of the nervous system” (3). Insomnia, which
is often accompanied by “depression and malnutrition” (8), intensifies neurasthenia,
acting as an “obstinate complication” (6). Hurry argues, “Insomnia also plays a large
part in the causation and perpetuation of insanity” because it strains the nervous
system (13). It forms a part of a vicious circle: “Neurasthenia may cause insomnia
which intensifies neurasthenia” (236). Since not sleeping becomes part of the circle
of disease, sleep, then, is a way of disrupting the circle: “Sleep is another of Nature's
methods of breaking Circles, especially in neurotic disorders which are complicated
by insomnia” (243). This text illustrates a discursive view of insomnia as both cause
and symptom of psychological disorder, and sleep as a possible remedy for
psychological disorder because it breaks the circle of sleeplessness. Hurry’s theories
correlate with Miriam’s fears about the relationship between her behavior and her
habits and decisions.
Miriam’s understanding of the relationship between her sleep habits and her
ostensible propensity for psychological collapse is further intensified by her mother’s
relationship to sleep. Towards the end of Honeycomb, Miriam’s mother suffers a
nervous breakdown, which eventually leads to her suicide. Miriam and her mother
both cite lack of sleep as one of the major factors in Mrs. Henderson’s psychological
disintegration, as Miriam thinks, “’Dr. Ryman is giving her bromide . . . she can't
sleep without it.’ Sleeplessness, insomnia . . . she can't see the spring . . . why not?”
(1: 475). The passage continues, “… bottles of bromide, visits, bills, and mother
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going patiently on, trusting and feeling unhelped. Going on. People went . . . mad.
If she could not sleep she would go . . . mad….” (1: 475). Both Miriam and her
mother equate sleep with a relief from the mother’s disorder; sleep provides a respite
from the mother’s tortured consciousness, which Fox interprets as a result of her
being “progressively ground down by the misogynist Mr. Henderson, leading to the
hopelessness which caused her death” (79).
Mrs. Henderson’s illness and treatment closely resemble that of hysterical
patients under the care of Mitchell. Just as Mitchell asserts the complete authority of
the doctor to make decisions for the patients and establish complete dependence of
his patients, Mrs. Henderson is “’in Dr. Ryman's hands.’ Dr. Ryman is treating her.
Mrs. Poole said Dr. Ryman was a very able man” (1: 475). Miriam doubts Dr.
Ryman’s ability to understand his mother's condition, asking, “how did he know more
than anyone else?” (1: 475), yet her mother allows the treatment to continue, despite
its ineffectiveness. In addition, just as Mitchell suggested hired nurses because
family members would give in to the selfish patient’s whims (49), the Hendersons are
encouraged to “behave as if there was nothing wrong with her” because “there is
nothing wrong but nerves” (1: 475), indicating a dismissal of nervous disorders as
“real” conditions. Further resembling Mitchell’s thoughts on his patients, Mrs.
Henderson’s illness is expressed as having an element of selfishness, her cure
requiring her to “forget about herself” (1: 475).
Just before Mrs. Henderson’s suicide, Miriam attempts to stay awake at night
to nurse her mother. She is very conscious of her mother’s inability to sleep, as she,
herself, struggles to stay awake: “She read on till the words flowed together and her
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droning voice was thick with sleep. The town clock struck two. A quiet voice from
the other bed brought the reading to an end. Sleep was in the room now. She felt
sure of it” (1: 487). The belief that her mother is able to fall asleep allows Miriam to
sleep herself; however, the relief is only momentary, and she awakens to her mother
having a hysterical fit. She again brings her mother to the doctor, but again, his
treatment is futile. On their way home, Mrs. Henderson says, “’God has deserted me’
. . . ‘He will not let me sleep. He does not want me to sleep. . . . He does not care’”
(489). Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Henderson commits suicide. In this passage, her
language reflects her thoughts both that her insomnia perpetuated her psychological
disorder, but also that it had moral implications. She felt punished by God, perhaps
as a result of her failure to adequately play her part as wife and mother. Ellen Bassuk
suggests that female hysteria is rebellion against being forced into and constrained by
the role of caretaker, wife, and mother; the hysterical woman refused to fill the role
and required others to care for her instead (253). Mrs. Henderson appears to be aware
that her hysteria has a rebellious component to it; however, she also has internalized
the legitimacy of the role she was supposedly intended to fill and feels guilt at her
inability or refusal to do what is expected of her.
A character similar to Mrs. Henderson, who provides further insight into
insomnia as a symptom of a conflicted sense of expectations of femininity, is Rhys’
semi-autobiographical character Sasha Jensen, who appears in her text Good
Morning, Midnight. Sasha, who was at one point married with a child, was
abandoned by her husband and lost her child prior to the main action of the novel.
Though Mrs. Henderson still has her husband and children around her, her situation is
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similar to Sasha’s in that both women are unable to fulfill their wife and mother roles.
Also like Mrs. Henderson, Sasha is extremely tortured mentally, and her depression
manifests as an inability to sleep. Sasha, unable to cope with her insomnia,
repeatedly resorts to a nightly combination of alcohol and Luminol in an effort to
make herself pass out. She has no tolerance for insomnia, as Miriam does. For
instance, Rhys, in a first person presentation of Sasha’s thoughts, writes, “I could not
sleep. Rolling from side to side. . . .” (12). This time of insomnia reminds Sasha of
her past, in which she remembers her marriage to Enno, but her memories are soon
overtaken by the ugliness of her environment, a dingy hotel room in which she
imagines insects crawling on the walls around her.
Sasha quickly gets out of bed, and she takes a second dose of Luminol, which
allows her to sleep immediately (13). This instance is only one of many in which
Sasha uses Luminol to sleep, sometimes staying in bed up to fifteen hours a day (86).
She would much rather sleep than be tired because when she is tired, “everything is
like a dream and you are starting to know what things are like underneath what
people say they are” (121). For Sasha, as for Miriam, being awake for too long
allows for exploration and revelation. However, unlike Miriam, Sasha does not like
what she learns; it leaves her feeling frightened rather than empowered. Both women
realize the artifice behind the way in which people behave, but while Miriam decides
to challenge what people expect of her and the way in which they judge her, Sasha
shrinks from their judgment and becomes increasingly unable to handle the pressures
of social encounters, knowing that she has failed to fill the role for which she is
marked. Sasha and Mrs. Henderson present two examples of characters who
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internalize the discursive presentation of females as destined for marriage and
motherhood, but also of females as inherently weak and unable to handle the excess
of thought insomnia brings.
Miriam, however, is different from Sasha and Mrs. Henderson. Ultimately,
Miriam is cynical about the way in which the doctors treated her mother and the role
for which others feel she is destined. Instead she exhibits a “refusal and appropriation
of the power relations embedded in the medical diagnosis” (Fox 93). For example,
after a consultation with the doctor Ashley Densley, she thinks:
In the stupor of relief that fell upon her, relaxing the taut network of
her nerves and leaving her seated as of old, infinitely at ease and at
home within the friendly enclosure, she waited for his facts, the
‘medical facts’ she had for so long scornfully regarded as misreadings
of evidence isolated from the context of reality, inertly going their way
until another group of facts, equally isolated from reality, brought
about a fresh misreading. But the facts she was now to hear, drawn
from the real of Sarah’s being regarded from the point of view of
Sarah who, in spite of her experiences, still unconsciously endowed all
specialists with omniscience, would carry conviction borrowed from
hope that Sarah’s faith might introduce a power that would carry all
before it. (4: 373-74)
Not only does she recognize any diagnosis Densley might proffer as inaccurate and
based upon misinterpretation of her character, she sees a possible source of power
that might come from his diagnosis. By putting “medical facts” in quotation marks,
she expresses her skepticism, further enhanced by what she sees as the inevitability of
his “misreading” of her condition. She also distinguishes herself from Sarah, who
takes the word of physicians without question.
Consequently, Miriam comes to regard her chosen insomnia not as an act of
selfishness, but as an independence and individuality—at time for exploration and an
opportunity for freedom. She regards sleep similarly to the way in which Richardson,
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who refers to sleep as a “nightly task” (qtd. in Marcus 65) does. Richardson views
sleep not as an escape from one’s life, but rather as chance for renewal and
understanding: “Richardson would express a resentment of the use of the day in the
service of the night (as opposed to sleep serving to renew the self for the day)”
(Marcus 64). In her response to a book by H. A. Foster, entitled Studies in Dreams,
Richardson claims that she perceives dreaming and dream analysis as “wasting time”
(qtd. in Marcus 63). Conversely, an ideal function of the dream and sleep time would
be not to provide an escape from consciousness but to provide “a direct consideration
of things as they are, undisturbed by the sense of time and place, and sometimes of an
undisturbed consideration of all that we are” (qtd. in Marcus 64). Richardson, like
Lois Farquar, does not view sleep as a respite from the self as Mrs. Henderson and
Sasha do, one both of them want desperately; rather Richardson wants to make use of
sleep time for uniting the past and present self in order to better understand our own
consciousness (Marcus 65).
Much like Pilgrimage, Wells’ The Soul of a Bishop both mirrors and exploits
scientific and medical discourse regarding the relationship between sleeping and
mental hygiene. Both texts use the scientific and medical disciplines against
themselves. For example, in describing Scrope’s first experiences with insomnia,
Wells gives both personal and medical justifications:
The night after his conversation with [his daughter] Eleanor was the
first night of the bishop’s insomnia. It was the definite beginning of a
new phase in his life.
Doctors explain to us that the immediate cause of insomnia is
always some poisoned or depleted state of the body, and no doubt the
fatigues and hasty meals of the day had left the bishop in a state of
unprecedented chemical disorder, with his nerves irritated by strange
compounds and unsoothed by familiar lubricants, and the core and
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essence of his trouble was an intellectual distress. For the first time in
his life he was really in doubt, about himself, about his way of living,
about all his persuasions. (34)
Wells incorporates two different causes of the bishop’s insomnia; the first is the
consequence of a conversation with Eleanor in which she discusses her desire to
pursue education outside of the household. Her desire for independence leads him to
question his own motivations and position within the Church. The second reason
given for Scrope’s insomnia is some sort of chemical imbalance combined with
working long hours, which he associates, like Laurence (but unlike Miriam) with
food. The explanation given in the text, a chemical disorder in combination with
overwork and poor diet, was, in fact, in accordance with popular theories on insomnia
from the time period of the text. Regarding overwork, an article written in 1900 by
physician James Sawyer explains that overwork alone is not enough to account for
insomnia: “I advise you to be wisely suspicious as to accepting work as a cause of
insomnia. Nature provides that disposition to rest shall follow work. It is mostly
worry, not overwork, or it is work under wrong conditions which brings unrest”
(1628). Sawyer’s passage is suggestive in that, as the text proceeds, we come to learn
of the dissatisfaction Scrope has with his job. However, as both Sawyer and Wells
seem to contend, overwork alone is not enough to cause insomnia, which Wells
clearly indicates through positioning the beginning of Scrope’s insomnia after his
worrisome conversation with his daughter, rather than simply as a cause of his work.
With regard to the idea of chemical imbalances, one common explanation for
insomnia is an imbalance of blood in the brain. As one of Scrope’s doctors, Dr. Dale,
argues, “My theory about your case is that this [kidney trouble brought on by
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drinking local water] produced a change in your blood, quickened your sensibilities
and your critical faculties just at a time when a good many bothers . . . came into your
life” (73). Dale suggests a combination of physiological and psychological factors.
With regard to the importance of blood flow and sleep, MacFarlane asserts that there
is a correlation between insomnia and changes in blood distribution:
As the causation of sleep from the earliest times has been supposed to
depend in some manner upon alterations in the blood-supply of the
brain, it will be useful to consider preliminarily some points in
connection with these vascular arrangements, more especially as the
cause of so many forms of insomnia is to be found in some
interference with the normal blood-supply, either as regards quantity
or quality, or both combined. (11)
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Scrope, at least in part, attributes his insomnia to
his recent decision to emulate the model of the King, and abstain from tobacco and
alcohol, referring to the fact that his nerves were “unsoothed by familiar lubricants.”
Scrope appears to believe that part of the cause of his insomnia is an imbalance
created by his change of habits and his doctor adds contaminated water to the
equation, but also acknowledges the “bothers” he is facing. Wells uses all of these
factors in combination—the bishop’s discomfiture with his daughter’s desire for
education and independence, his growing misapprehensions regarding his job, and his
attempt at the politicization of his body as a conservative reaction to social change—
to create a medical and psychological basis for the bishop’s insomnia. As Wells puts
it, “this intellectual insecurity extended into his physical sensations” (35). His use of
conditions reflected in the medical literature of his time period contextualize Scrope’s
insomnia to make it relevant not only to his personal experience, but his social and
historical experience.
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Interestingly, Scrope’s insomnia is also rooted in gender conflict. Wells
writes:
It was not only that the world of his existence which had seemed to be
the whole universe had become diaphanous and betrayed vast and
uncontrollable realities beyond it, but his daughter had as it were
suddenly opened a door in this glassy sphere of insecurity that had
been his abiding refuge, a door upon the stormy rebel outer world, and
she stood there, young, ignorant, adventurous, ready to step out. (35)
In the conversation with his daughter that sparked his mental unrest, he is disturbed
by her desire to “find out for [herself] what all this trouble about votes and things
means” (32), Further, she hopes for an education outside of her home: “I would like
to go to Newnham or Somerville—and work. I feel—so horribly ignorant. Of all
sorts of things. If I were a son I should go” (32). He protests, and she again replies to
him that “If [she] were a son, you wouldn’t say that” when he suggests she remain
home and read to further her education rather than going out into the world (32). For
Scrope, his daughter’s desire to be treated as a son reflects a society in collapse:
“Since the passing of Victoria the Great there had been an accumulating uneasiness in
national life. . . . Not that Queen Victoria had really been a paperweight or any
weight at all, but it happened that she died as an epoch closed, an epoch of
tremendous stabilities” (17). His ability to simultaneously assert and dismiss the
importance of Queen Victoria speaks to his skepticism of the role of women in public
life. On the one hand, he reflects on her stabilizing influence, but on the other, he
attempts to only view her death as coincidental to the social changes that followed.
Treatments
At first, Scrope searches for medical, rather than existential, cures for his
insomnia. Again we see contemporary theories on treatments of insomnia reflected in
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the text. At first, he turns to his friends for advice: “he had now experimented
ignorantly and intensely with one or two narcotics or sleeping mixtures that friends
and acquaintances had mentioned in his hearing” (48), including the use of opium to
which he becomes mildly addicted. More importantly, his pursuit of a treatment
leads to a change in character: “For the first time in his life he became secretive from
his wife” (48). Wells creates a parallel situation in which the bishop both hides his
doubts about his role within the Church with his surreptitious attempts at drugging
himself to sleep, as he “would have liked to discuss the perplexities in which he was
entangling himself . . . but his own positions were becoming so insecure that he
feared to betray them by argument” (48). He finds himself acting in a way he
considers “physically and morally evil” (49). His secrecy regarding his doubts of the
Church’s doctrines coincides with the secrecy of his attempts at self-medication.
Given the failure of his attempts at self-medication, which only leads to “an
intensification and vivid furnishing forth of insomnia” (48), as well as “his character
being undermined by the growing nervous trouble” (49), he eventually seeks the
assistance of a physician, Dr. Brighton-Pomfrey, who diagnoses him with
neurasthenia (71). Neurasthenia is a somewhat amorphous mental disorder used to
describe a variety of mental and physical symptoms including anxiety and insomnia.
According to Rankin, in an article compellingly entitled “Neurasthenia: The Wear
and Tear of Life” (1903), though neurasthenia is “sometimes ill-defined and always
capable of variation,” it generally “may be regarded as a derangement of function
resulting from exhaustion of nervous energy” (1017). Continuing, Rankin explains
that neurasthenia “attacks men more frequently than women, and is specially apt to

214

affect those of neurotic inheritance, or those who live under physical and mental
tension” (1107). Often, as is the case with Scrope, “the patient, who has been
indefinitely out of health for some time, is at last driven to the doctor because of this
sense of langour, to which has lately been superadded sleeplessness and impaired
digestion” (Rankin, “Neurasthenia” 1107), symptoms from which Scrope is clearly
suffering. Neurasthenia, according to Rankin, is a condition which requires both
physical and moral treatment: “rest is the first and obvious indication, and it must
always be both mental and physical. Its power for good is intensified by the moral
effect exercised on the patient by his physician and his surroundings”
(“Neurasthenia” 1019). In fact, Rankin suggests that the Weir-Mitchell treatment,
discussed earlier with regard to Miriam, “will yield the best results” (“Neurasthenia”
1019). Through the possible diagnosis of neurasthenia applied to Scrope by his
doctor, much is revealed about his situation: his nervousness and anxiety, his
frustration with his attempts at self-medication that drive him to seek medical
attention, and his sense of being morally lost and turning to a doctor (BrightonPomfrey), who “prided himself on being all things to all men” (161).
Scrope is not fully satisfied with the idea of resting to cure his neurasthenia
because he has “much to do” and fears a “loss” of “practical efficiency” (71), again
indicating the relationship, as Miriam draws, between insomnia and inefficiency. His
new doctor, Dr. Dale, provides an alternative explanation of his mental condition:
“You see, the trouble in such a case as this is peculiarly difficult to trace to its sources
because it comes just upon the border-line of bodily and mental things. You may take
a drug or alter your regimen and it disturbs your thoughts, you may take an idea and it
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disturbs your health” (71). Dale, explaining insomnia as a liminal condition
indicating an imbalanced body and mind, continues:
But I go off from the idea that every living being lives in a state not
differing essentially from a state of hallucination concerning the things
about it. Truth, essential truth, is hidden. Always. Of course, there
must be a measure of truth in our working illusions, a working
measure of truth, or the creature would smash itself up and end itself,
but beyond that discretion of the fire and the pitfall lies a wide margin
of error about which we may be deceived for years. So long as it
doesn’t matter, it doesn’t matter. (72)
Dale argues that something has happened to Scrope, probably fostered by his recent
relocation to Princhester and its related sense of uprootedness and change in physical
atmosphere, that disrupted Scrope’s “working illusions.” Dale argues that the
“loosening of the ties that bind a man to his everyday life and his everyday self is in
nine cases out of ten a loosening of the ties that bind him to everyday sanity” (75). In
this section of the text, Dale plays both physician and psychologist to Scrope, offering
a dual diagnosis of sorts. Scrope is a bit cynical of the psychological end of Dale’s
analysis, dismissing it as “Phenomena and noumena and so on and so on. Kant and
so forth. Pragmatism” (72), but becomes much more interested in what Dale has to
say when Dale discusses a possible drug of his own invention that might be helpful.
His intention is not to “[drug] oneself back to the old contentment” but to “drug
[Scrope] on to the new” (76). In fact, after Scrope takes Dale’s prescription, he does
experience a new sort of contentment. For example, whereas before, the war seemed
infinite and hopeless, after Dale’s drug, “he saw the war as something measurable,
something with a beginning and an end, as something less than the immortal spirit in
man. He had been too much oppressed by it” (79-80). Dale’s drug does allow him
the contentment he desires, at least for a time.
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Drugs were, and still are, a common recourse for those with insomnia.
Sawyer explains:
In the severer forms of psychic insomnia we must often at once secure
sleep by the action of some efficient hypnotic. I prefer opium or
chloral. By the use alone of one of these drugs we can often quickly
cure acute insomnia depending upon some mental shock or strain.
You will find that a few nights of sound and sufficient sleep,
artificially induced by the exhibition of a reliable hypnotic, will do
more than anything else to restore to the brain the power of sleeping
without further aid from drugs. Besides chloral hydrate, opium,
morphine, and the other soporific derivatives of opium, the chief
hypnotic drugs are sulphonal, trional, paraldehyde, amylene hydrate,
and the bromides, to which may be added alcohol and affusion of the
head with cold water. (1627-28)
The purpose of the use of such drugs was to break the cycle of insomnia, much in the
way that Hurry describes. Insomnia creates insomnia, but sound sleep can create a
change in the mental pattern or habit of insomnia. Yet, despite their alleged efficacy,
such drugs are not without extreme risk. Sawyer attributes the loss of “many human
lives” to overdose because of self-administration, and cautions against allowing
patients to “swallow chloral or any other of the dangerous but valuable hypnotics
whenever he feels so disposed” (1628), which is, of course, what Scrope begins to do.
Dale leaves Scrope with a phial of his concoction, instructing Scrope to “Take
it only . . . when you feel you must” but promising that “When you want more I will
make you more” (77). Clearly, he ignores the caution Sawyer advises, through
allowing his patient to self-administer the drug he has provided. Indeed, Scrope does
begin to use the drug somewhat dangerously, and it has significant effects on his
psyche. His first usage of the drug results in not only his change in position on the
endlessness of World War I, but leads him to the sense that “something snapped—
like the snapping of a lute string—in his brain” (82). Wells continues, “With a sigh
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of deep relief the bishop realized that this world had vanished” (82). Whereas his
insomnia forces him to acknowledge the changing state of the world, taking Dale’s
drug removes him from the world altogether, and it is a feeling he quite enjoys. The
hallucinogenic effects of this drug become more prominent as time progresses; he
removes his Episcopal livery and converses directly with God:
“Oh God!” he cried, “God my Captain! Wait for me! Be patient with
me!”
And as he did so God turned back and reached out his hand. It
was indeed as if he stood and smiled. He stood and smiled as a kind
man might do; he dazzled and blinded his worshipper, and yet it was
manifest that he had a hand a man might clasp.
Unspeakable love and joy irradiated the whole being of the
bishop as he seized God’s hand and clasped it desperately with both of
his own. It was as if his nerves and arteries and all his substance were
inundated with golden light. . . .
It was as if he merged with God and became God. . . . (88-89)
The bishop’s vision of God, made possible through his insomnia and pursuit of its
treatment, reinforces his view of God and desire to follow God, but culminates in his
rejection of the Church:
It may seem strange to the reader that this bishop who had been
doubting and criticizing the church and his system of beliefs for four
long years had never before faced the possibility of a severance from
his ecclesiastical dignity. But he had grown up in the church, his life
had been so entirely clerical and Anglican, that the widest separation
he had hitherto been able to imagine from this past had left him still a
bishop, heretical perhaps, innovating in the broadening of beliefs and
the liberalizing of practice . . . but still with the palace and his
dignities, differing in opinion rather than in any tangible reality from
his previous self. (90)
Rankin comments that insomnia makes “Moral responsibilities multiply, and a
progressive perception of the greater verities of existence creates new concepts of
duty, which add to the burden of each day’s endeavour” (“Broken Sleep” 77).
Scrope’s insomnia certainly follows this pattern. Hence, we can view the bishop’s
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insomnia teleologically. His discontentment with various positions he is expected to
adopt within the Church, in combination with his initial resistance to social change
generate his insomnia, which in turn results in his renouncement of his position and
break with the Church. Consequently, his break with the Church leads to his pursuit
of his own independent religious doctrine, which is in the spirit of the revelations he
has while under treatment for his insomnia. His insomnia creates the threshold over
which all of the other changes in his faith and life take place.
Whereas for Miriam, insomnia becomes a welcomed signifier of her growing
independence specifically because it allows her access to spheres from which her
access had previously been limited because of her gender, the bishop’s insomnia is
unwelcomed because it prohibits him from fulfilling his role as provider for his
family assigned because of his gender. His role as provider for his family and as
leader in the Church is complicated in multiple ways by his insomnia. The physical
symptoms of his insomnia and its subsequent exhaustion make his job quite difficult
to perform, as he struggles to prepare and present his sermons. His moral and
spiritual crisis, both cause and symptom of his insomnia, culminates in an address in
which he both renounces the Church and criticizes its role in the world, all quite
publically. During a confirmation ceremony, intended to welcome the young to full
participation in the Church, he shocks the crowd as he proclaims:
All ceremonies . . . grow old. All ceremonies are tainted even from the
first by things less worthy than their first intention, and you, my dear
sons and daughters, who have gathered to-day in this worn and ancient
building, beneath these monuments to ancient vanities and these
symbols of forgotten or abandoned theories about the mystery of God,
will do well to distinguish in your minds between what is essential and
what is superfluous and confusing in this dedication you make of
yourselves to God our Master and King. For that is the real thing you
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seek to do today, to give yourselves to God. This is your spiritual
coming of age, in which you set aside your childish dependence upon
teachers and upon taught phrases, upon rote and direction, and stand
up to look your Master in the face. You profess a great brotherhood
when you do that, a brotherhood that goes round that earth, that
numbers men of every race and nation and country, that aims to bring
God into all the affairs of the world and make him not only the king . .
. of an united mankind. (141-42)
The opening part of his sermon renounces the role of the Church, positing it as an
obstacle to God, and creates a sense of the falsity of distinction among religions. In a
confirmation ceremony predicated upon the learning of Church doctrines and
fostering participation in a specific ideology, Scrope denounces religion, with its
ceremonies and doctrines, as the proper means of worshipping God. The next part of
his sermon does little to appease the shocked group of parishioners:
It is your privilege, it is your grave and terrible position that you have
been born at the very end and collapse of a negligent age, of an age of
sham kingship, sham freedom, relaxation, evasion, greed, waste,
falsehood, and sinister preparation. Your lives open out in the midst of
the breakdown for which that age prepared. . . . Our country is at war
and half mankind is at war, death and destruction trample through the
world; men rot and die by the million, food diminishes and fails, there
is a wasting away of all the hoarded resources, of all the accumulated
well-being of mankind; and there is no clear prospect of any end to
this enormous and frightful conflict. Why did it ever arise? What
made it possible? It arose because men had forgotten God. It was
possible because they worshipped simulacra, were loyal to phantoms
of race and empire, permitted themselves to be ruled by idiot and
usurper kings. (145-46)
In this second part of his address, not only does Scrope criticize the Church for its
reliance on ceremony and artifice, but he also blames it, at least in part, for the Great
War. Because of the Church (and others like it), people developed both a sense of
complacency and misplaced attachments, leading to division, devastation, and death.
They worshipped not God, but symbols. False division of mankind, argues Scrope,
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cultivated by religious practice and distinctions, made the war possible, and the
generation of those about to be confirmed is reaping the outcome.
Insomnia and Gender Roles
After Scrope’s sermon, which he describes as a trance of sorts, Canon Bliss
attempts to explain away his ideas through allegations of “illness”: “you had a kind
of lapse—an aphasia. You mutilated the interrogation and you did not pronounce the
benediction properly. You changed words and you put in words” (148). Scrope, on
the other hand, asserts both his sanity and desire to leave the pulpit. Shortly
thereafter, his wife, Lady Ella, sends for a doctor. Later that night, Scrope “had a
temperature of a hundred and a half” and is advised by his doctor to stop thinking of
“these things” (149). But, Scrope realizes that he cannot stop his thoughts continues
on his course of changed belief.
The one obstacle he has preventing a complete break with the Church is his
role within his family. During a bout of insomnia prior to the incident of the sermon,
Scrope ponders the impact a full declaration of his feelings would have on his wife:
“His wife became as it were the representative of all that held him helpless. . . . It
was clear to him that any movement towards the disavowal of doctrinal Christianity
and the renunciation of his see must first be discussed with her. . . . And he could not
imagine telling her except as an incredibly shattering act” (108). Consequently, he
“left things from day to day, and went about his episcopal routines” (108).
Eventually, he tells her his feelings (before the sermon), to which she responds, “I
know you have been sleepless, but I have been so ready to help you. . . . My life is all
but to be of use to you” (138). To this point, she saw only the symptoms, but had no
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understanding of the root of Scrope’s troubles. Much like Cannon Bliss, her advice is
that he seek a doctor, rather than break with the Church. Yet, after his unexpected
sermon, he can no longer hide his feelings from other members of the Church, and he
understands that he has jeopardized their family’s security.
When he does quit the Church, the ultimate effect is one of unsettling and
uprooting his family. Wells writes, “Never was the whole world of a woman so
swiftly and comprehensively smashed. All the previous troubles of her life seemed
infinitesimal in comparison with any single item in this dismaying debacle. She tried
to consolidate it in the idea that he was ill, ‘disordered’” (170). Naturally, she blames
his insomnia: “In the past he had always been a very kind and friendly mate to her,
but sometimes he had been irritable about small things, especially during his seasons
of insomnia; now he came back changed, a much graver man, rather older in his
manner . . . but rigidly set upon his purpose of leaving the church” (171). His
decision to leave the Church threatens not only his source of income, but also his
family’s home, provided by the Church, as well. His family is forced to move into a
much smaller abode and subsist on a much smaller income. To mitigate the crisis for
his family, he attempts to work under the patronage of Lady Sunderbund, a wealthy
American heiress with whom his new doctrines resonate, yet he rejects her patronage
when he realizes she does not want to renounce the Church at all, but merely create
one in a new form. Ultimately, his family is reduced to poverty, but his wife, given
her sense of duty, chooses to follow him regardless of their circumstances, though she
never fully understands his motives. In a final bout of wakefulness at two in the
morning, the bishop realizes the conclusion of his spiritual quest, accepts that he will
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have no ministry of his own, and realizes that he is ultimately alone in his manner of
understanding God (at least within his family of women).
Richardson criticized Wells for his portrayal of female characters:
So far he has not achieved the portrayal of a woman, with the one
exception of Leadford’s mother. His women are all one specimen,
carried away from some biological museum of his student days,
dressed up in varying trappings, with different shades of hair and
proportions of freckles, with neatly tabulated instincts and one vague
smile between them all. (“Crank” 400)
Lady Ella’s blind following of her husband regardless of her disagreement with him,
her reduction of her husband’s spiritual crisis to the effects of a disordered mind
perpetuated by insomnia, as well as her inability to understand the faith to which her
husband ascribes, reinforce Richardson’s accusation, made more than a decade before
The Soul of a Bishop was published. Perhaps this is why, in her portrayal of Hypo
Wilson, Wilson is only able to view Miriam as a biological entity; he can never fully
understand Miriam’s motives, and sees her insomnia as not part of her maturation, but
rather an obstacle to it. Lady Ella is a “biological” character, and Hypo can only view
women “biologically.”
Francie’s insomnia in The Last September is illustrated in similarly biological
terms by the males in her life, her husband, Hugo, especially. Francie suffers from
chronic ill health, which her husband simultaneously cultivates and denies, claiming
that she is “fit for anything nowadays” (18) despite her fears to the contrary. Bowen
describes the ways in which he dictates her sleeping behaviors, telling her that she
should “lie down for a bit” because it will “freshen you up though you don’t need it”
(19). She does, in fact, desire the rest as she “was so very tired from motoring. . . .
Her thoughts ached” (18), and she acquiesces to Hugo’s ministrations. More
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significantly, Hugo dictates her physical positioning as she rests, according to his own
beliefs: “He made a valley for her head between the two pillows—he did not believe
it rested anybody to lie with their head high—and she lay down on the bed with her
head in the valley” (19). Francie understands that Hugo plays the dominant role in
their relationship, though she realizes it appears to be quite opposite to outsiders:
They might well say she had taken the brilliant young man he’d once
been and taught him to watch her, to nurse her and shake out her
dresses. And she knew she could, now, never explain to Myra what
she had failed to explain twelve years ago—when there had been so
much less to justify—how Hugo was too much for her altogether. (20)
While it might appear that Francie is using her power to require someone else to care
for her, quite the opposite is true. Hugo uses his care of Francie as a mechanism of
control, simultaneously asserting her strength, but reifying her infirmity. But the true
extent of his ability to control her behaviors, especially those related to sleep, is
apparent when others in the household act as enforcers of Hugo’s regime. For
instance, Lady Naylor says to Francie, in a manner very similar to Hugo’s, “You must
go and lie down—you’re looking as fresh as a rose but I know how Hugo insists upon
it” (82). Both Hugo and Lady Naylor send contradictory messages to Francie; she
does not appear to be tired, but needs to rest nonetheless. Towards the end of the text,
Lois comments about the sleep of a child: “Livvie kicked all night, she will be a
horrible wife” (236). Through this comment and those made regarding the control of
Francie’s sleep, Bowen illustrates the idea of feminine docility within a marriage
through the manipulation sleep behaviors. Women who sleep rigidly so as not to
disturb their husbands, like Francie, are also controlled by their husbands. Women
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who sleep fitfully, like Laura (who abandons her husband and family) or Livvie, are
much more difficult as wives and less likely to be controlled.
These three texts indicate a fascinating relationship between sleep and gender.
Throughout the texts, we see men’s attempts to control either their own sleep, as with
Scrope, or the sleep of the women around them, as is the case with Hypo Wilson or
Hugo. Consequently, the women either succumb to their control (or at least the
appearance of it), as does Francie, or resist it, like Miriam. Sleep becomes another
means of domination over the female body, but female bodies react very differently to
such domination. According to Alan Derickson, the relationship between sleep and
women had a great deal to do with their eligibility for marriage:
As early as 1906, physician Emma Walker, writing in Ladies’ Home
Journal, deployed the term “beauty sleep” in discouraging young
women from late-night activities: “As a rule, girls do not realize what
a very important element of beauty is the early bed-hour. It is not until
they begin to see the lines coming and dark circles appearing that they
wonder if late hours have anything to do with these fingermarks of
time.” Women’s magazines continued to play on fears that excessive
wakefulness would undermine good looks. (18)
Further, governmental regulations on sleep, particularly in the United States,
“targeted those whose sleeplessness posed a threat to general welfare. From that
perspective, in the earliest part of the twentieth century the most important safeguards
were extended to wage-earning women whose reproductive capabilities served
societal interests and supposedly depended on adequate rest” (Derickson 27). Bassuk
argues that:
The belief in primacy of the reproductive organs in women was used
to support the notion that a woman’s major responsibility was to
propagate the race. Because doctors assumed that each organism
possessed a finite amount of vital energy and was a closed system,
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anything that diverted women’s energy from the reproductive function
. . . must be avoided. (251)
Thus, the motivations to control female sleep represent an attempt at limiting the roles
of women to those of showpiece (good marital prospect) and mother. Sleep becomes
necessary for women for the purposes of preserving their looks and protecting their
fertility, or, in other words, ensuring that they will reproduce successfully. However,
as Miriam argues “If you define life for women, as husbands and children, it means
that you have no consciousness at all where women are concerned” (3: 222).
Prior to World War I, “idle middle-class women” were perceived as “the chief
clientele for nervous disorders” (Showalter, Female 195). Many doctors, such as
Mitchell, “believed that women were fundamentally inferior to men and that their
nervous systems were more irritable” (Bassuk 251). Thus, there appears to be more
danger associated with females with insomnia, especially those like Miriam who
choose insomniac behavior through the pursuit of interests other than marriage and
child-rearing. However, these texts indicate that this notion is overly simplistic. For
example, both Miriam and Scrope need their insomnia to reveal their sources of
underlying conflict. Miriam’s insomnia reveals her conflict with gender norms and
Scrope’s reveals his conflict with the relationship between the Church and modern
society. Insomnia offers a solution for both characters; for Miriam, it enables her to
incur on spheres beyond the domestic, and for Scrope, it forces him to confront,
rather than attempt to ignore, his conflicts in pursuit of what he sees as a more honest
spiritual path. The insomnia of both Scrope and Miriam lead to their supposed
mental breakdowns, which ultimately afford them a “rest” from their duties that they
find repugnant. Miriam, who should be “weaker,” handles her insomnia much more
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successfully than Scrope does (though, given her mother’s suicide she sometimes
doubts this ability). Where Scrope tries numerous methods, including powerful and
dangerous drugs, to rid himself of insomnia so that he can return to his initial role
within the Church and his family, Miriam cultivates her insomnia as a source of
power and independence. Even when she seeks the help of doctors like Densley, she
does so with no intention of ridding herself of insomnia, but rather of ridding herself
of the conditions she finds untenable. She never attempts to “cure” herself of it, but
rather resists cures and exposes them as attempts to corral her individuality and force
her into the role of mother and caretaker. Other female characters, including Mrs.
Richardson, Sasha Jensen, and Francie, ones who see themselves as “relative beings”
do not handle their insomnia well and see it as a form of punishment for their
inadequacy in fulfilling their wife-mother roles. They do not handle their insomnia
well because they are judging themselves against external, rather than internal
expectations, and insomnia perpetuates their sense of judgment. As Miriam explains,
“Women were there, cleverly devised by nature to ensnare man for a moment and
produce more men to bring scientific order out of primeval chaos” (2: 122).
Subjectivity
Insomnia is a necessary component of each character’s subjectivity and does a
great deal in shaping their perceptions of the world. For example, when Scrope first
begins to experience insomnia, Wells writes, “It was as if he discovered himself
flimsy and transparent in a world of minatory solidity and opacity. It was as if he
found himself made not of flesh and blood but tissue paper” (34-35). The bishop’s
insomnia parallels his growing sense of the destabilization of his place within the
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world. He can no longer see himself as fixed in the role that he has played for
decades, but begins to see this role as incredibly fragile and malleable. As his
insomnia continues, his sense of detachment from the world increases: “Again in a
slight detail he marked his strange and novel detachment from the world of his
upbringing. His hallucination of disillusionment had spread from himself and his
church and his faith to the whole animate creation” (38). Once he loses his sense of
place in his world, as the stability of his subjectivity is undermined through his
insomnia and the perceptual changes it engenders, he finds himself as “other” to the
world with which he is familiar. But because he must, at least for a while, function
within the bounds of his old world, he sees himself as a person divided: “During his
spells of insomnia he led a curiously double existence” (43). Eventually he comes to
a realization that makes him quite uncomfortable, at first, thinking that “he was the
most unreal thing in the universe. He was a base insect giving himself airs. What
advantage has a bishop over the Praying Mantis, that cricket which apes that attitude
of piety? Does he matter more—to God?” (118). In this passage, we see the bishop’s
new view of spirituality emerging, a spirituality in which customs and doctrines are
subsumed to an overall sense of unity under God. However, he is not yet comfortable
with his new stance: “He was afraid of greatness. He was afraid of the great
imperatives that would take hold of his life. He wanted to muddle on for just a little
longer. He wanted to stay just where he was, in his familiar prison-house, with the
key of escape in his hand” (119), the “key” being Dale’s hallucinogenic drug. The
bishop’s desire to “muddle on” within his “prison-house” indicates his resistance to
his re-imagined role in the world, but it is this same resistance that perpetuates his
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insomnia. In this passage, he is conflicted over the use of Dale’s drug, which would
alleviate his insomnia, but also open him to the visions that make his participation in
the Anglican Church untenable. Throughout the text, Scrope’s insomnia and
subjectivity are interrelated; because of his insomnia, his role shifts from that of
servant of his Church and King to servant of God alone. Consequently, he must also
sacrifice his role as provider for his family, another change in subjectivity altered
through his insomnia.
Much as Scrope’s insomnia shapes his perception of his relationship to the
world, Miriam’s does the same. By simple virtue of being a woman, she is ensnared
in the role of caretaker to a neighbor, the perpetually ill and dependent Miss Dear.
Because of her desire to maintain independence, she refuses to define herself in this
way and rejects this role forcefully. To Miss Dear’s finance, Mr. Taunton, she says:
You are very much mistaken in calling on me for help . . . ‘domestic
work and the care of the aged and the sick’—very convenient—all the
stuffy nerve-racking never-ending things to be dumped on women—
who are to be openly praised and secretly despised for their
unselfishness—I’ve got twice the brain-power you have. You are
something of a scholar; but there is a way in which my time is more
valuable than yours. There is a way in which it is more right for you
to be tied to this woman than for me. Your reading is a habit, like
most men’s reading, not a quest. You don’t want it disturbed. (2: 279)
In this passage, Miriam declares her own subjectivity, as a woman and intellectual,
but not as a caretaker. She allows herself to place her intellect above that of Taunton.
Much of her ability to make this assertion comes through her insomnia, as it relates to
her reading at night. That insomniac-time enables her to put her intellectual self first,
over her role as caregiver to her pupils, and enables her to view this part of her time
as equally, if not more, valuable than Taunton’s time. From Miriam’s comments, it
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seems as though he feels it is quite natural for his reading time to be undisturbed, but
for hers to be sacrificed to fulfill her more “natural” role as a woman, yet she, rather
than feeling ashamed of spending her nights awake as she first does, realizes that her
insomniac, intellectual and exploratory self is the exact self she wants to prioritize,
even at the expense of a man’s time. She refuses to subsume her own interests to that
of Taunton’s and in doing so, situates herself not as relative to him, but relative only
to herself and her own priorities.
Bowen’s text is a bit different than Pilgrimage and The Soul of a Bishop in
that the characters generally remain stable despite the instability around them. The
exception is Lois, who, in the course of the novel, falls in love with a man named
Gerald and loses him to fighting with the Irish rebels. Initially, Lois equates insomnia
with being happy, either through an apolitical society as discussed earlier or happy in
marriage: “One of the things Lois chiefly wanted to know about marriage was—how
long it took one, sleeping with the same person every night, to outlive the temptation
to talk well into the morning? There would be nothing illicit about nocturnal talking.
. . . Would conversation, in the absence of these prohibitions, cease to interest?” (10).
Insomnia, rather than being rebellious, becomes an expression of love. Yet, as the
text progresses, she comes to see sleep as the sign of happiness, as when she thinks of
Gerald: “she glimpsed a quiet beyond experience, as though for many nights he had
been sleeping beside her” (128). When Lois witnesses Hugo’s affections for Marda
(instead of his wife Francie), she is unable to sleep (168), again relating insomnia to
dissatisfaction in marriage. Later, when her relationship with Gerald becomes
unstable, this instability is expressed through insomnia. Bowen writes, “Still no
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answer, as though he were asleep. And indeed he felt, as at the approach of sleep, an
immense indifference. She, tortured by the loneliness of insomnia, had to cry out:
‘Won’t you even just try—won’t you just kiss me?’” (282). Lois, who resists, then
accepts the idea of being a wife (which is ultimately denied to her in the way she
imagines when Gerald dies), her views of insomnia change accordingly.
Emil Cioran asks of his readers:
Have you have had the brutal and amazing satisfaction of looking at
yourself in the mirror after countless sleepless nights? Have you
suffered the torment of insomnia, when you count the minutes for
nights on end, when you feel alone in this world, when your drama
seems to be the most important in history and history ceases to have
meaning, ceases to exist? When the most terrifying flames grow in
you and your existence appears unique and isolated in a world made
only for the consummation of your agony? (18)
Though masked as questions, Cioran’s interrogation draws some conclusions:
insomnia is a disorder of radical individualization, forcing the sufferer to valorize his
or her own suffering and view the self as “unique and isolated” within the world.
Further, it removes the insomniac from generalized historical significance and places
his or her own history above general history. As a form of subjectivity on its own,
insomnia has the function of removing the individual from historical subjectivity,
though not subjectivity altogether. For this reason, insomnia allows people to expose
and escape other forms of categorization, specifically those of gender. However, the
sleeping world—those not experiencing insomnia, still strive to relocate the
insomniac within history, but the insomniac’s perspective of himself or herself is
forever altered. Insomnia changes both Miriam and Scrope. Their insomnia allows
them to redefine themselves outside of the boundaries of their historical
categorizations. Bowen, however, presents insomnia in a different light. Her
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characters do not change because of insomnia, but rather as they change, so do their
views of insomnia. This difference speaks to the disparate goals of the texts. All
three texts depict individuals acclimating to a new society with various levels of
resistance or compliance. However, Miriam and Scrope (eventually) come to
welcome and require change; Bowen’s characters, on the other hand, seek stability.
Regardless of the different approaches these texts take to the relationship between
insomnia and subjectivity, they assert the importance of this relationship in shaping
and reflecting one’s ever-fluctuating identity within the world, presenting insomnia as
a form of transcendence into previously inaccessible categories of subjectivity and
escape from categories, which for many reasons, have become unsustainable for the
individual.
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CHAPTER 5

I CAN SLEEP WHEN I’M DEAD: RESTLESSNESS AND STATUS

In the essay “Sleeping and Waking,” F. Scott Fitzgerald writes, “It appears
that every man’s insomnia is as different from his neighbor’s as are their daytime
hopes and aspirations” (63). His observation not only echoes the idea of insomnia as
a highly individualized disorder, but also links insomnia to social role and what a
“man” aspires to become. Fitzgerald’s idea of “hopes and aspirations” is perhaps
related to Max Weber’s description of “labour as a calling” (121), a calling that had
spiritual, as well as practical implications, which Weber discusses in his famous work
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930). To an extent, insomnia
takes on a socio-economic component inasmuch as it is linked to a person’s daytime
drives and ability to meet vocational demands. Further linking his insomnia to
vocation through his repetition of the word “work,” Fitzgerald writes, “My own
experience with night pests was at a time of utter exhaustion—too much work
undertaken, interlocking circumstances that made the work twice as arduous”
(“Sleeping” 64). Overwork, which I have discussed in previous chapters as a cause of
insomnia, especially when that work is mental, clearly plays a role in Fitzgerald’s
insomnia. More importantly, his drive towards overwork, and its resultant
restlessness, does too. This drive, the sense that one should keep busy and undertake
“too much work,” has deep roots in capitalist mentality.
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Fitzgerald’s linkage among the drive towards self-improvement, the role of
work in reaching aspirations, and the association of work with restlessness and
insomnia reflects a Western capitalist mentality with Protestant origins. The drive to
produce and the restlessness associated with this drive are explained by Weber:
The religious valuation of restless, continuous systematic work in a
worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same
time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith,
must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion
and attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of
capitalism. (116)
In addition to illustrating a relationship between restlessness and faith, Weber’s
argument extends to the idea that to not be working is sinful, immoral behavior,
further explaining this compulsion towards work Fitzgerald displays. According to
Weber, “Waste of time is thus the first and in principle deadliest of sins. . . . Loss of
time through sociability, idle, talk, luxury, even more sleep than necessary for health,
six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation” (104). Waste,
the worst form of sin as Weber asserts, can take the form of too much sleep, but
insomnia itself, if not spent productively, can also be construed, according to the
dictum above, as waste because it is not time in labor or recuperating from labor, but
rather “idle” time. Fitzgerald’s association between aspiration and restlessness may
not necessarily be religious, but is certainly ethical. For Fitzgerald, this “restlessness”
manifests as insomnia, which is the time of confrontation between what a “man” is
and what he hopes to be. He struggles with this insomnia because it is time that he is
not tackling the overwhelming amounts of work he has taken on; similarly, as we can
see with Fitzgerald’s numerous depictions of the dissolute and immoral lives of the
idle wealthy, wasting time when one could or should be working creates a sense of
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restlessness and dissatisfaction. For Weber, restlessness takes on a dual meaning, in
part as a bridge or path to fulfilling both economic and spiritual goals, but if not spent
productively as with insomnia, as a form of sinful indulgence.
Paul Lafargue, a Marxist social critic, presents an altogether different view of
the function of rest and restlessness in reaching one’s potential, and he views work
(or lack of rest) as “the cause of all intellectual degeneracy, of all organic deformity”
(23). Where Weber sees degeneracy (at least from an analytical, if not personal,
perspective) in laziness, Lafargue points to an “intellectual,” rather than moral
degeneracy that comes when one cannot be idle at all. His main purpose in his essay
“The Right to Be Lazy” is to attack the ideology later explored by Weber, which
exalts what Lafargue refers to as “the religion of work” (28). Lafargue, contrary to
Weber, argues that persistent restlessness and need for work are ultimately destructive
to one’s aspirations and self-fulfillment. The hope of finding meaning through labor
alone is impossible:
This delusion is the love of work, the furious passion for work, pushed
even to the exhaustion of the vital force of the individual and his
progeny. I, who do not profess to be a Christian, an economist or a
moralist, I appeal from their judgment to that of their God; from the
preachings of their religious, economics, or free thought of ethics, to
the frightful consequences of work in a capitalist society. (23)
He disavows religion referring to “their God”, but not his own, and part of his
problem with religion is its correlation between work and holiness or purported
goodness. The consistent drive to work, Lafargue argues, ruins the laborer, as well as
his family (28), so certainly has moral consequences, if not spiritual ones. Rather
than allowing the laborer to reach moral or economic aspirations, work increases
“individual poverty” and assures “that becoming poorer, you may have more reason
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to work and become miserable” (32). Similarly, Fitzgerald argues that his overwork
and subsequent insomnia led him to “hating the day because it went towards night”
(“Crack-Up” 72), thus fostering misery. Fitzgerald continues, noting the destructive
character of his insomnia with relation to his work ethic:
In this silence there was a vast irresponsibility toward every
obligation, a deflation of all my values. A passionate belief in order, a
disregard of motives or consequences in favor of guess work and
prophecy, a feeling that craft and industry would have a place in any
world—one by one, these and other convictions were swept away”
(“Crack-Up” 78).
Fitzgerald, of course, is not a laborer of the type Lafargue addresses; however,
Fitzgerald’s exhaustion, a product of his own form of labor, does evoke the
consequences of which Lafargue warns. Fitzgerald simultaneously points to the need
for restlessness in exposing aspirations, but the danger of restlessness in becoming an
obstacle to those same aspirations.
Despite their opposing views on the value of work for self or spiritual
fulfillment, Weber and Lafargue do agree on the danger of doing no work at all.
Weber, for instance, states, “Sloth and idleness are such deadly sins because they
have a cumulative character. . . . They are the antithesis of a methodical life” (236).
Larfargue, who encourages some laziness, which he refers to as the “mother of arts
and noble virtues” (51) seeks a balance between complete sloth and overwork,
suggesting that all work equally, for three hours a day (34). In agreement with
Weber, Lafargue argues that the overwork of the laboring class and subsequent sloth
of the rich harms not only the laborers, but also the upper classes. Men who live off
of the work of others are “condemned to laziness and forced enjoyment, to
unproductiveness and over consumption. But if the over-work of the laborer bruises
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his folk and tortures his nerves, it is also fertile in griefs for the capitalist” (38).
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Lafargue’s opinion, no good comes from perpetual restlessness in either the drive to
work or to stand idle and bored while others work. The work of many creates
indolence in a few, and neither condition is ideal. For Weber, good can certainly
come from the drive to work hard, but sloth breeds hedonism and immorality.
Fitzgerald’s novel The Beautiful and Damned clearly indicates his agreement with
this point made by both Weber and Lafargue, by illustrating the disastrous
consequences of indolence, dissolution, and hedonism due to the failure of the
individual to engage in productive work. Fitzgerald’s own comments point to the
need for balance as well, asserting the harm in too much work, but acknowledging the
compulsion to do so and its resultant sense of restlessness.
Fitzgerald is not alone in his depiction of unfulfilled social or economic
aspirations as productive of individual strife. Much of what Fitzgerald describes in
The Beautiful and Damned as a conflict between desire and capability corresponds
with what sociologist Émile Durkheim refers to as anomie. According to Durkheim:
No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are
sufficiently portioned to his means. In other words, if his needs
require more than can be granted, or even merely something of a
different sort, they will be under continual friction and can only
function painfully. Movements incapable of production without pain
tend not to be reproduced. Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and as the
impulse to live is merely the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken
as the others relax. (82)
For Durkheim, no one can be content if they want more than they can reasonably
afford or attain. Fitzgerald’s protagonist, Anthony Patch, raised in wealth, but
lacking his own means of subsistence supports Durkheim’s claim, as we watch him
struggle to maintain a lavish lifestyle despite his inability to do so. Similarly, as he
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becomes enslaved by his own indulgences in alcohol, women, and parties, his
intellectual pursuits, for example, his desire to write (in a year abroad after college he
writes “some ghastly Italian sonnets” (8), for example), do, indeed, atrophy, as does
his desire even to remain alive. As he exclaims to his future wife, Gloria, “I do
nothing, for there’s nothing I can do that’s worth doing” (65). He continues in an
attempt to rationalize his sloth, “But I want to know just why it’s impossible for an
American to be gracefully idle. . . . I don’t understand why people think that every
young man ought to go down-town and work ten hours a day for the best twenty years
of his life at dull, unimaginative work” (65). Even so, without work, he does not find
himself any happier than he would have been at a job. His laziness leads to self
indulgence, leading to more laziness, and so forth. To a great extent, Fitzgerald
expresses Anthony’s struggle with his chosen idleness and its consequences through
his insomnia, as this chapter will argue.
Likewise, other modernist authors, such as Waldo David Frank, in the novel
Holiday and E. M. Forster, in A Passage to India make a similar connection between
anomie and insomnia. For both Frank and Forster, anomic conditions are created not
as much by class distinctions as they are racial and colonial interactions and
hegemonies. Anomie occurs when characters are exposed to a mode of living,
whether economic or based in freedoms of behavior and access, that they, themselves,
are unable to attain. Victoria Hade, for instance, sees a mode of living in the black
laborer John Cloud that she will never, as a white woman, be able to achieve. And, in
Forster’s novel, Dr. Aziz’s freedoms are limited because he is colonial subject, yet
one who constantly interacts with the British rulers who have a greater freedom of
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movement and behavior. These texts all contain characters whose insomnia reflects a
conflict among their social aspirations, the work that they do or do not do, and their
class status (as reflected by wealth, ethnicity, and status within a colonial society).
Further, these texts indicate a discrepancy between the pure drive to work and the
ability to attain privileged status through work alone. In all three texts, insomnia
becomes a device through which the characters’ anomie is realized and explored.
Insomnia and History
Because I am looking at insomnia as it is related to economic and social
status, some background information on the relationship among sleep, class, and the
necessity of work is useful. One major distinction between pre-modern times and
modern times in Western society comes with this relationship. The way in which this
relationship has changed is especially informative when relating insomnia to capitalist
systems of production. While many academics argue that insomnia is a condition of
modern life, A. Roger Ekirch suggests that modern academics falsely idealize the
sleep of pre-industrial peoples: “Implicit in modern conceptions of sleep before the
Industrial Revolution remains the wistful belief that our forebears enjoyed tranquil
slumber, if often little else, in their meager lives” (285). On the contrary, “early
modern slumber was highly vulnerable to intermitted disruption, much more so, in all
likelihood, than is sleep today” (Ekirch 288). Ekirch notes that a seventeenth century
healer reported that over twenty percent of his two thousand patients complained of
insomnia (290). Granted, this evidence is not a “scientific” study of insomnia, rather
it is anecdotal, but still indicates that a significant portion of the population,
particularly the under-classes, had trouble sleeping.
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The primary difference between insomnia in pre-modern eras and insomnia of
the Modernist period is the direct correlation in pre-modern times between the
likelihood of insomnia and being of the lower social classes specifically because of
lower class living environments. As Ekirch argues, while the wealthy undoubtedly
suffered insomnia at times due to stress, “those with the fewest resources to cope with
life’s problems remained the most ‘wakensome,’ or vulnerable to insomnia” (290).
This correlation existed primarily because the lower classes had less access to
comfortable sleep for a number of reasons. One major reason the lower classes often
had trouble sleeping was fear; “Of all mortal emotions, fear most often broke sleep,”
claims Ekirch (290). Fears could be related to subsistence, but also to physical
danger such as that presented by robbers and other criminals (291). In addition,
where the rich could afford comfortable beds, the poor were often more likely to
endure sleep spaces that “were ill suited to peaceful repose” for reasons including
noise either from urban traffic in the city or animals in the country (292), as well as
poorly insulated and poorly ventilated homes that made sleep uncomfortable (293).
Other interferences with the sleep of the lower classes included the necessity of nightwork (in addition to, rather than as a replacement for daytime labor) (Ekirch 161). I
find this information about insomnia in pre-modern societies informative because it
throws into such sharp contrast the insomnia of modern times. Insomnia in premodern times was often what I will refer to as “environmental” insomnia—it has a
direct correlation with environmental circumstances: lack of comfort, safety, food or
time to sleep. This type of insomnia had not been eradicated by the Modernist period
or even today, and it remains an issue of the under-classes.
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In modern times, we see an increased level of the visibility of insomnia. As
Ekirch argues, one of the consequences of industrialization was a “pushing back of
the darkness” (333) inherent in more abundant nighttime lighting, as well as more
regulated (rather than idiosyncratic and personalized) night work. With this reduction
of darkness came surveillance: “Critics complained that the light was too harsh. If
night became more accessible, it also became less private, on the job and off. Not
only could the human eye now see a farther distance, but there were infinitely more
eyes in public by which to be observed. . . . All persons faced greater scrutiny at
night” (Ekirch 333). With greater visibility comes a great awareness of individual
habits, exposing individuals whose habits do not conform to an increased likelihood
of intervention. Thus, the nighttime habits of people became a matter of public
concern and scrutiny rather than a private behavior unobserved by outsiders. As late
nineteenth and early twentieth century studies into fatigue attest, poor sleep habits
among the poor were a matter of concern only inasmuch as poor sleep affected
productivity, even if concern over the poor sleep of the poor in and of itself was not
generally an issue when it did not affect outsiders. In pre-industrial times, the poor
man or woman’s lack of productivity due to exhaustion was mostly his or her own
problem. However, in industrial times, insomnia had greater social implications
beyond the individual’s experience, as it may harm a wider group of people beyond
the individual worker and his or her family. For example, if a farm laborer gets into
an accident on his farm because of exhaustion, he and his family may suffer. But, if a
factory worker causes an industrial accident because of that same exhaustion, the
stakes are much greater, for the other employees who may be injured, but more so for
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the employer who loses labor time, laborers, and has to pay the cost of repairs.
Insomnia is more of an issue because not only is it more visible, it creates a broader
range of complications for a larger group of people.
The Modernist period, for reasons I have discussed in previous chapters, also
gave rise to a whole new type of insomnia, unrelated to manual labor or
environmental circumstance. Insomnia, as that suffered by characters like
Fitzgerald’s Anthony and Frank’s Virginia, is not due to lack of comfortable sleeping
spaces, fear of intruders, or outside disturbances, but is instead based in social
anxiety. Because this new form of insomnia exists due to internal, rather than
external circumstance, the insomnia of modern times takes on another discursive
angle in terms of its perception as a disorder of the individual rather than the
environment. As I discussed in the second chapter, fatigue was of great social
concern during the Industrial era. However, the focus of the medical discipline was
not generally on conditions of poverty creating disrupted sleep (though such
conditions certainly existed), but rather aimed towards the middle and upper classes
who could exert greater control over their sleeping environment and health-related
routines such as proper diet and recreational exercise (which requires free time and
energy). A wealthier person might seek treatment for sleeplessness, but a laborer’s
sleeplessness would not be noticed until it became a problem for his or her bosses.
Thus, to be diagnosed or treated for insomnia generally required access to doctors and
psychologists, but also relied upon the assumption that one could control one’s
sleeping environment. As such, during the modern age, insomnia is discursively
understood as less connected to external environment and more to internal
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environment, including one’s own mind and bodily conditions. In fact, physical
labor, with its exhausting capabilities, was largely thought to prevent insomnia, and
the less educated and prestigious were thought to be less prone to suffering from it
because of the relative (alleged) inactivity of their minds; perpetual physical
discomfort is no longer discursively significant to insomnia as a condition. Insomnia
is no longer a condition of circumstance, but more so a condition of individuality, and
also, more clandestinely, status. Though anyone may suffer from insomnia,
treatments are aimed towards those who have the time for sleep and resources to
cultivate a “proper” sleeping environment. Insomnia itself becomes anomic in the
sense that a tension exists between having hopes of sound sleep and having the ability
to sleep soundly. The poor, whose disruptive environments often precluded their
hopes of sound sleep, did not assume sound sleep was even possible—exhaustion was
an inevitable given. Yet, the wealthier, who could afford at least the environmental
conditions allowing for good sleep, but could not attain it, experienced a tension
between aspiration and attainability because of insomnia, making it, in this sense, a
disorder of privilege.
Insomnia of the Superfluous Man
Fitzgerald’s character Anthony, in The Beautiful and Damned, is an excellent
example of a character who suffers from insomnia related to social status and
position. Anthony is in a unique position of social privilege within this text, as he is
raised with all the trappings of luxury, has become used to those trappings, yet loses
his financial support halfway through the text. Initially, Anthony’s insomnia is based
in his anxieties caused by his privileged position and the pressures it entails, and later,
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it is based in his anxieties about maintaining his position. He cannot use his privilege
to eliminate his insomnia; in fact, his privilege (and attempts at maintaining it)
exacerbates his condition. He “fits in” excellently with upper class society, but
cannot adjust his lifestyle when his economic circumstances change fostering his
sense of anomie, nor can he uses his class status to protect himself against
unhappiness and anxiety. Fitzgerald replicates Anthony’s tenuous and anomic social
position (trapped between desire for the luxury to which he has grown accustomed
and his inability to sustain it) through his liminal depiction of Anthony’s character.
From the beginning of the text, Anthony is characterized liminally and
nocturnally. As the story opens, we learn that Anthony “has as yet gone no further
than the conscious stage” and he wonders if he is “a shameful and obscene thinness
glistening on the surface of the world like oil on a clean pond” (3). These opening
sentences suggest Anthony’s inability to access his own depths, with both the
metaphor of remaining always in the “conscious stage” thus not reaching
unconsciousness, and the image of his existence only on the surface of a (much
deeper) pond. Anthony views himself in a dual light. In part, he believes that he is
“exceptional,” “thoroughly sophisticated,” and “well adjusted to his environment,”
but there is a conflict between his positive, socialized view of himself as a member of
the elite and his awareness of his own superficiality since he has lived his life to this
point with no real sense of earning his status or motivation to become self-reliant.
Being born into wealth leaves Anthony trapped in a state of developmental delay, as
he is given the resources and education with which to make his own way in the world,
yet lacks the motivation to do so; he is liminally trapped between external wealth and
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internal impoverishment. Fitzgerald characterizes him as “a man who was aware that
there could be no honor and yet had honor, who knew the sophistry of courage and
yet was brave” (3), indicating his fundamental internal contradiction, bordering on
hypocrisy. Anthony’s ultimate, unattainable hope is to “accomplish some quiet
subtle thing that the elect would deem worthy” so as to “join the dimmer stars in a
nebulous, indeterminate heaven half-way between death and immortality” (3). Of
course, what this “thing” may be, Anthony has yet to figure out, and he puts much
more effort into avoiding this revelation than fostering it. All he is sure of is his
desire for approval from “the elect” and nothing more. The language Fitzgerald uses
in his initial descriptions of Anthony is the language of liminality, as he describes a
character who both loathes and vaunts his superficiality, values appearance but is
aware of its shallowness, and takes pride and comfort in, but also has contempt for,
his upper class status because, through privileging him, it has ruined him as well.
More significantly, however, Fitzgerald uses images of consciousness to illustrate
Patch’s character. He is trapped in the “conscious stage,” so, despite hints at a deeper
level of self-awareness of his unconscious self, he has yet to truly access this part of
his being. His ultimate hope is essentially to attain a state of perpetual insomnia,
neither fully present nor fully eradicated by death because he can enact no other
alternatives, or at least thinks he cannot.
Anthony’s initial characterization as an ontological insomniac, trapped
between the conscious world of artifice and appearance and the unconscious world in
which he could possibly some day access his inner self and the way in which he truly
hopes to give his life meaning, persists throughout the opening pages of the text. As
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we learn, Anthony’s given name is Anthony Comstock Patch; however, “the
Comstock dropped out of his name to a nether hell of oblivion” (5). Again, we get
the sense of his complete identity lying below an inaccessible surface, with hints of
its presence but access withheld. Not surprisingly, in addition to his insomniac soul,
Anthony has also suffered from chronic insomnia, related to a fear of illness, since
adolescence: “It was as a concession to his hypochondriacal imagination that he
formed the habit of reading in bed—it soothed him. He read until he was tired and
often fell asleep with the lights on” (7). While early in his life, his reading essentially
allows him to indulge his fear of the dark (and death through assuaging his
hypochondria), later in life, his “reading,” or, more accurately, book-purchasing,
takes on a materialistic component: “He laid the foundations for a library by
purchasing from a wandering bibliophile first editions of Swinburne, Meredith, and
Hardy, and a yellowed illegible autograph letter of Keats’s, finding later that he had
been amazingly overcharged” (8). Notably, Fitzgerald never references Anthony
actually reading these texts, especially not the “illegible” letter of Keats, thus
indicating that his love of books serves a purpose other than intellectual interest or
pursuit. Initially, his reading is a distraction, preventing him from having to
acknowledge his own thoughts and fears. Later, books become showpieces for his
library, symbols of economic status, rather than subjects of intellectual interest. He
buys books not to read them, but to own them.
Further relating insomnia to materialism, or, more specifically, the
obfuscation of the internal through a focus on the external, Fitzgerald writes that as a
child, “His stamps were his greatest happiness . . . he lay awake at night musing
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untiringly on their variety and many-colored splendor” (7). Again, we see Anthony’s
obsession with appearance, as he focuses on their colors and the breadth of his
collection (as opposed to their individual artistry or the emotional or creative
significance of the places they represent). He seems to always be fighting his
insomnia, both as a boy and later in life with alcohol and women rather than objects.
His insomnia comes to represent his awareness of the “vague melancholy that was to
stay beside him through the rest of his life” (6), but also representative of his attempts
to escape that melancholy through the accretion of material goods. For example,
rather than muse on his unhappiness and fear at night to get to its source, the
childhood version of Anthony occupies his mind with either reading or pondering his
stamp collection—both distractions from thoughts about himself. As an adult, he has
a similar experience of insomnia after a successful date with Gloria: “In bed that
night with the lights out and the cool room swimming with moonlight, Anthony lay
awake and played with every minute of the day like a child playing in turn with each
one of a pile of long-wanted Christmas toys” (127). Again, his insomniac thoughts
are described in material terms. Rather than stamps, in this case, he is treating the
moments of his prior happy day, specifically the distraction from melancholy that
Gloria initially provides, as material objects, to be “played with” for his amusement
and distraction. His moments are things to him. But, of course, the excitement a
child has over toys on Christmas is short-lived and somewhat superficial; the joy is
only temporary and cannot be sustained over the course of a lifetime, only
remembered. Anthony’s insomnia in these scenes is an insomnia of avoidance, rather
than confrontation as it is with many other characters, but it is also an insomnia that
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hints at a not readily (or willingly) accessible part of Anthony’s nature that loathes
what he is and dreads what he is already becoming.
Another means Fitzgerald uses to characterize Anthony as an insomniac
through allusions to spiritual ills is the repetitive symbolism of vampirism used to
describe the various women with whom Anthony associates. He was born to an
“anaemic lady” (5) immediately relating his character to blood disorder. In addition,
his friend Muriel Kane had been “told constantly that she was a ‘vampire,’” (83).
This association connects Anthony to a woman who subsists through draining the life
of others. Most telling, however, is the “vampirism” of his wife, Gloria. Gloria, in
recounting a friend’s description of herself claims, “[Mrs. Granby] thinks I may be a
vampire” (186). She is indeed a vampire, in the economic sense that she survives
through her dependence on others, but also because of her desire to make her life
nocturnal. Gloria’s true goal in life is to rest. When Anthony asks her what she
hopes for in life, she replies, “I want to sleep. . . . I want to just be lazy and I want
some of the people around me to be doing things, because that makes me comfortable
and safe” (66). She lives for the night, essentially, but more so the night in which she
is completely vulnerable to and dependent upon the attentions and care of others.
She never wants to act or work for herself, relishing her own languor. She does not
want to be herself in mind, but only in body, an object cared for by those around her.
Anthony continually finds himself surrounded by vampiric women, creating a further
connection between himself as a central point amongst these women, and heavily
associated with their nocturnality, dependence, and spiritual and physical anaemia.
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The vampire not only has literary significance as a perpetual insomniac and
liminally trapped soul, but medical and moral significance as a figure of extreme
depletion for those around him or her. Silas Weir Mitchell, in Fat and Blood, refers
to “an hysterical girl” as “a vampire who sucks the blood of the healthy people about
her” (49). For Mitchell, healthy blood means a healthy life, and thus, the female
“vampire” is literally draining the life and energy of those around her. While Gloria
is not medically diagnosed as “hysterical,” her desire to live in complete dependence
upon those around her in order for her to sleep comfortably reflects Mitchell’s
position on the vampiric girl as a drain on her family. If sleep is a state of
vulnerability and surrender of the self, then Gloria’s desire to “sleep” reflects this
drive to subsist on the energies of those around her, which, as both Lafargue and
Weber assert, leads to moral atrophy.
Not only does Anthony surround himself with vampiric women, his own
lifestyle comes to mimic that of the vampire, living only by what he can take from
others, and spending his days in bed while his evenings are active. He is a Draculalike figure to those around him, both controlling and perpetuating their insomnia and
soullessness through his own. Throughout the texts are allusions to Anthony’s
dependence on his grandfather for subsistence, as well as his non-standard sleep
habits. For example, he wanders New York at two in the morning (117), stays awake
all night picturing his “ideal” future with Gloria after their misguided purchase of a
house that they could not afford (178), stays awake brooding over the unhappiness of
his marriage shortly thereafter (210), and lays in bed all day after abruptly quitting a
much needed job he only held briefly (231). His life is full of nighttime activities,
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most of which include drunken parties and all of which are drains on his finances.
One of these nighttime parties culminates in a crisis, as his mortified grandfather
disinherits Anthony after unexpectedly arriving at a drunken shindig (293). His
grandfather’s arrival signifies the end of his practical ability to live vampirically, but
like the vampire, he cannot be changed without ceasing to exist, and he refuses to
change his lifestyle and habits accordingly.
Given its associations with vampirism and the liminal, “nebulous” state of
Anthony’s soul, his insomnia is frequently tied in with his morality. Fitzgerald uses
Anthony’s insomniac state as a heterotopic place from which Anthony can possibly
redeem himself from his frivolous and empty life (yet fails to do so); thus Anthony’s
morality and class status are inextricably linked. It is during certain periods of
insomnia through which we see Anthony getting glimpses of the origins of his
perpetual melancholy. For example, Fitzgerald describes Anthony sitting sleepless in
his apartment after a night of drinking:
Back in his apartment, the grayness returned. His cocktails had died,
making him sleepy, somewhat befogged and inclined to be surly. . . .
Oh, he was a pretentious fool, making careers out of cocktails and
meanwhile regretting, weakly and secretly, the collapse of an
insufficient and wretched idealism. He had garnished in his soul the
subtlest taste and now he longed for old rubbish. He was empty, it
seemed, empty as an old bottle— (56)
In this liminal state between consciousness and unconsciousness Anthony briefly sees
the “grayness” of his life; gray is a liminal color, neither black nor white. But, he also
notes that even his regret is not strong enough to make him change, and he has lost
any idealism, however “wretched” and “insignificant” it once was, and tied, through
the image of the empty bottle to his vice. Further, he acknowledges his own
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soullessness, in the sense that he has focused the energies of his soul on pursuit of his
external display of “taste” rather than anything of internal value. This passage does
not end with a full stop, but rather a dash, indicating that Anthony’s thoughts are not
completed, but instead interrupted. Importantly, they are not interrupted by
unconsciousness, which would allow him a release from his semi-conscious hell, but
rather a reawakening, courtesy of Gloria at the door to his apartment. He remains, as
Fitzgerald states earlier in the novel, as “going no further than the conscious stage”
(3) in his thoughts. Gloria’s disruption of his thoughts returns him to the “dazzling”
(57), yet distracting quality of his daily life. The insomnia that could have led
Anthony to unconsciousness, but more importantly an awareness of his unconscious
self, motivations, and the true nature of the problems that have been eating away at
him, culminates in a return to the “dazzling” façade of his everyday being.
Anthony has a similar semi-revelatory moment just before the beginning of
his doomed marriage to Gloria. On the eve of his wedding, he goes to bed excited for
the “union of his soul with Gloria’s, whose radiant fire and freshness was the living
material of which the dead beauty of books was made” (148). Again, he associates
Gloria with living death, but in a way that Anthony thinks to be flattering at the time.
He compares her to “the dead beauty of books” indicating that the purpose of a book,
for him, is in its external beauty, rather than its ability to bring something alive within
his mind or soul, as it, itself, is dead. And beauty, effeminized here, is also equated
with both death and femininity. His attempt at sleep is disrupted by a screaming
sound from outside, and again, his insomnia reveals the emptiness of his life:
Anthony stood by the window a moment longer before he returned to
bed. He found himself upset and shaken. Try as he might to strangle
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his reaction, some animal quality in that unrestrained laughter had
grasped at his imagination, and for the first time in four months
aroused his old aversion and horror toward all the business of life. The
room had grown smothery. He wanted to be out in some cool and
bitter breeze, back in the corners of his mind. Life was that sound out
there, that ghastly reiterated female sound. . . . Burying his face in the
pillows he tried in vain to concentrate upon the details of the next day.
(150)
In this passage, as in the aforementioned one, there is the association of the feminine
and death (the “ghastly” laughter), but also with femininity and animality. The
woman he hears is somehow less than human simply because of her spontaneous
moment of happiness (and even femininity itself). Perhaps because of this “animal”
quality in her laugher, her display of her enjoyment of life, he equates this sound with
life as much as death, but life itself for him is a sort of death. The idea of death in life
is associated with the feminine here, which is especially telling as he is about to unite
his life with Gloria’s. Again, Anthony resists any true revelation this episode might
bring. Notably, Fitzgerald writes that Anthony wants especially to reach “the corners
of his mind,” but ultimately resists this impulse and attempts a return to the
superficial, specifically the details of his wedding the next day. As in the passage
before, we see Anthony vacillating, at the point of insomnia, between a revelation of
and resistance to his spiritual emptiness, as well as the living death he foresees as
marriage to Gloria, and a desire to push this revelation back into the unexplored
corners of his (un)conscious mind. Though in this passage, Anthony does indeed fall
asleep, the sleep is incomplete, as when he awakes “it [is] only five o’clock,” which
upsets him because “he would appear fagged at the wedding” (150). His return to
consciousness, after unfulfilling and incomplete unconsciousness, is greeted at once
by a return to material and appearance-related concerns.
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Anthony’s most insightful points of self-reflection come at a time when he is
falling asleep, yet is neither fully asleep nor fully awake. Peter Schwenger refers to
this time as “a zero degree of existence,” which, for him is “an existence preceding
either the world’s categories or those that one determines for oneself in order to
determine a self. Such categories, general or particular, fall away with the onset of
sleep” (48). Schwenger’s analysis of the moment just prior to the onset of sleep helps
to explain Anthony’s experience in the two situations I have just described. In these
moments, he sees himself apart from the socialized role he fills, without the
distractions of his life. He comes face to face with his most basic self and is horrified
by the emptiness and grayness of that self and his choices, likening his existence to an
empty bottle. Simon Wortham argues that the onset of sleep eliminates the
distinction between the self and others (141). Perhaps, for this reason, during these
periods of near-sleep, Anthony loses his ability to take comfort in his elevated social
position. When he is awake, he can fall back on socially determined roles (though
these roles become increasingly destabilized within the text) and use his social
position to distract from who he thinks he might be or might want to become. But,
with the onset of sleep, he is reduced to his most essential self, without the ability to
compare himself to others, and does not like what he sees that self to be.
Thus far, I have explored Anthony’s insomnia on two levels. In one sense, the
insomnia functions phenomenologically as a point of possible, yet refused, revelation
for him. It allows him a brief glimpse into the parts of his consciousness that he has
heretofore been denied access, posing the possibility of redemption, yet denying this
redemption through an unwillingness or inability to press further. His experience of
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insomnia is described as a struggle between revelation and denial, each time resisting
revelation through a focus on the material. His constant return to a consideration of
the tangible in his life points to his desire to mute considerations of the intangible
elements of his existence that cannot be measured in economic terms. When he has
insomnia, he stifles his thoughts that come bubbling towards the surface of his
consciousness through a return to the trappings of his social status, whether it is an
attractive woman, a stamp collection, or the plans for his wedding day. In another
sense, the insomnia functions symbolically as a representation of Anthony’s liminal
existence, as a man who has higher philosophical and spiritual aspirations, but neither
the desire nor drive to define or attain them. He has the intelligence to recognize the
futility of his life, but does not use this intelligence to alter its course. He is also a
liminal figure in the sense of his ability to depend on others. Through much of his
life, he has never had to work to earn a living, and was always cared for by his
grandfather, so is fully dependent on that grandfather for his subsistence. Yet, the
sort of stable dependence that would allow restful, comfortable sleep (the kind Gloria
wants) eludes him, and his relationship with his grandfather remains tenuous. As
secure as his life has always been, his future is equally insecure.
Women as Remedy
He hopes that Gloria will allow him to sleep, and uses her to allay his
insomnia, just as he will use Dot, a woman with whom he has an affair, later in the
text. When he first meets Gloria, she is described as “the end of all restlessness, all
malcontent” (107). Shortly after the purchase of their country home, she “had lulled
Anthony’s mind to sleep” (191). So, her influence at times seems promising, as
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though she will give him the peace he desires; he wants to slip into the routine of
married life with Gloria, so he no longer has to make difficult decisions or force
himself to change with hopes that being a husband is enough for him. However,
despite Anthony’s perceptions of Gloria as a soporific agent, the text indicates that
she will ultimately do more to disrupt his sleep than enable it. For example, when he
is nodding off while contemplating the emptiness of life, it is Gloria’s visit that
awakens him (55). When he thinks of her dating other men, he cannot sleep (123).
When he goes on a date with her, he is unable to sleep the whole night afterwards
(127). When he is about to marry her, he cannot sleep on the eve of his wedding
(129). After they purchase their new home, they stay awake all night with
excitement (178). And, after she and Anthony fight, he “stayed awake to brood upon
the day, vaguely angry with her, vaguely dissatisfied” (210). Gloria contributes more
to Anthony’s insomnia than helps it. She is not the solution he needs to allow him the
rest he desires.
Seemingly, Anthony’s insomnia is an ontological condition, bound up with his
anomic conflicts of identity. But it is important that these issues of identity remain
consistently tied to his social class and the position of members of his class in
American society at the time period before and after World War I that the text covers.
His wealth at a young age affords him the privileges of time and study to gain insight
into life, yet, at the same time, prevents him from leading what he knows would be a
more meaningful life. Both the ontological and phenomenological aspects of
Anthony’s characterization as an insomniac are intrinsically connected to his social
class, and this connection via insomnia contributes greatly to the social critique
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Fitzgerald includes in this text. According to Craig Monk, though Fitzgerald
minimized the novel’s political intent, “his fiction seems, at some level at least,
concerned with problems related to the political developments of the post-war era in
the United States” (69). Monk describes the political statement of this text as
connected to “the disillusioning realization that there are limits to human
accomplishment” which “was the lesson learned by all liberals as the lasting realities
of the post-war period became manifest” (70). Once liberals lost political power after
World War I with the election of Republican candidate Warren Harding in 1920, their
dreams of exerting powerful influence over the shaping of post-war Europe were
thwarted by a movement to international isolationism (Monk 61). Just as Anthony
understands the power and influence he might have in his life, he realizes the futility
of those same hopes, understanding that they will never be realized, similar to the
failure of liberals to exert influence over world affairs and really make a mark in
Europe. His insomnia, symbolic of this struggle, also becomes symbolic of the
anomic tensions of his generation, which struggled between the desire to shape world
affairs and the inability to do so in a meaningful way.
Monk argues that “the war is the root of social disillusionment in the novel”
(66). World War I provided “the restless generation” a distraction from the leisurely
monotony of their lives, but once hopes of attaining influence and purpose from war
participation were dashed, the war only became a source of destruction of hopes and
dreams (66). Anthony has his own dreams related to the war; he enlists, hoping to
fight, but more importantly, hoping to be killed: “It was all very purposeless and sad
when Anthony told Gloria one night that he wanted, above all things, to be killed”
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(308). But even the idea of dying for his country (or himself) is futile. Through the
war, he seeks both the unconsciousness and honor he desires, and again, Fitzgerald
uses Anthony’s sleep to reflect upon the position in which Anthony places himself.
In military camp, prior to being sent away to fight, Anthony can finally sleep with at
least some hope of giving his life purpose and value. Fitzgerald writes, “For the first
time in his life he could throw himself down on his cot between dinner and afternoon
drill-call, and seeming to sink with each moment deeper into a bottomless bed, drop
off immediately to sleep, while the noise and laughter around him faded to a pleasant
drone of a drowsy summer sound” (318). His ability to finally participate fully in
something, with a clear goal in mind, allows him to rest at last.
But even this rest is short lived for Anthony, and he again becomes restless.
He begins an affair with a woman named Dorothy Raycroft, or more commonly, Dot,
which “was an inevitable result of his increasing carelessness about himself” (324).
Again, he realizes the futility of his involvement in the war effort and resumes his
previous attitude of indolence and immorality, trying to assuage his restlessness
through physical fulfillment. The affair with Dot is a result of his moral exhaustion
and he unites with her for the same flawed reasons he marries Gloria: “The girl [Dot]
promised rest; the hours in her company each evening alleviated the morbid and
inevitably futile poundings of his imagination” (325). The initial sense of purpose
joining the army allowed Anthony eventually culminated in his awareness of the
futility of his actions. The futility of Anthony’s participation in the war perhaps
reflects Fitzgerald’s sentiments on the false hope for influence the war fostered in
America and the futility of those hopes. Once Anthony realizes that he remains
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ultimately purposeless, he again becomes restless and seeks repose in the material,
trying to stifle the “poundings of his imagination” that tell him he is again acting in a
misguided manner. Dot becomes a new version of his stamp collection or his
physical experience of his first moments with Gloria; she is a way to distract his mind
so he can rest while conscious, but still does not provide him with the
unconsciousness he so desires. Of course, the affair with Dot does not serve its
purpose and renders Anthony only the most temporary comfort and happiness.
Consequently, Dot plays a significant role in the perpetuation of Anthony’s
liminal state at the end of the novel. Thinking he has severed ties with her when
planning his return from the war and the resumption of his marriage with Gloria, he is
dismayed that Dot returns to him and threatens suicide. After speaking with her on
the phone, Anthony “found himself walking slowly away, repeating over and over
that it was futile to worry. He had best go back to his tent and sleep. He needed
sleep. God! Would he ever sleep again? His mind was in a vast clamor and
confusion” (347). The woman he hoped would help him rest, like all of his other
feeble, lazy, and misguided attempts at happiness, perpetuates his insomnia. But,
again, we see Fitzgerald employing the language of futility and sleep as an escape
from worry, which Anthony needs, but cannot have.
Insomnia as Ontological State
Dot does not kill herself, but continues to inflict pain on Anthony even after
his return from the army. His final fall, ironically coinciding with success in his
lawsuit against his grandfather’s estate and the acquisition of the financial security he
has always supposedly desired, comes just after Dot visits him in his apartment. Her
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visit enrages him, and he threatens to kill her. Once she leaves, “a thick,
impenetrable darkness came down upon him and blotted out thought, rage, and
madness together—with almost a tangible snapping sound the face of the world
changed before his eyes…” (446). That “snapping sound” represents Anthony’s final
descent into a state of semi-conscious liminality, that denies him both full
consciousness, but equally importantly, unconsciousness. He regresses into a childlike state from which he believes his grandfather to still be alive (447).
In the final paragraphs of the text, Fitzgerald describes Anthony’s condition:
Anthony Patch, sitting near the rail and looking out at the sea, was not
thinking of his money, for he had seldom in his life been really
preoccupied with material vainglory, nor of Edward Shuttleworth [his
grandfather’s lawyer who committed suicide after the lawsuit], for it is
best to look on the sunny side of these things. No—he was concerned
with a great series of reminiscences, much as a general might look
back upon a successful campaign and analyze his victories. He was
thinking of the hardships, the insufferable tribulations he had gone
through. They had tried to penalize him for the mistakes of his youth.
He had been exposed to ruthless misery, his very craving for romance
had been punished, his friends had deserted him—even Gloria had
turned against him. He had been alone, alone—facing it all. (449)
The opening line of this passage is worth noting, as it reveals Anthony’s underlying
disavowal of the material, though many of his thoughts and actions seem to indicate
otherwise. The ironic tone of this passage, through the self-aggrandizement of his
“insufferable tribulations,” indicates the dissonance between Anthony’s selfperception as victim and his role as perpetrator of his own misery. This final
description of Anthony takes place during the day, and he is very much awake, but
his state of consciousness is of an insomniac nature. His mind is not in the present,
but rather travelling back through time and his thoughts become illogical and
paranoid, simulating the train of thought one may have during a period of insomnia.
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Most significant, though, is his sense of isolation, which is the same isolation of
which one is aware during a bout of insomnia. He has a sense of being awake, yet
utterly alone in the world, completely cut off from others and unable to communicate
with them. His insomnia, in this passage, is a time of re-visitation, as it is for so
many insomniacs, and, more significantly, it must take place in mental, if not
physical, isolation. Sadly, it is the state in which Anthony will remain for the rest of
his life, never able to reach the unconsciousness and attain the rest he desires.
Emmanuel Levinas describes insomnia in the following way:
Insomnia is constituted by the consciousness that it will never finish—
that is, that there is no longer any way of withdrawing from the
vigilance to which one is held. Vigilance without end. From the
moment one is riveted there, one loses all notion of a starting point or
finishing point. The present is welded to the past, it is entirely the
heritage of the past: it renews nothing. It is always the same present
or the same past that endures. A memory would already be a
liberation with regard to the past. Here, time begins nowhere, nothing
moves or shades off. (Time 48)
Levinas’ description of insomnia articulates Anthony’s mental state at the end of the
novel. He is, indeed, “welded to the past,” preoccupied with not a single memory that
might bring him some happiness, but “a great series of reminiscences.” His paranoia
assures that he remains in a state of perpetual vigilance with no end in sight (other
than his eventual death), and his present and past are inseparable. The closing section
of the story makes clear that Anthony will never find relief from perpetual
consciousness. In the preliminary statement of Studies in Hysteria, Josef Breuer and
Sigmund Freud argue that in cases of hysteria, “all that is present is what might be
called a symbolic relation between the cause and the pathological phenomenon, a
relation such as healthy people form in dreams—so, for example, psychical pain is
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joined by a neuralgia or the feeling of moral disgust by vomiting” (9). They assert
that the hysteric expresses psychic trauma through physical symptoms. In combining
the arguments of Breuer and Freud on hysteria with those of Levinas on insomnia, we
can see a similar outcome in Anthony. Anthony, immersed in a perpetually liminal
state throughout his life is condemned to this state in illness, unable to attain relief
through unconsciousness which can bring the resolution and outlet dreams afford. In
his life, he is trapped between conscious rationalizations of his actions and
unconscious awareness of their futility, which he is never quite able to realize. His
final physical state expresses this same sense of being trapped. He is physically
immobilized and left mute, yet in a state of simultaneous awareness of his
surroundings and delusion regarding his complicity in creating them. By the end of
the text, his inability to express himself at all mirrors his inability to express to
himself his own culpability in his final state. His physical immobility represents his
psychical immobility through his failure to act in ways designed to achieve anything
other than an untenable stasis, in which he will permanently remain.
Anthony’s insomnia and his social status are integrated in several significant
ways. Firstly, his wealth facilitates his insomnia and his lifestyle cultivates it. Peter
Baldwin, for example, notes the “uselessness” of the “pleasure seeking upper
classes” especially as it relates to their ability to live nocturnally (81). Anthony
embodies this sense of “uselessness” and exhibits it through his insomnia. He has the
luxury of not being required to work, at least for his adolescence and young
adulthood, which enables him to sleep and wake when he pleases, and he becomes
fully immersed in the night life of the early part of the twentieth century. Everything
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in Anthony’s life has been set up for him to require the least amount of effort on his
part, including the cleaning and maintenance of his luxurious Manhattan apartment.
His one business requirement is his once weekly meeting with his broker, which
“varied from semi-social chats to discussions of the safety of the eight per cent
investments, and Anthony always enjoyed them” (12). His lifestyle allows him to
stay up late at night, drink heavily, and live with a minimal sense of responsibility.
But, this “pleasant” sort of insomnia is a double-edged sword. Just as
Anthony can enjoy a life with few demands placed upon him, the persistent
knowledge of the emptiness of this lifestyle haunts him and exacerbates this
insomnia. His dazzling life grows increasingly disenchanted, leading him to
decisions that intensify his insomnia and trap him in the life he finds so depressing:
Over and against these things was something which his brain
persistently analyzed and dealt with as a tiresome complex but which,
though logically disposed and bravely trampled under foot, had sent
him to a library which had none of the books he most wanted. . . . He
found himself in a growing horror and loneliness. The idea of eating
alone frightened him; in preference, he dined often with men he
detested. Travel, which had once charmed him, seemed, at length,
unendurable, a business of color without substance, a phantom chase
after his own dream’s shadow. (54-55)
His hatred of his own life forces him not to make changes, but to continue along the
same path, similar to the way in which an insomniac’s fear of insomnia can foster
insomnia itself. The friction between his knowledge that he can and should be doing
something more meaningful with the resources he has been given, combined with the
knowledge that he has, is, and will fail at doing so, constitutes the anomic state of
being that perpetuates his insomnia.
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Anthony is an excellent example of the anomic individual. In the beginning
of the text, he has the “means” to succeed in terms of wealth, but has never been
taught to assert himself or actively pursue meaningful goals, so his needs and his
internal means are out of synch. The more he tries to find a direction, yet fails, the
more pain he experiences, eventually diminishing both his interest in trying at all and
in living altogether. When he has lost his fortune, his desire to live comfortably,
which is his fallback position, also becomes threatened, so he persists in a life he
cannot afford without taking reasonable steps towards remedying the solution. He is
trapped between maintaining an unfeasible lifestyle that he has been taught to expect
and forsaking this lifestyle to become a more complete person. Yet, neither option,
the wealth or the meaning, are within his grasp after his grandfather disinherits him.
His desire to be successful on his own behalf ends up atrophied by the end of the text,
much like his desire for material comfort.
Insomnia can trap the insomniac in this same anomic cycle which Anthony
experiences throughout the text. An insomniac may plan a good night’s rest to be
“productive” the next day, but another insomniac night can lead to another late
morning and “wasted” afternoon. As we see with Anthony, this insomniac instinct
comes to fruition after he finally does obtain a job to support himself and Gloria.
Fitzgerald writes, “His determination to stay in at night during the week did not
survive, and a good half of the time he came to work with a splitting, sickish
headache and the crowded horror of the morning subway ringing in his head. Then,
abruptly, he quit. He had remained in bed all one Monday, and late in the evening”
(231). Quitting his job makes him “more depressed and discouraged than he had
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been at any time since their marriage” (231), but this depression is not enough to
change his behavior. He is part of a vicious cycle of expecting failure and
disappointment, thereby creating failure and disappointment, much as expecting
trouble sleeping creates trouble sleeping.
Gloria’s Insomnia
Just like Anthony, Gloria frequently suffers insomnia for a number of reasons.
The vampiric Gloria, whose life’s aspiration is to “sleep” often finds herself unable to
do so. She first exhibits signs of insomnia after her marriage to Anthony, likely as a
result of her dissatisfaction with her life and the failure of this life to provide her the
protection and rest she desires. According to Monk, “In the absence of true, lasting
happiness, Fitzgerald’s characters seek solace in shallow pleasures. . . . Finally, in
desperation, Gloria embraces her mother’s belief in ‘Bilphism,’ in the education and
reincarnation of the soul” (68). Monk argues that Gloria’s adoption of this new
system of belief reflects a desperate attempt to rationalize her purposeless existence
(68). She becomes interested in a spiritual other-world to distract herself from her
spiritless reality, much in the same way Anthony uses his stamp collection as a child.
As she argues, “it’s always seemed to me that if I were unconsciously learning
something here it might not be so meaningless,” to which Anthony replies, “You’re
not learning anything—you’re just getting tired” (303). She needs the other-world to
give hope to her everyday world. Appropriately, one of the first descriptions we get
of Gloria’s insomnia comes because of the adaptation of this system of beliefs:
Gloria’s penchant for premonitions and her bursts of vague
supernaturalism were a surprise to Anthony. Either some complex,
properly and scientifically inhibited in the early years with her
Bilphistic mother, or some inherited hypersensitiveness, made her
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susceptible to any suggestion of the psychic, and, far from gullible
about the motives of people, she was inclined to credit any
extraordinary happening attributed to whimsical perambulations of the
buried. The desperate squeaking about the old house on windy nights
that to Anthony were burglars with revolvers ready in hand
represented to Gloria the auras, evil and restive, of dead generations,
expiating the inexpiable upon the ancient and romantic hearth. One
night, because of two swift bangs downstairs, which Anthony fearfully
but unavailingly investigated, they lay awake nearly until dawn. (187)
Where Anthony turns his attention to the material (threats of robbers), Gloria remains
fixated on the materialization of the other-worldly. Hearing what she feels to be
ghostly noises, she is unable to sleep, especially because she feels unprotected by
Anthony and his “unavailing” efforts to keep them safe, which, of course can be read
as symbolic of the state of their marriage. If we look at her spirituality in terms of her
efforts to distract herself from the problems of her earthly life, her insomnia can be
interpreted as a desire to experience the spiritual for some sense of fulfillment. She
refers to ghostly acts as “whimsical” and relates them to the “ancient and romantic”
hearth in her home; these are hardly suggestions of fear, but rather a romanticized
world view that offers a somewhat pleasant, if at least amusing, alternative to the
restful sleep she is denied.
Aside from other worldly concerns, Gloria suffers from insomnia for very
worldly reasons. In one case, after Anthony is disinherited by his grandfather, Gloria
lies awake contemplating the effects of aging on her appearance: “As the long night
waned she grew supremely conscious that she and beauty were going to make use of
these next three months [until her twenty-ninth birthday]” (393). She is especially
concerned with aging for financial reasons, even over those of vanity. Now that
Anthony has no money, she hopes to earn her living through one of the limited means
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available to women of her class and education: she hopes to become an actress. She
knows her looks are the only path to this career. Unfortunately, her poor sleep of the
night before makes her ill for an extended period of time, and she defers her plans of
auditioning until the week before her birthday (394-95). Her hopes of being on the
screen remain unrealized when she is passed over for a “younger woman” (403).
Gloria also suffers from insomnia when Anthony leaves for the army to
prepare to fight in World War I. Fitzgerald writes:
Two o’clock saw her dry-eyed, staring with steady persistent grief into
the darkness, remembering, remembering unmercifully, blaming
herself for a hundred fancied unkindnesses, making a likeness of
Anthony akin to some martyred and transfigured Christ. For a time she
thought of him as he, in his more sentimental moments, probably
thought of himself. (361)
Again, her insomnia is related to her position as wife of a soldier, but more
importantly, it provides her an opportunity to empathize with her husband.
Interestingly, however, the empathy she cultivates about Anthony is of a delusional
nature, as he is far from a Christ figure, living his life in order to avoid suffering,
rather than to sacrifice for others. Even his enrollment in the military was a means of
avoiding suffering and finding permanent unconsciousness rather than an act of valor
and self-sacrifice.
Thus, for both Anthony and Gloria, insomnia and social position are
interconnected in complex ways. The lifestyle they have which allowed them to
sustain insomnia for years in relative comfort eventually prevents them from
adjusting to new circumstances when their comfortable lifestyle is denied to them by
Anthony’s grandfather. Further, the conflict between Anthony’s aspirations and his
actual capability to fulfill those aspirations leave him trapped in a liminal state
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between wealth and poverty, action and inaction, and distraction and despair.
Likewise, Gloria’s disillusionment with Anthony’s ability to reform keeps her trapped
in a marriage which she still hopes will someday be restful. The “restlessness”
Weber describes as part of the motivation of Western capitalism and the insomnia of
aspiration described by Fitzgerald exist within Anthony, yet instead of acting on this
restlessness with the goal of what he would consider a “meaningful” achievement (he
does not exactly know what this means, which is part of the problem), Anthony
attempts to stifle that restlessness through his lifestyle. Gloria, instead of making him
accountable for his inaction, retreats into her own other-worldly belief system and
resorts to what Fitzgerald calls “the negative principle ‘Never give a damn’” (203).
When their affluent lifestyle fails them and they can no longer be distracted from their
problems through parties and alcohol, Anthony’s mind snaps completely, leaving him
in a state of continuous mental and emotional waking isolation. Gloria is forced to
become his babysitter, and live as a woman who appears to others to be “sort of dyed
and unclean” (448). For both, the makings of their fallen state and hints at the futility
of their attempts to avoid their fall are apparent in the nature of the insomnia they
both experience throughout the novel.
Insomnia of Limitation
Much like Anthony Patch, Waldo Frank’s character, Virginia Hade
experiences an insomnia of anomie. In order to explain the wealthy and white
Virginia’s insomnia, we can compare it to the impoverished, black John Cloud’s
untroubled sleep, as the text itself does. Toni Morrison argues that with regard to
issues of race implicit or (less frequently) explicit in literature: “[T]he subject of the
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dream is the dreamer. The fabrication of an Africanistic persona was reflexive; it was
an extraordinary meditation on the self, a powerful exploration of the fears and
desires that reside in writerly consciousness, an astonishing revelation of longing, of
terror, of perplexity, of shame, of magnanimity” (208). Frank illustrates this type of
meditation through the thoughts of Virginia, a white woman. Virginia uses John,
both literally through her accusations of rape and assault, but also metaphorically, as
a vehicle through which she can express her own fears and desires. Morrison
continues:
There is no romance free of what [Herman] Melville called ‘the power
of blackness,’ especially not in a country in which there was a resident
population, already black, upon which the imagination could articulate
the fears, the dilemmas, the divisions that obsessed it historically,
morally, metaphysically, and socially. This slave population seemed
to volunteer itself as objects for meditation on the lure and elusiveness
of human freedom, on the outcast’s terror and his dread of failure, of
powerlessness, Nature without limits, inborn loneliness, evil, sin,
greed. . . ; in other words, on human freedom in all terms except those
of human potential and the rights of man. (211-12)
Virginia embodies, through her insomnia, this sort of articulation which Morrison
applies to the Romantic text more generally. John becomes for Virginia an object of
contemplation, but she does not contemplate John as a unique individual, but as a
relative being, exposing her own limitations and anxieties and idealizing the freedom
and limitless nature that he purportedly represents. She uses him for the purposes of
her own attempts at self-awareness and escape from her own perceptions of bondage.
Though, in many ways Virginia and John are reflections of each other in terms
of the freedom of body they desire, John’s very clearly defined social role with no
prospect of mobility enables him to sleep well. This is not to say John is content in
his lower position or to glorify his social status in any positive way, but if he is not
268

content, he is stable. He does not lose any sleep over the possibility of wasted
aspirations because he is all too clear on the limits to which he can aspire; whereas,
Virginia’s ability to grasp at mobility, while facing the reality of her immobility,
renders her sleepless. On some levels, Virginia envies John’s security of social
position (however insecure this position makes him in terms of security of
personhood), and, rather than attacking those who oppress her (the white males who
surround her), Virginia lashes out against John because it is only against him that her
words have authority. She attempts to assert power not by resisting the racist and
misogynistic hegemonies of the American South in the 1920s, but by becoming the
epitome of Southern social paradigms, however falsely contrived her position is: the
helpless woman victimized by the sexually violent and immoral black man who needs
the white males around her to seek revenge on her behalf. Through his text, Frank
critiques the social system that cultivates and perpetuates such paradigms.
Frank both asserts and resists these paradigms through the names of the
primary characters. Virginia Hade’s name is reminiscent of both the South itself (the
state of Virginia) and hell, with the closeness of her surname to Hades. Thus, her
name conflates southern-ness and descent into the underworld. As Morrison notes,
“racial ideology” affects not only the racialized “other,” but also “the mind, the
imagination, the behavior of the master” (208). Frank illustrates this effect in terms
of moral and physical damnation itself. Conversely, John Cloud’s last name invokes
connotations of ascent and transcendence. The name “John” comes to represent the
everyman, not the “other” but the average. For Frank, he is symbolic of the norm
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rather than relativity to a norm. He is the standard of comparison; whereas Virginia’s
name is rooted in relativity to her place in the South.
Despite Virginia’s abuse of John, she realizes she is merely falling into
prescribed roles and perpetuating, rather than challenging the cycles of racism,
sexism, and violence that permeate her world and damn her soul. Her daytime
actions are in accord with the corruption of her values equated with life in the South,
but her insomnia reveals both her knowledge of her own corruption, as well as her
awareness of the need to resist those very same values she ultimately ends up
reifying. Our first introduction to Virginia’s inner consciousness begins with her
insomnia: “Virginia Hade lies in her broad mahogany bed, awake. –I am afraid of
sleep. That’s why my eyelids tremble and burn; that’s why my hands hold rigid on
my brow” (64). Her insomnia makes her aware of her physicality, but more
importantly that her physicality (white womanhood) is corrupt, as she thinks, “There
is a poison in your body, and it lurks in knots. If you draw in your leg, the poison
lingers” (64). Later, in the course of her insomniac train of thought, she thinks, “—
Lord, won’t You let me sleep? Look: I’m stretched out. The poison can flow away,
if only You’ll let it. . . . —Sleep .. dream world… writhing shapes writhe out And
stand upon my breasts And stand upon my mouth Forcing my lips!” (67). This
“poison,” or perceived corruption of her body, manifests itself most fully in her
awareness when she tries to sleep and has only herself and her body with which to
contend. She is aware that the very movements of her body influence the movement
of her supposed internal corruption. The way in which she describes both her
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insomnia and feelings of corruption also have religious implications, as she looks to
God for both sleep and purification.
Her insomnia is also intrinsically connected with her work on her family’s
plantation. She thinks:
Is it wrong to work? How hard I work… Bob is a loafer, and Papa’s a
Judge. … Ticketing Answering mail Billing and crediting and
shipping Sending the sugared fruit to the sour North .. What does it
do but wear away The shell of sleep The shell of ease, Baring the
nerves that hunger! Tiring my mind, tiring my decency So that my
soul lies naked under this black night! (65-66)
In this passage, she presents her work as essentially unsatisfying, but also
contributing to a restlessness of the soul that prevents her sleep. She sees her work as
“tiring her decency,” and, therefore, seems to understand her own role in the South’s
moral corruption and exploitation of black laborers. Her work also pits her against
her white family members who do not have to work as hard as she does, revealing the
inequality of her relationship with the white males in her life. She must work to earn
a voice in her family, but her father and brother do not have to do the same. They can
merely observe and pronounce judgment, be heard without having to earn a voice.
The most interesting points of Virginia’s insomnia revolve around her heavily
racialized (and racist) view of the night. Race, for her, is conflated with both the
darkness of her soul and her sexuality, highlighting the main tensions she faces
throughout the text, and culminating in her duplicitous instigation of John’s lynching
and murder. She refers to the night as “a raping nigger!” (66) and considers that “the
night . . . Breeds niggers!” (68). Despite her use of overtly racist language, she
seems to possess an understanding of the falsity of her description of the night as a
“raping nigger” and the association of blacks with nighttime. Just as John Cloud is
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falsely accused of and murdered for rape (he is NOT “a raping nigger” as she and
others characterize him), she sees “darkness” within herself rather than as part of the
racialized “other.” She asks, “Why can’t I sleep? Are my insides dark? Will they
flood out if I sleep, Wash my white soul black?” (69), hoping for a transformation of
her soul.

Then, she finally declares, “My soul’s not white! Death’s white: my soul

wants to live. . . . Soul, you’re a little black babe under my heart” (70). The thoughts
that conclude this monologue indicate that, for Virginia, it is not the perceived
“blackness” within her that becomes a force of death, but is instead equated with her
desire to live without restraint. Here Virginia is making use of what Morrison refers
to as “a fabricated brew of darkness, otherness, alarm, and desire” (212). This
association with internal blackness allows her to “employ an Africanistic persona to
articulate and imaginatively act out the forbidden in American culture” (Morrison
224). She wants to act in ways that are forbidden to her because of her whiteness and
femininity, but articulates such desires in terms of their “blackness” reflecting both
her resistance to and internalization of racist social norms and beliefs.
The language of the section of the text that depicts Virginia’s insomnia
structurally recreates in readers the insomniac experience. Throughout this section,
the language is abrupt, both fixating on various ideas and flowing freely from image
to image. The section contains very little finite punctuation, mostly relying on the use
of question marks, exclamations, and ellipses, rather than full stops. The chaotic,
flowing nature of this passage reflects the turmoil and tension within Virginia’s mind,
as well as her conflicting views on race and gender. Virginia is herself a liminal
character, given the privileges of white skin and wealth, but the disadvantages and
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limitations of femininity. If we look at Virginia in terms of Durkheim’s theory of
anomie, we can see a clear conflict between the desire for autonomy denied to her
because of her gender and the power and freedoms afforded those of her race and
class. At the same time, she understands that blacks have their own power as well,
and this power angers her. After stabbing herself with John’s knife, she says, “But I
am strong, John Cloud. Have no fear. I’ll meet you at your height” (183). John, for
Virginia, despite his low social status, has perceived freedoms she does not and can
command attention she cannot. After watching him swim in the hot summer
afternoon, she says to him, “I’d love to do that too. Run free. Ride free. Swim
free… Be free, John, too” (164). John is, of course, very far from free on many
levels. He knows that so much as a misinterpreted glance at a white woman could
mean his doom (and a false accusation by one is his doom). His body is under
constant scrutiny and control. Yet, Virginia perceives his ability to use his body in
ways that she interprets as free because they are denied to her as the height of
freedom. She cries, “I am John Cloud” (170), but the knowledge that because she is a
woman, she cannot and never can be John Cloud causes her to destroy him though an
attempt at destroying herself, as she stabs herself with his knife, representing both a
sexual act and act of self-destruction.
John’s Sleep
Unlike Virginia, John is very sure of his position in the world (surety and
content should not be confused, however). He acknowledges that “the cabin ‘n’ the
swamp is chokin’ me” (21), yet he tells his mother “how lovely is our world. . . .
Don’t you see how I loves.. how I loves.. our land!” (23). His land is equated with
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the nighttime: “Our land! Our night, it is! Our breathin’, singin’ world!” (24). On
the other hand, the world of whites is not nearly as harmonious. When describing
night in the white part of town, John says, “Yo’ ought to see the night yonder on
Main Street, Mammy. Night’s all broken with jagged ugly lights. Night’s runnin’
away from Main Street, all de time. It’s our night, Mammy, an’ it’s our red lan’”
(24). He does not want what the whites have, so there is no sense of “aspiration” to
be like those he cannot be, but more importantly, he does not aspire to have what the
whites have because he does not want what the whites have; he sees it as corrupted.
While John’s social position is untenable, his assurance of himself and relationship to
the world around him is secure. When he dives into the water, which is described as
both sleeping and somnolent (138), he can experience pure, physical ecstasy,
something denied to Virginia because of gender limitations placed upon her
experience of her own body. But, for John “An ecstasy is air, kissing his arms, his
shoulders, lipping his chest as he flings off his shirt. An ecstasy is air, clasping his
thighs, his stomach, his legs. John stands naked in the clasping air, between earth and
water .. drinking the air he needs” (139). The physical world does not frighten him as
it does Virginia, but rather affords him both pleasure and sustenance; it gives him all
he needs. Despite his social immobility, he is able to experience his physical body,
and through this body a perspective of connectedness with the land on which he lives
and work, that Virginia is alienated from.
After a long day working, John sleeps well. While Virginia tosses and turns,
struggling with hatred of herself and others, John declares to himself, “My flesh is
whole!” upon lying down on his cot, listening to the sounds of the night outside from
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the porch of his house (60). For John, “Sleep is a sure peace whose balm lies swiftly
near and casts its magic even upon the day. John is awake .. but easeful in his
waking. Sleep is near. . . . John feels the alchemy whereby this pent black world,
drenching in ignorance and pain and soil, shines fair” (61). The time before sleep,
which to Virginia reveals corruption and violation, shows John something entirely
different. John clearly sees the “ignorance,” “pain,” and “soil” of the world, but the
night, specifically the time before sleep, provides an end to this worldly suffering and
exposes the possibility of a beautiful life. As he falls asleep, “His body lies prone and
sweetly wakeful within the magic of his folk” (61).
He is lying in bed awake, but the wakefulness is both short lived and pleasant
for John. As with Virginia, we get a transcript of John’s inner monologue, but unlike
Virginia’s, his is both coherent and replete with peaceful images. For instance, he
thinks, “There’s a white dream that stands between my mouth and Mary’s, A white
sunbeam in my soul. I’ll climb it. That’s what it’s fo’! I’ll vault with the white
sunbeam! Empty pale world .. world of the Free, Wait till I come an’ warm you:
wait till I come an’ fill you” (62). Rather than a conflict with his physical self, John
experiences a sense of both peace and hope. Whiteness, which for the white Virginia
is evil, is for John an obstacle whose conquest could be glorious. He neither exalts
nor vilifies whiteness, but sees it simultaneously as an obstacle to freedom and a
means to it as well. Night is the time when he can envision his necessary place in the
natural, rather than social, world, and this presence is a positive one, rather than
Virginia’s “black” and “poisoned” vision of herself. John’s monologue is also much
shorter than Virginia’s as he quietly and peacefully falls asleep. As Frank writes,
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“Night is not made for thought. Fantasy dances in oblique moon-motes. Vision tides
like a sea upon the tree-tops, drenching darkness in magic. John is asleep” (63). As
he is not his own enemy, neither is the night, and he does not have to fight for sleep.
Night returns him to harmony with the natural world around him and leaves the
concerns of the social world for the daytime.
Sleep and Death
Virginia cannot indulge in the same fantasies as John, nor can she feel as
comfortable with her body as he does in this scene and the one in the water; or,
perhaps she can but is socialized against doing so. In order to do so, she attempts to
become John, first by kissing his girlfriend Mary, then by observing John’s naked
swim and commenting on his body, and finally by stabbing herself with his knife (the
sexual suggestiveness of this action is significant). But, Virginia cannot become
John, fails in her half-hearted attempt at suicide, and ultimately destroys what she
cannot be by instigating a riot and allowing John to be lynched by not speaking the
truth. As John’s lynching occurs, Virginia again experiences insomnia, but insomnia
which indicates the possibility of a sense of peace engendered through her actions.
Initially, she feels at peace, as Frank writes, “She lies at ease within her bed,” but this
peace is short lived as she becomes “concerned in her own quiet” (227). She
becomes increasingly conscious of her body again, watching “a toe thrust up within
the sheet” (227). Despite her initial sense of peace, she starts to question herself:
“Why am I not waiting also? What am I so quiet?” “But,” writes Frank, “she knows
she is not waiting. She is replete. She can stir a toe and watch it lift the linen” (227).

276

Though she remains “lying quiet in her sheet” the questions in her head
become louder and more persistent: “Did I make it?” “Dare I stop what I did not
create?” “Will I go [save John Cloud]?” “And what is ‘saving’? And what is ‘John
Cloud’?” “Who made this wound?” “Will I go?” “Am I down there? Am I your
victim, John?” “Did you make the storm of Nazareth that hunts you? make it to hunt
you? make me make Nazareth hunt you?” (229). The silence that she had previously
experienced is now punctuated by Frank’s interjection of “Murmur. Murmur” (229).
She becomes both increasingly awake and frenetic and more aware of her body. The
murmuring ceases and silence returns, but again it is short lived. This time, the
silence is punctuated not by a murmur, but by a howl. Frank writes, “The shutters of
her room shiver: HOWL .. bursts in her room” (230) breaking any sense of silence
and peace she once felt. Her final question is “Will I go?” (230). She does not go,
and John is attacked by an angry mob and immolated. Finally, while John is burning
to death, Virginia does sleep: “Virginia, soothed by the silence, sleeps in her bed”
(233). She finds the rest she wants, but readers are left with the sense of the futility of
the temporary peace she has found as she will have to live with knowledge of her
responsibility for John’s death.
In Frank’s text, insomnia is used as a structural device to illustrate one’s
ability to be at peace with his or her place in the natural and spiritual world, or, rather
to transcend or fail to transcend that place. John can transcend his social status in the
time before sleep and envision a grander image of the world’s potential beauty.
These moments of realization and peace come as he falls asleep, not exactly
experiencing insomnia, but instead a winding down of his thoughts. Because he is
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allowed these moments of transcendence, yet also realizes their practical limitations,
he does not experience the same level of anomie Virginia does. He already has what
he desires and has already learned the limits of his desire. Virginia, on the other hand,
is in a double bind. She is allowed some of the benefits of wealth and privilege, but
denied a more spiritual and physical relationship with the world around her through
her body as John has. My argument here is not that John is somehow “closer to
nature” than Virginia, but rather that John understands, in a way Virginia does not,
the superficiality of social hegemony and is able to find solace when he is removed
from society, which primarily takes place at night as he is trying to sleep. John is
frustrated and angered by the constant corruption he faces, but he does not allow that
corruption to reach the core of his being, as Virginia, with her greater complicity,
does. The expectations placed upon her by the white males around her force her to
simultaneously resist and participate in contemporaneous social hegemonies. She
attempts to transcend both race and gender, but when that fails, she falls back on the
stereotype of the innocent white woman victimized by the sexually aggressive,
animalistic black male. Of course, John is neither sexually aggressive nor
animalistic, and Virginia knows this to be the case, yet uses these classifications to
destroy him. She wants to be what she thinks he is, but because she does not truly
understand what he is because of racial and sexual barriers, she can only be a force of
destruction, both of herself and John. These tensions within Virginia’s mind prevent
her from sleeping until what she cannot be or have is gone. Insomnia reveals the
struggles of gender and class Virginia faces and the limited and horrific options she
has to feel a sense of power.
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Insomnia in the Colonial Text
Virginia Hade and John Cloud live in an American society rigidly divided
along lines of race and class, and, as such, their sleep is related to their disparate
positions, drawing attention to both what makes them different, as well as what
makes them alike. We see a similar paradigm in British literature with regard to sleep
in colonial societies in E. M. Forster’s novel A Passage to India. Frantz Fanon, in his
essay “Colonial War and Mental Disorders,” argues that colonialism itself creates
psychological disorder: “in this war psychiatric phenomena entailing disorders
affecting behavior and thought have taken on importance where those who carry out
the ‘pacification’ are concerned, or that these same disorders are notable among the
‘pacified’ population” (249). In his essay, Fanon describes countless cases of mental
disorder related to colonial practices. One common feature discussed in many of
these cases is the subject’s insomnia. As Fanon argues, “It is the painful, suffering
body that calls for rest and peace” (289).
As I noted earlier, oppression affects not only the oppressed, but also the
oppressor. It is a force of corruption for all involved. Yet, even the oppressed are not
without some power. As Foucault argues, “Power comes from below; that is, there is
no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of
power relations, and serving as a general matrix” (History I, 94). In other words, the
exertion of control over others requires also an exertion, if not exhaustion, of energy
and resources to affect that control. The ability to require this assertion of resources
is a form of power to which oppressed classes have access and resistance to control
requires further exertion on the part of ruling classes. In a sense, the oppressed force
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the hand of the oppressor, determining action in order for the oppressor to perpetuate
domination. But the cost of this exertion is often damaging to the oppressor, as well
as the oppressed. For Forster, the oppressive, colonial system in India brings out the
worst in people, corrupting and harming both the rulers and ruled. As Adela Quested
thinks of her fiancé Ronny Moore, “India had developed sides of his character that
she had never admired” (80). His position of authority in India damages his
character, causing his corruption through his efforts to exert control over subjects.
In A Passage to India, Forster places the country of India itself in a similar
position as John Cloud, where India is both the oppressed and the source of tension
for its oppressors. Fanon argues that in a colonial system, “The colonized people find
that they are reduced to a body of individuals who only find cohesion when in the
presence of the colonizing nation” (294). Forster illustrates Fanon’s argument
through his personification of India itself, as described through the view of the
British, for whom he writes, “This pose of ‘seeing India’ … was only a form of ruling
India; no sympathy lay behind it” (306). The British constantly attempt, and fail, to
see India as a unified whole. “Seeing India” for Forster means dominating its people
by authorizing them through interpretation, so they are seen not as individuals but as
a whole nation, much in the way Virginia sees John Cloud as an image of her own
racialized fantasies of physicality and sexuality, using him through her depictions of
him, rather than using her depictions to understand him as a unique individual in any
meaningful way.
Forster describes India in terms of its liminality, being almost asleep and
restlessly awake, beginning each of the novel’s three sections with a description of
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the country itself. He further characterizes India as being in a paradoxical position of
being incredibly ancient, yet not fully formed. Of this novel, Edward Said argues,
“Forster’s using India to represent material that according to the canons of the novel
form cannot in fact be represented—vastness, incomprehensible creeds, secret
motions, histories, and social forms” (200). The country is massive, yet the
characters are often claustrophobic. There is a deep spirituality underlying the
pettiest of political quarrels. India is represented in the novel at multiple levels,
including the level of the social, exposing systems of domination, but also the
spiritual, as we learn that Mrs. Moore comes to India with “an easy” goal: “To be
one with the universe!” (208). In attempting to realize this goal, vague and clichéd in
its presentation, she uses India as the subject of her self-reflections, again in a way
similar to Virginia’s use of John. India becomes the land through which both its
inhabitants and visitors attempt to connect with spirituality, yet also find out how
distant spiritual understanding is because India is only imagined in terms of their own
conceptions of spirituality, rather than on its own terms. They can never “see” India
because their vision of India is always occluded by their vision of what India
represents in Western culture. At the opening of the book’s third and final section,
Forster writes, “God is not born yet—that will occur at midnight—but He has also
been born centuries ago, nor can he ever be born, because he is Lord of the Universe,
who transcends human processes. He is, was not, is not, was” (283). We have in this
passage the language of paradox and incomprehensibility; as long as the characters
remain human and view the world through their human biases and preconceived
ideas, this paradox cannot be resolved.
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Forster situates this conception of God at a liminal moment, both on the verge
of awakening (being born) and sleeping (having been born centuries ago—perhaps
now exhausted or unconscious). If we look at the moment of falling asleep as JeanLuc Nancy describes it, a falling away of the self from the self, Forster’s God exists
in this moment of the simultaneous “is,” “was not,” “is not,” and “was.” In other
words, God exists on the threshold between consciousness and unconsciousness that
humans cannot grasp in their experience. As Glen Allen argues, India “has no unity
itself” (937). Yet, in the novel we have two characters in particular who attempt to
reconcile the ancient India with the new and developing (rather than developed)
India: Dr. Aziz and Mrs. Moore. Aziz is an Indian native, yet attempts to befriend
and embrace the British nationals who now control and inhabit his country. He wants
to see a peace brokered and puts himself on the front lines. Mrs. Moore, on the other
hand, is a visiting British national, but different in that she shows deference for Indian
culture (for example, she removes her shoes before going into the mosque with Aziz)
and sympathizes with the native inhabitants in a way the other British characters
largely fail to do. These are the two characters who experience insomniac states the
most significantly throughout the text. Their insomnia, then, can be interpreted as an
attempt (a failed attempt, as Forster suggests any attempt to “understand” India would
be) to comprehend the significance of India itself and its liminal place in the world.
They are not merely sleepwalking through the country, turning their eyes from
injustice. Forster writes, “Inside its cocoon of work or social obligation, the human
spirit slumbers for the most part, registering the distinction between pleasure and
pain, but not nearly as alert as we pretend” (132). If most of the characters, then, are
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merely slumbering their way through life, it becomes significant to note the
observations of those who experience troubled sleep, like Aziz and Mrs. Moore.
Allen argues that much as in the West, “light and sun imagery in Hindu
philosophy is associated with intelligence,” yet, “Forster [in a scene describing a
match illuminating the Marabar Caves] is pointing to the inadequacy of intelligence
or reason in its effort to discover within the limits of its categories the ultimate nature
of the universe” (943). Given Forster’s conception of the failure of light to render all
things comprehensible, it is important that Aziz’s and Mrs. Moore’s contemplations
take place in the dark and in a space of consciousness between “enlightened” daytime
thought and unconscious thought. When Aziz is ill with a fever, for example, and he
dozes, “his thoughts wandered over the varied surface of life” (101). Life is not
cohesive and continuous for Aziz, but rather infinitely complex. Sitting awake in bed
conversing with Fielding, who has visited him, Aziz is able to clearly articulate the
position on India of many Westerners: “Here’s your home. . . . Here’s the celebrated
hospitality of the East. Look at the flies. Isn’t it jolly? Now I suppose you want to
be off, having seen an Oriental interior” (115). Aziz understands that for many
Westerners, “seeing” India is merely an accretion of experiences with no true
consequential empathy. However good their intentions may be, for Westerners,
seeing is equated with domination and “real” Indian life becomes a sort of side show
for cultural amusement.
Mrs. Moore has a similar realization, when, exhausted, she is hoping for a
nap, but kept awake by Adela’s conversation. Forster writes, “She felt increasingly
(vision or nightmare?) that, though people are important, the relations between them
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are not . . . centuries of carnal embracement, yet man is no nearer to understanding
man” (135). Like Aziz, she understands that to “see” something is not to empathize
with it, and the reliance on imposed social boundaries can only separate people from
each other. Forster’s use of “vision or nightmare?” in this passage points to the
ephemeral nature of Mrs. Moore’s revelation. It is not an “enlightened,” daytime
thought, but a truth revealing semi-hallucination brought about by exhaustion. It is
the type of realization only made possible without the full use of consciousness, or,
rather, beyond the limits of daytime consciousness. Upon leaving India, Forster
describes Mrs. Moore as having “had come to that state where the horror of the
universe and its smallness are both visible at the same time—the twilight of the
double vision in which so many elderly people are involved” (207). She is able to see
the universe in terms of irresolvable paradox, which Forster notes involves “the
twilight of double vision,” and seems to imply that seeing the universe means simply
understanding that it cannot be seen singularly. The view itself is uncertain and
associated with the space between light and dark, consciousness and unconsciousness.
When she abruptly awakens in the middle of the night during her departure
from India, she fully understands its incomprehensibility: “’I have not seen the right
places,’ she thought . . . ‘So you thought an echo was India; you took the Marabar
caves as final? . . . What have we in common with them, or they with Asirgarh?’”
(209-10). She understands the failure of the “cohesion” colonizers assert over those
whom they colonize. India cannot be a singular experience, something reducible to
an overall sentiment or epiphany gathered through a series of cultural observations,
but is rather a combination of binaries and contradictions. Just as we only “know”
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sleep because we are not awake and know waking only as not being asleep, India can
only be “known” through being unknowable. In a sense, it is similar to the Kantian
sublime; what we can comprehend points to something beyond comprehension, only
approaching comprehensibility through its very incomprehensibility.
Where Mrs. Moore’s attempts at understanding India take place on a semispiritual level, Aziz’s understandings are more bound with social liminality. For
example, even after his name has been cleared in the trial over the assault on Adela,
his sleep suffers. He says to Cyril Fielding, “It is those who stop in the country, not
those who leave it, whom such a story [of his alleged attack on Adela] injures.
Imagine my dismay and anxiety. I could scarcely get a wink of sleep. First my name
was coupled with her and now it is yours” (272). This passage expresses Aziz’s
understanding of relations between the British and Indians. His knowledge of the
perceived harm done through the linking of a British citizen’s name with that of an
Indian, despite his earlier efforts at befriending the British and Fielding’s statements
to the contrary indicate that he has come to understand, in part through his insomnia,
the incompatibility of the two cultures on the colonial front. He knows his name has
no power beyond India, as “those who leave it” will not be affected by such a
coupling, but understands that while in the country, Indian-British friendships are
unsustainable. Because association with his name cannot harm those who leave,
these damaging relationships exist only within and because of the colonial regime.
Forster, like both Fitzgerald and Frank, has a dual purpose in his use of
insomnia. On one hand, a character’s insomnia reveals the liminality of their
position, social or spiritual. Mrs. Moore comes to India to find answer to her own
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spiritual questions, but realizes, through her insomnia that those questions cannot be
answered, and the practices of Indian governance interfere with such revelations.
Aziz, who at first hopes to become the friend of the British, realizes, also during
states of insomnia, the futility of such efforts so long as a system of colonial
domination is in place. On the other hand, insomnia not only exposes the liminality
of belief, but also the liminality of social position. Mrs. Moore has come to India to
view Indians as equals, and ultimately cannot do so. Similarly, Aziz hopes to foster a
sense of equality between Indians and British, but also fails. They are both positioned
between the two disparate societies. As with Fitzgerald’s Anthony Patch and Frank’s
Virginia Hade, insomnia is symbolic of the character’s liminal social position, with
hopes of mobility but not access to it, but also evidence of the character’s ultimate
uncertainty about their ability to give their lives the meaning they desire because of
their social position; thus, insomnia has both phenomenological associations, as it is a
part of their everyday experience, and ontological ones, as it reflects their state of
being in both the social and spiritual world. In essence, insomnia unites these two
worlds, illustrating that they cannot and refuse to be separated from each other.
Insomnia and Female Labor
Thus far, I have discussed insomnia as it relates to those in a position of
liminal and precarious states of privilege, specifically dealing with those who have
hopes of social elevation but face serious obstacles to such attainments, as well as
those, like John Cloud and Mrs. Moore, who see the disconnection between social
aspiration and meaningful spirituality. However, to be fair, insomnia has a more
utilitarian side, and it also strikes the under-classes, primarily because they have to
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work nights for the sake of subsistence. This type of insomnia, forsaking sleep to
work, has historically taken place for centuries. According to Ekirch, “Among the
hardest workers—night in, night out—were women.” For women, continues Ekirch,
“Night brought little seeming relief. Often, to paraphrase a contemporary, work was
exchanged for work. Domestic tasks invariably extended the days toil” (163). We
see examples of women working all day and then into the night in the works of
American authors John Steinbeck and Gertrude Stein. While my intent in this
argument is not to deny women’s ability to use insomnia as a time and space of
agency and reflection, it is important to note a disparity between women’s access to
the night world and that of men. Baldwin argues that through much of the nineteenth
century, women’s access to public spheres at night was severely restricted. Going out
into public at night was both a subject of social disapprobation and practical danger;
for the most part, women who ventured out at night had better do so with a male
companion, or risked physical and verbal harassment and violation (154). While the
twentieth century and its related illumination afforded women more freedom to
venture out into the night, efforts were still made to limit women’s access to the
public sphere after dark supposedly for their own good (Baldwin 180).
Accordingly, much of the nighttime behaviors we see with women occur
mainly within the domestic realm (Richardson’s Miriam is a noteworthy exception, as
discussed in Chapter 4). Steinbeck’s novel, The Grapes of Wrath, includes a
character, Ma Joad, who chooses insomnia for the sake of protecting and preserving
her family, indicating her internalization of this role, as well as the limitations it
places upon her. Due to the combination of the advent of mechanized farming and
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the devastation of farmable lands in the Mid-West that occurred during the Dust
Bowl, the Joad family is forced to leave their farm, which no longer supports them, to
try and find work in California. To prepare for the trip, the family stays up all night
packing their belongings. Ma is the leader of the family: “They waited for her to
come back across the darkening yard, for Ma was powerful in the group” (103). She
is the one who “started the fire roaring” (104), which allows the family both to eat
and to have the light by which they can continue their preparations. At one point, Jim
Casy, a former preacher accompanying the family on its journey, comments that Ma
“looks tar’d,” to which Tom (Ma’s son) replies, “Women’s always tar’d … That’s
just the way women is…” However, Casy notes that she seems “tar’der than that.
Real tar’d, like she’s sick tar’d.” Ma overhears Casy’s comment, and “Slowly her
face tightened, the lines disappeared from the taut muscular face. Her eyes sharpened
and her shoulders straightened” (108). Despite her exhaustion, Ma makes an effort to
prevent her family from realizing how tired she is. She knows that she must lead
them through the preparations and sacrifices her physical well-being to do so. She
chooses insomnia to protect her family. By making her insomnia relative to her
position as caretaker, she reveals the limitations of this assumed role, but through her
enactment of this role and denial of its damaging effects, she illustrates her own
strength and integrity.
Ma’s self-sacrifice continues throughout the trip to California. For example,
on the way there, she “had folded her hands in her lap, had retired into a resistance
against weariness” (164). Throughout the novel, she watches over her other family
members as they sleep, and even sedates the family’s grandfather who refuses to
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leave his home in order to bring him along (127), but hardly ever sleeps herself. She
says to herself, “I pray God we gonna get some res’. I pray Jesus we gonna lay down
in a nice place” (217). For Ma and the rest of the family, California (at least until
they actually get there) represents a promised land, a heaven from which they can
cease to be like those others forced off their land who “Walk arou’ like they was half
asleep” (77) and begin anew. It is a land of redemption, but it is also the place where
she hopes to finally find some rest. She knows that until she gets there, she must
sacrifice her own sleep in order to maintain her vigil over the rest of her family; until
then, her work is incomplete and she cannot sleep. When California turns out to be
an utter disaster (no work, no food, no shelter, family in ruins as Tom is forced to
escape the police and Rose of Sharon has a miscarriage), Ma’s inability to sleep
persists: “Ma turned restlessly in her sleep. Her eyes started wide open” (447).
Because her family is not safe, Ma never gets the rest she requires. Her sacrifice is
highly spiritualized—she is the family’s protector and guardian. She sees it as her
vocation to care for them and keep the family together, and because her family is
poor, she takes on the brunt of the responsibility for their care through the sacrifice of
her sleep. As long as she is unable to protect her family, though not through lack of
trying, she remains unable to sleep. Her insomnia does not indicate that she has sins
with which she must reckon, as with Anthony or Virginia, but rather that she has a
strong sense of guiding purpose which keeps her awake and ever-vigilant.
Stein provides a similar example in the novella “The Good Anna” from Three
Lives. Stein’s character Anna, like Ma Joad, works tirelessly to care for those around
her, and in doing so, sacrifices her own health and welfare—she sees this role as
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caretaker as an intrinsic part of her identity connected to both her social position as a
member of the servant class and her femininity. In the beginning of the story, Anna is
defined through her exhaustion, as Stein notes that “Anna led an arduous and troubled
life” (7). She sacrifices herself to her work because “To her thinking, in her stubborn,
faithful, german soul, this was the right way for a girl to do” (23). Her faith in the
social role into which she was born motivates her tireless work:
Anna really did believe with all her might. It was her fortune never to
live with people who had any faith, but then that never worried Anna.
She prayed for them always as she should, and she was very sure that
they were good. . . . Anna found it hard to always know why it was
that things went wrong. Sometimes her glasses broke and then she
knew that she had not done her duty by the church, just in the way that
she should do. (46)
The ironic tone of this passage suggests Anna finds a great deal of fault with those
around her, but sees their reform as part of her vocation. Ultimately, she does not
blame herself when “things went wrong,” but rather the failings of others, which she
takes on as her own responsibility. Part of her hard work involves caring for her dogs
and the people around her: “Periods of evil thinking came very regularly to Peter and
to Rags and to the visitors within their gates. At such times Anna would be very busy
and scold hard” (8). Here, Stein emphasizes the religious nature of Anna’s work by
associating her business with the prevention of evil and her association of any sort of
failure, like her glasses breaking, as a religious failure, though not her own lack of
belief. Her role as a woman is also a role as a savior. She is not corrupted by wealth
like those she works for, but can rather use her ascetic position as one of reformer.
Stein also emphasizes the exhaustion Anna feels through illustrating Anna’s
stubborn refusal to rest: “No argument could bring her to sit an evening in the empty
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parlour . . . and tired as she was, she would never sit down during the long talks she
held with Miss Mathilda” (17). Anna’s sense of position (she is Miss Mathilda’s
servant) and her drive to fulfill her duties, which she largely sees as protecting those
around her from either want or evil, result in an exhaustion that ultimately threatens
her life. Eventually, Anna is persuaded to rest and she undergoes an operation meant
to restore her to health, but only after being assured that her household duties will be
covered. However, even the operation and period of rest has little success. Stein
writes, “When she was once more at work for her Miss Mary Wadsmith, all the good
effect of these several months of rest were soon worked and worried well away. For
all the rest of her strong working life Anna was never really well. She had bad
headaches all the time and she was always thin and worn” (23). Her concerns for
others keep her awake at night as well, as we learn that “She worked and worked all
day and thought all night how she could save” (59). Literally, Stein is writing about
Anna saving money (so she can give it to others), but her use of the word “save” had
a dual meaning—Anna also tries to save people; this is how, despite her relatively
inferior social position she can give her life meaning. She does not have wealth or
property to sacrifice to others, so she sacrifices her sleep and well being. Her need to
save others keeps her awake. By the end of the story, “Anna grew more tired, her
headaches came oftener and harder, and she was now almost always feeling very sick.
She could not sleep much in the night” (61). Throughout the story, Anna transcends
her physical suffering to fulfill the sense of duty as a woman that her faith instills in
her and this tendency causes her to lose her health. Anna is very similar to Ma Joad
in the way she sacrifices her body to protect those around her, limited to the domestic
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realm, and the form which this sacrifice takes is her constant and perpetual
restlessness; for both women, religious belief combined with lack of material
resources through which they can aid those around them cause their willful insomnia.
Conclusions
Characters of all social positions, races, and genders have trouble sleeping and
experience insomnia, but the reasons for this troubled sleep differ from character to
character and are largely contingent upon status. Poor characters, like Ma Joad and
Anna, sacrifice their bodies through sacrificing their sleep because it is all they truly
have to give and their “giving” is limited to the domestic realm because of their
gender and class status. Similarly, John Cloud essentially sacrifices his body at the
end of Holiday by not resisting the lynching because it too is all he has. On the other
hand, characters who are in a position to use their wealth and power to give their lives
purpose come, through their insomnia, to the realization of the falsity of material
goods to provide and ensure happiness. When Anthony Patch finally gains the
financial security he desires, it does not enable him to rest and experience
unconsciousness, but rather does the opposite; it places him in a state of permanent
insomnia. Because, as Anthony realizes, the wealth is never really what he wanted,
he cannot rest easy once he has it, and at the same time, the wealth is his primary
obstacle to finding out what it is he really wants. It is a glittering distraction, keeping
him awake at night. Mrs. Moore has material wealth, but wants spiritual wealth as
well. But, like Anthony, social position (her role in a colonial empire) becomes an
obstacle. She cannot have a “pure” experience of India because of the very reasons
she has come to India in the first place, to “see” what Britain now owns. Virginia
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Hade is in a similar position of complicity with corruption, unable to be free because
of the freedoms she participates in denying to others. Virginia falls back on her
teachings, becoming the epitome of what she hates, and Mrs. Moore, with her final
revelations of futility, dies.
In all of these texts, insomnia is a chronotope of revelation and becoming. In
is in times of insomnia characters realize the falsity of social position and see status
as an obstacle to fulfillment, rather than the means to fulfillment they were socialized
to believe it is. Insomnia is the physical enactment of anomic tension created by the
visibility of realms to which individuals are denied access due to their class, race,
gender, and status. Anomie is liminal: one is trapped between desire and attainment
of desire. Likewise, the liminality of insomnia, being trapped between sleeping and
waking, reflects restlessness and discomfort in a situation where one should be able to
rest (the comfort of one’s own bed). Further complicating this dynamic is the
valorization of restlessness (though not insomnia) as a marker of productivity and
moral goodness within a capitalist paradigm. Yet, as many of the characters I have
discussed illustrate, restlessness neither fosters material productivity, nor reveals a
state of moral goodness. If anything, it gets in the way of both. Rather, the
restlessness associated with insomnia, in these literary texts, exposes the immorality
of characters like Virginia and Anthony, and the incomplete morality of others like
Mrs. Moore. And, these texts very clearly indicate the interrelationship between
morality and social position, specifically through the characters’ behaviors during and
reactions to their insomnia. The isolation and thought-time of insomnia forces these
characters to face themselves not as social beings, but as individuals forced into an
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untenable social position, but also allows them to realize the consequences of their
position. Whether that position comes with poverty, as it does for Anna or Ma Joad,
or through an abundance of material comforts, as with Virginia Hade and Anthony
Patch, insomnia foreshadows the ultimate collapse of who these characters thought
they could and should be. It does bring about reflection and revelation, but when that
revelation is obfuscated by social circumstance, the hopes brought about by such
revelation atrophy. Having insomnia without being able to learn from the insomnia
renders insomnia symbolically meaningful yet futile with regard to action and
behavior. All of these characters are doomed by their own exhaustion, which is
merely a consequence of the roles they have been expected to fill.
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CHAPTER 6

A VISION OR A WAKING DREAM: INSOMNIAC LITERATURE

John Keats closes the final stanza of his poem “Ode to a Nightingale” with
two questions: “Was it a vision, or a waking dream? / Fled is that music:—do I wake
or sleep?” (8.9-10). His uncertainty about his state of consciousness is significant.
This poem, about the liminal space between life and death, which he relates to the
space between sleeping and waking, asserts that it is from this liminal space that
poetry itself is produced. For Keats, a Romantic poet, this space allows for reverie,
and reverie for contemplation and art. Arguably, this drowsy state of reverie for the
Romantics became insomnia for the Modernists. Where Keats finds himself being
lulled to sleep, unsure of whether or not he has yet to reach unconsciousness, his
modernist counterparts find themselves vigilantly awake, wondering if they will reach
sleep at all. Yet, the liminality and significance of this space remain. The question,
“Do I wake or sleep?” remains an important one because the answer itself, as Keats
suggests through even asking this question, resists such binary classification.
Writing about authorship and the space between consciousness and
unconsciousness, Maurice Blanchot argues:
[I]t is thus toward another sort of language entirely—the language of
writing, the language of the other that, outside of everything, outside
of consciousness and unconsciousness, in the element that vacillates
between waking and reawakening, we know ourselves (not knowing
this) to be always already deported.
Of course, the separation, which seems to affect the one and
the other and divide them infinitely, can in its turn give place to a
dialectical process. (Disaster 79-80)
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This dialectical process, the vacillation between the sleeping and waking self and the
way each changes and shapes the other, for Blanchot, is also that which allows for the
language of writing. According to Peter Schwenger, “Any page of a novel is a
threshold zone, whose words simultaneously partake of the waking and the dreaming
worlds” (21). He continues, “writing always takes place in a liminal zone, neither
wholly on the page, nor wholly in the mind” (23). Insomnia, which Schwenger
characterizes as “almost always more liminal than simple wide-awakeness” (ix) and
which for many, as I discussed in the second chapter may very well be a series of
vacillations between sleeping and waking, is a time and space encompassing this
dialectical process discussed by Blanchot from which writing emerges, especially in
the Modernist period, during which insomnia was so culturally and historically
significant.
Mikhail Bahktin provides useful language through which to discuss both the
phenomenology and ontology of insomnia as it relates to authorship. Bahktin uses
the term chronotope to define the interrelationship of time and space: “We will give
the name chronotope (literally, ‘time-space’) to the intrinsic connectedness of
temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (84).
While in this definition of the chronotope, Bahktin is referring to a specific element in
the text itself (the insomniac’s experience of time when in bed awaiting sleep is an
example), the association between time and space also has significant implications for
the authorship of the text itself. Bahktin argues:
We might put it as follows: before us are two events—the event that is
narrated in the work and the event of narration itself (we ourselves
participate in the latter, as listeners or readers); these events take place
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in different times (which are marked by different durations as well)
and in different places, but at the same time these two events are
indissolubly united in a single but complex event that we might call
the work in the totality of its events, including the external material
givenness of the work, and its text, and the world represented in the
text. (255)
Thus, for Bahktin, an inextricable relationship exists among the time and space
contained within the text, the time and space of authorship, and the time and space of
readership. This relationship among these disparate chronotopes as they are related to
the phenomenological and ontological experience of insomnia, for characters,
authors, and readers, are the subject of my inquiries in this chapter.
If one were to compile a list of modernist authors, and choose from this list at
random, chances are quite good that the authors selected would be insomniacs.
Among the insomniac Modernists, we can find names such as Marcel Proust, Franz
Kafka, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and
Vladimir Nabokov, to name just a few of numerous examples. Modernists are not the
only authors to suffer insomnia, and other notable insomniacs from literary history
range from Homer and William Shakespeare to Gustave Flaubert, Fyodor
Dostoevsky, and Charles Dickens (Schwenger 149). In short, a connection appears to
exist between insomnia and authorship, and it is the nature of this connection I seek to
explore in this chapter, specifically as it relates to modernist literature.
In his 1865 text, entitled On Wakefulness, physician John Hammond proposes
a possible explanation as to why authors are more prone to insomnia than others
through making the connection among cultural refinement, propensity towards
excessive thought, and insomnia: “As nations advance in civilization and refinement,
affections of the nervous system become more frequent, because progress in these
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directions is necessarily accompanied by an increase in the wear and tear of those
organs through which perceptions are received and emotions excited” (39).
Hammond argues that despite increasing levels of material comfort and hygiene made
possible by modernization, instances of insomnia become more, not less, prevalent
specifically because of an increased stimulation of perceptive and emotional faculties.
In other words, the less one has to guard against environmental dangers, the more one
can devote time to thought, yet thought sometimes begets over-thought, which begets
insomnia. As Hammond asserts, “irregular or excessive cerebral action” leads to a
heightened propensity towards sleeplessness (40). For Hammond, a combination of
intelligence and sensitivity to perceptions of the world produce insomnia.
Accordingly, he believes that “the more active the mind the greater the necessity for
sleep, just as with a steamer, the greater the number of revolutions its engine makes
the more imperative is the demand for fuel” (12). Using mechanistic language,
Hammond not only equates mental stimulation with insomnia, but asserts that those
who are the most mentally stimulated, and therefore sleep less, should actually be
sleeping more because their mental faculties are more in need of restoration.
Hammond’s arguments derive from his theory that all bodily organs and
tissues are in a constant state of decomposition when in use, only to be remedied
through periods of rest and inactivity (11). In the case of the brain, “Its substance is
consumed by every thought, every action of the will, by every sound that is heard, by
every object that is seen, by every substance that is touched, by every odor that is
smelled, by every painful or pleasurable sensation, and so each instant of our lives
witnesses the decay of some portion of its mass and the formation of new material to
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take its place” (12). This “formation of new material” can only take place during the
comparative rest of sleep, which allows restoration of the mental faculties because not
all parts of the brain are at work. Interestingly, from Hammond’s perspective, sleep
and intellect are in a paradoxical relationship: while heightened intellect leads to
propensity to poor sleep, poor sleep leads to a reduction of intellect. He cautions,
“Upon the intellectual powers the mischief [of insomnia] is still more serious. . . .
[M]any a noble spirit has been utterly prostrated by habitual loss of rest” (43). Citing
multiple case studies of literary authors as patients whose work suffers from their
inability to sleep, the treatment he consistently finds to be most effective for restoring
“normal” sleep patterns is a hiatus from intellectual activity (43-44; 62-68).
Hammond is not alone in his association between insomnia and those who
perform mental labor. While A. W. MacFarlane, writing about a quarter of a century
later, disagrees with Hammond that those who do active brain work require more
sleep, he agrees with the correlation between high brain function and the tendency
towards sleeplessness:
The more highly-cultured races sleep for a shorter time than those in
the lower grades of civilization. Active brain-workers require, and
probably get, a smaller amount of sleep than those who are engaged in
manual labor, and still less than those who spend their days in frivolity
and idleness. They live their lives more fully. Some of the most acute
and brilliant thinkers and writers of the present day sleep
comparatively little, from the power, probably, that they posses of
concentrating their sleep (illustrating the quality of sleep). Brainworkers are peculiarly liable to sleeplessness. The cerebral cells,
being in constant use, are apt to remain active after work has been
abandoned, and while this is the case, sleep is prevented. (45)
Despite the obvious racially and economically motivated (not to mention racist and
classist) ethnocentrism of MacFarlane’s claim (as well as Hammond’s to a lesser
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degree), he makes two important points, which seem to be in conflict with each other,
and are both in contradiction with Hammond’s assertions of the correlation between
intellect and sleep requirements. MacFarlane argues that those of heightened intellect
“probably” know how to sleep more efficiently than others, and, therefore, require
less sleep, not more, as Hammond suggests. Examples such as Thomas Edison,
famous for allegedly subsisting on naps in his workshop, and Napoleon, notable for
sleeping little, but at will, come to mind (MacFarlane 44). Yet, sometimes “brainworkers” remain unable to turn off their brains, and thus, have difficulty falling
asleep, which suggests not efficient consolidation of sleep, but time relegated for
sleeping spent unwillingly awake, sometimes rather painfully as the personal, nonfiction writings of some authors suggest. Either way, MacFarlane concludes brain
workers not only get less sleep, they need less sleep. Unlike Hammond, MacFarlane
does not see reduced sleep as hampering to a powerful intellect.
Literary authors appear to have similarly divergent views on the purpose and
necessity of sleep, as expressed in their journals and other autobiographic writings.
Vladimir Nabokov, for example, expresses resentment towards the need for sleep,
seeing it as wasted, unproductive time. He values his insomnia as a necessary
component to his literary productivity because of the time it affords him to work.
Nabokov, true to form, holds nothing back in his own devaluation of sleep. In his
autobiographical work, Speak, Memory, Nabokov discusses his sleep habits and
views on the practice of sleep:
All my life I have been a poor go-to-sleeper. People in trains, who lay
their newspaper aside, fold their silly arms, and immediately, with an
offensive familiarity of demeanor, start snoring, amaze me as much as
the uninhibited chap who cozily defecates in the presence of a chatty
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tuber, or participates in huge demonstrations, or joins some union in
order to dissolve it. Sleep is the most moronic fraternity in the world,
with the heaviest dues and the crudest rituals. It is a mental torture I
find debasing. The strain and drain of composition often force me,
alas, to swallow a strong pill that gives me an hour or two of frightful
nightmares or even to accept the comic relief of a midday snooze, the
way a senile rake might totter to the nearest euthanasium; but I simply
cannot get used to the nightly betrayal of reason, humanity, and
genius. No matter how great my weariness, the wrench of parting with
consciousness is unspeakably repulsive to me. (108-09)
His case is particularly interesting in response to MacFarlane’s remarks on the ability
of the actively-minded to consolidate sleep because of his expression of his ability to
avoid sleeping whenever possible. Nabokov, not one to soften his statements for the
sake of amicability, has some sardonic words for sleep and its constituents, depicting
sleep as a conformist ritual of the avoidance of consciousness and agency. While
many texts, both literary and medical, present sleep in pleasant light, as a respite from
the worries and cares of the day, Nabokov argues that sleep is quite the opposite. It is
not only a window to viewing possible drug-induced horrors, but also a form of
“torture.” Nabokov is not the first to equate sleep with a temporary loss of the self,
which he views as a “betrayal of reason, humanity, and genius,” but he is relatively
unique in the virulence of his repulsion to this mental hiatus. By bringing in terms
like “euthanasium,” he equates the blind following of sleep-related rituals and
deference to sleep with blind participation in the fascist and dictatorial regimes he left
Europe to escape. For Nabokov, giving oneself willingly over to sleep is as absurd as
giving oneself willingly over to violent oppressors. Being a staunch anti-Freudian (he
“[rejects] completely the vulgar, shabby, fundamentally medieval world of Freud,
with its crankish quest for sexual symbols . . . and its bitter little embryos spying,
from their natural nooks, upon the love life of their parents” (Speak 20)), it stands to
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reason that Nabokov sees little value in the analysis of his unconscious thoughts or
images from his dreams. Strikingly, Nabokov also rejects the equalizing factor of
sleep, both for its biological commonality (“moronic fraternity”) and its elements of
socialization (“crudest rituals”). He does not share the insomniac’s hope of being
able to sleep “normally” like everyone else, but instead resents that he needs to sleep
like everyone else does. He may not have the power of efficiently “concentrating
[his] sleep,” to which MacFarlane alludes (though he appears to wish for it), but
certainly possesses the “liability to sleeplessness” MacFarlane describes.
Though many writers have confessed to similarly troubled sleep, not all
writers share Nabokov’s outright disdain for it. Many writers view sleep as
necessary, presenting a view more akin to that of Hammond, who argues that more
mental labor requires a greater amount of sleep. Kafka, for instance, wrote
specifically to “shut [his] eyes,” according to statements made in his journal (qtd. in
Flaherty 215), indicating his pressing desire to sleep despite it not coming easily to
him. Sleep appears to be something Kafka actively sought, and his writing was the
means through which he could release his thoughts enough to find rest. Much as the
writing instructor will often encourage his or her students to “write to discover what
you think,” Kafka needed writing to process thought, the expression of which allowed
a temporary escape.
F. Scott Fitzgerald, like Kafka and Nabokov a notorious insomniac, describes
sleep in much more seemingly pleasant terms than Nabokov does, writing in an essay
about sleep, “Sleep—real sleep, the dear, cherished one, the lullaby. So deep and
warm the bed and the pillow enfolding me, letting me sink into peace, nothingness”
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(“Sleeping” 67). Fitzgerald emphasizes the idea of sleep as an escape from the world,
one which he desires. But, his language also indicates an infantilizing of the sleeper
by referring to sleep as a “lullaby.” The bed becomes like the womb, welcoming him
back to its enclosure, to a state of stasis and inertia, such as the one Sigmund Freud
describes in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.” For Freud, humans vacillate between
life-affirming drives and life-denying drives. Freud argues that “the goal of all life is
death” and as such, life “must aspire to an old state, a primordial state from which it
once departed” (Beyond 78). Fitzgerald’s description of the comfort, security, and
encompassing enclosure of his bed evokes a sense of his desire to return to this
“primordial state” of “nothingness.” Sleep is an escape for Fitzgerald, an escape from
life into temporary death, so it would seem.
Regardless of the disparate presentations of sleep from the literary
community, some consistency does exist within the medical community. From the
nineteenth century until today, a majority of medical practitioners in the sleep field
agree that sleep is a biological necessity though they may disagree on how much
sleep is needed for any given individual (a debate that continues today). Literary
authors, on the other hand, are divided: some see writing as a means towards the
pleasant relief of sleep, while others see sleep as an obstacle to completing their
writing. While both groups acknowledge the need for sleep, they place different
values on it. The former relates sleep to biological necessity, the other to authorship.
However, my purpose in this chapter is not to debate the value of sleep, nor is
it to discuss the ways in which authors valorize or demonize sleep in their works.
Rather, my goal here is to fill a crucial gap in the connection between insomnia and

303

authorship with which I began this chapter. While MacFarlane and Hammond
overtly connect an over-active or highly intellectual mind to an increased propensity
towards insomnia, I choose to examine a variation on this theme: how does the
inability to sleep shape the productions of an over-active mind? More specifically,
what contributions does insomnia make to creativity and authorship? My objective in
this chapter is not to draw connections between the insomnia of authors and the
insomnia of characters to make biographical assumptions, but instead to illustrate the
ways in which the chronotope of insomnia structures the modernist text, both in
content and form. In other words, in this section, my desire is not to show why or
how a given character (or an author for that matter) experiences insomnia, as I have in
previous chapters; my purpose is to illustrate how the insomnia of the author relates
to the structure of the text and the experience of the reader. How is the time and
space of the author’s insomnia reflected in the time and space of the text?
MacFarlane and Hammond argue that mental activity generates insomnia; whereas, I
posit that insomnia generates the unique type of mental activity necessary and
intrinsic to the creation of texts, especially the modernist text. It does so not merely
in terms of giving one time and isolation with which to work, but also in shaping
one’s perspective in a manner that influences one’s interpretation of the world. This
insomniac interpretation of the material world of the author is then transferred onto
the author’s generation of the world of the text. The texts I will discuss in this
chapter are not simply a consequence of the author’s insomnia, nor are they a cause of
it or cure for it. Instead, they are structurally determined, at least in part, by the
phenomenology of the author’s insomnia. Features of the experience of insomnia and
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perceptual changes it allows are then represented within the text, both through the
actions and thoughts of characters and the relationship between time and space within
the text itself. Insomnia is not only a result of the creative process, but also necessary
to it both temporally and spatially, and the way in which both time and space are
experienced differently in the state of insomnia become apparent through the ways in
which modernist texts are often structured.
To this end, I plan to explore two different directions with regard to the
function of insomnia as it relates to the modernist text. One direction of inquiry deals
with the way in which the experience of insomnia shapes the text itself in terms of its
relationship to narrative time and space. Much of the reasoning behind this argument
stems from my position that there is a great deal of affinity between one’s state of
mind during a period of insomnia and one’s state of mind during the act of writing.
Both states share a liminality of subjectivity, an act of partial, yet incomplete loss of
the self. Herschel Farbman, for instance, argues that “there is no subject present in
sound sleep to whom anything might seem” (35). Just as an author transitions from
the role of subject (human, citizen, gendered body, member of a given race and class),
to the role of creator of subjectivity within his or her texts, yet remains trapped
between both states in the act of writing, the insomniac is placed in a similar position
of consciousness of the self in an attempted transition to the loss of the self sleep
entails, from being a subject in the material world to being an author of dreams in the
unconscious world. This liminal space of writing is similar to the liminal space
between sleeping and waking because of its transitory nature and the space of
movement from the mind to the page and beyond. In terms of temporality, Farbman
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argues that “Writing must go on in order to finish and finish in order to go on” (70).
The same can be said of insomnia, which both traps the subject between states of
awareness of subjectivity and loss of subjectivity, but also entails a constant
movement towards an end (sleep), as it requires that end occurs for it to exist at all
because without the need for sleep, insomnia is not possible.
The relationship between insomnia and authorship extends beyond simply the
liminality of the time and space of writing, especially in the case of the modernist
text. The phenomenological experience of insomnia shares numerous structural
features with modernist literary works. Michael Greaney explains, “Modernist
literature—stream-of-consciousness narrative, interior monologue, the absent-minded
trance of involuntary memory—can be read as dispatches from the hinterlands of
sleep, the effusions of a hyperactive mind a substantially deactivated body” (5). As
Greaney notes, some of the symptoms, or “structural features” of insomnia are
expressed in modernist literature as textual devices. Both insomnia and the modernist
text have elements similar to what one experiences during insomnia including an
intense focus on individual psychology, a heightened awareness of the passage of
time yet simultaneous sense of frozen time, a basis in the routine and everyday
experience, and a continuous vacillation between immersion in a stream of thought
and return to self-consciousness. This consciousness of oneself during insomnia
manifests as the inability of the insomniac to find true immersion in the stream of
thoughts leading towards sleep, as these thoughts are constantly disrupted by either
the self or outside stimuli. As Schwenger argues, “Sleep comes by means of the flow
of one’s thoughts, a flow that becomes a drift” (3). But, for insomnia, this “drift” is
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constantly interrupted by a return to the realization of the state of insomnia (checking
the clock, shifting positions in bed, getting up and walking around). Similarly, the
modernist text frequently breaks the reader from full immersion in the characters’
thoughts and experiences through its self-referentiality and tendency to draw attention
to its own structure and fictionality. While I completely agree with the correlations
Greaney lists between the various devices of modernist novels to the experience of
insomnia, I would posit an additional layer of correlation, and this layer is the holistic
experience of the text as also insomniac in nature, obeying larger patterns of cyclical
time and memory, as well as disruption of and immersion into streams of
consciousness.
This holistic experience of the text relates both to the relationship between
insomnia and the author, as well as insomnia and the reader. If, as I argue, the
author’s experience of insomnia structures the production of the literary text and its
use of various devices, perspectives, and temporality/spatiality, and the author
transfers this structure to the mind of the reader through the process of reading, then
the insomnia of the text is not exclusive to the author; it becomes the reader’s
insomniac perception and experience as well. Another element of my argument is to
describe the ways in which reading the modernist text transfers the experience of
insomnia to the reader. Not only does the act of reading put one into a liminal state of
mind, akin to the insomnia of authorship, but it also can engender the actual
experience of a state similar to insomnia, for example, racing thoughts, an altered
sense of the passage of time, and even anxiety or frustration. For example, Bryony
Randall argues:
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Remaining aware of clock time, of the time taken up in the practice of
reading, the reader’s attention will be only partially engaged with the
text, and will still be fully aware of external objects and pressures. At
the other end of the spectrum, losing the sense of clock time, being
immersed in the time the text describes, will be a kind of allembracing attentiveness, perhaps even involving a loss of sense of self.
(166)
Bryony Randall situates the reader, at least one who is fully immersed in the act of
reading, in a position almost similar to that of the author, in a liminal state of mind
between the text and the self. This reader can easily lose a sense of time, but can
similarly be returned to awareness of time’s passage, depending on the amount of
immersion into the text the reader experiences. Schwenger discusses a passage in
which Marcel of Swann’s Way by Marcel Proust drifts off to sleep while reading and
has a dream-like experience of himself within the text (38). Regarding Marcel’s
experience and the experience of the reader more generally, he refers to “the fusion of
the dreaming and waking states at the page’s surface” (40). For Schwenger, reading
is “the place where consciousness is taken over by something else that thinks
otherwise than do our daylight minds” (40), similar to the “nocturnal thoughts” of the
insomniac described by Elizabeth Bronfen. Bronfen argues, “[Insomniacs] open out
to an encounter with what Hegel calls the night of the world in which the self reaches
the navel of all coherent self-conceptions, where it has insight into its own
unfathomability” (159) because insomniacs are “compelled to endure a state of body
and mind that severs them from the consciousness of the day” causing them to
emerge as “a radically subjective spirit” (160). Just as the reader experiences a state
of consciousness differentiated from ordinary daytime consciousness through
immersion into reading, thus becoming a subject of the text he or she is reading, the
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insomniac also experiences an otherness of thought, becoming subject of his or her
insomnia. Our experience of the world mediates our experience and awareness of our
consciousness and perceptions, but, as I argue, there is a correlation between this
mediation as it relates to insomniac-consciousness and readership as both are related
to the slippage of subjectivity, the former towards sleep and the latter towards
immersion in the text.
To make my argument, I will examine three texts in which not only do
characters experience insomnia, but are themselves insomniac in their structure and
have the capacity to transfer this sense of insomnia to readers. These texts are James
Joyce’s Ulysses, Nabokov’s Lolita, and Richard Wright’s Black Boy. Ulysses, I will
argue, is an insomniac text both for its temporalization of day only in relation to
night, as well as through the constant alterations of stream of consciousness passages
with metafictional devices used to jar the reader out of full immersion not in the text,
but in its narration, drawing attention to the “otherness” of textual thought. Lolita
illustrates the power of insomnia as a creative force, as narrator and protagonist
Humbert Humbert uses his insomnia to create both his narrative and the character of
Lolita. As in Joyce’s novel, the daytime passages are all placed in relation to
Humbert’s night-thoughts, and the night-thoughts are those which move the novel
both forwards and backwards in time and action. Wright’s Black Boy is different
from both Ulysses and Lolita in that it is not a fictional, but rather an autobiographical
text. However, Wright’s experiences recounted through this text use the otherness of
night thought to reveal the tensions of the characters’ daytime lives, and the text is
also structured as an unending and unfulfilled, yet ultimately hopeful, quest for restful
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and secure peace. Through these texts, I will argue that significant parallels exist
both among insomnia and the production of texts, as well as the conventions of the
modernist text, and between insomnia and the experience of the reader of these texts.
Insomnia as Narrative
Literary texts are particularly useful in the understanding of insomnia both
because of their ability to illustrate the phenomenology of the insomniac experience,
as well as the similarities between the work one may do in fields such as medicine or
psychology in studying the individual character and the work an author does in
creating his or her characters. Evidence of this connection comes through the
widespread use of both the material and methodology of literature in medical and
psychological studies of sleep and insomnia. Hammond, for example, quotes Don
Quixote’s Sancho Panza to express to his readers the nature of the experience of sleep
(Wakefulness 43). Though there is often a tendency to separate conclusions and
observations drawn within art and science and view them as oppositional in both
purpose and methodology, many in the medical discipline look to literary texts as
case studies (Sigmund Freud is one notable example), as well as construct medical
texts using literary forms, such as the narrative. Additionally, many literary authors
are involved in medical practice. Notable examples include Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
and Anton Chekov, both of whom were also physicians.
In an address entitled “Shakespeare as a Guide in the Art and Practice of
Medicine” by British physician Sir St-Clair Thomson, M.D., given in 1919, St-Clair
argues that Shakespeare is “one author which every medical man should study
deeply” (901). He looks to Shakespeare for information on various aspects of the
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medical field, including a history of medicine and regard for the medical profession
(902), but also for insight into medical conditions, such as digestive disorders and
fainting (905). Of course, one of the issues on which St-Clair seeks Shakespeare’s
knowledge and experience is that of sleep. He writes, “There is one function of the
mens sana in corpora sano which I never appreciated to its full value until taught by
Shakespeare, and that is the importance of sound, sufficient and regular sleep” (908).
He continues, “Indeed, it has been suggested that the poet himself must have suffered
from sleeplessness, so vividly does he describe the horror of insomnia, so wisely does
he regard the invoking of sleep, and so warmly does he praise the value of being able
to steep our senses in forgetfulness” (908). To illustrate his point, St-Clair cites four
of Shakespeare’s plays: Macbeth, Measure for Measure, Cymbeline, and Henry IV,
Part II. From his study of Shakespeare’s work, he concludes that sleep is an underappreciated and natural “course in the cure of disease” and “that the sweat of industry
is the best soporific” (909). Through Shakespeare’s work, St-Clair draws practical
conclusions applicable to his patients, but also emphasizes the importance of using
literary works as valued educational texts providing descriptions of symptoms and
cures. The literary plays an important role in the creation of medical texts about
insomnia for a number of reasons. Such texts can effectively teach us about the
phenomenology of insomnia and the insight of authors into human experience should
not be overlooked, but more importantly the emphasize the interrelationship between
the medical and the literary. Both involve the use of narratives to explore the
phenomenological. Just as an author might describe an insomniac experience within
his or her literary work, a physician does the same in his or her case studies, as well
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as relies on the patient’s own narrative of his or her symptoms in the process of
diagnosis and treatment. Insomnia is a unique condition in that physician cannot
diagnose or treat it without the patient’s narrative. As Kenton Kroker notes, “the
physician [facilitates] treatment of what the patient already [knows] to be the
problem” (350).
In short, insomnia is a condition that both facilitates the production of
narratives, as the insomnia narrates his or her insomniac thoughts and perceptions,
and requires narratives for medical diagnosis and treatment, inasmuch as one must
describe the insomnia and its surrounding circumstances to the doctor and the doctor
attempts to generalize about the condition as it applies to both the sufferer and others
based on the patient’s narrative. One of the first insights with regard to insomnia and
the creation of texts comes with the relationship between the environmental
conditions related to insomnia and the function of these conditions for the author. To
return to the passage from Nabokov’s autobiography cited earlier, it is clear, given his
hatred of having to sleep at all, that Nabokov sees productive value in his insomnia,
and often spent “a sleepless night of verse-making” (Speak 268). Dreaded by him as
a child (Speak 266), his insomnia later became useful to his career, so that his friends
began “commending [his] nocturnal labors” (Speak 267). Part of the reason Nabokov
and writers like Fitzgerald and Kafka were able to use their insomnia productively
comes with the physical conditions insomnia affords, a combination of idleness and
isolation. For Nabokov, this time was used actively writing, at least sometimes.
For Fitzgerald, it was used for contemplation. During bouts of insomnia,
which he refers to as “a period of silence,” Fitzgerald “was forced into a measure that
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no one ever adopts voluntarily: I was impelled to think. God, it was difficult! The
moving about of great secret trunks” (“Crack-Up” 78). The “silence” for Fitzgerald
gives spatial element to his thoughts, which he can envision as concrete objects
within his mind. His imagery here is paradoxical, as it both renders thought as
something predating his awareness of it, a thing in his mind that only awaits his
“discovery” in a sense, a discovery that insomnia makes possible. Yet, at the same
time, his ability to discover these thoughts is limited, as they are locked up in “secret
trunks,” that though moveable, still remain closed. Fitzgerald continues, commenting
that he “had done very little thinking” and that, the more he thinks, the more he
realizes that “there was not an ‘I’ anymore—not a basis on which I could organize my
self respect. . . . It was strange to have no self” (“Crack-Up” 79). By maintaining
the secrecy of these “trunks” of thought, which seem to exist simultaneously within
and independent of his own mind, Fitzgerald effectively upends Descartes’ cogito:
arguing instead, “I think; therefore, I am not.” Insomnia is the point at which he is
both able to “lose” his subjectivity, but remain conscious of this loss. This experience
of loss of the self in the transference (“moving about”) of one’s thoughts reflects the
liminality of authorship, in which the author transfers thought to the page so that
these thoughts can exist external to, yet intrinsically connected with, the author’s self.
Insomnia creates an ideal circumstance for thought because it is often
experienced in a state of isolation united with idleness, as one lies in bed awaiting
sleep, which Bronfen suggests “offers a psychic state and stage for an encounter with
one’s most intimate desires and anxieties” (160), or rather forces an individual to
confront the existence of thought itself and the relationship between thought and
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awareness of existence. Virginia Woolf also discusses the way in which one’s
perspective changes both as a result of illness and time spent in bed:
[Illness] invests certain faces with divinity, sets us to wait, hour after
hour, with pricked ears for the creaking of a stair, and wreathes the
face of the absent (plain enough in health, Heaven knows) with a new
significance, while the mind concocts a thousand legends and
romances about them for which it has neither time nor taste in health.
(“Ill” 6)
For Woolf, illness changes our relationship to ourselves, and therefore others,
represented in this passage metonymically as “faces.” Significantly, it gives the ill
person the ability to authorize these “faces,” endowing them from his or her unique
perspective with a different significance, generated by the ill individual rather than
the person the face signifies. Through illness, we do not just contemplate others, but
actually create them in an image we determine, an act of authorship. While insomnia
and illness are far from synonymous, some of the significant features of illness to
which Woolf points (isolation, time spent in physical inactivity, prolonged periods of
waiting) are characteristics of insomnia as well. Woolf further notes the way the
world changes from the view of the supine, arguing that “the sky is discovered to be
something so different from this [everyday view] that it really is a little shocking”
(“Ill” 13). The combination of these two conditions of isolation and idleness
facilitates and encourages thought, but more importantly the transference of thought,
even if that thought is not necessarily desirable but inevitable, as Fitzgerald, Bronfen,
and Woolf observe.
Of these combined conditions of idleness and isolation and their resulting
influence on perception, Walter Benjamin writes:
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Among the conditions of idleness, particular importance attaches to
solitude. It is solitude, in fact, that first emancipates—virtually—
individual experience from every event, however trivial or
impoverished: it offers to the individual experience, on the high road
of empathy, any passerby whatsoever as its substitute. Empathy is
only possible to the solitary; solitude, therefore, is a precondition of
authentic idleness. (805)
Solitude allows the solitary individual to differentiate between perception and
“objective” experience. In doing so, the individual can cease to view experience
through only one lens, but rather creates a multiplicity of possibilities of reflection
from various subjective viewpoints. In other words, being able to reflect on
experience from without, not as participant, but as observer, is necessary in the
production of empathy, the ability to imagine experience from a different perspective.
To do so, one must be able to separate the experience from one’s subjective
experience of the experience. To this end, Jonathan Crary makes an interesting point,
citing the work of Hannah Arendt, specifically her text The Human Condition. Crary
writes, “For an individual to have political effectiveness, there needed to be a balance,
a moving back and forth between the bright, even harsh exposure of public activity,
and the protected, shielded sphere of domestic and private life” (21). Crary’s concern
is that with the constant influx of information and perpetual infiltration of the public
into the domestic sphere via technologies such as social networking and mobile
phones, which for many occupy a space on the bedside table when one is sleeping,
this private space for reflection is increasingly threatened. One is too busy
experiencing to ever remove oneself from that subjective position of experience.
Arendt’s concern may be with “political effectiveness,” but the same logic can apply
to writing and artistic creation. To write, one needs a separation between public and
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private, and insomnia, when one is isolated from the world, provides this isolation
(which would more have been the case in the Modernist period, where computers,
cell phones, and social networks did not offer twenty-four hour access to the public
and even fellow insomniacs). As Bryony Randall argues, “Creativity … is itself
evidence of duration” (55). Aside from images or ideas with which to work, authors
need time, time often provided by insomnia. Since literary works require reflection
on the part of the author (they do not merely transcribe events, but comment on them
as well), solitude and literary creation are most certainly closely related.
Benjamin’s argument is particularly interesting with regard to the creation of
the literary text and the author’s ability to both empathize with his or her characters to
create them and transfer this sense of empathy to readers through their own
movement of thought inasmuch as this movement is controlled by the text. He argues
that solitude is a necessary condition for empathy, and insomnia, whether in the form
of Nabokov’s active writing or Fitzgerald’s inevitable thinking, surely allows for such
solitude. Because of the change in perception solitude allows, the novelist is capable
of replacing the thoughts and mindset of the readers with those of the characters,
through a transmutation of emotion to imagery, but of course, to do so, one must first
understand emotion, made possible through empathy, a consequence of solitary
reflection. Further, the novelist can then enable his or her readers to empathize as
well. While insomnia is not necessarily intrinsic to this process for every novelist, for
some, it certainly plays an important role. The novelist can create a text in which the
reader feels as though he or she has become a part of the world of other people, thus,
separating lived experience from individual perception of experience.
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Benjamin continues, “idleness, in the bourgeois society that knows no leisure,
is a precondition of artistic production. And, often, idleness is the very thing which
stamps that production with the traits that make its relation to the economic
production process so drastic” (805-06). Though Benjamin is not very specific in this
passage as to the “relation to economic production” of the production of art, one can
conclude that he views the two as in a state of tension. Conditions of economic
production often require a very black and white relationship between activity and
inactivity. Activity means the production of material or otherwise tangible goods and
services (including tasks such as caring for children), and inactivity is a state
necessary to prepare oneself for such production, echoing the mechanistic model of
the body and its accumulation and replenishment of resources posited by Hammond.
However, in terms of economic production, no room for idleness exists outside of its
function as a time for necessary rest. As E. P. Thompson argues with regard to
capitalist ideology, “the labourer must not loiter idly” (83). He or she is rewarded
“for the productive consumption of time,” which includes time spent sleeping (91).
The laborer’s rewards, according to Thompson, “are wage incentives and expanding
consumer drives” or in other words, “palpable” (91). Even our use of the phrase
“time spent sleeping” (or doing anything else for that matter) implies time as a
commodity or a form of currency to be exchanged for a commodity. However, for
the artist, author or otherwise, reward comes not through labor, but specifically
through a uniquely productive form of idleness often provided through insomnia. A
writer’s rewards may be “palpable,” in terms of earning royalties from a financially
successful book or receiving critical praise, but often they are not. Rewards come in
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the form of the ability to cultivate and express insight if only to oneself—a reward
that cannot be measured or understood in material terms.
Thus far, a clear correlation exists between the insomnia of authors, the
solitude and idleness it engenders, and the realizations of empathy and insight
available only through such solitary and idle thoughts. It places the author in a
liminal state, not dissimilar to the process of writing itself (Schwenger xii). As
Schwenger observes, the processes of reading and writing are similar in their
liminality: “While literature is here the means of understanding liminal states, the
reverse is also true: liminal states throughout are used to speak of the ways in which
literature is itself is a liminal state, for the writer and the reader” (xii). Therefore, not
only does insomnia provide the conditions by which the empathy and insight
necessary to literary creation are cultivated, but the liminality of insomnia also
mimics the processes of both writing and reading. Much as an insomniac often loses
control of his or her thoughts, as they drift from present, past, and future, the reader’s
internal voice is replaced by that of the text. Additionally, for the reader there is
dissociation between material conditions (the physical reading environment) and the
mental production of the world of the text.
Bronfen writes that insomnia and its related “nocturnal thinking,” “seeks to
explore a scene of philosophy in which our eyes are open, our hearing alert, our spirit
attentive, our words ready for a mobilization that is as yet uncertain, even while
drawing its strength from the certainty that the morning is still a long way off” (161).
The author is one who can “mobilize” the uncertain words and put forth the “scene of
philosophy” experienced through his or her “nocturnal thinking.” Bronfen argues that
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night is “a privileged site for an existential openness to the other, to being outside and
beyond material existence, which is also the domain of modern textuality” (22).
Again, Woolf expresses a similar insight with regard to illness, emphasizing its ability
to change our perceptions by leaving us alone with them (“Ill” 23). The author is able
through both authorship and insomnia to be open to the other through both the
experience of and creation of the other. Because a text creates its own reality, the text
exists outside of the objective material world of day-to-day life; insomnia creates a
passageway to this world.
Literature, then, is in a unique position not only to confer empathy towards
characters on the reader through eliciting the character’s thoughts in the reader’s
mind, but also the mental state of the author himself or herself, mitigated further
through the narrator, as the author’s words in the narrator’s voice replace the reader’s
internal monologue and the text’s scenes replace the reader’s environment. Further,
literature can also give expression to the author’s physical, as well as mental state.
Woolf, in her essay “On Being Ill” writes of her astonishment that most authors do
not choose to write about experiences of illness, which she finds surprising given the
power of the body to influence one’s perceptions of the world:
All day, all night the body intervenes; blunts or sharpens, colours or
discolours, turns to wax in the warmth of June, hardens to tallow in the
murk of February. The creature within can only gaze through the
pane--smudged or rosy; it cannot separate off from the body like a
sheath of a knife of the pod of a pea for a single instant; it must go
through the whole unending procession of changes, heat and cold,
comfort and discomfort, hunger and satisfaction, health and illness,
until there comes the inevitable catastrophe; the body smashes itself to
smithereens, and the soul (it is said) escapes. But of all this daily
drama of the body there is no record. People write always of the
doings of the mind; the thoughts that come to it; its noble plans; how
the mind has civilised the universe. They show it ignoring the body in
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the philosopher’s turret; or kicking the body, like an old leather
football, across leagues of snow and desert in pursuit of conquest or
discovery. Those great wars which the body wages with the mind a
slave to it, in the solitude of the bedroom against the assault of fever or
the oncome of melancholia, are neglected. (4-5)
In this passage, Woolf notes the power the body has over the mind of the writer,
especially when it “enslaves” the mind, or in other words, the body and mind are in
conflict, as in the case of insomnia. The body does not necessarily compose the
perceptions of the individual on its own, yet the ill body produces a distinctive lens
through which experience is mediated and, therefore, perception is filtered. Often,
argues Woolf, we can pretend the body does not exist as it is related to thought—
thoughts exist independently of the body, in a different realm. But, illness forces us
to realize this correlation, as we can no longer separate physical condition from
mental condition. It is not so much that this relationship does not exist in “normal”
healthy daily experience, but that a body that does not draw attention to itself through
pain renders itself ignorable. Woolf also points particularly to this battle between
mental and bodily awareness happening in the bedroom, which is suggestive of the
sleep space as battle ground, and later refers to sleeplessness as a potential literary
“villain” (6). Insomnia, as a condition of or akin to illness, draws the insomniac’s
attention to the easily underestimated relationship between bodily sensation and
perception. Most importantly, Woolf’s acknowledgement of literature’s tendency to
devalue the physical body, despite the body’s power to influence thought and
behavior, particularly when it malfunctions, illustrates her era of writing as a possible
turning point in literature. Earlier in this essay, she acknowledges the work of
Thomas DeQuincey, given his writing about his experiences with opium abuse, as
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one of the few exceptions to the general neglect of the body in literature, and her
insomniac contemporary Proust as the one of the only to address bodily concerns with
any sense of depth, but asserts that there is a general lack of such writing (4). Woolf
is ultimately illustrating the importance of bodily states and sensations in influencing
perception and interpretation, but also calling on authors to give the body the
prominent role it deserves in literature because of the prominent role of the body in
daily life and experience. Because insomnia is both a physical and mental
experience, the fact that it should be incorporated into texts in the ways Woolf
suggests, as a means of “[gazing] through the pane” of the body, it would seem that
her contemporaries agree with her argument, and incorporate bodily experience, via
insomnia to literary texts, more so in the Modernist period than previous literary eras.
If we then add to the structural qualities of the modernist text Woolf’s desire to give
the body its own source of expression in the literary work, we can see why insomnia
becomes so crucial to the modernist novel. It combines bodily and psychological
experience during a specific historical time and place.
Insomniac Structures
To describe a model for the way that insomnia can structure texts, and more
specifically the modernist text, it is useful to describe the experience of insomnia
first. While not all insomniacs have the same experience and the experience of
insomnia is often linked to other aspects of one’s subjectivity such as class or gender,
it is informative to have a general model in mind. Take, for example this passage
from the “Penelope” section of Joyce’s Ulysses:
frseeeeeeeefronnnng train somewhere whistling the strength those
engines have in them like big giants and the water rolling all over and
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out of them all sides like the end of Loves old sweet sonnnng the poor
men that have to be out all night from their wives and families in those
roasting engines stifling it was today Im glad I burned the half of those
Freemans and Photo bits leaving things like that lying around hes
getting very careless and threw the rest of them up in the W C Ill get
him to cut them tomorrow for me instead of having them there for the
next year to get a few pence for them have him asking wheres
Januarys paper and all those old overcoats I bundled out of the hall
making the place hotter than it is the rain was lovely just after my
beauty sleep I thought it was going to get like Gibraltar my
goodness… (754-55)
Molly Bloom’s internal monologue relating her thoughts during a bout of insomnia
presents a microcosm of many of the features that one could include in an insomniac
literary text. The first feature is the text’s relationship to temporality, associating the
action of the text specifically to sleep, but even more specifically to sleep as a
woman, as she considers the concept of “beauty sleep.” Significantly, the text is not
related to sleep in general but sleep during a specific time and space, as her insomniac
thoughts are influenced by her surroundings, indicated by their shift as a result of the
train’s whistle and her thoughts regarding her home. Time is presented both
chronologically, and cyclically, as her mind races forward in time, planning a future,
imagined conversation with her husband, yet also backwards through her memory.
She is simultaneously lulled into this stream of consciousness, yet jarred out of it by
external factors, including the sound of the train and the warmth of her house. She is
also notably empathetic in this passage, as the sound of the train reminds her of the
situation of its workers, as they remain separate from their loved ones at night. Her
thoughts are blurred together, as they race forward with no discernible separation,
indicated by the lack of punctuation. Finally, while the diction, syntax, and pace of
the passage suggest anxiety and frustration through the fast pace of this whole
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section, she still acknowledges positive consequences to insomnia as she uses it to
contemplate her future plans.
If one were to stretch the features included in Joyce’s passage over the course
of a novel, it would invariably be a novel structured by insomnia; similarly, even
reading this passage conveys to the reader the sense of anxiety and frustration she
feels as she lies awake. Many modernist texts encompass some of the features of this
passage, including cyclical time, intense focus on psychology, and fragmentary
experience, and when used in combination, the texts can provide a structural literary
model of the experience of insomnia. To begin, there are numerous examples of
modernist texts that open with an awakening, or in other words a body separated from
sleep. Ulysses is one such example: “Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the
stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and razor lay crossed” (3-4).
The novel then proceeds to describe his morning routine and breakfast. Joyce
doubles this theme of awakening by reproducing a similar scene in the opening of the
first section of the second book of the novel (“Calypso”) with the novel’s protagonist,
Leopold Bloom, preparing breakfast for himself while his wife Molly remains asleep
in their bedroom upstairs (55). While this text does not open with the actual
experience of insomnia, it does open with a significant feature of insomnia:
wakefulness related to the sleeping state. By situating the novel temporally in the
morning, the wakefulness of the text is placed in direct contrast to sleep; the
characters were recently asleep, but now they are awake. The wakefulness is not
independent of sleep, but has a closely implied relationship to it.
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Similarly, Nabokov’s Lolita begins with awakening as well, but an awakening
of a different sort: sexual awakening. As the novel proper opens (I am temporarily
excluding Nabokov’s ironic forward written by the fictional John Ray, Jr., Ph.D.)
with the lines, “Lolita, light of my life, fire of my loins” (9), “Lolita” has clearly
ignited the narrator’s sexual urges, awakening him in ways he has not experienced
since his pubescence. The opening line of the second paragraph, “She was Lo, plain
Lo, in the morning…” (9) again emphasizes her role as a stimulant through the
immediate connection of Lolita with the morning itself. His reference to her in the
morning situates her memory as closely related to his nighttime experiences. She is
not just “plain Lo” but only “plain Lo” “in the morning.” “Lo” itself is one of the
many variations of her character; others include Lolita, Lola, Dolly, Dolores, and
Mrs. Richard F. Schiller. Much as it begins with Humbert’s sexual re-awakening
courtesy (he alleges) of Lolita, the novel ends with Humbert preparing for his death,
essentially putting both himself and the writing of novel to rest. Yet, his last thoughts
are not of death as sleep, but rather the perpetuity of immortality, another sort of
unending wakefulness, as he writes, “I am thinking of aurochs and angels, the secret
of durable pigments, prophetic sonnets, the refuge of art. And this is the only
immortality you and I may share, my Lolita” (309). Using words like “durable” and
“immortality,” this passage evokes a sense of the unending. Bronfen writes,
“Insomnia draws attention to the threshold between ordinary diurnal thinking and
nocturnal recognition relentlessly focused on the nothingness subtending all earthly
existence” (161). The opening and closing passages of Lolita make the same
associations when put together, first with the ordinary, everyday morning vision of
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Lo, and then with Humbert’s consciousness of the end of his earthly existence and the
possibilities of what he may leave behind.
Ulysses, as well, ends not with sleep, but with a sense of the infinite. It begins
with awakening, but ends with insomnia. As Bill Hayes notes, Homer’s The Odyssey
ends with Penelope and Odysseus preparing for bed: “Wary of being deceived by the
gods, Penelope forces Odysseus to reveal the ‘great secret’ of their marriage bed. . . .
Immovable, literally rooted to the earth, the bed is the center of their home, symbolic
of their love for one another” (Hayes 79). Odysseus’ proof of knowledge of this
secret allows both he and his wife to finally get some sleep, together. Joyce has a
different (and I would argue uniquely modernist) variation on this ending, in his own
revision of Homer’s work, which ends not with rest, but with insomnia. The last
section of the novel (“Penelope”) consists solely of Molly’s train of thought as she
lays awake in bed, thinking over her many secrets and those of her husband (the
passage I cited earlier was just a short part of a very long sequence). Ulysses takes
place over the course of a single day. Joyce’s decision to use this diurnal temporality
implies the importance of the presence of sleep to the text. Molly’s wakefulness is
not simple, everyday wakefulness, but rather wakefulness specifically engendered
through the absence of sleep. In other words, the novel does not end with Molly
being awake, but rather with her being unable to sleep. Her husband joins her in bed
later in the section, and the presence of the sleeping Bloom next to her, whom she
wishes would “sleep in some bed by himself with his cold feet on me give us room
even to let a fart God or do the least thing better yes hold them like that a bit on my
side piano quietly sweeeee theres that train far away pianissimo eeeeeeee one more
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song…” (763), reminds Molly of both her inability to sleep and the constraints which
her marriage places upon her (also note the shift in thoughts from contemplation to
material circumstance, as her stream of thoughts is again interrupted by the train’s
whistle). Joyce uses insomnia as an ending to illustrate the perpetuity and seemingly
infinite nature of Molly’s thoughts, but also to relate the daily life of Bloom and
Molly to their sleep habits. His decision to make Molly an insomniac in this scene,
rather than united in separate sleep with Bloom is perhaps indicative of this text’s
modernity—their bed does not contained their shared secrets, but their separate ones,
making them fragmentary, even as a couple sharing a single sleeping space.
Though Wright’s Black Boy is different from Ulysses and Lolita in that it is an
autobiographical, rather than fictional text, like both it begins with an awakening and
ends with a failure to sleep. The first words of the text are “One winter morning in
the long-ago, four-year-old days of my life…” (3). Through this allusion to the
morning, Wright opens the text with an awakening, situating the autobiography in
direct relation to sleep. In the passage to come, one in which Richard attempts a
prank and accidentally sets fire to his family’s home, Richard is awakened both to the
discrepancy between intent and outcome, as well as to the complexity of the
relationship with his family. He will not get too much rest after this opening
sequence as his social, self, and familial conflicts gain traction throughout his
adolescence. Again like Ulysses and Lolita, the ending of this novel tends towards
the infinite. The text closes with the following paragraph: “I would hurl words into
this darkness and wait for an echo, and if an echo sounded, no matter how faintly, I
would send other words to tell, to march, to fight, to create a sense of hunger for life
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that gnaws in us all, to keep alive in our hearts a sense of the inexpressibly human”
(384). Much like the closing passage of Lolita, in which Humbert claims to share
immortality with Lolita through his words, Wright creates a similar sense of the
perpetual vigilance of language, but specifically language moving through darkness.
Like Nabokov, he gives words agency, or at least hopes they have the ability to carry
out his wishes even when he cannot. While people may sleep, words do not, and can
carry with them the power of the infinite. Though this closing passage does not deal
explicitly with sleep (incidentally other sections of the text do specifically describe
Wright’s failure to sleep as related to hunger that “gnaws” in him), it does suggest an
unending wakefulness through the text itself.
Thus far, I have given examples of modernist texts that utilize awakening and
insomnia to temporally situate the novels, thereby connecting the texts both to sleep
and to diurnal rhythms. What I have not yet explained is what makes this tendency
specifically Modernist, as certainly plenty of examples of texts from any given
literary period include similar imagery, though not necessarily similar structure. As I
have posited, the beginning of Modernist period came with the outbreak of World
War I. This temporal connection is of particular importance to my argument, as I
have argued in my first chapter. Additionally, the amount of people made physically
and mentally ill because of the war, either because of physical or psychological
trauma made the perceptual changes Woolf explains as part of the experience of
illness a widespread phenomenon. As Trudi Tate argues, any modernist literature
written after 1914 is inevitably war literature (3).
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Such widespread helplessness, both for soldiers and civilians, perhaps
contributed to a new sort of narrative developed during the Modernist period, a type
of narrative that speaks to feelings of anxiety, frustration, and immobility. Greaney
refers to this type of narrative as:
[T]he “world-from-a-bed” tradition in twentieth-century literature, a
tradition in which the spectacle of modernity is glimpsed not from the
boulevard but from the bedroom. Unlike the flâneur, that mobile
eyewitness of the modern cityscape, the horizontal subject is distanced
from the spectacle of modernity in ambiguous ways. On the one hand,
this figure is luxuriously insulated from the demeaningly humdrum
chores of everyday work and survival: the world-from-a-bed narrative
traces the workings of a mind that is conscious of everything except
the body to which it belongs. On the other, horizontality can be an
unenviable predicament, one that speaks of infirmity, paralysis, and
claustrophobic immobilization. (4-5)
Just as I have argued in previous chapters that the insomnia is a bodily manifestation
of social mores, expectations, identity categories and anxieties, Greaney’s observation
creates a similar correlation between lived-experience and narrative structure. The
anxiety and changes in the experience of temporality World War I fostered became a
new sort of narrative, one from which an anxious, immobile person, isolated from yet
a witness to the everyday, narrates from a position of reclusion. This reclusion may
be physical, as is the case of Proust’s Marcel in In Search of Lost Time, but it may
also be metaphorical. Take Humbert Humbert as an example: one may read him not
as an urban flâneur, but as an American flâneur, as he travels the country observing
the various idiosyncrasies of American culture. However, these observations are
made specifically from a series of beds, or, more specifically, the various motel
rooms in which he stays, so he is more of the horizontal flâneur Greaney describes.
While he is exploring American culture, he is never integrated into it or interacting
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with it as the true flâneur does. Rather, he is “luxuriously insulated” from the
everyday, avoiding any sort of “normal” daily existence. Additionally, his obsessive
love for Lolita renders him immobile, claustrophobic, fearful and anxious.
This new post-war sense of temporality that shaped the societies in which
modernist authors lived is still present in their texts. They do so especially through
the endings of their texts, which I have discussed earlier. Humbert speaks of a love
for Lolita that transcends time. Since this love has been the essence of his
destruction, images of devastation and the infinite are used in combination. Susan
Mizruchi argues that there is a connection between Humbert’s (“a European refugee”)
experience of both the first and second world wars and his sense of time: “In part
because he is so anxious about the passing of time, Humbert, is obsessed with dates.
Throughout the narrative, he keeps us informed of the year, sometimes the date and
weather, and even the seasonal peculiarities of the place he happens to be” (632). His
obsession with dates and times provides evidence of his anxiety over time, trying to
retain some sense of control and awareness over something that is clearly beyond his
grasp. Joyce, through his fragmentation of the marriage of Bloom and Molly,
illustrated through his twist on the ending of Homer’s The Odyssey, illustrates the
ignorance and confusion, as well as discontinuous sense of temporality of their daily
lives. Wright ends his autobiography with a sense of never-ending battle, through his
use of words such as “march” and “fight.” Though none of the authors I have cited in
this chapter were directly involved in the conflict of World War I, the war’s influence
on their experience of disrupted temporality and continuity, which I discuss in detail
in the introductory chapter, is evident in all three texts.
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Another relationship between the modernist text and the experience of
insomnia comes through the text’s use of temporality, not by day-night associations,
but rather through a vacillating movement between past, present, and future. Also as
I posit in the introductory section, insomnia before the war was often an insomnia of
anxiety regarding the future. Yet, in the modernist insomniac passage, we see
insomnia as fixated not only on the future, but also on the present and past. Eluned
Summers-Bremner describes the insomniac’s experience of time:
In its unpredictability, insomnia brings that idiosyncrasy back to the
insomniac’s small world of one—no one knows when the sleep train
will arrive, or the thought-light go out—yet, intriguingly, it also
mimics industrial modernity, transposing into the night world
operations that have become routine in the day. Like the factoryowner, insomnia thinks ahead and, once started on its labours, builds a
senseless momentum. Like the bells and timers factory-owners
installed to track worker productivity, insomnia refuses to allow us to
be oblivious to our surroundings, to the fact of night. The clock’s
strike or digital display repeatedly jolts or frustrates us. (122)
Summers-Bremner’s discussion of sleep as a train is certainly relevant to Molly’s
inclusion of the sound of the train in her insomniac thoughts, as she unites regulated,
external time with her own experience of time in bed. In her description of the
insomniac’s experience of time, Summers-Bremner raises several key points.
Initially, she notes that as much as we seek to regulate and designate the use of time,
insomnia makes all such systems of order futile, as we can see in the chaotic nature of
Molly’s thoughts. Similarly, Humbert may be hyper-vigilant with regard to dates,
seasons, and years, but this acknowledgement does not prevent Lolita’s aging beyond
the realm of the “nymphet.” Similarly, the insomniac may diligently set aside eight
hours for sleep in his or her schedule, but that does not ensure eight hours of sleep
will take place, nor does the constant thought “If I fall asleep now, I can still get X
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hours of sleep…” ensure any sort of control over sleep quantity. Insomnia also, as
Summers-Bremner states, “brings the day into the night,” which occurs in various
ways dependent upon the insomniac, who may, on the one hand, spend insomniac
time considering daytime worries or may give up on sleep altogether and become
active in doing some type of work or leisure activity typically done during standard
waking hours. Further, while the insomniac may become temporarily lost in a train of
thought, he or she is always brought back to an awareness of the passage of time,
making the night seemingly both endless and all too fast, as hours of potential sleep
pass away. Time stands still and moves ahead independent of our wants or desires.
What Summers-Bremner describes here in relation to time is an ebb and flow
of the insomniac’s thoughts, as they drift from daytime cares or memories of the past
to future worries and anxiety over the ever-shortening time left to sleep. However,
control of these thoughts, much like control over time, is beyond the insomniac’s
powers. The insomniac’s consciousness moves from immersion in a stream of
thought to a return to the surface world with realizations of time’s passage. Further
complicating matters is an idea I discussed in the second chapter, the idea that
insomniacs often sleep more than they realize. So, part of the insomniac’s experience
may well be loss of consciousness without consciousness of consciousness’s loss.
This cyclical forward and backward movement both through time and states of
consciousness mirrors our actual cycles of sleep, an important subject of inquiry
pursued by one of the foremost sleep researchers during the Modernist period,
Nathaniel Kleitman. As Kleitman argues regarding his observations after nearly forty
years of research, which began in the 1920s:
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While water and ice are as easily distinguished from each other as
wakefulness is from sleep, in both situations temperature data can
furnish valuable information. Liquid water may be close to freezing,
with its molecules rather sluggish, or it may be near the boiling point,
its molecules about to erupt into steam; ice may be about to melt or it
may be very cold. And so it is with sleep and wakefulness. The depth
of sleep is not the same throughout the night, and by the use of various
criteria, depth-of-sleep curves have been plotted. (678)
In this passage, Kleitman notes the distinction between sleep and waking, but also the
slippery nature of this distinction. David Randall explains the cycles to which
Kleitman alludes further: “Researchers . . . realized that sleep is made up of five
distinct stages that the body cycles through over roughly ninety minute periods” (23).
These stages include the first stage, in which the sleep is “so light that if you wake up
from it, you night not realize that you have been sleeping”; the second stage, which
marks a transition from light to deep sleep; the third and fourth stages of deep sleep
(the fourth stage is “the farthest your brain travels from conscious thought”); and the
fifth, REM stage, is “when most dreams occur” (D. Randall 23). Incidentally,
Kleitman is the researcher best known for having made famous the “discovery” of
REM sleep. The body then repeats this cycle of ascent and descent from and to
unconsciousness multiple times through the hours spent sleeping. Additionally,
dreams occupy the space in the sleep cycle closest to reawakening—they are both
phenomenologically and temporally the closest to consciousness.
If we apply this sleep cycle to the cyclical thoughts of the insomniac, we can
see the progression of “light” insomnia, where the insomniac has not yet realized he
or she will not be sleeping (when exactly does not yet having fallen asleep become
insomnia, after all?). Then, the second stage connotes a realization of insomnia. The
“deepest” stages of insomnia (comparable to stages three and four of the sleep cycle)
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are reflected in the insomniac’s seemingly endless train of thought, which typically
alternates between past and future, and in some cases, even unconsciousness. The
final, lightest stage of sleep mirrors the insomniac’s return to awareness of his or her
current condition of insomnia and the passage of measurable clock time. While this
cycle of insomnia is more idiosyncratic than sleep cycles in terms of time spent in
each phase, the relationship between the insomniac and his or her consciousness
fluctuates throughout the period of insomnia. Keeping in mind that the widespread
illness and disorder brought about by World War I created a new awareness of the
physical body in shaping perception and experience, it makes sense that the modernist
literary text displays a close relationship between the bodily experience of insomnia
and reflects this experience through the narrative.
Another way through which the structure of the modernist literary work can
both illustrate for and cultivate in readers a sense of insomnia is the presentation of
temporality as cyclical. Molly, for instance, moves from present to past to future in
her thoughts. Additionally, time in the final pages of Ulysses is not only cyclical, but
simultaneously frozen and moving rapidly. The time it seems to take to fall asleep
when one has insomnia appears to be unending. Yet, a hyper-awareness of time’s
passage (watching a clock, or hearing church bells marking the passage of hours)
makes time appear to fly, despite the sense of its standing still. The process of
insomniac thought Molly’s passage describes mimics the cycles of sleep, albeit
broken sleep, so that these circadian rhythms become distorted. While these cycles
are cycles of sleep, they also mirror the various stages of insomnia as presented in
literary texts. The first stage is a liminal one—the point at which one is moving from
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simple wakefulness to the realization of insomnia. The second is a transition into the
deeper stages of insomnia, as marked by the stream of consciousness flow of memory
(third and fourth stages). The fifth stage is the stage of moving from insomnia to
wakefulness, as in the case of Molly becoming aware of Bloom’s entrance to the
bedroom or the bells and train whistles outside.
In Ulysses, Molly’s experience of insomnia demonstrates the cycle I have just
described. Her thoughts jump from present to past to future, and are disrupted by
outside noises (the train whistle and the church bells) (726; 772) and the presence of
Bloom sleeping near her (771). She tries to sleep, but finds herself unable to do so,
and as she struggles, she becomes aware of time’s passage: “theres Georges church
bells wait 3 quarters the hour wait 2 oclock well thats a nice hour of the night for him
to be coming home at” (772). Molly continues, “a quarter after what an unearthly
hour I suppose theyre just getting up in China now . . . let me see if I can doze off
12345 what kind of flowers are those they invented…” (781). This section lacks any
punctuation until the very end, illustrating the racing thoughts of the insomniac.
Molly’s mind shifts from counting to flowers with no transition; all of her thoughts
blend into each other. Additionally, though much of the content of the passage is
focused on the past, as she traces the origins of her relationships with both Bloom and
Blazes Boylan, the passage also indicates a heightened awareness of time, as the
church bells remind of her the lateness of the hour. Though Molly expresses
frustration at her inability to sleep, the passage ends on positive hopeful note, as she
remembers accepting both Bloom’s marriage proposal in the past and says “Yes” in
acceptance of their future and the possibility of a simultaneous future with Boylan:
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“yes I said yes I will Yes.” (783). The final line of the story places past “said,”
future “will,” and present statement “Yes” in association with each other, much as her
insomnia makes her experience past, future, and present simultaneously.
Of course, the example of Molly’s insomnia is just that, a literal case of
insomnia, with all of its movements from past to present and to getting lost in thought
to an awareness of time’s passage and the external world. On a larger scale,
Nabokov’s Lolita follows a similar pattern with relation to temporality. According to
Elizabeth Prioleau, in Lolita “time and space move backward, doubles proliferate,
language fractures into new combinations” (428). She continues, “Central to man’s
condition, Nabokov believes, is an imprisonment in time which is ‘spherical and
without exits’ (Memory, p. 10)” (429). Nabokov’s sense of time is that of the
insomniac and is evident in the way Humbert constructs his narrative. The novel
begins with Humbert’s framing of the past as he traces the origins of his pedophilia to
a, possibly imagined, childhood relationship with a young girl named Annabel Leigh
(an obvious allusion to Edgar Allan Poe’s famous poem, “Annabel Lee”). While
initially, the opening sections of the novel immerse the reader in Humbert’s
remembrances of the past, these visions of his past are then connected to his anxieties
over his present and fears of the future:
I leaf again and again through these miserable memories, and keep
asking myself, was it then, in the glitter of that remote summer, that
the rift in my life began; or was my excessive desire for that child only
the first evidence of an inherent singularity? When I try to analyze my
own cravings, motives, actions and so forth, I surrender to a sort of
retrospective imagination which feeds the analytic faculty with
boundless alternatives and which causes each visualized route to fork
and re-fork without end in the maddeningly complex prospect of my
past. (13)
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Humbert’s writing of his own experience of having memories is significantly related
to the experience of insomnia on many levels. Notably, the past, the future, and the
present are not separated for Humbert, but are complexly interconnected. He is
looking to his past to find something about his present, but also trying to find his
present in his past. He views his past as complex, yet its complexity lies in the future
movement of his constantly multiplying attempts at analysis. This cycling between
past, present, and future analysis of the past represents the insomniac’s drift into
streams of consciousness in which memories and anxieties become intertwined.
Another important feature of this passage is Humbert’s seemingly infinite
capacity to analyze. He can find no conclusion to his thoughts, as they multiply and
build on each other, or, as he puts it “fork and re-fork without end.” Even the word
“re-fork” is suggestive, as a “re” implies a return to something or a repetition, yet “reforking” is also a movement forward, infinitely replicated. Here, Humbert’s analysis
of his own thought process expresses a sense of over-determination. Gilles Deleuze
and Félix Guattari argue that “the unconscious itself [is] fundamentally a crowd”
(29). In their terms, “the Wolf is the pack” (31). While Nabokov, whom I have
described earlier as virulently anti-Freudian, in this passage rejects any simple one-toone correlation between symbol and meaning, the idea of images from the
unconscious having this infinite capacity for meaning as proposed by Deleuze and
Guattari makes sense. For Humbert, every image or memory creates an infinite
amount of related ideas that can split into endlessly different directions (one can
understand Nabokov’s affinity for the writings of Jorge Luis Borges). So, while the
actual narrative itself is constrained to what is on the page, Humbert implies infinite
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possibilities of meaning that lay underneath the narrative structure, as well as the
temporal consequences of finding oneself lost in perpetual over-analysis.
The passage from Lolita is a microcosm of the text itself. The novel
consistently drifts back and forth between Humbert’s memories and his attempts to
editorialize and analyze himself and his actions in the context of those memories. As
he becomes immersed in the past, retelling the story, awareness of the present and
future is constantly interspersed, primarily in the form of an address to the text’s
audience of the future, treating them as though they are listening in the present. For
example, immediately upon narrating the process of his search for Lolita after she has
left him, he writes, “This book is about Lolita; and now that I have reached the part
which (had I not been forestalled by another internal combustion martyr) might be
called “Dolorès Disparue,” there would be little sense in analyzing the three empty
years that followed” (253). This is not the first instance in which Humbert creates
another fictional text from his own text, a future book derived both from his past
experience and future completion of his current narrative. Here, both Humbert and
the reader are brought out of the memory to both the present and the future.
Humbert’s consciousness drifts from his past (and his disruptive habit of overanalyzing that past) to his concerns of both the present (his writing of the narrative
and the elements essential to it), as well as the future (the imagined reader’s
experience of the text). Humbert can only predict a future audience, as he
apostrophizes to Lolita, “neither of us is alive when the reader opens this book” (309).
His thoughts are very much a combination of past, present and future, and there is a
forwards and backwards cyclical movement throughout the text.
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Thus far, we have a beginning of the text that slowly integrates us into the
world of the pedophile, just as the insomniac slowly realizes he or she will not be
sleeping much on a given night, which I have characterized as the first stages of
insomnia. Humbert’s thoughts drift towards the past throughout the text, and often
get lost in this past, as an insomniac may temporarily become lost in a stream of
consciousness, which are the deeper stages of insomnia. Yet, this same movement
towards the past is constantly reunited with the present and the passing of time
towards the end of Humbert’s life (he knows, as he writes, that he will soon be
executed, another move reminiscent of Poe). At the very end of the novel, Humbert
is completely removed both from an immersion in his act of narration and brought
back to the surface world, as he realizes the “real-world” consequences of his writing
in the form of a possible embarrassment of the now dead (but he does not know she is
dead) Lolita, as well as his imminent death. Nabokov, of course, further complicates
this schema through his inclusion of “John Ray, Jr., Ph.D.’s” opening remarks, telling
readers that “’Mrs. Richard F. Schiller’ died in childbed,” (4), which foretells of
Lolita’s death before Humbert’s narrative has even begun, yet forestalls the reader
from knowledge of this event until he or she has neared the end of the text and learns
of Lolita’s marriage to Richard Schiller (in the case of a reader with an extremely
astute memory), or, more significantly, the reader re-reads the text, beginning the
cycle anew, but now with the knowledge that Lolita has been doomed to an early
demise from the start. Even his act of requiring the reader to re-read the text to have
a more complete grasp of its implications is insomniac in nature. Insomnia relies on
the disruption of cyclical patterns of sleeping and waking; Lolita is similarly
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disruptive, not allowing the reader to “rest” at the end of the text, but requiring that he
or she return again to the start, to a re-awakening of the text with the newfound
knowledge that Lolita has died before it has all begun.
Most significantly contributing to the insomniac temporal structure of this
novel is Humbert’s project of producing Lolita. Carol Shloss relates Nabokov’s past
experience with the way in which he links temporality and textuality in the
production of texts:
Though [exile from Russia] deprived him of opulence and aristocratic
prerogatives, these losses were important not because they caused
discomfort, but because they engendered a perspective: loss of
childhood homeland became, for Nabokov, a model for all losses of
time, and his subsequent vulnerability a spur to re-examine the nature
of wealth and the methods of recouping the tangible world’s
disintegration. (224)
Perhaps Nabokov hated sleep for a related reason: it is lost time. So, Humbert, a
chronic insomniac, often uses his sleep-time to produce the Lolita he desires in
numerous ways I will describe. Schloss continues, “Nabokov plays consistently with
the analogy between building identity and building a text, and asserts in both
instances his invulnerability to misfortune” (225). Much as the text is a production of
Lolita, it is also a production of himself, as he begs of the reader, “Imagine me; I shall
not exist if you do not imagine me” (129). Like Fitzgerald, his thoughts alone do not
make real his existence. Only the reader’s thoughts can do so. Humbert clearly
presents his constructed text as a guard against his separation from Lolita, not while
alive, but in the afterlife. His story is meant to immortalize their relationship, but also
to present it in the carefully shaded light under which he has crafted his narrative.
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In introducing both his pedophilia and the profile of the “nymphet,” Humbert
makes several notable references to the relationship of the nymphet to time. For
instance, he writes, “[In my description of the nymphet] it will be marked that I
substitute time terms for spatial ones. In fact, I would have the reader see ‘nine’ and
‘fourteen’ as the boundaries--the mirrory beaches and rosy rocks--of an enchanted
island haunted by those nymphets of mind and surrounded by a vast, misty sea” (16).
In this passage, time has a tangible presence, manifesting in the physical transition to
and then from “nymphet” within a certain age window. Similarly, for the insomniac,
the hours of going to bed and having to emerge from bed to face another day, are
similar boundaries of insomnia. Further, he writes, “the elusive, shifty, soulshattering, insidious charm that separates the nymphet from coevals of hers as are
incomparably more dependent on the spatial world of synchronous phenomena than
on that intangible island of entranced time where Lolita plays with her likes” (17). To
recognize a nymphet, “You have to be an artist or a madman, a creature of infinite
melancholy” (17). Again, we see Humbert producing the nymphet out of a
coincidence of time and space. He looks at the “world of synchronous phenomena”
not as a world delineated by time, but by space, much as the insomniac’s experience
of time is also linked to the sleeping space. For example, one who is tired but cannot
sleep at business meeting does not have insomnia (at that moment), but one who is
tired and cannot sleep in his or her bed does have insomnia. Similarly, merely being
between the ages of nine and fourteen does not make a young girl a nymphet; she
must be linked to other physical conditions, such as “the slightly feline outline of a
cheekbone” or “the slenderness of a downy limb” (17). There must be a concurrence
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of temporality and spatiality exclusive only to the nymphet, just as there is a similar
concurrence in the case of insomnia.
Unsurprisingly, then, insomnia is one of the conditions through which
Humbert produces Lolita and Lolita, both as narrative and as character. But it is also
meant to produce the Lolita he desires. He writes, “What I had madly possessed was
not she, but my own creation, another fanciful Lolita—perhaps, more real than Lolita;
overlapping, encasing her; floating between me and her, and having no will, no
consciousness—indeed no life of her own” (62). What he wants is not a living human
being, but a sleeping one. He acknowledges that his textual Lolita is not “real” but
only his “own creation” without any personal agency, much like a person asleep.
Interestingly, his first “official” molestation of Lolita comes after he has drugged her
to sleep (while lying awake next to her observing her every movement). His ability to
monitor and manipulate her sleep, while he remains vigilantly awake, is intrinsically
related to his ability to (or attempt to, at least) control her. He sees her and his
insomnia as closely intertwined, and writes, “So how could I afford not to see her for
two months of summer insomnias?” (66). His “insomnias,” which he typically
describes as plural, become a necessary state in his relationship to Lolita. For
example, it is during his insomnia that he plots the means by which to gain control
over Lolita: “As I lay in bed, erotically musing before trying to go to sleep, I thought
of a final scheme how to profit by the picnic to come” (54). His intent is to lure
Lolita into the woods to molest her, while her mother remains unaware. When this
plan fails, he develops another fantasy, which involves impregnating Charlotte so as
to place her in “a prolonged confinement” which “would give [him] a chance to be
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alone with [his] Lolita for weeks, perhaps--and gorge the limp nymphet with sleeping
pills” (80). His fantasy of control over Lolita requires that she be asleep, and his
planning takes place when he fails to sleep.
While he never does impregnate Charlotte before her death, his idea of using
sleeping pills on both mother and daughter becomes his course of action: “I saw
myself administering a powerful sleeping potion to both mother and daughter so as to
fondle the latter through the night with perfect impunity” (71). His plan requires two
basic factors: their susceptibility to sleep and his confidence in his insomniac ability
to remain vigilant and active “through the night.” In the scheme to use sleeping pills,
Humbert’s relentless insomnia (or “insomnias”) becomes a source of power. If he
can be awake while Lolita and Charlotte are sleeping, unconscious, and unaware, he
can do with them as he pleases. But, because he realizes the permeability of the
barrier between sleep and wakefulness, he must be careful to strengthen this barrier
through the use of sedatives. He begins experimenting on Charlotte’s sleep while
Lolita is away at camp, trying various sedatives and doses to find the right formula by
which to render her completely unconscious without her noticing his machinations.
He describes the steps he takes to bring his plan to fruition:
Throughout most of July I had been experimenting with various
sleeping powders, trying them out on Charlotte, a great taker of pills.
The last dose I had given her (she thought it was a table of mild
bromides--to anoint her nerves) had knocked her out for four solid
hours. I had put the radio at full blast. I had blazed in her face an
olisbos-like flashlight. I had pushed her, pinched her, prodded her-and nothing had disturbed the rhythm of her calm and powerful
breathing. However, when I had done such a simple thing as kiss her,
she had awakened at once, as fresh and strong as an octopus (I barely
escaped). This would not do, I thought; had to get something still
safer. At first, Dr. Byron did not seem to believe me when I said his
last prescription was no match for my insomnia. He suggested I try
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again, and for a moment diverted my attention by showing me
photographs of his family. He had a fascinating child of Dolly’s age;
but I saw through his tricks and insisted he prescribe the mightiest pill
extant. He suggested I play golf, but finally agreed to give me
something that, he said, “would really work”; and going to a cabinet,
he produced a vial of violet-blue capsules banded with dark purple at
one end, which, he said, had just been placed on market and were
intended not for neurotics whom a draft of water could calm if
properly administered, but only for great sleepless artists who had to
die for a few hours in order to live for centuries. (94)
Humbert’s reference to “great sleepless artists” echoes Hammond and MacFarlane’s
correlations between “brain-workers” and sleeplessness, illustrating the degree to
which they are connected: only the “great” ones are candidates for the maximum
dosage of sleeping pills. Though Humbert later realizes that “the purple pills did not
even belong to the big and noble family of barbiturates, and though it might have
induced sleep in a neurotic who believed it to be potent drug, it was too mild a
sedative to affect for any length of time a wary, albeit weary, nymphet” (128), his
attempted use of such pills is significant. This passage playfully illustrates the
authoritative physician, skeptical of Humbert’s motives, giving him a placebo in
place of a strong narcotic. But, more importantly, this passage points to Humbert’s
desire to control through sleep. His nightly observations are quite reminiscent of yet
another of Poe’s tales, “The Tell-Tale Heart,” in which the narrator spends a week
observing the sleep of his murder victim, plotting the perfect time to act without
awakening the old man whom he kills. Humbert is similarly vigilant in his
observations of Charlotte, and renders her comical through the various experiments
he performs on her.
After Charlotte’s death, when it comes time to try his experiments on Lolita,
he turns to the literary to illustrate how, through the manipulation of her sleep, he
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attempts to become her author or creator. Once he drugs her with the ultimately
ineffectual purple pills, he spends a whole night of heart-burn ravaged insomnia
observing every minutia of her sleep, waiting for the right moment to act. Yet, the
right moment does not arrive, as her sleep remains fairly light and she responds to his
movements and presence. While waiting, he composes a fantasy version of their first
coital encounter in which he can have his way with her, yet, by keeping her unaware,
maintain her innocence: “She was fast asleep again, my nymphet, but still I did not
dare to launch upon my enchanted voyage. La Petite Dormeuse ou l’Amant Ridicule”
(129) (another example of a theoretical text Humbert “invents” in the novel). By
giving their “story” a title, Humbert emphasizes his authorship of Lolita, but can only
do so once he has diminished her agency through manipulating her sleep. Yet, his
insomnia fails him, and “Time and again, my consciousness folded the wrong way,
my shuffling body entered the sphere of sleep, shuffled out again, and once or twice I
caught myself drifting into a melancholy snore” (131). Of course, his plan to molest
the unconscious Lolita fails and she is quite conscious when they “consummate” their
relationship: “by six she was wide awake, and by six fifteen we were technically
lovers” (132). She resists, through awakening, his attempts to create her in the image
of the innocent object he desires, takes on some form of agency, however perverse, in
their sexual relationship, and in doing so, refuses to take on the form he desires. She
may be his lover as he desires, but she will not be the untouched virgin for whom he
hopes. As James Tweedie argues, “Humbert’s main source of anxiety is the
realization that Lolita maintains an identity outside his self-contained realm, and in
his memoirs, he searches for a medium to enforce her isolation while permitting his

344

singular mannerisms to survive” (161). One “medium” Humbert attempts to use is
the sleeping pills, which both “enforce her isolation,” as she is literally cut off from
the world when asleep, and also strip her of her individual identity, as with sleep
comes the loss of individually acknowledged subjectivity. Particularly revealing is
the mention Humbert makes of Lolita’s “sobs in the night—every night, every
night—the moment I feigned sleep” (176). Here, we can see the war between their
two subjectivities, where they both use the sleep of the other to become more
themselves. When others are asleep, there is no longer a need to hide oneself—the
problem becomes what occurs when one only appears to be asleep and inadvertently
reveals something to an aware observer. Tweedie continues, “But in moments of
despair, he realizes the difficulty, even impossibility of such a project because he is a
prisoner not only of his solipsism but also of his own narrative, a mirror of sorts,
which reflects its author as accurately as its ostensible subject” (161). In constructing
his narrative, Humbert has constructed himself as a subject as much, if not more, as
he has constructed Lolita, and Nabokov subjugates all of his characters. Tweedie
views Humbert as a “liminal” figure (161), and this liminality can be read as the
liminality of authorship, a sort of insomnia between awareness of subjectivity and
loss of subjectivity, but evident of the inescapability of subjectivity when conscious.
This novel, then, takes on an insomniac temporal structure for a variety of
reasons. It is insomniac, in part, because of the constant fluctuations between and
melding of past and present that we see in Humbert’s narrative, as well as Humbert’s
hyper-awareness of the passage of time. It is also situated between an awakening
invocation of a mortal subject and an awareness of impending death concurrent with a
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closing apostrophe to an immortal image, whom, as we learn from the start of the text
that frames Humbert’s narrative, is no longer alive, but can only be re-subjugated
through language. As Prioleau argues, numerous circumstances in the novel,
including shocking and accidental deaths of both Humbert’s mother and Charlotte,
“all bespeak a reversal of rational, sequential experience in his ‘memoir’” (433). The
events of the text rely on the insomniac’s vigilance, but also note the failure of that
vigilance despite the will to maintain it, illustrating insomnia as a conflict of will and
desire. Most significantly, the text posits insomnia as the temporal space of
authorship, as Humbert requires both his insomnia and Lolita’s sleep to create her as
the subject of his desire. Through the text, we see Humbert’s struggle to control his
own subjectivity through his wakefulness and alertness, yet, he still becomes the
subject of the narrative, and, quite comically, a subject to be studied by “parents,
social workers, educators” who must “apply [themselves] with still greater vigilance
and vision to the task of bringing up a better generation in a safer world” (6). The
passage just cited is the last sentence of the introduction written by “John Ray, Jr.,
Ph.D.,” which encourages the reader’s vigilance as a mirror to Humbert’s,
emphasizing the reader’s own possible insomnia (“vigilance”) generated by the text.
But, as the text suggests through the obvious irony of “Ray’s” introduction, even
extreme vigilance is fallible.
Literary texts play with temporality in a way that relates the narrative to
insomnia, but the autobiographical Black Boy does as well. Wright’s non-fiction text
can be viewed as a melding of past and present. His rewriting of his past from the
vantage point of the present, with an eye towards the future at the end, indicates the
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fusion of these three temporal states. In many ways, Wright is doing through his
writing exactly what Hayes does in his periods of insomnia, when he “[recalls his]
entire life” (3) as a way to put himself to rest. In describing his decision to begin his
own writing, he writes:
I picked up a pencil and held it over a sheet of white paper, but my
feelings stood in the way of my words. Well, I would wait, day and
night, until I knew what to say. Humbly now, with no vaulting dream
of achieving a vast unity, I wanted to try and build a bridge of words
between me and the world outside, that world which was so distant
and elusive that it seemed unreal. (383-84)
His desire to begin writing his story is a story of waiting, in this case not for sleep, but
for the words of the story itself to emerge, a waiting that takes place both during day
and night. Writing for Wright, like sleeping for an insomniac, is an end to the period
of waiting for “a bridge” to a “distant and elusive” world when the waiting ends.
As he tells the story of his upbringing, Wright describes the relationship
between his insomnia and the conditions of his life. Of the relationship between his
family’s poverty and his insomnia, he writes:
Hunger stole upon me so slowly that at first I was not aware of what
hunger really meant. Hunger had always been more or less at my
elbow when I played, but now I began to wake up at night to find
hunger standing at my bedside, staring at me gauntly. The hunger I
had known before this had been no grim, hostile stranger; it had been a
normal hunger that had made me beg constantly for bread, and when I
ate a crust or two I was satisfied. But this new hunger baffled me,
scared me, made me angry and insistent. (14)
This passage is of particular importance because of its use of temporality. Wright, as
he acknowledges in this passage, was no stranger to hunger. Yet, until his hunger
awakens him and instigates his insomnia, he had been able to remain relatively
independent of it. However, once his hunger awakens him, we see a union of past
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(hours and weeks of insufficient food) and present (awakening hungry). One does not
instantly experience hunger, but rather becomes hungry, or at least hungry in the way
Wright describes, over a period of time; his type of hunger is an accretion of various
hungers, related to lack of food, but more importantly his race, class, family
relationships, physical habitation, and a variety of other elements of his subjectivity.
The moment of insomnia that prompts his future actions (“beg constantly for food”),
unites his past with his present, but also determines his future course of action.
Other examples of Wright using the time and space of insomnia as a temporal
device include a passage in which Wright spends his first night living with his uncle
and finds out he must sleep in the former bedroom (and bed) of his deceased cousin:
I groped into the dark room and fumbled for the bed; I had the illusion
that if I touched it I would encounter the dead boy. I trembled.
Finally I jumped roughly into the bed and jerked the covers over my
face. I did not sleep that night and my eyes were red and puffy the
next morning. . . . The next night was the same; fear kept me from
sleeping” (94).
In this passage, we see the time and space of insomnia as a convergence of past,
present, and future. In the textual present (which is also the textual past as Wright
recreates his narrative), young Richard is forced to confront both his family’s past
(the death of his cousin) and his own future (a new life with his aunt and uncle)
simultaneously. His sleeplessness continues for a week:
I spent another sleepless night, shivering in the dead boy’s room—it
was not my room any longer—and I was so frightened that I sweated.
Each creak of the house made my heart stand still. In school the next
day I was dull. I came home and spent another long night of
wakefulness and the following day I went to sleep in the classroom.
When questioned by my teacher, I could give no answer. Unable to
free myself from terror, I began to long for home. A week of
sleeplessness brought me near the edge of nervous collapse. (94-95)
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His insomnia becomes so problematic that not only does it have an adverse effect on
his education, it also leads to a confrontation with his aunt and uncle that eventually
results in a beating and a return to his grandmother’s house, as he can no longer stand
to live with them. Insomnia becomes yet another turning point for Richard, forcing
him to confront his family’s past and significantly impacting his future.
One additional insomniac episode again speaks to the unification of past,
present, and future within the text. Wright writes:
I used to lie awake nights and think back to the early days in Arkansas,
tracing my mother’s life, reliving events, wondering why she had
apparently been singled out for so much suffering, meaningless
suffering, and I would feel more awe than I had ever felt in church.
My mind could find no answer and I would feel rebellious against all
life. But I never felt humble. (156)
In this passage, we see Richard thinking not only about his own past, but about his
mother’s. However, his mother’s past goes back even farther than her actual lifespan,
as Wright seems to trace her sufferings not only to her experience, but to the
historical experience of both African Americans and women. His thoughts move
towards the past, through his reminiscences, as they simultaneously lead him to an
attitude of future rebellion. This rebelliousness leads to a confrontation with his
uncle, interestingly about time itself. Richard snaps at his uncle, who has asked for a
confirmation of the correct time. He writes, “I was tired, sleepy; I did not want to
look at the watch again, but I was satisfied that, on the whole, I had given the correct
time” (157). His uncle challenges his timekeeping, eventually leading to physical
threats both from the uncle to Richard and from Richard to the uncle, as Richard
threatens to slash his uncle with razors if his uncle attempts to beat him again. This
motif of time itself as a source of conflict underscores the importance of insomnia as
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a temporal-structural device, as these insomniac moments of convergence continue to
fuel the narrator’s anger, determine his future actions, and force him to confront his
and his family’s past. The scenes I have described in these paragraphs deal directly
with experiences of insomnia, but they have overall structural significance as well,
and serve as a model for the narration as a whole. These scenes are microcosms of
the structure of the text, which seeks to draw connections between confronting one’s
individual and historical past in a way that makes future actions almost inevitable.
Just as his insomnia leads to poor performance in school, despite the narrator’s innate
intelligence and love of reading and learning, his forced confrontation with the
conditions of his and his family’s past create a circumstance from which anger and
rebellion become almost pre-destined. Throughout the text, Wright gives a sense of
acting in a way he knows to be morally and ethically questionable, citing instances of
various confrontations with family members, school or neighborhood children, and
even drunkenness at a young age, but he also describes these various scenarios in a
way that makes his actions seem as though they are beyond his control, much like his
insomnia or the next-day exhaustion that follows it. His actions and descriptions
consistently unite his past circumstances to his present ones, but also shape his future.
Insomniac Language
Not only does the modernist text have a particularly complex relationship with
temporality, specifically waking and not sleeping, as well as the convergence of past,
present and future, it also has a complex relationship with language (as does any
literary work, of course). But, just as in the way insomnia makes thoughts almost
seem to explode and multiple, the modernist text does so through its use of language.
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As I argued in the first chapter, World War I not only changed the individual’s
relationship to the his or her body forcing an awareness of the body as perceptual
filter, and his or her experience of the passage of time, but also to language. To
inform my current discussion, I would like to reiterate two important, and conflicting,
points. Language, following the war, became increasingly reliant on the binary
(reflecting the “us” versus “them” and “good” versus “evil” mentality of the war), and
language itself was seen as inadequate in portrayal of the war experience. Thus,
experience only became represent-able through the replication of experience through
art. What then do we make of an art reliant upon language, as literature is?
Literature in order to convey any sense of significant meaning at all must be as much
a representation of experience as any other art form, and it does so, in part, through its
resistance to overly-simplistic binary language. Insomnia, itself a form of resistance
against the overly-simplistic binary of sleeping and waking, becomes a method of
both creating a literature of experience and using language in a way that resists
reduction. Thus, it is important to pay attention to the language used within the
insomniac sequence and text, as well as the language describing insomnia itself.
Insomnia and language are also related because of the insomniac’s lack of
control over the flow of language. During a period of insomnia, one cannot stop
one’s thoughts as they shift and multiply. Molly’s monologue is an excellent
example here, as are Humbert’s references to the “re-forking” of his thoughts. In this
sense, language becomes symbolic of insomnia itself in its refusal to be controlled.
An insomniac may obsess over a word or phrase. More importantly, insomnia is
resistant to a clear, stable definition (as many doctors note that insomnia is unique to
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each individual) rooted in binaries (what is the opposite of insomnia?). So, we have a
condition resistant to language in which the sufferer experiences language as just as
far beyond his or her control as sleep itself is. Insomnia is a contextual multiplicity;
in other words, insomnia is both unstable in its definition and only recognizable
through context, which involves individual circumstance, and at times misperception.
Placed in the context of an era during which people attempted to stabilize an upended
world through the reduction of language to binaries, yet simultaneously noted the
failure of these binaries to convey experience, a condition that explodes both binaries
and language is extremely relevant.
Jacques Lacan argues that language structures experience: “it is the whole
structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious” in
part because “language, with its structure, exists prior to each subject’s entry into it a
certain moment in his mental development” (139). “The subject,” Lacan continues,
“is still more the slave of a discourse in the universal movement of which his place is
already inscribed at his birth” (140). Language, for Lacan, not only structures our
experience of the world, this structure already existing in the mind of the individual
before the he or she is able to use language, it also immerses the individual into a
discursively derived identity, rooted in historical time and place. Insomnia reveals
our inability to control both language and the relationship between our bodies and
minds, thus essentially revealing that while such a structure may exist, this structure
is beyond our control. We cannot control the way our minds are structured any more
than we can control what happens to our loved ones in a war. This revelation is
particularly appropriate during an era in which a sense of lost control was pervasive,
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and one way in which the modernist text reflects this sense of lost control is through
the use of the chronotope of insomnia in which language itself is beyond control.
Through illustrating language as over-determined, in which meaning is unstable and
exists only in multiplicities, instability and lack of control are made apparent.
Regarding Modernism, Peter McHugh argues that it “persistently follows and
works out the inevitable variability in relation between sign and meaning. . . .
Modernism seemed to struggle to tame this variability,” and he views the “value [of
this relationship] as uncertain” (26). Humbert struggles with this variability as he
tries to recount the story of his love for Lolita. One example comes with Humbert’s
use of Lolita’s name throughout the text. Humbert, who says, “Oh, my Lolita, I have
only words to play with!” (32) illustrates both the power of language to attempt to
“[work] out” the relationship between words and meaning, but also the failure of
language to truly consolidate and capture meaning. For this reason among others,
perhaps, Tweedie refers to Lolita as a text written about “a country on the slovenly
verge of postmodernity, with its farrago of displaced images and styles” (153). The
word Lolita is only a word, after all. As Tweedie points out, “Nabokov has created in
Humbert Humbert a narrator who strives with great alacrity, even desperation, to
capture perfectly in words a human form; the tragedy of the novel is his eventual,
overdetermined, costly failure. Lolita exists as a subject and object somewhere in
Humbert’s prose, but nowhere beyond the text” (169). In insomnia, words and
images multiply endlessly in meaning, yet in doing so, fail to retain any meaning at
all outside of the mind of the insomniac. As Woolf argues, “In illness words seem to
possess a mystic quality. We grasp what is beyond their surface meaning” (“Ill” 21).
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The same can be said of the word Lolita for Humbert. Knowing that she has already
died before the text was written, and knowing that her given name is not even Lolita,
she is only a word, a word with infinite meanings and possibilities, but she cannot
exist as more than a word without the text itself. Tweedie writes, “that word both
begins and ends his narrative, creating a closed circuit, and endlessness, a perfection
of form redolent of his earlier narrative goals” (168). As Tweedie illustrates, the
word Lolita binds the text together, with awakening on one hand and death with
hopes of immortality on the other. While the word is in use, the novel is insomniac,
trapped in “a closed circuit” with a sense of “endlessness”--words one would use to
describe the ontological experience of insomnia.
Nabokov’s insomniac usage of language extends beyond Lolita’s name into
much of his diction and syntax. Tweedie argues, “Down to the level of his sentence
structure, to his penchant for periodic and (surprisingly for such a demanding stylist)
rambling sentences, Humbert’s style reflects his aversion to ends” (160), and
insomnia is arguably an aversion to ends also. Much as Joyce uses Molly’s rambling,
disconnected, and unpunctuated monologue to both express and replicate her
insomnia, Humbert’s sentences create the same effect. For example, Humbert writes:
My very photogenic mother died in a freak accident (picnic,
lightening) when I was three, and, save for a pocket of warmth in the
darkest past, nothing of her subsists within the hollows and dells of my
memory, over which, if you can still stand my style (I am writing
under observation), the sun of my infancy had set: surely, you know
all those redolent remnants of day suspended, with the midges, about
some hedge in bloom or suddenly entered and traversed by the
rambler, at the bottom of a hill, in the summer dusk; a furry warmth,
glowing midges. (10)
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The length of this sentence suggests Humbert’s inability to end it, as it continues on
and on, with parenthetical interjections, images of liminality, and acknowledgement
of both mental and syntactic rambles. Though Humbert is ostensibly trying to put the
image of his mother to rest and quickly introduce and dismiss her presence in his life,
this sentence does anything but, and ends with images of a permanent sense of being
trapped between daylight and nighttime, not fully awake, yet being unable to sleep.
Even Nabokov’s use of the twice repeated word midge is significant to this passage’s
meaning. Nabokov, known for his entomological interests, deliberately chooses not
one particular and specific image of an insect to use, but a word that encompasses
several different species of small flying insects who occupy a wide range of habitats,
some of whom are vampiric and transmit disease. Nabokov, who mocks translators
who inaccurately claim Kafka’s character Gregor Samsa is a “flat cockroach” rather
than “a domed beetle” (Strong 55), certainly could have provided a more specific
insect term than “midge” if he had chosen to do so. Yet, through his choice of this
vague and over-determined insect name, clouds of them in fact, he illustrates
Humbert’s unwillingness or inability to pin anything down. On the one hand,
Humbert asserts his infancy is over and his mother is dead, but on the other, the
images and memories persist within him refusing to come to an end, just as his
sentence persists on the page itself.
Nabokov’s use of spider-imagery related to Humbert is another instance of the
over-determination of language within this text. Humbert writes, “I am like one of
those inflated pale spiders you see in old gardens. Sitting in the middle of a luminous
web and giving little jerks to this or that strand” (49). Regarding this passage,
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Tweedie connects the spider imagery to Humbert’s “plurality of focus” (154).
Indeed, the image of the spider, which also makes an appearance in Nabokov’s novel
Invitation to a Beheading, as a spider who vigilantly watches Cincinnatus’ every
move, illustrates both plurality and vigilance. This spider is simultaneously creator
and destroyer, as it weaves a web intended to trap its prey. Similarly, Humbert is a
creator, as he produces Lolita through his text, but upon trapping her in his web of
machinations, he ultimately destroys her. In addition, the spider’s ability to maintain
vigilance over all parts of its web, the various strands it controls, mirrors Humbert’s
perpetual vigilance over every aspect of Lolita’s conscious and unconscious activity.
Additionally, the spider plays both heroic and villainous roles, trapping harmful
insects in its web (as Humbert eventually traps the predatory Clare Quilty), yet also
harming even the most benevolent of insects. Just a spider can theoretically generate
an infinite web, the image of the spider can generate infinite possibilities of meaning.
Another level at which Nabokov utilizes over-determined and unending
language is through his use of tmesis, as Tweedie notes. Tmesis, the immersion of
one word into another to create a whole new word or phrase, disrupts typical
linguistic cycles and expectations. Tweedie writes:
Humbert repeatedly pries apart common phrases to insert the world
outside his solipsism. But unlike the classical model where necessity
is parted for the sake of art, the order is reversed in Humbert’s fantasy
world: tmesis allows ends to rush back in. Images that traditionally
evoke nostalgia become symptomatic of inevitable decay. (156)
One example of this “phrasal tmesis” Tweedie discusses comes with Humbert’s
assertion that “The rapist was Charlie Holmes. I am the therapist—a matter of nice
spacing in the way of distinction” (Lolita 150). The introduction of a space,
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transforming “therapist” into “the rapist” illustrates the ways in which Humbert uses
language, or in this case, its absence, to generate meaning. If we look at therapy in
the way Nabokov (controversially) suggests, as a fraudulent quest for symbols and
manipulation of the subject, Humbert is both therapist and rapist to Lolita. He is also
the void between the the and rapist. Much as the Lolita of the text is not the “real”
Lolita, drawing readers’ attention not to her presence but her absence, Humbert’s
attempts at creating himself are reliant on a similar void. As readers follow
Humbert’s narrative, it becomes clear that the Humbert produced by the text is not the
“real” Humbert. Rather, the text, through what Humbert does not say or do, reveals a
very different Humbert, thus his identity is just as present in the space between
therapist and rapist as it is in either word.
For Joyce, the use of language within Ulysses is also highly over-determined.
In Ulysses, nearly every word has a multiplicity of meanings; however, the Nighttown
scene (“Circe”) presents a perfect example of novel as “threshold zone.” Within the
Nighttown scene, in which narration shifts between Stephen and Bloom, Joyce
illustrates this sense of multiplicity. The imagery is surreal, much of it hallucinatory,
making it difficult to distinguish “real” from unreal and sleeping from waking
consciousness. Images constantly morph into other images and people change into
other people. This scene is one that blurs the lines between dream and wakefulness,
exchanging perception with over-determined symbol and fear with nightmare. This
scene is a representation of liminality, both structurally (shifts of narration) and in
terms of content (reality and hallucination). For example, in this section, the
“Timepiece” is given a voice, which declares “Cuckoo” three times over (469). Even
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this simple word, one attributed to an insentient object (notably one that measures
time), is over-determined. For one, the declaration marks the passage of time,
specifically a time when most people are asleep, if we read this as three in the
morning. Secondly, the word cuckoo can also mean mentally unstable, which is
fitting in a hallucinatory scene during which Bloom’s state of mind is in question.
Thirdly, the word is phonetically similar to the earlier used word “cuckold” (469),
used to describe Bloom’s status within his marriage to the unfaithful Molly. Finally,
the word becomes symbolic of the judgment placed upon Bloom (or the selfjudgment he fears) as mentally unstable and cuckolded, as sounding of the clock
signals the presence of the jury who emerges from behind “a panel of fog” (469).
This one over-determined word has both symbolic and structural significance within
the text, marking time’s passage, calling Bloom to judgment, and exposing the
instability of his psyche, as well as his marriage. The word’s associations with time
(three in the morning) and mental stability connect the word with insomnia as well.
For Wright, much of the over-determination of language comes through his
attempts at dealing with race relations, something he struggles to control but cannot.
He is aware that as a black man, even the most innocent phrases or gestures can put
him at great risk. He writes of the difference in language for blacks and whites:
[Wright’s boss’s client] had not asked me for this long explanation, but
I had spoken at length of fill up the yawning, shameful gap that
loomed between us; I had spoken to try to drag the unreal nature of the
conversation back to safe and sound southern ground. Of course, the
conversation was real; it dealt with my welfare, but it had brought to
the surface of the day all the dark fears I had known all my life. The
Yankee white man did not know how dangerous his words were.
(There are some elusive, profound, recondite things that men
find hard to say to other men; but with the Negro it is the little things
of life that become hard to say, for these tiny items shape his destiny.
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A man will seek to express his relation to the stars; but when a man’s
consciousness has been riveted upon obtaining a loaf of bread, that
loaf of bread is as important as the stars.) (232)
Growing up in the South, Wright is conditioned to speak in two very different
languages, one of submission to whites, and the other of fraternity to blacks. So, for
him, even an expression of a most basic truth, that he is hungry, becomes problematic
when speaking with a white person, who may interpret the statement as a complaint
against him or herself or social hegemonies. Not only must Wright carefully watch
what he does say, considering every possible interpretation of his words to be sure
and choose “safe” ones, he must also watch what he does not say, as there is power in
the gaps of conversation as well (related also to gaps in consciousness during
insomnia). The significance of language is emphasized throughout this text, as the
choice of the proper word for a given situation could be, for Wright, the difference
between safety and threats of or actual violence against him.
Stream of Consciousness
The preoccupation with sleeping and waking, as well as the tendency of words
and images to multiply in meaning, evading control as sleep evades the insomniac,
are only some of the many textual features that equate the modernist text with the
experience of insomnia. Another common feature is the intently psychological nature
of both the modernist work and insomnia. Of course, this is not to argue that
nineteenth century texts or contemporary works do not have any focus on
psychology, but rather that this feature is especially important to the modernist work,
which often emphasizes psychological development over plot development. In other
words, novels such as Dickens’ Great Expectations or Joseph Sheridan La Fanu’s
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Carmilla require a lengthy of events given the intricacy of their plots. On the other
hand, novels such as Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, or Joyce’s Ulysses require only a
simple explanation of the plot: in Mrs. Dalloway, Clarissa Dalloway throws a party,
to which she invites friends she has not seen in a long while, and Septimus Smith
attempts, with the help of his wife, to treat his war trauma, but ends up committing
suicide. Likewise, in Ulysses, Harold Bloom walks around Dublin, attends a funeral,
meets with various people, eats lunch, goes to a beach and a brothel, and comes home
to his wife who is awake in bed. This, of course, is not to say that either of the latter
two novels lack in complexity, but the complexity lies primarily in the psychological
development of the characters, rather than the intricacy of events.
One of the structural features attributed to the psychological nature of the
modernist text is the stream of consciousness form of narration. William James, who
first developed the metaphor, explains: “Consciousness, then, does not appear to
itself chopped up in bits. Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly as it
presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A ‘river’ or a
‘stream’ are [sic] the metaphors by which it is most naturally described” (“Stream”
159). For James, while awake, consciousness never stops. In fact, James sees the
only true disruption of this stream of consciousness as sleep. He writes, “When Peter
and Paul wake up in the same bed, and recognize that they have been asleep, each one
of them mentally reaches back and makes the connection with but one of the two
streams of thought which were broken by the sleeping hours” (“Stream” 158). The
stream to which Peter returns is Peter’s and Paul returns to Paul’s stream. As an
interesting aside, it might be worth considering James’ choice of the names Peter and
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Paul in this passage, given their association with the failure of vigilant wakefulness.
Peter and Paul were among Jesus’ disciples and play a role in Christ’s betrayal
specifically because they fall asleep, allowing Judas to commit his act of betrayal:
“And he come unto the disciples, and findeth them asleep, and saith unto Peter, What,
could ye not watch with me one hour?” (Matthew 26:40). Jesus then asks his
disciples to remain vigilant, but finds them asleep again: “And he came and found
them asleep again: for their eyes were heavy” (Matthew 26:43). It is while the other
disciples sleep that Judas betrays Jesus. Thus, if anything, James’ choice of names of
his two sleepers has interesting connotations with the disconnect between conscious
vigilance and the lack of awareness sleep entails. Sleep is a betrayal of vigilance.
The stream of consciousness and its associations with vigilance is critical in
the modernist text. The modernist text, if it did not invent this form, certainly
perfected it, and many modernist literary works use this as a device. It is not
coincidental, in light of the changes of literature that took place after the World War I
that I described in the first chapter, that this device becomes so popular in this
specific historical period. It is a device through which the text becomes experiential
for the reader. In other words, there is a phenomenological aspect of reading a stream
of consciousness narration that evokes the experience of insomnia in the reader
(whether or not the actual stream of consciousness passage takes place during the
character’s insomnia, which often it does). Indeed, both Ulysses and Lolita utilize
this method of narration. In Ulysses, the passage that consists of Molly’s insomnia
discussed earlier is an excellent example of stream of consciousness writing.
Similarly, both Nabokov and Wright often allow readers to become immersed in their
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characters’ streams of thought. Immersion in a stream of consciousness is, as I have
argued, a phenomenological feature of insomnia (though this immersion vacillates
according to the “cycles” of insomnia I have described earlier). Through replicating
this sense of immersion in this stream, the text replicates the experience of insomnia.
Because insomnia takes place in isolation, often without outside stimuli, the
insomniac too finds himself or herself immersed in a stream of consciousness. While
this stream is not exclusive to insomnia, as James notes, a heightened awareness of
the flow of one’s thoughts is certainly characteristic of insomnia, given the lack of
other stimuli often present as one awaits sleep in a darkened room; there is not much
else to experience other than one’s bodily sensations and thoughts. Modernist authors
often use this idea of the stream of consciousness as a literary device, illustrating the
often haphazard nature of thought, perhaps with the input of bodily perceptions
Woolf suggests. Thus, this use of the stream of consciousness is one way in which
the phenomenological experience of insomnia makes its way into the modernist text.
Take, for example, the following passage from Ulysses, as thought by Bloom:
Did I write Ballsbridge on the envelope I took to cover when she
disturbed me writing to Martha? Hope it’s not chucked in the dead
letter office. Be the better of a shave. Grey sprouting beard. That’s
the first sign when the hairs come out grey and temper getting cross.
Silver threads among the grey. Fancy being his wife. Wonder how he
had the gumption to propose to any girl. Come out and live in the
graveyard. Dangle that before her. It might thrill her first. Courting
death … Shades of night hovering here with all the dead stretched
about. (107-08)
In this stream of consciousness passage, we see the seeming randomness of Bloom’s
thoughts as they flow from one subject to another. Of course, Bloom is not
experiencing insomnia during this passage. But, my argument here is not that stream
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of consciousness is an exclusive feature of insomnia (it is not), but rather that the
individual gains a heightened awareness of the stream of consciousness in the
insomniac state. With regard to reading a text, the reader also experiences a
heightened awareness of the immersion in the stream of consciousness when this
device is used by the author. So, in essence, while stream of consciousness for the
character does not necessarily indicate insomnia, the phenomenology of the reading
experience of this device replicates features of the phenomenology of insomnia.
James envisions a model of consciousness in which thoughts flow
continuously, yet are often trapped in “the pails and the pots” within the stream
(thoughts on which we focus intently for a while), “still between them the free water
would continue to flow” (“Stream” 165). Even when one focuses on a single idea for
a given period of time, an undercurrent of thought always remains, as we can see
when Bloom contemplates related ideas within the above passage. He pauses on a
singular thought momentarily, but the next thought is already determined based on his
surroundings. Thus, his seemingly random movements from thought to thought
actually correlate to his movements around Dublin. These points of focus, for James,
are not breaks in the stream of consciousness, but rather intrinsic to it. Yet, if we
take insomnia for a model, we can see that sometimes there are gaps in consciousness
of which the subject is unaware. Bloom’s stream of consciousness displays similar
gaps, not in awareness, but rather in the movement from one thought to another,
another phenomenological similarity. In other words, to be conscious of the letter to
Martha means temporarily being unaware of his beard growing, and so forth. In the
second chapter, I discussed the possibility that insomniacs sleep more than they
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know, illustrating gaps and shifts in this stream. If this is the case, then that stream of
consciousness is broken by unconsciousness, as James says, yet the subject is not
aware of the unconsciousness, so, is therefore not aware that the stream has been
temporarily severed. The reader’s experience of reading the stream of consciousness
narrative replicates the nature of insomniac thought with its combination of flow,
gaps, and shifts.
Contemporary sleep researcher Stanley Coren provides a real world example
of his experience of unconsciousness of unconsciousness, upon arising up from a
night in which he had believed himself to have not slept at all:
Although I felt that I had been wide awake all night, I had actually
been so soundly asleep that I had completely missed an earthquake
that had brought down a large quantity of plaster from the ceiling onto
our bed. In fact, as I got up, two large chunks of plaster, each the size
of a tennis ball, rolled off of my chest, where they had apparently been
resting for an hour or more since the earthquake. (15)
Coren gives us an example of his unawareness of his consciousness transitioning to
unconsciousness, in a way similar to that in which Bloom’s thoughts drift, without
any apparent awareness on his part, from one impression to another. Coren’s model
of sleep and wakefulness is similar to James’ stream and bucket model, in which
one’s thoughts both simultaneously focus and continue running. Coren’s mind was
asleep, yet despite this fact, he had a distinct sense of the continuity of his thoughts,
though this seeming continuity was later disproven by the realization of the
earthquake’s occurrence. These sometimes repetitive transitions between
consciousness and unconsciousness, all experienced under the larger umbrella of
insomnia points to a type of consciousness that is neither fully awake nor fully asleep.
Metafiction as Awakenings
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This liminal consciousness can be compared to the act of writing. As
Farbman argues, “Writing is not just committing black ink to a white page—here with
pens, there with presses. The real location from which it emerges is a Grayer area”
(15). This “Grayer area” is a space of movement from the self to the unidentifiable
other, the author’s consciousness as I to the author’s consciousness as text (Farbman
48). This “Grayer area” Farbman describes is also a state of liminality, and the author
is essentially “falling asleep” into the text, in a transitional state between
consciousness as subject (gendered body, citizen, and so forth) to consciousness as
creator. The creator-consciousness is necessarily that of the “other” to which
Farbman alludes, as one cannot simultaneously be a subject and exist beyond
subjectivity, as “God-like” figure ruling over the world of a text, an ante-subject to
the subject. Yet, the author makes this transition. When discussing his own method
of creating characters, Nabokov describes those authors who allow their characters to
“take hold of them” as “very minor or insane.” He continues, “I am the perfect
dictator in that private world [of the created text] insofar as I alone am responsible for
its stability and truth” (Strong 69). Through his process of writing, he has moved
from subject of the “real” world to creator of the textual world. This liminal position,
hovering between subjective reality and creation of the objective textual world is akin
to the loss of self that happens when one falls asleep. One moves from pure subject
to pure object (bodily mass). Insomnia traps someone between these two states.
This sense of the cyclical experience of diminishing awareness of the self and
return to the self is replicated in the modernist text through the use of metafictional
devices. When an author draws a reader’s attention to the fictionality of the text that
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the reader is currently immersed in, it has the effect of temporarily preventing the
reader’s immersion in the text, thus drawing him or her back to self-awareness.
While Wright’s text is non-fictional, and therefore makes no effort to draw attention
to its fictionality, it does draw awareness to its status as a text, especially through
Wright’s discussions of the power of language to construct and mediate experience.
Both Lolita and Ulysses are fictional texts which intentionally refer to their own
fictionality. In Ulysses, Joyce draws attention to the text’s structure through the ways
in which he changes narrative style from section to section. By continuously
introducing not only different perspectives from which the text is written, but also
different genre conventions, as well as literary styles, the reader’s experience of the
text is often disrupted by the multiplicity of voices and styles to which he or she must
adapt in the reading process. Just as in her own passage of insomnia, Molly breaks
from one train of thought to another, at times interrupted by goings on of the material
world inside and outside of her bedroom, the modernist text often brings readers to
awareness that they are indeed reading a text, disrupting the flow of thought.
Insomnia disallows the drift of thoughts into the unconscious state of sleep.
Likewise, in the metafictional text, the reader is never able to become fully, but only
temporarily immersed in that flow, much like the insomniac, as he or she is
repeatedly jolted out of it when the novel draws attention to its own fictional
structure. In the modernist text, sleep becomes symbolic of complacency and lack of
agency.

Characters who desire sleep, like Gloria in Fitzgerald’s Beautiful and the

Damned or Mrs. Henderson in Dorothy Richardson’s Pilgrimage desire withdrawal
from the world, an escape, and want to cede control of their bodies to the control of
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others. But, as Nabokov asserts in his description of preparation for sleep as akin to
“[tottering] to the nearest euthanasium” (Speak 108), complacency and lack of
vigilance are dangerous indeed. Such complacency, when perhaps developing new
technologies like exploding shells and mustard gas without considering their
consequences, or lack of agency, such as Americans felt in their role regarding world
affairs after World War I (leading to the “restless” generation that I discuss in the
previous chapter) or Scrope in The Soul of a Bishop feels with regard to the role of
the Church in World War I society, must be avoided. Sleep may be a pleasant return
to the womb as Fitzgerald describes it earlier in this chapter, but it is also akin to
inertia and death, an ultimate state of vulnerability and helplessness. For this reason,
the modernist text encourages the reader to stay awake and remain vigilant.
Nabokov repeatedly uses metafiction as a device in Lolita, as narrator
Humbert often draws attention to the fictionality of his story. Where Joyce
manipulates the reader through changes in style and perspective, Nabokov does so
through his use of Humbert’s admissions of his own “filling in the gaps” when
recalling events, as well as through his use of often absurd, and therefore, markedly
unrealistic language when naming characters and places. With regard to Humbert’s
admission of his authorial license within the text, he reconstructs a letter written to
him by his second wife and Lolita’s mother, Charlotte Haze. The letter is presented
in the text as a separate entity, set apart through the use of a smaller sized font.
However, despite the apparent transcription of this letter, Humbert writes:
What I present here is what I remember of the letter, and what I
remember of the letter, I remember verbatim (including that awful
French). It was at least twice longer. . . . There is just a chance that
“the vortex of the toilet” (where the letter did go) is my own matter of
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fact contribution. She probably begged me to make a special fire to
consume it. (68-69)
Just as the reader is lulled both into Charlotte’s thoughts and comes to trust
Humbert’s faithful transcription of the letter, Humbert admits that he likely made his
own edits, reminding us that this “verbatim” letter is, in fact, highly modified and the
narrator’s own memory of it is faulty at best. This type of jarring realization is
similar to the incomplete thought drift of the insomniac, where he or she can be
completely immersed in a flow of thought leading slowly towards sleep. Just when
the flow feels reliable, an interruption occurs to break the sense of serenity.
The Vigilant Reader
How, then, does this insomniac structure apply to the reader? While thus far I
have talked about structural formalities of a text as being insomniac, it is also
important to note that the text goes far beyond just mimicking insomnia through
allusions to sleep and waking, focus on an individual stream of consciousness and so
forth. More significantly, the text enables the reader to feel as an insomniac does.
Bryony Randall argues that when one remains aware of the passage of time during
reading, “the reader’s attention will only be partially engaged with the text”; however,
“being immersed in the time the text describes, will be a kind of all-embracing
attentiveness, perhaps even involving of self” (166). Take for example the
aforementioned passage from Ulysses in which Molly has insomnia and readers
follow along her train of thought. As one reads the passage, one does not just note
that Molly has insomnia; one actually experiences it. As Molly’s thoughts are heard
in the mind of the reader, the reader, not Molly, becomes the one with disjointed,
slippery images racing through his or her mind. The reader shares Molly’s awareness
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of time only because she (not the reader) notes its passing. The lack of punctuation in
the final section of the novel creates a sense of urgency and desperation (for the pause
of sleep), and successfully drags the reader along at a rapid pace.
Similarly, metafictional devices also prevent the reader’s full lulling into a
reading of the text. Within the metafictional text, the world of the text is never fully
stable, just as consciousness itself may be unstable when one has insomnia. During a
period of insomnia, a reader may start on one train of thought, ostensibly on his or her
way to the “drift” that eventually becomes sleep. At this point, one of two outcomes
may occur. The insomniac may either unknowingly fall asleep, only to reawaken
with no knowledge of having slept, or the insomniac may find himself or herself
jolted out of this train of thought, perhaps through rolling over in bed or catching a
glimpse of the clock. Molly’s attention to church bell’s tolling is an excellent
example of this return to awareness of the material world.
Conclusion
Modernist literary texts are contextually related to sleep through their
temporally situated relationship to both waking and sleeping. Further, much as
insomnia has an inevitable eventual end, but an idiosyncratic one, these texts both
point to and question the possibility of their own perseverance beyond the content of
the text itself, as they end with an image of the language of the text reaching out to
the future with no stable and predictable consequence or termination. Additionally,
the experience of reading the insomniac text serves the dual function of immersing a
reader in the text, yet reminding the reader that he or she is essentially only
encountering a text, not a different state of consciousness. The reader is never fully
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able to lose his or her own subjective identity during the reading of the metafictional
text. These texts display an anxiety over temporality, often experienced by the
insomniac, as well as a sense of the past, present, and future converging in a singular
time and space. In short, the experience these authors had with insomnia structured
their understanding of the relationship between time, memory, and thought, as well as
our understanding of our own consciousness and ability to be aware its functioning.
Such revelations are made possible through the experience of insomnia.
For numerous reasons, all of the texts I have discussed in this chapter
exemplify what I am referring to as the “insomniac structure” of the modernist text.
Modernism needed insomnia for many reasons. First and foremost, insomnia
becomes a device through which the text becomes not only a text, but an experience.
World War I brought about the revelation that words alone cannot convey the
complexity of experience. Only experience itself (as art) can even attempt to
replicate experience. Specifically, insomnia is an experience of the body, and, as
Woolf argues, experiencing the world through a consciousness of one’s body, which
she asserts comes through illness, alters perceptions in significant ways. It makes us
aware of our subjectivity, as bodies, but also allows us a more actively authorial role
in shaping our perceptions and understandings of the world and people around us.
Further, insomnia allows authors and their characters the solitude necessary to reflect
on the world and develop empathy, necessary both to the development of characters
and the function of the author as creator the textual world. The era preceding the
Modernist period was one of rapid technological development, and development and
action without reflection are problematic, as one creates without considering the
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consequences of that creation. The modernist text reminds us to reflect, and through
the device of insomnia, forces its characters and readers to do. The modernist text
does not allow its readers to sleepwalk through it—its structure itself requires us to
stay quite awake, jarring us out of any complacent acceptance of the textual world,
just as we must avoid such complacency in our “real” lives. We cannot even take
language for granted anymore, much as the text and insomnia itself reveal to us the
failure of simplistic definitions and associations, as words explode into multiple
possibilities and meanings. Inasmuch as language structures our experience of the
world, the modernist text reminds us that the world is infinitely complex and must
never be viewed from just one perspective. By becoming, largely through the use of
insomnia, an experience for readers, it emphasizes the fact that experience itself is
never singular and can be shared, asserting the importance of the ability to view the
world through someone else’s perspective, lest we risk relaxing too much into our
own and lulling ourselves out of awareness of the world around us.
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CONCLUSION

In 2004, the BBC premiered a reality show called Shattered. The premise of
the show was simple: expose people to severe sleep deprivation, have them compete
against each other to perform various tasks, and record the whole process. The
purpose of the show was to have contestants stay awake for just over a week, up to
180 hours (“Shattered” Channel 4), though some reports maintain that the contestants
were allowed up to two hours of sleep a day (“Shattered” UK Game Shows).
Throughout the week, contestants were eliminated based on their competence during
the various tasks they performed, including memory and coordination activities. The
winner of the show could earn up to £100,000, but for each instance in which the
individual fell asleep for more than ten seconds outside of break times, the prize was
reduced by £1,000 (the winner walked away with £97,000 in total) (“Shattered”
Channel 4). The show was not without its share of controversy, especially after one
contestant, a 21 year old woman, voluntarily withdrew from the show after consulting
with psychologists (“Channel 4”). The show ended with a “sleep off,” during which
the three final contestants were put to bed. The contestant who managed to remain
awake while in bed the longest, Clare Southern, won by keeping herself alert for
almost two hours longer than the other two finalists; she reportedly did so by
“[singing] to herself” and “playing blinking games” (Chapman).
A show such as this essentially inverts discursive presentations of insomnia
during the Modernist period. Where I have argued that insomnia is a form of
vigilance, this type of extended insomnia so exhausted participants as to make them
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unsure of themselves and their surroundings; the only vigilance here is that of the
cameras. Where I have looked at insomnia as a form of isolation and solitude, this
show exposes insomnia, putting it on view for the whole world. Where I have looked
at insomnia as a form of heightened awareness of both body and mind, this show
rendered its participants wakefully insentient. Where I have looked at insomnia as
productive of a different type of thought, this show rendered insomnia so intense as to
be thoughtless. And, where I have looked at insomnia as a form of resistance to
capitalist paradigms of activity and productivity, this show makes insomnia itself the
means of profit.
In my final chapter, I argued that Modernism needed insomnia, as a sort of
bastion of individuality in an increasingly rationalized and dehumanized world. It
represented, for the Modernists, a space and time unique to the afflicted individual,
affording him or her both time for contemplation and pursuit of individual interests
and reflections. It both exposed and resisted social and cultural expectations placed
on the individual. A show such as this effectively took that time and space away
from the insomniac, co-opting the time and space of insomnia for profit instead.
Insomnia is no longer something to be used by the individual, but to be used by those
seeking to profit. The title Shattered comes to represent this new type of insomniac,
robbed of individuality and agency, no longer solidified in character through
insomnia, but broken by it, dispersed like so many pixels on a TV screen. This new
insomniac no longer uses insomnia to resist exploitation and subjection, but instead
embraces both.
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Sleep researchers Steve Kroll-Smith and Valerie Gunter define sleep as “a
nonsocial somatic state” which leaves us “unaware of a world outside the body”
(346). “Sleepiness,” they argue, “is being colonized as a partial state of
consciousness requiring social and individual attention” (347). Paradoxically, a
condition that makes us “unaware” now requires us to be just that. Additionally, our
state of unawareness to the outside world becomes an issue to which the outside
world must be made aware. While they situate this colonization of sleepiness in
contemporary times, I would argue this project began much earlier, primarily in the
nineteenth century. As is typically the case with any form of “colonization,” some
will resist. Insomnia afforded the Modernists resistance to the colonization of sleep.
Insomnia, despite our best efforts to this day, can at best be managed, but certainly
not controlled. For the insomniac, there is no guarantee, no matter what measures are
taken, that a good night’s sleep will come. In an era of increasing normalization,
generalization, observation, and control, during which privacy and unregulated time
diminished as technology and science flourished, insomniacs shirked regulation and
discipline. Insomnia reminds modernist authors and their audiences of the dangers of
permitting oneself to lapse into comfortable unawareness of the world around them
and their role in shaping it.
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